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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to examine the deregulation of airline employment within Europe, 
by relating that change to the US experience. A historical/political economy approach 
is adopted which locates the process of deregulation within a context of changing 
product market conditions, bargaining power and regulatory influence. The regulated 
regime where labour conditions were protected is contrasted with one in which labour 
has come under pressure to concede premium terms and conditions. Analysis of 
labour costs and productivity assume that these terms and conditions will simply 
evaporate under the pressure of competition and privatisation. The thesis provides 
evidence that this may not be the case. It is argued that failure to examine employee 
concerns and perceptions underestimates employee responses, and overestimates the 
power of airline management, given the considerable bargaining power of key labour 
groups. Airline workers, especially those in large and successful, formerly state 
owned carriers, have expectations of wages and conditions based upon the regulated 
era. This regulatory overhang is examined in a detailed questionnaire of British 
Airways as a major European carrier, previously state owned, but now privatised. A 
number of models of labour market deregulation and case studies are introduced to 
analyse the nature and extent of these deep seated changes and their implications for 
labour, management and the state. 
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Introduction 
US and European Airline Deregulation and Employment: An Emerging 
Comparison 
In the summer of 1997, British Airways' (BA) cabin crew engaged in a short bitter 
strike against restructuring proposals (Blyton et al 1998). In the spring of that year, 
the airline recruited a temporary workforce and trained them in ground handling 
techniques at an air force base in Oxfordshire. (Ibid. ) This was part of a contingency 
plan to defeat similar strike action then being contemplated by ground staff. In July of 
the previous year, pilots at British Airways had forced management to back down on 
restructuring proposals with the threat of strike action. (Financial Times 3.7.1998). In 
September 1998 pilots at the US carrier Northwest struck and were locked out over a 
new pay contract. (Financial Times 7.9.1998). In Europe, Air France employees, who 
in the autumn of 1994 had blocked the runways of Orly airport in protest at job and 
wage cuts, continued to take industrial action. With the 1998 soccer World Cup about 
to take place in France, pilots at the state airline took industrial action against 
restructuring proposals. This was despite the presence of a new management regime 
and an acceptance of core restructuring proposals. (Gill 1998: 11. ) In the summer of 
1999 pilots at the low cost carrier Virgin Express launched strike action against 
attempts to relocate them from Belgium to Ireland. (Jones 1999: 8. ) In many other 
airlines, conflict and strife have been endemic. 
It would be easy to see these strikes and disputes as the growing pains of 
restructuring, and as a short-lived response to the deregulation of the airline industry. 
However the range of countries involved, and the fact that they are all at different 
stages of the deregulation process with differing product and labour market 
environments, suggests something deeper than knee-jerk union responses. 
This thesis analyses the process of restructuring which took place in the wake of 
deregulation. In doing so it looks beyond the fixation with costs and productivity, 
which has preoccupied the research effort in airline employment. This approach aims 
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to explain the nature of regulatory change, management strategy and labour response 
to airline restructuring. The thesis will locate these changes within a broader product, 
labour and regulatory environment, allowing us to understand why the pace and 
tempo of change varied within different airlines and in different national contexts. 
It is the central contention of this thesis that deregulation has fundamentally altered 
the product market, with competition, market entry and some renegotiation of the 
regulatory environment. Nevertheless, deregulation has taken much longer to alter the 
labour market. Traditionally airline jobs have been associated with higher pay and 
conditions than the rest of the economy, fostering a determination amongst airline 
workers to retain these premia even in a deregulated environment. This "regulatory 
overhang" which pertains across the industry, as this thesis will demonstrate, has 
proved difficult to undermine. This is not to say, however, that workers will be able to 
resist the onslaught on wages and conditions indefinitely, but rather the process will 
take time. For the full impact of deregulation on wages and employment in the airline 
industry to occur requires a fusion of regulatory and product market change; a process 
which, though already emerging, is a gradual one nonetheless. Product market and 
regulatory change push airlines onto a path of restructuring, giving rise to an 
increasingly competitive industry. The need to service different markets and routes 
and the need to compete in a wide range of segmented markets is promoting a 
globalised airline labour market. This globalised airline labour market though still in a 
putative stage, has led to a downward pressure on wages and conditions. 
The episodes of restructuring and conflict introduced in page one above provide a 
flavour of that process in microcosm. In each case management sought to introduce 
cost reductions in anticipation of an increasingly threatening competitive 
environment. At British Airways, for example, the carrier attempted to restructure the 
pay and conditions of cabin personnel. They tried to do this by reforming the internal 
cabin crew labour including the consolidation of overtime, allowances, a merit based 
promotion system and lower entry-level wages. ' But cabin crew employees resisted 
and members of the main cabin crew union either took strike action or, fearing 
management retaliation, reported sick. In the case of ground handling workers, 
British Airways: Flying Into the Future: Restructuring Policies for Cabin Crew November 1997 C, 
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management wanted a dramatically lower cost structure for the Heathrow operation, 
which has been characterised by high levels of overtime and low productivity. Again 
it wanted to restructure allowances and pay and introduce two tier wage rates. This 
time the members concerned were so fearful of the threat of outsourcing they 
accepted instead a long term pay freeze. Other ground handling workers accepted the 
pay restructuring and two tier wage rates. 
In the US case, pilots at Northwest, many of whom have conceded wage reductions of 
up to 30 per cent in the past five years, sought to restore their position, in a buoyant 
domestic market, whilst attempting to close the gap between established and new 
entrant workers. 2 (Northwest Airlines 5.9.1998. ) In France, pilots were trying to 
restore the two tier pay deals and wage freezes they conceded under less auspicious 
times, and using the massive public spectacle of the 1998 World Cup to do so. 
(Moxon 1998; 25. ) In the UK, nominally less regulated UK BA pilots have been able 
to resist restructuring and have even managed to recoup ground conceded in an earlier 
round of restructuring. In the case of Virgin Express, the Belgian pilots objected to the 
decision of the carrier to relocate them to Dublin in order to escape Belgium's high 
non-wage costs. 
The cases above demonstrate three principal issues about the effects of deregulation 
on employment. Firstly, the differing experience of pilots, cabin crew and ground 
workers provide evidence on the varied experience of different occupational groups 
during restructuring. Broadly, general workers have suffered and found their premium 
wages and conditions most under threat, whilst strong groups such as pilots have been 
relatively unscathed. Secondly, they indicate the extent to which restructuring is 
contested at all levels of the industry from national flag carriers to smaller low cost 
operators. However these superficial similarities mask clear variations in. response 
according to the country and labour regulation environment concerned. 
This is clear in the disputes we have already discussed. In all of these cases, workers 
were opposing in whole, or in part, the impact of deregulation on their terms and 
conditions. Yet all are are experiencing different stages of the process. In the UK, 
2 Northwest Airlines Web page 5.9.98 
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British Airways, which has been privatised since the late 1980s, is responding to new 
regulatory and product market environment of the 1990s to guarantee future survival 
in an increasingly competitive airline industry. In doing so it faces a workforce used 
to a particular set of wage and employment conditions, defined in the thesis of 
regulatory overhang. There is a similar picture in France, in the USA and in Belgium. 
Airline workers are facing an increasingly merciless drive to improve cost 
competitiveness. For reasons analysed in chapter I and subsequently, labour costs 
within the industry are the most readily variable aspect of that cost base. 
In order to understand and contextualise these issues, and to make sense of the 
emerging regulatory environment and labour's response to it, it is necessary not to 
analyse regulation and deregulation as binary opposites. Rather, it is necessary to see 
the process as a continuum, which can be understood in terms of its effect upon the 
labour market and the bargaining power and stance of labour and capital. Despite 
deregulation, workers, especially those in highly skilled industry specific categories 
such as pilots and mechanics, have maintained their bargaining threat given the 
disruptive capacity which they possess. Until the nature of the regulatory regime 
changes to such an extent that the balance of power is dramatically altered, then 
labour will continue to be effective in resisting restructuring. Nevertheless, the 
process by which this takes place is tortuous and complex. It is argued that a changing 
form of regulation in the shape of globalisation, in the form of major alliances, 
provides that background. Within these groupings, and with the aid of a tolerant 
regulatory structure at national, regional and supranational levels, airlines can, and do, 
develop the capacities to undermine the structure of labour market regulation and 
bargaining power which have existed since regulation. 
Outline of the Thesis Chapters 
In order to locate the approach of the thesis it is necessary to look at the nature of 
labour market regulation and the effects which changing regulatory regimes can have 
on labour. The first chapter looks at the Political Economy of Restructuring in 
Regulated and Privatised Industries in order to provide the backdrop to the rest of 
the study. The chapter also looks at how economic criticisms of regulation and state 
ownership (that it leads to rent seeking by powerful monopoly unions) have driven the 
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debate around employment restructuring. Yet there has been little attempt to move 
beyond these essentially theoretical analyses of the regulated labour market. This 
chapter discusses the theoretical approach to the labour market aspects of regulation 
and deregulation. The thesis then argues that in many cases the process of 
deregulation and privatisation becomes a process of labour market deregulation and 
the privatisation and commercialisation of employment relationships. Evidence from a 
number of industries is used to indicate the extent of this and its often negative effect 
when seen as the sole solution to the problems of restructuring industries. The thesis 
then argues that neglect of the industrial relations/institutional environment has meant 
studies which emphasise short-term wage and employment considerations have been 
to the fore. More institutionally grounded approaches, which emphasise the industrial 
relations aspects of deregulation and privatisation, are then utilised. It is proposed that 
by looking at the interconnection between product market, labour market and 
regulatory change, and considering both employer and labour strategy in the process 
we can come to a fuller understanding of the process of deregulation/privatisation and 
labour market change. The different stages of labour market regulation are discussed 
by reference to a number of industries. These models are respectively: the regulated 
control model, the competitive disengagement model, the labour market restructuring 
model and the global product market convergence model. Each model is illustrated by 
reference to a particular industry, and all four used to explain the process of regulation 
and deregulation within the airline industry. 
Chapter 2 outlines the methodological approach, introducing the combined political 
economy approach and the models of regulation and deregulation discussed above. 
The concept of the "regulatory overhang" is examined and a survey of BA used to 
explore it. The study also uses a case study approach and utilises industry statistics. In 
order to provide an overview of the regulatory process, and in order to locate the 
process of regulation and deregulation in a historical context, the third chapter looks 
at these issues. 
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The nature of change in deregulated and privatised industries cannot be understood 
without reference to the historical antecedents of regulation. Chapter 3 looks at this 
process of change by considering Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining in 
the US and UK Airline Industries: The Historical and Institutional Context. This 
strand of the thesis considers the evolution of product market and labour market 
regulation within both the US and UK. The US developed a structure of agency 
regulation, formalised a framework of labour legislation, and craft based collective 
bargaining. The development of a framework of industrial relations was premised 
upon the state's desire for stability in an industry that had been characterised by 
chronic downward directed competition, and labour unrest. (Capelli 1987: 137. ) The 
formation of the pilots' union, ALPA, represented the origin of major trade unionism 
within the industry. The state assisted labour in its battle to gain recognition, and then 
underpinned labour's bargaining power as with other labour groups in the New Deal 
legislation. With their unique bargaining power pilots were able to secure their 
objectives until the formation of an employers' pact neutralised their power. 
The UK industry was state owned and embodied a corporatist form of industrial 
relations often used to represent typical developments in regulation within Europe. 
This involves the nationalisation of the industry, and the development of corporatist 
forms of industrial relations. In the case of the UK industry, the protections afforded 
to labour were less clear cut, and pilots were offered the right to collective bargaining 
under legislation dating from the late 1930s. Full nationalisation provided a more 
systematic framework of industrial relations but constrained the power of pilots and 
other skilled groups, allowing the nationalised operators BEA and BOAC to control 
costs. The development of industrial relations and collective bargaining in both 
countries is examined using the regulated control model. In particular the US is 
identified as exhibiting characteristics of strong regulated control for reasons already 
discussed. The UK, on the other hand, with its weak formal levels of product and 
labour market regulation can be analysed as conforming to a pattern of weak 
regulated control. Even with nationalisation and nominal state control there was never 
a significant level of codified regulatory intervention as occurred in the US industry, 
and the implications of these differences are examined. 
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In chapter 4 the process of deregulation is examined by looking at pilots, as the 
occupational group who have benefited most from regulation, and yet retain potent 
bargaining power through their skill specificity and bargaining muscle. Such workers 
benefited from regulation as the regulated environment allowed increases in pay and 
conditions to be funded independent of the financial performance of the airlines 
concerned. (Capelli 1987: 139. ) This situation altered and in chapter 4 Pilots and 
Management Under Deregulation: The USA and Europe, we look at the effect of 
deregulation on pilots. For the USA we look at the effect on wages and bargaining 
power, including the nature of concession bargaining, and on the influence of pilots as 
a labour group with particular power and influence in the firm and the regulatory 
arena. For Europe, a similar analysis is undertaken and the process of deregulation is 
viewed in terms of its effect on the earnings, bargaining power and regulatory 
influence of pilots. We examine this period in terms of the competitive disengagement 
model to analyse the effect of restructuring on pilots in both the US and Europe. The 
impact of strategies such as regionalisation, franchising and the impact of low cost 
carriers are used to look at the European industry, and to introduce these issues for 
later chapters. 
Having set the scene by discussing the nature of regulation and the labour market, 
introduced the historical and institutional context and looked at the detailed fortunes 
of pilots as a barometer of the long-run effects of deregulation, we need to examine 
the process of how change is implemented and more importantly perceived by airline 
workers. One of the worldwide constants of airline restructuring is that airline 
workers expect superior terms and conditions as a result of working in the airline 
industry, and regardless of their skill and occupational level. Thus chapter 5 and 6 
bring the discussion into the deregulated period discussing how management strategy 
has changed to adapt to the new competitive environment of market entry, fierce 
competition from restructuring flag carriers and a general concentration on labour 
costs. 
As previous chapters argued, the importance of employee attitudes to restructuring 
and deregulation is crucial in terms of the existence of a 'regulatory overhang' of 
expectations of employment, wages and bargaining. This concept should be seen as 
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separate and distinct from the airline wage premium, which has been well noted 
particularly in the US industry (see Hendricks et al 1980). 
The 'regulatory overhang' describes the set of beliefs and expectations which airline 
workers have towards change in the deregulatory period, as influenced by the residual 
effect of the regulated era. Thus, whilst pilots might realise, and even accept, that the 
industry environment is threatening and competitive, they will seek to defend flight 
duty limitations which date from the regulated era, as these are seen as part of the 
'airline package'. and the benefits of working in a large scale regulated industry. 
Ground handling workers will resist market rates for their occupation, because they 
view themselves as airline workers, and have always received higher rates of pay than 
external workers. 
Given the existence of this set of beliefs, little work has been conducted on employee 
attitudes within the airline industry in regard to the deregulated environment. The 
overhang, however, changes through time and though workers initially resist 
restructuring on the basis of protecting gains obtained from regulation, the changing 
industry environment forces a re-evaluation. In a US study, Wever charted employee 
attitudes to take-over restructuring on the basis of an Employee Share Ownership 
Programme (ESOP). (1989: 163-185. ) Studies have largely concentrated on 
management strategy or the effects of changing regulation and product markets 
without addressing employee attitudes. The identification of a 'regulatory overhang' 
in the expectations of airline workers meant that it was necessary to test employee 
attitudes towards deregulatory change. This is especially significant against a 
backdrop of employment change and labour market deregulation which is threatening 
the premium terms and conditions enjoyed by airline workers. The attitudes and 
stance of both management and airline workers is crucial in making sense of the often 
complex process of deregulation and restructuring. 
Chapter 5, which is entitled Corporate Strategy and Employment Change in the 
Global Airline Industry, prepares the survey by discussing the nature of 
management strategy in an emerging global airline labour market. In particular the 
chapter points to the nature of BA's strategy since privatisation which has been 
identified by Blyton and Turnbull (after Storey) as one of 'dualism' (Blyton and 
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Tumbull 1998: 74) and where attempts to rationalise collective bargaining to reflect 
perceived business needs. The impact of global strategies, such as the formation of 
alliances and code sharing, is also discussed with the implications for BA workers. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the survey on employee attitudes. The survey 
considers issues such as regionalisation, franchising, the impact of low cost carriers, 
the creation of internal low cost subsidiaries and the extension of atypical work. 
Further questions examine employee attitudes towards outsourcing and policies of 
globalisation. These policies are addressed from the point of view of both the product 
and the labour market. Thus, attitudes towards issues such as state subsidy and 
alliances are examined in terms of their effect on BA, as is the perceived effect of 
these policies on employment. The chapter also looks at employee attitudes on the 
proposed abolition of collective bargaining, which is crucial given the obstacle which 
unionisation presents to management strategy. Undertaken at a major turning point in 
the airline's future, before both the major efficiency drive of the Business Efficiency 
Programme (BEP) and after the threatened pilots' strike of July 1996, the survey 
provides a rich and varied assessment of employee attitudes towards the deregulation 
of employment. The survey also provides an indication of the sort of employment and 
wage expectations which BA workers have. The survey provides a detailed 
assessment of the attitudes and perceptions of BA workers as they face a period of 
major change. 
Chapter 7 develops the issues introduced in the preceding two chapters by examining 
Labour Market Restructuring in the European Airline Industry. This extends and 
deepens the discussion in detail of the process of post deregulation adjustment within 
the European airline industry. The chapter utilises the labour market restructuring 
model introduced in chapter I to examine the perceived high cost/low productivity 
perception of the industry. 
Firstly the chapter examines the nature of wages and earnings within the European 
airline industry in order to explore the extent to which the perception of high costs has 
motivated both management and government. Secondly, we consider the comparative 
evidence on wages and productivity between the US and Europe, arguing that, though 
the gap has been closing, pressure for labour cost has not abated. Evidence suggests 
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that premium wages are still fairly high in the European airline industry and that 
workers enjoy a significant premium on workers outside the industry. This can be 
partly attributed to the highly skilled nature of many jobs, but the existence of this 
premium has led management o target the wages and conditions of airline workers. 
The chapter then details some of the strategies which are being pursued to erode those 
premium wages and conditions, building on earlier chapters. Such policies include the 
use of internal low cost carriers, the spread of outsourcing, expansion through 
franchising and regionalisation and increasing use of tiered pay structures. Given the 
power of organised labour within Europe, however, management attempts to 
restructure the wage/effort bargain within the industry have been met with industrial 
unrest. In many cases management strategy has been altered to take account of the 
continuing institutional power that labour enjoys. It is argued that although 
restructuring has taken place, labour has been able to resist in many cases, although 
the impact of industrial relations institutions has not been as important as many 
analysts imagined. In the longer term, restructuring can only be achieved when 
regulatory change allows management to obtain global scope and thereby to reduce 
labour costs. 
Whilst chapter 7 indicated the extent to which restructuring has been taking place, it 
also demonstrated that the process is a difficult and conflict ridden one. In chapter 8 
we look at the broad sweep of change from Regulated Control Towards Global 
Product Market Convergence. Subtitled The Emerging Regulatory Framework 
and the Airline Labour Market, the chapter focuses on how change in the 
regulatory environment has facilitated labour restructuring. The environment has 
fundamentally altered from systems, which had the effect of upholding and protecting 
the interests of organised labour, to one which vests control in the hands of major 
airline alliances. This has allowed the major airlines to control the industry and to 
procure reduced costs, whilst avoiding curbs on concentration and monopoly. 
Whilst regulators have allowed major airlines to pursue growth through consolidation 
and 'virtual merger' they have failed to protect labour conditions in the US and are 
seeking to dismantle them within Europe. The effect of the emerging regulatory 
framework is to allow operators to reap economies of size and scope, and arguably 
scale, whilst failing in most cases to guarantee market access, for example, by re- 
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allocating slots in mergers and alliances to a sufficient degree. In the USA this is 
characterised by the failure of government to address the effects of deregulation on 
jobs as originally provided for under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. In 
addition, the toleration of systemic bankruptcy within the industry has encouraged 
operators to drive down costs in the face of the pricing strategies of bankrupt carriers. 
This phenomenon has also initiated a wave of concession bargaining which, though 
leading to large scale reduction in the wages of pilots and others over the short terrn, 
has produced instability as workers seek to claw-back lost ground. At the same time 
authorities are pursuing at national, regional and supranational levels, an agenda of 
supply side labour market reforms, which favour large operators, often accepting the 
harmonisation arguments of operators. 
Thus regulators have allowed cross border crewing, attempts to harmonise the hours 
of flight deck staff around less restrictive criteria, and the deregulation of local ground 
handling services, all benefiting capital within the industry. Increasingly these trends 
are connecting at a global level, as the industry restructures along the lines of large- 
scale regional carriers and massive global alliances. 
The thesis then seeks to indicate the likely nature of employment deregulation within 
the context of the changing global framework of regulation. A reassessment of the 
product, labour and regulatory environment is undertaken using a model of global 
product market convergence, to examine how common global product market 
pressures combine to alter the labour market. 
Whilst these processes are taking place labour has not remained quiescent. 
Nevertheless these new developments present considerable challenges to organised 
labour within the industry. The chapter thus utilises a major survey of ITF unions, 
involving the author, to examine the position of trade unions towards globalisation 
and labour flexibility. (Blyton et al 1998a. ) Finally the emergence of new forms of 
trade union collaboration and co-operation and the possibility of new forms of cross- 
national bargaining are detailed, demonstrating both opportunities and threats inherent 
within the emerging regulatory framework. 
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Overall, therefore, the thesis seeks to provide a study of the detailed effects of labour 
market change within the regulated and deregulated airline industry, with a special 
focus on the comparative aspects of that process and on the emerging pattern of 
regulation evident within the deregulated period. This will contribute to our 
understanding of the nature of employment regulation and deregulation, its specific 
labour market impacts and the response of both management and labour. 
16 
I 
The Political Economy of Labour Restructuring 
and Industrial Relations in Regulated 
Industries, 
1.1 Deregulation and The Labour Market: An Introduction 
This chapter addresses the literature on the labour market effects of deregulation 
focusing not just on wages and employment but on wider issues of market structure, 
regulatory regime and industrial relations. This approach will provide a broader 
understanding of labour market deregulation than has hitherto been available. The 
treatment provides a more grounded understanding of employment trends than that 
provided by dominant models of deregulation and employment. The purpose of the 
chapter is to evaluate and examine the extent of labour market deregulation. In order 
to do so we need to firstly 'unpack' some of the broad approaches which have been 
deployed to date, most notably the union monopoly/rent sharing view and its 
supporting theories. Secondly, we will examine some of the empirical and theoretical 
evidence on the employment affects of deregulation. Thirdly, given the basis within 
this literature towards assessing outcomes, we will develop a series of models of the 
process of labour market deregulation. Using case studies these models will allow us 
to view the interconnections between product market, regulatory and labour market 
change, attending deregulation. Having introduced these models we will then examine 
the industrial relations dimension of labour market deregulation. Economists have 
tended to problematise labour in terms of its productive efficiency, reasoning that 
changing the regulatory regime and removing rigidities will automatically lead to 
greater labour efficiency and productivity. Industrial relations scholars have studied 
the institutional interplay between capital and labour in privatised and regulated 
industries. It is the task of this chapter to unite these two perspectives and to assess 
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the wide-ranging effects of labour market deregulation. The first task is to map the 
context of deregulation and the dominant models and approaches used to examine its 
labour market impacts. 
1.1.1 Context: The Push Towards Deregulation and Privatisation. 
The transport economist, Kenneth Button, has described the period since the late 
1970s as the "Age of Regulatory Reform", when an almost total belief in the role of 
the state, either through ownership or regulation, was replaced by a corresponding 
faith in market solutions. This was particularly so within the transport and the utilities 
sector. (Button 1988: 13. ) Growing global convergence of product markets and 
regulatory policy, mean that even countries, which choose not to deregulate, face a 
deregulated external environment. These product market and regulatory changes feed 
through into the labour market. Whilst a great deal of research and policy analysis has 
been undertaken into the market structure and consumer choice aspects of 
deregulation, less attention has been paid to the labour market dimension. Although 
there is a great deal of solid research on labour costs and productivity within the 
privatised and deregulated industries there has been little work so far on the 
interconnections between regulatory change, product market change and labour 
market change. 3 In addition little attention is paid to the manner in which regulatory 
non-intervention, as opposed to intervention, has come to define the current era. The 
post-deregulation dynamics have meant that as the state withdraws, a number of 
labour market and employment effects become manifest. In this chapter, such 
processes are analysed within a variety of industries and the evidence is then applied 
to the airline industry. The first task is to review some key theoretical perspectives on 
the relationship between regulatory and labour market change. 
1.1.2. Regulation and the Labour Market: A Theoretical Overview 
Early work on the possible employment effects of privatisation and deregulation was 
initiated by 'new right' economists. Their critique flowed from a number of key 
observations about the functioning of regulated and state controlled industries. Under 
Belzer (1993) provides an example of such an approach in his analysis of the US trucking industry. 
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regulation, it was argued, labour protected its position with arcane work rules and 
sought inflationary wage increases paid for in higher consumer fares. Managers had 
little or no incentive to alter the situation as all operators in a regulated market were 
protected from bankruptcy and either isolated from, or subject to, lax shareholder 
pressure. Privatisation or, in the case of the USA, deregulation, would break this 
cycle of rent-seeking and featherbedding and force managers to control costs. A 
tvirtuous circle' of improved cost control, better labour relations and enhanced work 
rules would then ensue, resulting in lower fares. Looking at the US airline industry 
and having discussed the ease with which costs could be passed-on to consumers 
Bailey et al encapsulated the deregulationists' main concern about the operation of the 
regulated labour market: 
'Workers' negotiating leverage was also augmented by several other 
characteristics of the airline industry. First airlines as a service industry cannot 
store output, so sales lost during strikes are lost forever. Secondly the 
prevalence of highly skilled workers with a corresponding problem of 
substitutability make it difficult for management to confront powerful organised 
labour. In addition regulation created a small number of stable, easily 
identifiable carriers for unions to organise. ' (Bailey et al: 1984: 97. ) 
Bailey et al's criticisms of labour management within the regulated airline industry 
can be applied to most regulated and state controlled sectors, consequently they and 
other economists viewed labour market reform as a crucial gain from deregulation. 
According to these writers deregulation produced several positive outcomes in terms 
labour market efficiency. First came productivity improvements in labour and 
delivery systems, second, increased innovation in price-service options, third, the 
adjustment of prices towards incremental costs and fourth an end to cross subsidy. 
(1984: 54. ) Just how privatisation and deregulation affects labour is best demonstrated 
by the rent-sharing approach, which identifies labour's ability to command a large 
share of regulated revenues through unionisation as the source of its superior terms 
and conditions. These issues are explained in relation to a number of seminal studies, 
all emanating from the USA, which nevertheless have informed policy makers in the 
UK and now Europe. 
The dominant neo classical tradition of economic analysis tends to see regulation as 
the guarantor of union monopoly power. For writers in this tradition the labour market 
19 
is characterised by the power of union monopoly, underpinned by the strict control of 
market entry and pricing. (Booth 1994: chapter 3. ) Using the union monopoly 
framework, Posner (1984: 990) views control of entry, demarcation and the use of 
seniority as the key distortions which arise from union control. He argues that the US 
legal framework "is best understood as a device for facilitating, though not to the 
maximum possible extent, the cartelization of the labour supply by unions. " (Ibid. ) A 
further dimension of the union monopoly model is the notion of union members as 
privileged incumbents of jobs within regulated sectors. The monopoly union/rent 
sharing theory also models the behaviour of managers. Without the rigour and 
discipline of competition, managers have little incentive to resist union demands and 
are, in any case, hampered by union control. This control is institutionalised through 
systems of state directed industrial relations and collective bargaining. These 
mechanisms are implied to set the limits of managerial intervention. (Ibid. ) 
Exercised by the prevalence of regulated enterprise throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
American scholars have developed detailed empirical studies of the effect of 
regulation and later deregulation. The dominant paradigm has been that of rent- 
sharing. Unions, it is argued, are able to capture a disproportionate share of the higher 
prices consumers pay for goods produced within regulated sectors. 4 
The trucking industry was the focus of many of these studies, as it provided a simple 
test of a strong and powerful union, the Teamsters, and a regulated product market 
through the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Earlier, Moore (1978: 327-343) 
investigated the effects of trucking regulation on the various parties and found 
evidence of significant bargaining power for the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (IBT), the drivers union. Hirsch and MacPherson (1997) viewed the 
4 One major detailed study of labour earnings under regulation found little evidence of a systematic 
regulatory effect upon earnings (I lendricks 1977) Indeed earlier research into earninas within electrical 00 
utilities had shown that "wages were lower than in unregulated industries with the same market 
structure" (ibid. ). Hendrick's research qualifies any regulated-industry-higher earnings hypotheses, 0 
although it could be argued that rent seeking in three key industries is evidence that the phenomenon 0 C, does exist. Hendricks questioned the accepted notion that regulated industries would automatically 
push wage increases onto consumers. His research found support for the idea that rent sharing of the 
variety described might be offset by a desire of union members for employment security and stability. 
In other words unions and their members rrdght not act to secure higher wages at all times but 
sometimes prioritised job security prizing the greater quality of regulated jobs. Regulated firms might 
also, he argued, pay premium rates to obtain better quality labour. Above all Hendricks emphasised the 
importance of the "type of regulation" in any analysis of labour market effects. (Hendricks 1977: 249) C, 
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truckers union as the major beneficiary of regulation in terms of cosy working 
agreements, high wages, and a variety of other benefits. Rose's empirical analysis of 
'rent-sharing' in the US trucking industry formed a seminal critique of union 
behaviour under regulation. Using a longitudinal study she argued: 
'Understanding rent sharing is essential to analysing government 
regulation. Regulatory protection can create rents over which workers 
and firms negotiate. Regulatory profit constraints may distort a firm's 
labour input decision or alter bargaining power vis a vis unions: 
regulatory barriers to entry may enhance union power and the political 
nature of regulatory agencies can expand the scope of potential games 
between firms and workers. ' (Rose 1987: 1147. ) 
Rose analysed union contracts in both the regulated and deregulated periods to test 
her prediction that rents would fall in the absence of regulation. As evidence of rents, 
she measured union wage premia in both periods. Her data identified a union 
premium of 50 per cent, close to previous estimates. In addition, she compared the 
trucking premium with that for other groups of American workers. (Rose 1987 : 1165. )
She found that even the highest premia in general industry were exceeded by the 
trucking premium by about one third. (Ibid: 1165. ) Rose found that the premium fell 
considerably after the introduction of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 which 
'deregulated' the industry. In addition, she estimated an overall figure for regulated 
rents and found that these were allocated disproportionately in favour of labour. (Rose 
1987: 1174. ) In her calculations the IBT captured 75 per cent of regulatory rents, a 
sum of around $1.2 billion. (Rose 1987: 1175. ) In the same year, Hirsch looked in 
detail at the effect of deregulation on unionisation and earnings. He concluded that 
deregulation led to a significant decline in wages for unionised employees. (1987: 3 1. ) 
The rent sharing approach therefore identified a significant 'regulated premium' for 
unionised workers in the USA. Has this experience been replicated within the UK? 
1.1.3 Privatisation and Labour Market Restnicturing in the UK 
The US findings on deregulation and earnings were confirmed in the later context of 
UK privatisation and deregulation. Haskel and Sysmanski (1993: 161) looked at the 
fortunes of labour in the UK's deregulated and privatised industries. In their 1993 
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study, which spanned 16 years of state control and privatisation, these writers 
identified significant labour market impacts. The change to more commercial 
objectives led to a fall in employment. However, wages tended to be affected only if 
the firm lost market power. Arguably, these studies underestimated the effect on 
employment and wages. (Martin and Parker 1997: 85. ) In a later study Martin and 
Parker (1997) found that the share of business income going to wages fell 
considerably in most UK privatised industries, implying the pre-existence of rents. 
For example, whilst the proportion of income allocated to wages at British Gas was 
20 per cent in the nationalisation period this fell to 18 per cent by 1996. (Martin and 
Parker 1997 Table 8.2. ) At British Telecom, the figure fell from 44 % in 1977 to 
fewer than 30 per cent in 1995. 
In a recent study Haskel and Sanchis identified the erratic nature of earnings within 
privatised industries. Wages, they found, rose or fell according to the product market 
position, the level of monopoly power and the influence of trade unions. (Haskel and 
Sanchis 1995: 301. ) The authors' explanation of rising wages is based on a simplified 
and stylised model of the labour market. They account for rising wages post 
privatisation in terms of increased effort. The firm is assumed to pay more for greater 
effort. (Ibid: 302. ) However, privatisation and deregulation may have a considerably 
deeper affect on organised labour than is suggested in this type of literature. 
The overall employment picture is also important. Whilst Haskel and Sysmanski and 
earlier studies identified a fall in employment attending UK privatisation, Martin and 
Parker present an updated longer-term picture, where the trend becomes more 
discernible. 
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There are clearly dramatic declines in employment within the telecom, gas and steel 
industries, though employment is stable in civil aviation. (See figure 1.1 I 
Figure 1.1 Ernployment Trends in UK Privatised Enterprise 
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Nevertheless, the general picture is one of employment decline, pointing at least to 
huge increases in efficiency and utilisation, as well as the impact of new technologies. 
Whilst the UK literature provides rigorous measures of wage and productivity change, 
it fails to capture the institutional and organisational effects of such changes. 
Arguably these are the most important considerations, and a lack of focus upon these 
issues can lead to a crude form of analysis. We might assume that wages fall for 
example, because of a restoration of management power and the dissolution of a 
union monopoly, when in fact the fall may be a tactical adaptation by either unions or 
management to product market change. In addition, whilst we have a great deal of L- 
information about the labour market outcomes of deregulation, we have little 
systematic understanding of' the process. Arguably, these issues can be more clearly 
understood by using an approach which recognises the interconnections between 
product, labour market and regulatory change. This aspect is addressed in the next 
section. 
23 
Source: Generated frorn Martin and Parker Chapter 8 
1.2 Regulatory Change and Labour Market Effect: A Re-Assessment 
1.2.1 Re-conceptualising Labour Market Deregulation 
Arguably an understanding of the processes and dynamics of change is crucial to our 
understanding of how deregulation and market reform affect employment. It is 
important to look at the nature of bargaining and the interaction between the labour, 
product and regulatory environments. A change in the emphasis of regulatory policy 
can have a profound effect upon employment within a given industry. MacDonald and 
Cavaluzzo for example (1996: 79) identified ma or impacts upon labour within the US 
railroad industry, arising from pricing adjustments under the Staggers Act of 1980. 
Shippers responded to the price reform by concentrating production within certain 
terminals and certain types of traffic, all reducing labour demand. (MacDonald and 
Cavaluzzo 1996: 80. ) The writers believe that an increase in profits could be ascribed 
to increasing work intensification. Wages did not fall, they concluded, but 
productivity rose markedly. (Ibid. ) This was despite the existence of job protection 
legislation implicit within the legislation. Subtle adjustments in pricing and changes in 
the regulatory stance, that at face value to have little to do with the labour market, can 
have wide ranging effects. 
In order to understand the impact of deregulation and market reform upon the labour 
market it is necessary to conceptualise precisely how varying types of regulatory 
environment act to alter labour market dynamics. In order to build that understanding 
a number of models are used to analyse the deregulation of the labour market. These 
are then supported by a case study of that type of labour market deregulation to 
enhance understanding. Devised in the course of the study, the models build upon 
existing research on the employment consequences of deregulation. They help to 
categorise the interconnections between the regulatory product and labour market 
environment, within privatised and deregulated industries. The models are not 
intended to be mutually exclusive and there are elements of each within the other, but 
they do help to organise our thinking in this complex area. Broadly the models used 
are the competitive disengagement model, the regulated control model, the labour 
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market reform model and the product market convergence model. Whilst there 
are obvious similarities and overlap between the models they do have distinct 
characteristics which can help us understand the process of labour market 
deregulation. The first model to be discussed is the competitive disengagement model. 
1.2.2. The Competitive Disengagement Model: UK Bits Privatisation 
In cases of competitive disengagement the state withdraws in order to promote a 
competitive environment unburdening itself of the regulatory oversight and financial 
support it has previously allowed. This effect is most likely in industries such as US 
trucking, domestic airlines, inter city buses and UK buses and ports. Here short run 
competition competes away the excess profits of the regulated era and immediately 
threatens the premium wages conditions and work rules of labour. In the competitive 
disengagement model labour market effects become immediate as the product market 
becomes highly contested. In some cases competitive disengagement is undertaken 
with the precise aim of labour market reform in mind. 
The labour market is affected in several ways. Firstly, the bargaining power of labour 
is reduced by competitive entry as a non-union sector challenges the unionised labour 
market. Secondly, the withdrawal of government control marginalises collective 
bargaining and industrial action. Management is forced to confront costs and more 
importantly to resist labour demands, as postulated in the public choice and X- 
inefficiency arguments. Thirdly, after the initial 'competitive frenzy' and with the 
process of merger and concentration, there is interaction between the product market 
and the labour market encouraging innovation within labour management strategies. 
These can range from wage restructuring and bargaining reforrn in order to serve 
differentiated markets, to the outsourcing of key areas in order to procure lower costs. 
Management might develop strategies based on differentiated quality production 
(DQP) as for example Federal Express in the US trucking industry and American and 
Delta within the airline industry. All have employed high-wage/high-performance 
models of labour management, with an emphasis on organisational culture and 
Human Resource approaches to labour management. Alternatively management might 
seek to pursue a low costflexible production (LFP) strategy where cost containment, 
especially in areas of low margin high volume business, is emphasised. (See chapters 
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5 and 6. ) The strategies can of course be differentiated within firms, with the 
employment of both DQP and UP strategies according to the product market 
environment. (See Porter 1990. ) The deregulation of the product market therefore 
drives the deregulation of the labour market, whether towards cost cutting and cost 
containment, or towards service improvement and the development of quality based 
policies. Each approach has specific effects on the wages and conditions of labour 
within the industry. 
The deregulation of the bus and coach industry in Britain from 1980 provides a clear 
example of the competitive disengagement model of labour market deregulation. 
Deregulation was advanced as offering greater price and route competition in an 
industry beset by managed decline. Government advanced the idea that deregulation 
should help halt the long-term structural decline of the bus industry: 
New measures are urgently needed to break out of the cycle of rising costs, 
rising fares, reducing services so that public transport can win a bigger share of 
the expanding market. Competition provides the opportunity for lower fares, 
new services, and more passengers. ' (Dept of Transport Buses White Paper 
1985 quoted in Bannister 1997: Ibid. ) 
Barriers to entry were relaxed, the role of the traffic commissioner in overseeing the 
fare and route structure was bypassed, and as predicted fierce competition ensued. 
New entrants flooded in and incumbents sought to protect and enhance their position. 
Savage (1985: 58) described in an earlier study of the deregulation of long-distance 
coach services the effect of that initial phase of competition upon labour. Using 
Liebenstein's X-ineffliciency framework, he describes how competitive pressure 
provided incentives to reduce costs. Managers tighten up on scheduling, reduce slack 
time, and lengthen the productive hours of work. Alternatively, the benefits of 
increased competition were obtained through the replacement of a high cost operator 
by a lower cost operation. (Savage 1985: 59. ) In this way, the cost nature of the pre- 
deregulation operation and its attendant institutions is exposed. 
The cumulative effect on the workforce arising from bus deregulation has been 
profound. Wages were reduced, hours lengthened and discretionary wage elements 
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such as overtime and shift bonus consolidated into basic rates. In addition there has 
been widespread pay restructuring. Firms created lower wage rates for new entrants, 
often using enhanced redundancy payments to buy out the higher rate 'insiders. In 
addition, wage settlements have often involved lump sum payments rather than 
percentage rate increases, eroding the real value of earnings and further reducing 
costs. Forrester (1993) indicates the nature of such policies at East Midland Motor 
Services where: 
The wage structure prior to 1987 was detailed in the national 
agreements covering many other ex NBC (National Bus Company) 
subsidiaries. Later in the year hourly rates of pay were consolidated 
into a single rate, and in 1989 a separate lower rate of pay was 
introduced for recently recruited minibus employees. All subsequent 
new recruits were to start as minibus drivers. ' (Forrester 1993: 225. ) 
Most operators chose to increase utilisation rather than to reduce wages. Considering 
the evidence for productivity improvements in the post-deregulation coach industry, 
Forrester (1993: 226) identified an increase in the proportion of driving time to total 
hours of some 9 per cent, a considerable increase which involved the introduction of 
unpaid meal breaks and the introduction of split shifts. The Transport and General 
Workers Union (TGWU), the main bus workers' union, anticipated the sacrifice in 
basic terms and conditions which would arise from deregulation. Glaister's findings 
on the cost difference between a regulated and deregulated industry identified a 
differential of one third between the labour costs of a large double deck bus under the 
regulated and deregulated system. (1986: 243 table 15. ) Deregulation brought a 
significant reduction in labour costs. Costs were mainly productivity improvements 
(the elimination of X-inefficiency) and then, as the industry grew more 'competitive' 
and wage costs became more salient, through reductions in wages and conditions. 
In some ways the post deregulation dynamics of competition have benefited labour. 
Concentration for example around four major operators has led to a stabilisation in 
wages and conditions. There has been a proliferation in employee shareholding within 
privatised operators, although often these in return for concessions. (See chapter 4 for 
airline industry examples. ) Bus workers have obtained significant capital gains from 
these developments. (Bannister 1997: 43. ) The bus industry case indicates that after 
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an initial bout of competition, which promoted a concentration on labour costs, the 
industry has settled into a pattern of zonal oligopoly with operators such as 
Stagecoach, Firstbus and Arriva promoting investment and some forms of 
organisational innovation. Nevertheless labour costs remain crucial in the competitive 
strategies of bus operators. Whilst competitive disengagement in the bus industry 
forced operators to compete on efficiency and labour costs in response to 
'spontaneous' competitive pressures, in the UK utilities government engineered a 
model of regulation, which had similar effects. For similar reasons labour costs also 
become paramount within the UK utilities where labour market effects can be 
assessed through the regulated control model discussed below. 
1.2.3 The Regulated Control Model: The UK Utilities. 
The regulated control tnodel applies to industries or sectors which are nominally 
deregulated but where potential market power and monopoly force government to 
regulate and control the industry. The regulated control model often occurs where 
there is no real prospect of competition in the short run and where any future 
competition has to be based upon strict regulation. The regulated control model is 
most evident within the US railroad and energy sector, UK utilities and UK railways. 
By varying means, from limiting rates of return, capping profits, holding down prices 
and using tenders and auctions, government asserts control over the industry. The 
regulated control model allows the undertaking to receive private investment and to 
trade its shares. Managerial control is enhanced and executive rewards linked via 
share options and performance bonuses. Though government manages the 
environment and full commercial freedom is curtailed, the incentive to organisational 
change and reform is restored. The best examples of these types of labour market 
regulation use the price-capping method whereby consumer prices are held down by 
regulatory intervention, promoting a concentration on input costs. (Jackson and Price 
1994: 14. ) Predictably, since labour costs are among the most variable of input costs, 
this promotes a clear incentive towards labour cost savings. 
The importance of the regulated control model to the labour market is clear from the 
privatisation and subsequent regulation of the UK utilities. (Yarrow 1994: 71. ) 
Consumer prices are held at a level below the retail price level prescribed by the 
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regulator. The method, known generally as RPI-X, tightly controls the prices which 
can be set by these private monopolies. Constrained in the price setting, the utilities 
can only profit by increasing internal efficiency. The focus of efficiency measures 
tends to be labour costs as these are usually the most malleable of costs. In most 
utility privatisations, there have been both massive job losses and increased work 
intensification for those remaining. O'Connell Davidson's analysis of the privatised 
UK water industry reasons: 
'Water companies now have a strong incentive to cut costs and improve 
labour productivity, in order to avoid being penalised when the "K" 
setting is viewed. This pressure was one of the factors that spurred 
management to make the changes to employment relations and work 
organisation. '(O'Connell-Davidson 1994: 40. ) 
In another study Ogden identified the effect of privatisation on bargaining, confirming 
to an extent the public choice view of managerial behaviour .5 (Ogden 1993: 44-58. ) 
As a consequence of privatisation the industry was segmented into a patchwork of 
local water and sewerage monopolies. Predictably national level bargaining 
disappeared and managerial prerogative was unleashed. A flavour of management's 
restored vigour is given in the following comment from a senior manager at Thames 
Water on the implications of the collapse of national bargaining. 
"Managers are given greater control over their own affairs and their 
responsibility for people is more clearly established. If you believe that 
management is essentially about the motivation and organisation of people. In 
those circumstances it is difficult to justify the delegation of pay and 
employment conditions to an outside body. " (Ibid. ) 
The effects of price cap regulation are perhaps most apparent in the 
telecommunications industry. Denied the path of price increases, British Telecom has 
focused on a strategy of sustained cost reduction. A huge technological shift in the 
industry as it converts from analogue to digital technology, and diversifies into areas 
such as mobile telecommunications, direct business to business communications, and 
computer networks, has allowed the company to off load workers whilst increasing 
productivity. (Bolton 1994: 1. ) Some 40-50,000 jobs have been shed in the UK since 
5 Public Choice views of management slack and bureaucratic satisficing are often an adjunct of the 
monopoly/rent sharing view of unions. 
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privatisation, for example, at a time when the volume of business has increased. 
Whilst within the competitive disengagement model and the regulated control model 
the labour market effect of deregulation is implicit, that is, the pressures of product 
market and regulatory change lead to an effect on the labour market. In other 
circumstances the labour market becomes the prime target of deregulation. Often a 
perceived unholy trinity of managerial slack, inefficiency and union monopoly mean 
that labour market deregulation is identified as the only solution to industry problems. 
Thus a labour market restnicturing approach is adopted which prioritises labour 
market reform. This aspect of labour market deregulation is discussed below. 
1.2.4. The Labour Market Restnicturing Model: UK Port Transport 
The labour market restnicturing model of deregulation is explicitly concerned with 
the deregulation of a regulated labour market, rather than with any wider objective of 
'allocative' efficiency. 6 Normally analysis of the labour market within a particular 
industry indicates a strong union monopoly, high levels of rent sharing and X- 
inefficiency. The deregulation of this labour market is thus expected to deliver the 
principal benefits'. In other words the 'technical efficiency' motive is explicit over the 
'allocative' benefits. Examples include the deregulation of the US trucking industry 
and the UK port transport sector. In both industries the union monopoly, underpinned 
by respectively product market and explicit labour market regulation, boosted the 
power of the main unions. The UK ports industry is a prime example of explicit 
labour market deregulation, however, the tendency of policy makers to view the 
labour market as the central problem can have adverse consequences as the case 
below indicates. 
Privatisation and deregulation can often be seen as a way of restructuring labour 
markets viewed as 'inefficient' and 'corrupt. This point is addressed by Turnbull in 
60 We make the distinction here between allocative efficiency (AE) (greater competition and pricing 
options, lower prices, better services etc. and technical efficiency, (TE) greater efficiency from factor 
inputs within the firm/ industry/sector. The two can be self-reinforcing with greater TE allowing 
greater competition and lower prices, as in US trucking. In some cases however there is reduced 
allocative efficiency as in the case of the UK bus industry, and the docks industry, while TE is 
improved. In effect it could be argued that this simply means rents are taken from labour and given to 
the firm, without any redistribution to consumers in the form of lower fares, greater competition or 
better services. (in the case of buses), or to the overall performance (In the case of UK ports. ) 
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his study of the economic impact of ports restructuring in the aftermath of the 
abolition of the United Kingdom Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) in 1989. Turnbull 
(1991: 17-35. ) The 'scheme'. as the NDLS became known, reformed the casualised 
basis of port work by offering registered dockers a monopoly over wharfside work. 
(Ibid. ) The NDLS operated as a union monopoly situation, though there was a 
'competing' labour force in the 'non scheme'ports. However, as Turnbull argues, the 
abolition of the scheme was based on an unrealistic and almost theoretical view that 
7 non-scheme ports operated as non-union environments. Deregulationist views of the 
labour market based on neo classical assumptions of monopoly union behaviour 
drove the policy of both government and employers. (Turnbull et al 1992: 3. ) Labour 
was characterised as the source of inefficiency with little reference made to issues 
such as under-investment and fragmentation in the UK industry. Structural factors, 
such as the impact of changing trade patterns on port networks, were neglected or 
ignored. 
As Turnbull (1991: 25) argues the neo classical view of the labour market encourages 
the belief that industrial relations can only be reformed by climactic change. The 
labour market is viewed as the sole problem and deregulation in creating incentives 
and discipline for both management and workers is seen as essential to that process. 
The activities of trade unions and of workers and collective action is often viewed as 
malevolent with labour groups often characterised as being pathologically committed 
to maintaining demarcations and restrictive practices. One of the problems, Turnbull 
argues, is the simplified use of labour market models. Used with care and 
qualification these can elucidate complex employment relationships both theoretically 
and empirically, but in the hands of some policy makers and academics these models 
can become purely ideological. 
According to Turnbull the simplicity of assumptions involved in labour market policy 
debates can often lead to perverse outcomes. The UK now has a relatively inefficient 
port transport sector and because of the limited scale of port capacity is unable to 
7 This assumption was based on the Monopoly Union wage Model of employment. However the actual 
power of Dockers related not to their institutional position within the labour market but to the nature of 
the labour process and work organisation. As Turnbull explains non-scheme ports where characterised 
by the same working methods, restrictive practices and personnel problems as Scheme ports. (Turnbull 
1991: 22) 
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attract the deep sea traffic which has been largely captured by the rival Hanseatic 
ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp and Bremen. (Ibid: 27. ) Continued labour 
unrest as witnessed in the recent Liverpool dock strike (Saundry and Turnbull 1997: 
275-289) has been a feature of this casualised labour market environment. 
Casualisation and the destruction of premium terms and conditions is of course a 
feature of other industries, it fits exactly with the creation of a non union sector to 
challenge perceived union monopoly situations, and with the incentive on 
management to reduce costs. In the case of the ports industry, reform has taken place 
sporadically across various countries often under the pressures for structural 
adjustment, (see Turnbull and Wass 1996). In the UK, USA and Australia port labour 
has been comprehensively deregulated and its fortunes can be contrasted with other 
nations where reform took place within a bigh road' strategy of increased training, 
flexibility and productivity. Thus there has been a clear divergence in the port 
transport sector usually reflecting national industrial relations systems and constraints. 
For example in a comparative study of the UK and Spain, Saundry and Turnbull 
(1999: 271-294) point out that in Spain the tendency towards casualisation has been 
mitigated by comprehensive training and job protection. They argue that: 
Through a contextualized comparison of labour regulation in both countries, it 
is possible to demonstrate that an institutionally saturated and politically 
bargained system of production and employment is compatible with, if not a 
necessary condition for, competitive performance in the international port 
transport industry. ' (Saundry and Turnbull 1999: 271-294. ) 
Similar developments are seen in the Netherlands and Japan. In other industries the 
pressures for convergence are activated by a deep-seated reform of the regulatory and 
product market environment. These operate in tandem with common international 
cost structures, common technology, a similar customer base and infrastructure to 
promote a global convergence on re-regulation. Within such an environment labour 
costs become paramount and though changes are refracted through the lens of national 
industrial relations systems, there is a pressure for global convergence on the labour 
market. This final example can be defined as the global product tnarket convergence 
model and is discussed below. 
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1.2.5 The Global Convergence Model: The Airline Industry 
Within certain industries deregulation of the product market acts because of the 
globally integrated nature of the industry to promote global deregulation within the 
labour market. Key examples are the global shipping industry where the deregulation 
of crewing has led to a convergence on low cost 'flag of convenience' crewing (see 
Lane 1997), and the global airline industry where deregulation, privatisation and 
liberalisation have rendered labour the most malleable and alterable component in the 
cost structure. Thus global pressures towards convergence affect the labour market. 
The developing global airline industry offers an example of this global product 
market convergence model of labour market deregulation. The airline industry has 
been characterised to a large extent by growth, with expansion well above that of the 
growth in GDP. The story for much of the industry's existence has been of vigorous 
growth and expansion. As Hanlon argues disregarding the exaggerated impact of the 
low growth base of World War Two passenger air transport has grown by an 
annualised average of 9 per cent since 1960. The total output of the industry measured 
in average tonne kilometres grew by a factor of around 20 between 1960 and 1993 the 
corresponding GDP rate was only 3.2.8 As global prosperity has grown so to has air 
travel though growth has been more fitful recently with an annual rate of 5.4 per cent 
in the ten years between 1982 and 1992. Most future predictions of growth are that it 
will settle at between 5 and 7 per cent over the decade from the millennium (Hanlon 
1996: 11, International Air Transport Association IATA 1998. ) Growth rates tend to 
vary by region with maturity (or rather stability) being reached in Europe and North 
America, and growth potential evident in the Latin American and Asia Pacific 
regions. This growth however, is accompanied by a fall in yield (the average profit 
per passenger), meaning that despite huge volumes the industry earns low margins. 
Yield has fallen precipitately. This is partly because of the growth of leisure travel 
which is price elastic compared to the more lucrative business travel market which is 
(relatively) inelastic. In general, business travellers who account for only a fifth to a 
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third of passengers can yield between two thirds to three quarters of revenues. British 
Airways, for example, earned 70 percent of revenue from 30 per cent of passengers. 
Yields have been falling precipitately thereby affecting profitability. In constant 1985 
values yield has fallen from about 190 cents per passenger in 1960 to around 65 cents 
per passenger in 1995. (Doganis 1993: 11. ) (Ourn and Yu 1998: 229-237. ) In a ten- 
year analysis of productivity and profitability Ourn and Yu found that increased 
efficiency was the most likely explanatory factor in higher profitability. In addition, 
for much of its existence the airline industry has operated within a cartelised 
environment. States developed their airline industries as national assets given the 
enormous costs of establishing airlines, their strategic importance, and their early role 
as a military reserve. Consequently airlines tended to be under either public 
ownership as in the majority of states, or operated under tight regulation as in the 
USA. (See chapter 2. ) States have prioritised the growth of their airlines, and in the 
USA the state through regulation has also fostered that growth. In parallel with state 
ownership, given both the early problem of viability, the need for stability and 
national security, state ownership and regulation exists beneath an internationally 
regulated system of bilateral competition. In effect, nations have agreed to the 
exchange of air services between two 'city pair'routes often agreeing to pool revenues 
and, in order to ensure viability, have restricted the number of operators on those 
routes. These 'air services agreements' (ASAs) have continued in existence. A prime 
example is the Bermuda II agreement between the UK and the USA which in effect 
protects British Airway's access to the American market whilst restricting the rights 
of US operators into the UK. (Button et al 1998: 17. ) In many ways the environment 
of air transport regulation has changed dramatically commencing with the 
deregulation of the US industry in 1978 and the spread of bilateral liberalisation 
agreements between countries such as the UK and Ireland (see Barrett 1997 67-75) 
and the UK and the Netherlands (see Uiittenboggart 1997: 31-38), and European 
deregulation. (Hanlon 1996: chapter 3. ) Major change has taken place within the 
industry, even then however, the structures of regulation have remained. Writing in 
1993 Doganis described a situation, which largely pertains today: 
8 Average Tonne Kilometres (ATK) is the standard crude output measure and simply means the C, Average number of Tonnes (Passenger and freight) flown per kilometre. 0 C, C, 
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Today a complex web of bilateral air services signed by its home state faces 
each international airline. Such agreements will specify which points can be 
served and what traffic rights have been granted. Some may impose capacity 
controls others may not. Some may even insist that air services be operated in 
4pool'. It is the bilateral which tells the airline when and where it can and cannot 
fly and how. '(Doganis 1993: 30. ) 
Air transport regulation is evolving especially as air transport services come under the 
general framework of competition policy common in other traded services. 9 The 
cumulative effect of national and supranational deregulation has been profound. In 
response to these pressures countries such as the UK and the Netherlands have 
pursued the path of privatisation and partial privatisation in order to adapt their 
national flag carriers to the competitive environment. The privatisation of British 
Airways in 1987 was preceded by about 10 years of comprehensive restructuring, a 
similar situation occurred within the Dutch carrier KLM. These 'early adapting' 
countries (Encoua 1991) as cited in Marin (1991) have developed 'open skies' 
bilateral agreements between them which have expanded. They have since been 
joined by countries like Germany, France, Spain and Italy who have undertaken 
massive restructuring in order to meet the challenges of the deregulated environment. 
As carriers adjust to this position of low yields, intensified competition, and the 
escalating price of equipment and infrastructure, they seek to control costs. Since the 
cost of aircraft, equipment, reservations systems and other aspects are relatively 
stable, the area in which management has increasingly sought cost reduction is in 
labour costs. As chapter 6 indicates, attempts to reduce labour costs are based on the 
fact that air transport workers have enjoyed premium wages and conditions which 
outstrip those of external comparators. However, as in other industries, management 
have sought to roll back these regulated terms and conditions often in the teeth of 
concerted labour opposition. (Blyton et al 1998a. ) Yet, as this thesis will demonstrate, 
even within those carriers which have been privatised or liberalised at an early stage, 
the premium wages and conditions for airline workers remain high. (McGurk 1997. )
In essence these terms and conditions, as well as the industrial relations structures of 
the industry, are bound up with the state owned, subsidised legacy of the industry. 
9 There is a clear intention under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) to break the bilateral system. However this is being resisted as nations 
continue to make air transport a special case. 
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The main consequence has been a restructuring of national airlines to improve the 
cost base and prepare carriers for competition. The foremost policy has been that of 
segmentation, where airlines have created separate operational units based on costs 
and yield. This practice originated in the US with the 'vertical integration' of 
commuter operators, but in Europe however, the process has been one of franchising 
and regionalisation. Franchising has allowed large operators such as British Airways 
and Lufthansa to feed commuter and regional traffic into their route networks whilst 
escaping the costs and risks of servicing essentially low yield routes. Lower terms and 
conditions reflect the marginal nature of these services thereby allowing the airline 
concerned to reap lower costs. Management polices in this regard are typified by the 
position of British Airways. (See Colling 1995: 18-33. )
These developments have had obvious consequences for airline labour especially 
within the national flag carriers where regulated wages and conditions are threatened. 
As this thesis argues, the deregulation of the airline industry within both the USA and 
Europe has been at least partly rationalised on the basis of lower labour costs. 
Although earlier advocates emphasised competition and consumer benefits (Caves 
1962: 109), later advocates concentrated on the effect of regulation in promoting rent 
sharing between labour and capital. Bailey et al's (1986) demonstration of the wage 
comparison between union and non-union carriers and Capelli's detailed argument 
(1987: 44) that regulation allows increased wages to be passed on in higher consumer 
fares, have in many ways driven the debate. More general critiques of the regulated 
sector such as Kahn's argument about the inherent productive inefficiency of 
regulated enterprise were also seminal, and had major labour market implications. 
(Kahn 1970. ) These contributions have all reflected an aspect of the wider debate 
about regulation/deregulation and the labour market originating in the USA. Both 
Caves and Bailey et al utilised a simple union monopoly framework to analyse how 
labour obtains and protects superior wage levels. Kahn's approach utilised a mixture 
of public choice theory and X-efficiency, to indicate how managers and bureaucrats 
had little incentive to serve the public interest causing them to collude in rent sharing 
pacts with airline labour. Capelli demonstrated how collective bargaining dominated 
by strong labour groups such as pilots and maintenance staff, allowed labour to share 
in the rents of the industry and for a disproportionate share of those rents to accrue to 
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the most powerful groups. Thus analyses of the regulated airline industry carried an 
implicit analysis of how labour benefited from regulation. 
As later chapters will demonstrate, US airline labour has suffered setbacks and has 
conceded some ground, yet the resilience of labour terms and conditions is the more 
dominant picture. Disregarding some seemingly spectacular falls in average earnings 
(see chapter 4) which appear no worse than general falls in the economy, deregulation 
has affected labour ifi more subtle ways. 10 Arguably, although there has been some re- 
alignment and retrenchment over the long run, deregulation has had no great impact 
on the potential power of organised labour. That is not to disregard the effect of 
painful restructuring and bankruptcy episodes and the many bitter disputes which 
have arisen, but to put these in a longer term context. 
Has a similar picture emerged within Europe? Clearly the process of liberalisation and 
deregulation within Europe has affected airline labour within Europe, most often 
through the privatisation of state carriers and the withdrawal of continuous state 
subsidy. At the same time the emerging structure of competition has had pronounced, 
if as yet unmeasured, effects. The pressure towards concentration and merger, and the 
growth of alliances and marketing pacts, are promoting a major re-alignment of costs 
within both large and small airlines. Constraints of infrastructure and the continued 
dominance of large carriers through their proprietary alliances mean that competition 
has taken place at the margins, but arguably this low cost competition has had major 
labour market effects. Carriers such as Ryanair, EasyJet, and Air One have exposed 
the cost bases of the major carriers in low yield routes, and threaten profitability on 
key business routes through the problem of overcapacity. The major carriers use cost 
comparisons with these carriers in order to encourage cost reductions within their own 
operations. (See chapter 7. ) The low cost carriers however, target a different market 
than the flag carriers who still derive enormous benefits from their domination of the 
major international hubs, which tend to be used by business travellers. The low cost 
operators tend to use secondary airports and target the 'point to point'budget leisure 
market. (See chapter 7 for discussion of their cost structures. ) Often the major 
carriers initiate their own low cost operations as BA has done with the creation of 
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both EuroGatwick and GO, and Alitalia with it's TEAM subsidiary, often 
supplementing these with regional operations carrying lower wage rates and inferior 
conditions to 'core' (i. e. higher yield) services. These trends towards labour market 
segmentation have affectedwages and conditions within the main flag carriers and 
illustrate the kind of restructuring which is going on within them. 
Thus it is essential that we understand the interactions and dynamics taking place 
within the system of regulation, the product market and the labour market. However 
one final piece of the jigsaw has to be completed in order for us to reach a full 
understanding of the process of deregulation. So far we have concentrated on the 
labour market and employment change, rather than on the industrial relations aspects 
of the issue. Yet these are crucial. It is the prevalence and power of organised labour, 
the relationship between labour and the state, and the power resources of both labour 
and capital which together with the system of regulation, the product market and 
labour market environment, determine the course of events. The industrial relations 
context is discussed below. 
1.3 Privatisation, Deregulation and Labour Market Reform: The 
Industrial Relations Dimension 
1.3.1 Privatisation, Deregulation and The Institutions of Industrial Relations 
'The labour market never was and never will be a bourse and other intellectual 
tools are required to explain persistent wage and benefit differences in labour 
markets. Product market forces and internal labour markets play a significant 
role in such persistent differentials beyond any supply side differences. '
(Dunlop 1993: 7. ) 
Dunlop's advice to look beyond the pre-occupation with wages and labour costs has 
only recently been heeded. Employment change within privatised and deregulated 
industries have been well documented by writers such as, Ferner and Colling (1991 
and 1995), Veljanovski (1987), and O'Connel-Davidson (1994). Looking at the 
experience of privatisation in the UK erner and Colling associate privatisation with 
the removal of the "social and political obligations and constraints that hamper 
10 Chapter 4 will demonstrate that moving beyond earnings gives a more complete picture of how key 
labour groups have been affected by deregulation. 
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management action. " (Ferner and Colling 1995. ) This brings a reassertion of 
managerial prerogative as the public choice and agency theory literature would 
suggest. (Ibid. ) Privatisation implies the transfer of property rights from the public 
domain to the private, and encourages management to re-assert its power and control. 
As privatisation takes place and labour markets are deregulated, there is a clash 
between the industrial relations structures of nationalisation and the desire of 
management to utilise labour resources more 'efficiently'. Implicit within this view is 
an assumption that where labour markets are subjected to privatisation or 
deregulation, they automatically become more 'efficient'. 
Typical of these approaches was a study of the industrial relations of privatisation and 
marketisation within UK public enterprises. (Pendleton and Winterton 1993: 55, 
Ferner and Colling 1995: 391-409. ) The study examined the impact of privatisation 
and deregulation upon the workforce, trade unions, bargaining, and managerial 
prerogative. In analysing these industries in both contemporary and historical context, 
these writers were able to uncover many interesting facets of the deregulated 
employment relationship. One such finding, and a finding bome out by this thesis, is 
that there is a tendency to look at privatisation and deregulation as a discontinuity, a 
break with some perceived former system. This may well be true in terins of the 
product market and organisational structures but is only partially true of industrial 
relations. The studies indicate that even without overt commercial pressure, rapid 
change was introduced into such industries over time. Pendleton's study of the 
railway industry is instructive. As he argues, systematic rationalisation took place 
throughout the nationalised period: the route network was reduced by 44 per cent 
from 1948 to 1979. (Pendleton 1993: 45. ) Major job loss and labour market 
restructuring attended this. Major modernisation initiatives such as the transition from 
steam to diesel and then electric power caused considerable job loss (Ibid. 46). 
1.3.2 Deregulation, Decentralisation and Bargaining 
Perhaps the key difference between a regulated and a privatised environment is an 
overriding emphasis on efficiency. One key efficiency target is the rationalisation and 
decentralisation of bargaining structures and the introduction of more managerial 
forms of labour control. The trend towards decentralisation in transport and utilities as 
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a consequence of fragmentation and the 'strategic choice' by management in British 
Airways to develop an HRM culture in the aftermath of privatisation are examples of 
this. However as the British Airway's case study in chapter 5 and 6 will indicate, the 
transfer of ownership from the public to the private sphere does not mean that the 
bargaining power of labour is automatically challenged. This very much depends on 
the context of regulation and industrial relations within the country concerned and 
industry studied. 
Certainly, labour often suffers from job losses, reduced pay, casualisation, 
outsourcing and other negative employment aspects associated with restructured 
labour markets. However, these changes cannot be applied uniformly to labour in 
regulated and privatised industries, again they depend on the context of the regulatory 
system and the product market. Another essential aspect of the industrial relations 
picture is the role of expectations in worker perception of the employment contract. 
Under regulation and/or public ownership workers become used to a level of 
employment regulation. How this regulation of the employment relationship arises is 
the topic of the next chapter. What is important at this stage is that these expectations 
can only be altered slowly and painfully. This is especially the case in industries such 
as the airline industry where the effects of strike action on individual carriers are so 
severe that 'climactic' change of the type discussed by Turnbull in relation to the UK 
ports is at best extremely difficult and at worst impossible. Management to some 
extent relies on the effects of regulatory and product market change to drive forward 
restructuring. 
Regulatory reform often plays a central role, in tandem with product market change, 
in undermining structures of labour market regulation and collective bargaining. 
(Femer and Colling 1991: 391-409. ) It is the combined pressure of regulatory, 
product market and labour market change, which in turn influence management 
strategy. Deregulation allows product rnark-et change to become more of a driver of 
labour market conditions than in the preceding regulated era. Despite the obvious 
pressures labour does not willingly submit to this set of regulatory and product market 
pressure. Management often assumes that workers will submit to the realities of the 
deregulated environment and surrender the premium terms and conditions 
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accumulated under regulation. Workers however, become used to a certain 
expectation of labour market regulation such as a full time, well paid job, a core 
employment contract underpinned by collective bargaining, which they become 
reluctant to surrender. In fact given the alternative of 'market rates', outsourcing, the 
introduction of atypical contracts and the dissolution of national wage bargaining, it is 
rational for workers to protect their regulated terms and conditions. These 
expectations which can be termed the 'regulatory overhang'are discussed in chapters 
3,4,5,6 and 7. Nevertheless, even in privatised and deregulated environments labour 
retains strong bargaining power and is able, to a much greater extent than is often 
acknowledged, to influence that change. The 'regulatory overhang' can only be 
removed by guarantees of job security at existing rates for existing staff, and the 
transfer of the adjustment burden onto new staff. The use of pay restructuring, 
particularly the use of tiered wage structures, reflects this need within the airline 
industry to protect 'insiders'at the expense of outsiders. This issue and others will be 
detailed in the case study of British Airways. 
Undoubtedly in the long run, labour can suffer from privatisation and deregulation, 
however, to re-iterate, its fortunes are affected by a complex interplay of business 
strategy, product market change, and regulatory response. Aspects such as inter-firm 
collaboration, concentration, and globalisation all operate to shape labour market 
change. In response to these labour market developments a variety of changes in 
bargaining and in management and trade union response occur. Both management and 
trade union response are crucial in our discussion of the airline industry. The effect of 
market reform despite the stylised models of rent sharing and public choice does not 
automatically strengthen management. The process can be much more complex. 
Fairbrother (1994) uses the example of restructuring of industrial relations in the UK 
Civil Service, pointing to the absence of literature on the labour implications of these 
reforms: 
'... it remains uncertain just how managerial structures have been recast and the 
way their recasting has a bearing on work and employment relations. ' 
(Fairbrother 1994: 13. ) 
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Fairbrother believes that paradoxically privatisation and market restructuring can 
impact positively on trade unionism, by opening the door to trade union renewal. He 
points to the ossified, male dominated structures of UK Civil Service unions being 
galvanised by the growing concern of members at the threat to jobs and conditions. 
(Ibid. ) Moreover, he points to a rise of managerialism replacing the culture of 
paternalism, which operates in tandem with the old union structures. These forces, he 
argues, combined to alter the stance of both trade unions and management. Further 
evidence for the renewal thesis is found in Lloyd's study of the effect of 
decentralisation on bargaining within the NHS. (Lloyd 1997: 477-446. ) Such 
arguments certainly call into question the assumptions of the public choice/principal 
agent approach, they illustrate the richness and complexity of industrial relations 
environments which are not automatically eroded by restructuring. What is clear is 
that changes of ownership and the introduction of explicitly commercial objectives do 
affect industrial relations but that these changes interact with, and are tempered by, 
the power and capacity of management and labour. 
Conclusion 
We have examined the centrality of employment change within the context of 
deregulation and privatisation in a number of industries. Major theories relating to the 
issue of both regulation and the labour market have been discussed, focusing on the 
dominant union monopoly/rent-sharing approach. In order to develop our analysis of 
it was argued that economic approach, devoid of industrial relations institutions and 
contexts, was inadequate. Despite the methodological rigour of many such studies, 
they address only the outcomes of labour market deregulation. Rather, an appreciation 
of the interplay between regulatory reform, product market change and industrial 
relations processes provided a richer and more fruitful analysis. Workers become used 
to a certain expectation of employment under regulation, which is not readily altered 
by the introduction of regulatory reform and restructuring. Such change can even have 
the effect of re-galvanising the bargaining environment sometimes, as in the civil 
service; dormant institutions of industrial relations are re-vitalised by change. This 
suggests a further complication to the deregulation-employment argument, which is 
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examined within this thesis. In order to build upon this analysis the next chapter 
begins a study of deregulation and labour market change within the airline industry. 
Given the case study and theoretical evidence on deregulation and employment, the 
airline industry provides an excellent opportunity to assess the nature of deregulation 
and labour market change. The airline industry has been one of the few globally 
regulated industries, whose deregulation alters labour market conditions throughout 
the world. Regulatory intervention in both the USA and Europe made labour 
conditions and industrial relations part of the fabric of that regulation. Analysis of the 
comparative industrial relations system between the USA and UK will therefore, be 
used as a framework to examine the principal types of product and labour market 
regulation and their specific effects on employment. The following chapter therefore 
locates that Process of change historically by examining the nature of product market 




2.1.1 The Broad Theoretical Approach: A Political Economy of Airline Deregulation 
and Employment 
The previous chapter explored the nature of labour market deregulation in regulated 
industries. Building on the models of deregulation and employment introduced in 
chapter 1, the thesis develops an analysis of the airline industry, as a sectoral. case 
study of the impact of employment deregulation. In order to do so the study develops 
an approach, which integrates regulatory, product market and labour market aspects 
of deregulation and employment. In doing so it focuses upon the airline industry 
building upon previous research efforts. There is a huge disparity in that research 
effort between Europe and the United States where airline industry research is more 
prominent. Thus early work by Kahn (1950) and Baitsell (1966) looked at the 
bargaining power of pilots and engineers but very much from an institutional and 
empirical viewpoint. Krolick developed a broader approach in his comparative study 
of the occupational differences between pilots and railroad engineers, yet a 
comprehensive analysis was missing. (Krolick 1966. ) In Britain, Blain's (1971) 
application of Dunlopian system theory to the development of the pilots' union, 
BALPA, and growth of industrial relations structures provided the first systematic 
analysis of the airline industry. The approach of these researchers was necessarily 
confined to the institutional history of pilots and their employers. (Blain 1970. ) Both 
provided a historical analysis of pilots in the UK and the USA respectively but only 
Blain made an attempt to develop theory out of seemingly disparate episodes of 
industrial relations behaviour. The author felt that most approaches tended to divorce 
the airline industry from its regulatory structure product market, and often from its 
wider labour market. The issue of continuity therefore becomes as an essential aspect 
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of the research given the resilience of aspects such as trade union power, collective 
bargaining and labour unrest in a deregulated and privatised environment. These 
factors contribute to the persistence of worker expectations of terms and conditions, 
defined in chapter 7 as the regulatory overhang. 
In investigating the emergence of deregulatory change within the USA and Europe, 
this study hopes to accomplish several aims. Firstly, to synthesise the available 
literature identifying a common set of themes and issues. Secondly, to develop a 
theoretical approach to the study of labour market regulation/deregulation within the 
industry. Thirdly, to provide core case studies of the effect of regulation/deregulation 
on pilots as a key occupational group. Fourthly, the thesis uses a case study and 
employee survey of British Airways to look at worker attitudes towards deregulatory 
and product market change, within a critical case context. The survey provides the 
foundation for a wider analysis of deregulation within Europe and the effects of that 
process on trade union and employer strategies. Finally, the consequences of the 
emerging regulatory and product market environment are analysed in respect of their 
impact for the future labour market environment. 
Before going on to consider the research questions we need to outline the basic 
theoretical approach of the thesis. The approach involves identifying distinct 
categories of employment effect arising from the process of regulation and 
deregulation. A process of regulated control can be seen to have pertained between 
1935-1978. Then product market and technical regulation delivered a heavily 
regulated labour market, although there were shifts in the nature and extent of 
regulation. This period was followed by a process of competitive disengagement, 
where the removal of regulatory controls on the product market encourage rapid 
market entry and exit, as in the USA from 1978. The process of deregulation was 
much more gradualist within Europe, but when regulatory and product market took 
place, industrial relations and the labour market were identified as the central obstacle 
to reform. Thus the labour market restructuring model is used to explain this period 
of early restructuring within Europe. In that period powerful unions and collective 
bargaining were identified as upholding excessive wages, poor productivity, and 
driving political pressure for subsidies and protection. By the late deregulation period 
roughly from about 1995 onwards, industry consolidation, interfirm collaboration and 
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an increasing focus on costs and productivity the airline industry can be identified 
within a global product market convergence model. 
In addition to these broad questions a number of specific questions are addressed 
within the survey relating to employee perceptions of the effect of deregulation, 
product market change and labour market change upon airline employees using the 
case study of British Airways. These research questions within the British Airways 
case are addressed in section 2.2.5. 
2.1.2 The Political EconomylDynamics of Industrial Relations Approach 
In addressing these research questions the thesis was informed by a central theoretical 
approach. The main theoretical stance is that of the political econoinyldynainics 
approach based on realist/political economy approach. Godard (1994: 1-35. ) Godard 
criticises prevailing approaches to the study of industrial relations as reliant on logical 
empiricist and behaviourist epistemologies. He argues for a more grounded analysis, 
providing a theoretical foundation for the field. The 'political economy' approach, 
practised by writers such as Hyman (1989,1991), Fox (1974), R. Edwards (1979), 
Gospel and Littler (1983) and P. K. Edwards (1986) is, he believes, more useful. These 
approaches which analyse industrial relations their social, and economic context allow 
seemingly rapid shifts and reversals to be viewed dynamically. That is they come to 
be seen not as disparate episodes but as part of the process of industrial relations 
between the state capital and labour. This approach is adopted by Turnbull et al 
(1992) in their analysis of the restructuring of the dock labour scheme. Understanding 
critical episodes of conflict and change and analysing these within their industry, 
economic and political context is therefore crucial. As Blyton and Turnbull argue: 
'Employee relations do not take place in a vacuum. They are situated 
within, influenced by and in turn impact upon many other aspects of 
the work organisation. Variables such as the size and structure of 
companies, the technologies they use, their patterns of ownership and 
control, and the character of their product markets have increasingly 
come to be recognised as important influences on the processes and 
outcomes of employee relations. ' (B lyton and Turnbull 1998: 37. ) 
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Without such an emphasis, institutional complexities and peculiarities fixate analysis. 
(Blyton and Turnbull (1998. ) Extending this approach the same authors have 
developed an approach, which views industrial relations not as the study of 
institutions and their peculiarities, but as an analysis of 'changing modes of labour 
regulation'. (Blyton and Turnbull 1996: 7-20. ) Modes of regulation'are the forms of 
low level and high level job control, which govern the relationships between labour 
and capital. (Ibid. ) In this way we can assess changes in employment regulation in a 
comparative sense without being blinded by institutional differences. As chapter 3 
will indicate, the stability which characterised the airline industry before the 1980s 
was upset by the changed economics of the industry, forcing management to institute 
a new mode of regulation via the Mutual Aid Pact, (MAP) which effectively matched 
the collective bargaining strength of pilots. The role of the state is crucial, given its 
own goals in promoting a strong and stable airline industry. The fact that it reversed 
its previous decision of upholding the interests of labour indicated the ways in which 
changes in the form of product market regulation could impact upon labour. 
Previously the state had overseen the promotion of craft based collective bargaining 
through the Railway Labor Act, as a method of securing safe, stable air transport. 
These shifts can be understood within dynamics/political economy framework. 
Traditional approaches would see unions neutralised, and management in the 
ascendancy, because of the nature of product market competition and management 
strategies. Such a view would be particularly plausible in the case of the UK, where 
labour market deregulation, job insecurity and high unemployment have produced a 
labour market setting which has strengthened management. Yet such a view ignores 
the institutional and product market context of the airline industry which, though 
privatised was still subject to tight regulation. Thus collective bargaining and union 
influence continued to apply within labour management relations at BA, more than a 
decade after privatisation. It can be argued that the reason for this is that workers have 
become used to certain broadly defined norms of employment within the airline 
industry, involving a unified firm focus, high wages, generous work rules and 
generous fringe benefits. These characteristics are all part of an airline employment 
compact, described in chapters 3 and 4. The study of BA and its employment relations 
forms a central aspect of the study. 
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2.2. The Research Questions 
In looking at these issues several key questions are addressed. The broader questions 
are introduced and are posed from the point of view of the regulated and deregulated 
period. These broad questions are then expanded into specific research questions to be 
dealt with in each chapter. 
2.2.1 The Regulated Environment 
A number of broad questions address the nature of the labour market under regulation. 
This allows the study to be set in context by framing the issue in terms of the 
continuities of industrial and labour relations. This provides an opportunity to locate 
the issue of regulation/deregulation within the context of earlier employment change. 
Why did labour market regulation arise in the airline industry, whatfonnIs did it 
take and what were the broadprocesses of its introduction? 
Which groups of workers benefitedfrom collective bargaining and why? 
" How did airline management in both nations regard the spread of collective 
bargaining? 
" What was the role of product market regulation in regard to controls on market 
entry, fare setting, mergers, concentration and other industry matters? 
2.2.2 The Deregulated Environment 
Deregulation has altered the airline labour market considerably. In terms of the 
deregulated environment a number of general questions are addressed: 
What were the effects of deregulation on the product market and labour market? 
What effect did deregulation have on the earnings of key airline labour groups? 
Whatfeatures of the institutional and labour market endured between the USA and 
Europe? 
What was the role of the state in promoting a particular type of deregulation? - 
What sort of business strategies einergedfrom deregulation and what were the 
limitations of these strategies? 
9 What has been labour's response in the USA and Europe? 
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Having set out these broad "'driving' questions we now proceed to the detailed 
questions. These are detailed by order of the chapter in which they are dealt with, 
although issues are interlaced throughout the thesis. The British Airway's case study 
and research questions are dealt with in a later section. 
The Dynarnics of Product and Labour Market Regulation In The US and Airline 
Industry. 
This section examines the detailed impact of regulation and industrial relations within 
the airline industry. It identifies the product and labour market effects, permitting 
shifts and developments in the relative position of labour and management to be 
analysed. The following questions are addressed. 
* How did regulation of the product market affect the labour market and 
employment relations within both the US and the UK? 
* How did an institutional framework of industrial relations arise within the airline 
industry, in the US, UK and globally? 
* What were the effects on trade unions and management? 
* How did management respond to the bargaining power of trade unions in both 
countries? 
What role did the state play in airline industrial relations? 
To what extent does the Regulated Control nwdel of labour market deregulation 
explain the nature ofproduallabour market regulation in this period? 
Pilots and Management Under Deregulation: The USA and Europe (Chapter 4). 
Building on earlier analysis of the regulated and deregulated environment, the 
discussion details the impact on a key employee group. Concentrating on the 
experience of pilots in both the USA and the UK allows for a number of key questions 
to be addressed: 
* What has been the effect of deregulation1product market change on pilots as a key 
occupational group both within the USA and Europe? 
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" To what extent has concession bargaining affected pilots within the US and 
European industry? 
" To what extent have European airline management been able to make inroads into 
pilot tenns and conditions? 
" How have airline premium wages been main tained/undermined since 
deregulation? 
" How have pilots maintained their influence through regulatory structures and new 
forins offirin governance? 
" How does the Competitive Disengagement model of labour market deregulation 
explain this period? 
Deregulation and Employment in the European Airline Industry: The Emerging 
Trend (Chapter 7). 
The study of the European airline industry examined in this chapter offers a 
comparative analysis between the US and Europe. Extending earlier work on pilots 
and the case study/survey of British Airways allows for issues of wages and 
productivity, management strategy and trade union response to be addressed. 
How do US and European airlines compare in terms of productivity and 
efficiency? 
To what extent is state ownership afactor in this relative performance? 
Can this be explained in terms of the concept of rent sharing and premium 
wages/regulatory overhang? 
How have management strategies attempted to tackle these rigidities in response 
to deregulation? 
What has been the extent offranchising and low cost strategies within Europe? 
To what extent has there been industrial actionlconflict within the European 
airline industry? 
How has industrial action affected management stance in the restructuring 
process? 
How does the Labour Market Restructuring model of employment deregulation 
help us to understand the process of adjustment in the European airline industry? 
From Regulated Control to Global Product Market Convergence: The Emerging 
Regulatory Framework and The Airline Labour Market (Chapter 8). 
Additional questions about market structure and competition within both the USA and 
Europe are addressed in chapter 8. This chapter investigates the dynamic nature of 
regulatory, product and labour market change. This allows a comparison between the 
USA and Europe. The chapter also offers an analysis of the global consequences for 
airline employment of an 'emerging'regulatory and product market environment. 
50 
To what extent has the US and European airline industry become concentrated 
since deregidation? 
What has happened to regulatory and competition policy since deregulation? 
How has the withdrawal of state aid affected the stnicture of the industry and 
impacted upon airline labour? 
How have concentration and emerging regulatory structures affected labour 
conditions? 
What is the likely impact of alliances and code sharing on employment? 
To what extent have regulatorylproduct market changes shifted the burden of 
deregulation onto labour? 
How have trade unions responded towards these strategies? 
To what extent does Global Product Market Convergence explain changes in the 
labour market and industrial relations? 
The study will therefore utilise the models of employment regulation introduced in 
chapter 1, detailing how the interconnected process of product, labour market and 
regulatory change impact upon employment. The next section discusses the various 
sources used in this aspect of the study. 
2.2.1 The Secondary Data 
In order to analyse these questions a range of secondary data and literature is 
analysed. These combined sources are used to address both broad and specific 
questions on the employment impact of deregulation. The benefits and shortcomings 
of the various sources are discussed below. Questions on the BA case study are given 
in the section on the case study and survey (2.2.5). 
ICAO Fleet and Personnel Data and IATA World Air Transport Statistics 
In addition a range of questions relating to the nature of wages, employment and 
bargaining are addressed through secondary data. This involved using International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO, the UN directorate for civil aviation) and the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA, the employers' body) as key sources 
of data on wages employment and productivity. There are major problems with these 
secondary sources. Firstly the problem of non-response is particularly acute in regard 
to the ICAO Fleet and Personnel data where many large airlines fail to complete the 
necessary entries and the researcher has to extrapolate from earlier data. For example 
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in order to obtain comparison data for earnings between European carriers the mean 
of the highest earnings in Europe and the US is used for the missing observations. 
(See chapter 7. ) In addition the data is often out of date, as returns are made just in 
time for a new reporting year. There are often bizarre omissions. For example in the 
1997 series Lufthansa occupational data is so incomplete as to be unusable, yet there 
is full data for the small low cost carrier German Wings. (See chapter 7. ) 
Nevertheless ICAO data is the major source of data and it does provide a good 
overview of the principal trends in wages, employment and productivity, and is 
widely used. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research for example, 
compiled the most recent comparison of productivity using ICAO data. (NIESR) 
(Vass 1997. )
The IATA World Air Transport Statistics (WATS) provide trend data on employment 
growth across occupational categories and detailed financial information on carriers. 
IATA data tends to have a higher response rate due to the fact that is an employers 
body (rather than a regulatory function as ICAO is often viewed), but often fails to 
repeat the same series of data in consecutive years making comparisons difficult. In 
addition IATA data tends to give only aggregated trend data on employment change, 
rather than the specific occupational data given by ICAO. Nevertheless together these 
are the only consistent sources of raw data on labour market issues within the airline 
industry. 
US Labor Department: Monthly Labor Review 
The US Labor department Monthly Labor Review (NILR) data provide comprehensive 
and complete information on bargaining arrangements within US industry and provide 
other information, for example, on aggregate employment trends. The MLR also 
provides detailed information on concession bargaining, wage agreements and 
employee shareholdings, as well as periodic analyses of different industries and 
sectors. Year end analysis in the January edition of each MLR provides a 
comprehensive overview of foregoing trends and developments. These data are used 
extensively in chapters 3,4,7 and 8. 
New Eamings Survey (NES) 
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NES is published by the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) and provides a 
comprehensive survey of pay and hours data by industry and sector. This data allows 
us to look at general aggregate data on earnings in UK air transport in order to 
contextualise the discussion on British Airways in chapters 5 and 6. This provides the 
foundation for our discussion in chapter 7 of the regulatory overhang and the 
premium wage. The difficulty with the NES data is that for air transport it provides 
only aggregate data increasing the distorting effect of high salaries. However it does 
provide data on male manual wages, which can be compared through other data 
sources. 
Avniark Data 
Avmark is a major aviation research organisation and consultancy which publishes a 
bi-monthly industry journal, the Avinark Aviation Economist. The study uses a report 
commissioned by the European Union to investigate detailed issues of labour cost and 
productivity. The Avmark data is used in tandem with ICAO and IATA surveys, to 
supplement the analysis in chapters 4 and 7. In addition the survey uses occasional 
reports and papers, compiled by a variety of organisations. In order to provide data on 
bargaining, wages and employment within a more detailed national context, aggregate 
data from the US labour Department, UK New Earnings Survey and other statistics 
are also utilised. 
Airline BusinesslAir Transport World 
These monthly industry journals are used extensively throughout the thesis. Both 
provide extensive coverage of the industry, and regular comments and editorials. Both 
Journals take an industry/management viewpoint but are analytical in their approach. 
Major industry statistics are published by both and particular use is made of the 
Airline Business Yearly Airport Data, published in January of each year, which 
provides the raw data for analyses of concentration and market dominance within the 
industry. Airline Business also publishes an authoritative survey and analysis of global 
alliances in June of each year, which is used to look at alliance impacts on the 
workforce. Air Transport World publishes a regular global survey of world airlines, 
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and detailed industry traffic and employment data. Both publications also carry a 
variety of named articles, which are alphabetically listed in the bibliography. 
2.3 The British Airways Case Study/Survey and Its Context 
A major aspect of the study involved a detailed case study of British Airways. This 
carrier was used as a typical example of a carrier pursuing the new business strategies 
in a unionised collectively bargained environment. Single case study approaches are 
often criticised for being ungeneralisable, therefore before elucidating the nature and 
purpose of the case study it is necessary to justify the single case study approach and 
the trade unions based nature of the questionnaire utilised. 
2.3.1 British Airways: A Critical Case Study of Airline Deregulation and Employment 
In terms of revenue, market ranking and employment for instance, British Airways is 
a hugely important carrier in the global airline industry. Its leadership in many 
business strategies and early prioritisation of cost reduction make it hugely influential 
within the industry. BA is a 'first mover' in industrial relations change, and an 
aggressive innovator in low cost business strategies, whose policies are nonetheless 
tempered and controlled by the historical legacy of collective bargaining, and of the 
specific episode of corporate reconstruction which accompanied its privatisation. Its 
industrial relations antecedents can be traced back to the beginnings of UK airline 
industrial relations. For all of these reasons a case study of BA represents to a great 
extent, the past, present and future of airline industrial relations. 
British Airways is currently adjusting to new regulatory and market environments 
ahead of other European carriers. For these reasons the British Airways' case study 
offers a 'critical' example of the processes and issues affecting the labour market and 
industrial relations after deregulation. The case also serves to indicate the importance 
of employee attitudes towards deregulation and employment change, and as such, 
provides an insight into the way in which workers cherish premium terms and 
conditions, even within carriers which operate in neo liberal, flexible labour market 
environments such as Britain. The existence of the 'regulatory overhang' and the 
strength and capability of organised labour means that workers in the airline industry 
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generally have been reluctant to give concessions. The BA case illustrates these issues 
by examining both management strategies and employee attitudes during a period of 
critical change. At the time of the present study the carrier was responding to the 
phased deregulation of the European market whilst evaluating the prospects for an 
alliance with American Airlines. It also faced the challenge of low cost carriers and 
the general problem of falling yields. The presence of much stronger transatlantic 
competition both from Virgin Atlantic and the stronger US carriers also threatened 
long term profitability. These pressures led to a major series of employment 
initiatives, which sought to radically restructure costs within the airline. The nature of 
regulatory and product market structures mean that carriers will tend to converge in 
terms of their responses to these broad environmental pressures. This is not to say that 
the detail of their response will neglect the constraints of industrial relations, and 
labour organisation within specific countries, there will be wide variation in response, 
but to say they are driven by the pressures of a converging global regulatory and 
product market structures. (Chapter 8. ) This leaves room both for specific institutional 
response in terms of the broad national industrial relations framework and specific 
'strategic choices' from management towards that environment. These issues are 
discussed in chapters 5 and 7. However all of these choices are constrained by a wider 
environmental context. Since all airlines need to respond towards globalisation, 
alliances, low cost competition and the withdrawal of state funding, all face the need 
to restructure operations to address these pressures. 
In short British Airways has encountered all of these pressures, and as a privatised 
flag carrier has had to confront the need for change much earlier than other carriers. 
Consequently, other carriers have emulated BA's employment policies. Looking in 
detail at these issues within British Airways therefore provides a 'critical' case study 
on how individual carriers and their workforces adapt to deregulation and 
employment change. 
This then raises the question of representativeness. Is BA representative of the 
industry as a whole? To a large extent, and owing to its early adapting role it is 
representative, but we need to be aware that it is representative only of the regulatory 
and product market pressures which drive airline management in the current era. In 
that sense it is a representative case and its experiences are applicable to other carriers 
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at various stages of the restructuring process. BA's early experience with privatisation 
and employment change with the withdrawal of state aid and market flotation render 
it useful in comparing the experience of other European carriers undergoing 
privatisation and quasi-privatisation. Its post privatisation experience, whereby 
management pursued massive cultural change programmes such as the quality 
initiative Putting People First, are being emulated in one way or another by other 
European airlines. Its post deregulation experience where it faced the need to confront 
the problem of declining yields and greater competition, has been the experience of 
other European carriers such as Lufthansa and Air France. Though all are pursuing 
different policies according to their own unique national labour market environment, 
the regulatory structures and product market pressures, which they face, are largely 
similar. This issue of global product market convergence is addressed in chapters I 
and 8. The case of BA illustrates clearly the stages of adaptation to the deregulated 
competitive environment, within a major flag carrier airline. The detailed rationale for 
the case study and its relevance to the research objectives are discussed below. 
2.3.2. Case Studies and Relevance 
The debate between the case study method and other methods is often misconceived 
as a debate between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Often such debates 
become not discussions about the appropriateness of methods in particular settings, 
but puerile exchanges about the efficacy of one or other method, adding little to our 
understanding of methodology. Case studies should be understood and used as a 
hybrid technique that can embody the best of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. Yin argues that case studies are often confused with more specialised 
qualitative techniques, such as ethnography and participant observation. (Yin 1994: 
11. ) Yin cites Schramm's viewpoint that: 
'The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of 
case study is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions, 
why they were taken, why they were implemented and with what 
result. ' (Ibid. ) 
Other researchers offer the case study as a particularly valuable tool in organisational 
research. Bryman argues, for example, that case studies in facilitating the application 
i 
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of many techniques of data collection and analysis allow a much more involved and 
meaningful interpretation of issues. (Bryman 1989: 172. ) On the problem of 
generalisation Bryman argues that many criticisms of the inadequacy of case studies 
in this respect are based on "erroneous application of statistical notions which treat 
the case study as a sample of one. "(Ibid. ) Such views question the applicability of the 
case study on the basis that it cannot be generalised statistically. However, as Yin 
argues, case studies should be judged on the basis of the theoretical inferences 
generated. The case study, he argues, provides information which informs theoretical 
reasoning. In any case, belief in the cast iron dependability of statistical methods is 
itself questionable given the issues raised by the realist school in social science 
research. (See Sayer 1984: 190-199. ) Again it is not the purpose of this section to 
revisit methodological debates, which however stimulating can become, in the wrong 
context, ultimately diversionary. Rather the aim is to justify the relevance of utilising 
a single case study of British Airways as a basis from which to generate theory on the 
process of airline industrial relations in the deregulated and oligopolistic era of airline 
competition. 
2.3.3 The British Ainvays Case Study: Relevance to the Research Objectives 
The case study allows us to look at the depth, richness and complexity of airline 
industrial relations within a carrier whose environment and market position, though 
unique, are not peculiar. The evolving structure of the industry (described in chapter 
8) means that we can make some generalisations about airline strategy based on this 
case. In stating this preference for theoretical generalisation it is hoped that the error 
of practical generalisation is not committed. This can be seen at the most basic level 
in the excellence literature of Peters and Watennan and journalistic analyses of airline 
strategy, which tend to utilise the case as a confirmatory and even celebratory device. 
This involves identifying several qualities and attributes, which are deemed 
"'desirable', identifying these within one setting and prescribing these for other 
settings. This characteristic of the case is de-contextualised from other factors, 
becoming in effect an 'ideal stereotype. ' In this vein writers such as Corke and 
Campbell-Smith, (both 1986) have written largely celebratory accounts of British 
Airways transition from the public to the private sector. Given the paucity of literature 
on UK airline industrial relations, these approaches have become unduly influential. 
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For example, the radical cost surgery of 1982, where unions accepted employment 
reductions, wage freezes and the implementation of new management strategies, is 
identified as the manifestation of a unique British Airways' spirit rather than 
reflecting the specific economic, political and industrial relations environment of the 
UK. Such factors were equally if not more important than any cultural factors. These 
views betray a unitarist pre-occupation, to be expected in essentially journalistic 
accounts of the 'phoenix from the flames' variety. However, even within established 
industrial relations research there is a tendency towards this confirmatory bias in the 
use of case studies. 
For example, in a study of European airline industrial relations Warhurst (1995: 259- 
74) argues that most European airlines would 'converge' upon the sort of Human 
Resource Management (HRM) model utilised by BA. (Warhust 1995: 259-74. ) As 
Blyton and Tumbull argue, this assumes that the institutional richness and complexity 
of European industrial relations is susceptible to being shoe-homed into a particular 
management paradigm, or that organised labour has no agency in these matters. 
(Blyton and Turnbull 1996: 7-20. ) In any case, British Airways, as recent events have 
shown, has not avoided strikes and conflict and has been constrained by traditional 
institutions of collective bargaining and unionised labour. Outside core managerial 
grades, it is doubtful whether HRM policies are greatly used. Nevertheless, major 
preconceptions exist about the nature of BA's business and industrial relations 
strategies, and these often inform analysis. When British Airways faces a strike the 
reaction of uninformed commentators has often been one of surprise or even 
incredulity. " The detailed critical case study is therefore of great importance in 
analysing and explaining episodes of industrial unrest and employee dissatisfaction 
that could otherwise be viewed as pathological. It moves beyond the merely 
confirmatory and celebratory accounts of the mainstream and journalistic literature, 
and provides a much deeper understanding of the complexity of labour management 
relations then can be obtained from descriptive and prescriptive accounts in the 
academic literature. 
11 This surprise is likely to be dampened after the 1997 cabin crew strikes and episodes such as BEP, 
late 1990s profits slump. These events have exposed organisational problems at BA, many of which are 
deep- rooted industrial relations issues. 
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The approach is first of all to delineate the carrier's detailed strategies within the 
wider context of global competition and market structure analysed in chapters 6 and 7. 
Secondly, to consider employee responses to these strategies. The first section looked 
in detail at the employment initiatives being undertaken by British Airways. The first 
aspect of the process involved detailed in depth interviews with key actors from both 
management and trade unions. These interviews were used to explore and refine some 
of the key research hypotheses, which had arisen from the historical work and the 
developments in the USA. The interviews also helped in the formulation of research 
questions for the specific European context. The interviews were supplemented with 
an investigation of company documents, many of which related to the key business 
strategies then being advanced. In addition trade union material from various levels 
was also utilised; constraints and practical problems including management re- 
organisation were reviewed. 
The issues uncovered during the BA case study led the author to believe that there 
was a substantial gulf between the carrier and its trade unions in terms of future 
direction. This raised questions of the extent to which staff views were being taken 
into account by management. The assumption was that staff were more or less 
resigned to the employment implications of deregulation and there would be little 
resistance. Management emphasised the need to adapt to the global marketplace, and 
to compete in an increasingly contested environment. There was little evidence on 
staff attitudes about detailed issues. The company carried out periodic surveys but the 
type of attitudinal questions did not look at sentiments about the future of the industry 
and issues of restructuring which were becoming 'live' at that time. 
2.3.4. The Questionnaire: Rationale and Research Questions 
The survey instrument was designed to test the idea that staff attitudes were being 
influenced by the 'regulatory overhang' argument deployed in chapters 2 and 3. In 
essence employees had become used to a certain type of labour contract which had 
arisen under a regulated environment, and this employee belief in this challenged 
short term and even long term cost-reduction policies. After interviewing both 
management and staff it became clear that there was a need to look at employee 
attitudes. Too often staff views have been assumed, particularly in the rent 
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sharing/union monopoly literature, which aggregate the views of entire workforces 
under a set of theoretical assumptions. However this is also the case in the popular 
literature and the HRM based literature of Kochan et al and Warhurst, where 
management policies and strategies are accepted implicitly, without recourse to 
employee views. Employee views however are of utmost importance because the 
perceptions of employees upon the legitimacy of management decisions can often 
have huge consequences for the process of restructuring. An example is the BA cabin 
crew strike of 1997 where management assumed that cabin crew would accept the 
need for pay restructuring and a rationalisation of overtime and pay increments. 
However cabin crew were attached to the traditional earnings package based in the 
regulated era, and preserved throughout the transition period of King and Marshall. 
There were similar issues around the restructuring of ground handling, and to a lesser 
extent catering. Thus in order to engage the interest of respondents, and to 
loperationalise' a number of the key research hypotheses the questionnaire was 
designed to reflect a number of debates and issues which were affecting both the 
airline and the industry at that particular point in time. 
The attitudes explored related to the following broad areas: 





Future of collective bargaining 
Detailed questions addressed within the survey related to the nature of the 
employment contract within the large international carrier, and allowed some 
assessment to be made of the concept of regulatory overhang. 
How will workers view the introduction of regional terms and conditions with 
lower pay rates? Will workers accept this or resist it? 
How will workers view the extension of franchising and low cost operations? 
Are there any differences in perception of employment effects between those who 
were recruited pre-privatisation (before 1987) and those who were recruited 
before post privatisation (after 1987)? 
What will be the attitude of workers towards the extension of atypical work? Will 
there be any differences by gender? 
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" How do workers perceive the threat of outsourcing to terms and conditions of 
employment? 
" Given the trend towards outsourcing which aspects of working for BA do workers 
rank highest? 
" How do workers view the loss of the terms and conditions when considering the 
possible outsourcing of theirjob? 
Additional questions on management strategy and globalisation sought to obtain the 
view of workers on the strategies being pursued within the airline, and whether 
workers supported or rejected these policies. 
" How do workers view management strategies in the post deregulation 
environment? 
" How do workers view the policy that cost reduction should be the overriding 
priority? 
" What is the attitude of workers towards moving some functions to low labour cost 
countries? 
" What is the attitude of workers towards the growth of global alliances and 
acquisitions? 
" In terms of global alliances how do workers view the prospect that existing flights 
could be operated by partner airlines? 
How will workers view general management strategy on globalisation? 
How will workers view global policies when posed directly in terms of 
employment? 
How do workers view these policies in terms of their effects on local terms and 
conditions? 
Other questions related to the perceived break up of national level bargaining. This set 
of questions can be seen as addressing an aspect of the regulatory overhang as 
national collective bargaining underpins the regulated terms and conditions of 
employment, its abolition would be perceived as in other industries, as the precursor 
to large scale reductions in terms and conditions. 
How will employees view the break up of national bargaining? 
Will workers perceive that the break-up of national bargaining will lead to lower 
terms and conditions and to threaten stability of employment? 
How do employees view the introduction of business unit bargaining? 
Will employees perceive their trade unions as being marginalised by such 
developments? 
2.3.5. Early Design and Modification 
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After extensive reading on questionnaire design the author opted for a 'closed set' 
attitude questionnaire based on the Likert scale. The format was to design blocks of 
questions in specific 'modules' which could be used to measure a particular set of 
variables. Questions themselves were formulated on the basis of industry knowledge 
gathered from interviews, documentation and other accounts. The questions attempt to 
measure staff attitudes towards aspects of business strategy, which had direct and 
indirect effects on employment and industrial relations. In order to capture the full 
range of attitudes and to minimise 'formulation bias' in the questionnaire, statements 
were alternatively loaded' where appropriate, in one direction or another. This 
technique was used in response to Oppenheim's advice about loaded questions and 
their role in the production of bias. (Oppenheim 1992: 137. ) The decision was taken 
to make the loading of questions explicit and to alternate the loading bias. Thus one 
question would embody a company view of the issue alternated with a trade union 
view. 
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So. a qLICStIOll CICSIDICCI to 111Cý1SUIv employee attitudes towards flexihility might havc 
the l'ollowing set of' responses (see I'l, "Llre 2.1 1 Z7 
Figure 2.1 The Loading Of Questions Within the Survey 
Strongl, ý Agree Neither Strongly Disagree No Opinion 
Agree agree nor Disagree 
disa ree 
More flexible hour-, 
%sill help %%ith 
commitments such 
as familN. 
I %till get lo%%er 
stages due to the 
reduction of hours. 
I is ill get fe%ser 
benerits than full 
time staff. 
Fie-tibilit for the 
compan) , %ill mean 
greater job sectjrit. ý 
for e%er. % one 
including those oil 
contracts. 
The compan) will 
use neiwe shifts to 
cut out mertime 
%%hich %till reduce 
paN 
I is ill accept it 
because the airline 
business needs 
people to be nexible. 
It can be seen that even if a respondent were to tick the boxes at random s/he would 
have a reasonably equal chance of' agreemo/disagreeing with a management loaded Z- -- Z7 I- 
statement as a trade union loaded one. This is appropriatc in a nuillher of otile[* 
questions and appendix 2, which includes a full reproduction ofthe questionnaire, will 
indicate this. 
2.3.6 Piloling and The Negollalion (ý/',, Access 
Having formulated the questions and generated scveral versions of' the questionnaire. Cý I- 
pilot testino commenced in March/April of 1996. It is worth commenting oil some of 
the existing advice on piloting that rightly advises that questionnaires should be fully 
piloted on every aspect. Oppenhelm, for example, adViSeS LIS (0 'test' eVerVilling 
through a scrics Of Pilot SLIIAVVS, 1), tying attention to cletalls from the stanip/frank issue 
down to the quality of the typeface. (Oppenheim 1992: Chapter 4. ) He a(kises Lis to 
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conduct a number of pilot surveys until we perfect the questionnaire. Unfortunately in 
an industrial relations context, especially at a time of critical change and management 
re-organisation, the opportunity for pilot work is limited. However, within these 
constraints appropriate pilot work was undertaken. A sample of 80 questionnaires 
were dispatched in March 1996 through the various unions and the management with 
equal numbers sent to each (20). Returns indicated that a number of issues had to be 
reworked and re-thought. At the same time extensive consultation with both 
management and trade union officials indicated the need for some immediate changes. 
For example the category of bargaining unit in the first pilot was changed to that of 
National Sectional Panel (NSP) in the next revision after consultation with the 
TGWU, as discussions with a TGWU full time officer suggested members related 
only to their NSP grouping. In addition consultation with supervisors and a 
departmental methodology adviser suggested the need to rework scales, and include a 
'neither agree nor disagree' category in addition to the 'no opinion' response. Some 
additional questions were formulated and revised in response to pilot survey 
comments. Returns for the first pilot amounted to 33 per cent. 
British Airways had initially been favourable to the survey but after detailed 
discussions and a major meeting at their HQ, decided that the time was 'not right'to 
allow a questionnaire to be distributed. 12 The author was told that the issue could 
either be reconsidered or new research plans discussed. The issue of focus groups in 
line with access to an internal company questionnaire was discussed but the author 
saw severe limitations in this approach. The focus groups, though chosen solely by 
management, were considered as an appropriate method of discussing issues with 
employees and monitoring and recording their views. These would have been based in 
Glasgow and London but problems with the frequency of meetings in an environment 
characterised by shiftwork and in the expense of servicing meetings in London and 
Glasgow, led to the decision that the focus group approach would be inappropriate. 
12 Management at BA returned incomplete all 20 pilot questionnaires sent to them. They wished to C, "discuss" the questionnaire and felt that it was "not the best way to collect information". The author 
tried to resolve this situation by setting up a meeting with management, which resulted in a major re- 
appraisal of the project. A further modified pilot was designed and presented to BA management in 
June 1996. Management initially wanted a more neutral questionnaire but appeared convinced of the 
benefits of a 'no holds barred' attitudinal questionnaire. However by 26 June 1996 when the author met 
with British Airways management to discuss the distribution of the questionnaire, the airline faced a 
strike ballot by pilots, which caused them to withdraw their promised participation in the survey. 
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The use of the BA staff questionnaire was more problematic. Though easy to access it 
addressed none of the research questions the study was designed to address and 
amounted to a satisfaction survey, rather than attitudinal questionnaire. The data from 
this staff survey were available only in aggregated graphical form, which made it 
impossible to re-analyse or interpret the data. This alternative methodology was 
therefore abandoned and instead a decision made to distribute the survey via the trade 
unions. This decision had a number of implications for the survey as discussed below. 
2.3.7 The Trade Union Based Questionnaire: Questions and Issues 
The three key trade unions participating in the research were approached to distribute 
the questionnaires, given BA management's withdrawal of co-operation. This 
approach in itself presented several problems. Firstly, the sample would be confined 
to trade union members only. Secondly, the method of distribution was problematic. 
The method envisaged was that of the stratified sample. This is the ideal cost efficient 
method of sampling across a number of different locations and occupational 
categories. The technique involves the selection on the basis of a random sample, 
which should represent the different geographical and occupational categories. (De 
Vaus 1996: 65. ) The main drawback with the stratified sampling technique is that 
small deviations (oversampling, undersampling and non-sampling) can produce large 
distortions. However, as De Vaus argues this may not matter if the characteristic on 
which the sample is unrepresentative is not related to the focus of the study. (Ibid. ) In 
this case there were three trade unions all of which were sampled on the basis of their 
actual membership in British Airways. 
A sample of the unionised workforces of the TGWU, BALPA and AEEU 
(respectively 40,000,10,000 and 8,000) was selected with an average 1.7 per cent 
sample. Repeated attempts were made to obtain access to union records and 
membership data, in order to construct a stratified sample, and to obtain control over 
return and follow up. In pursuing this repeated faxes and telephone calls were made to 
key officials reminding them of the need for a random sample to be obtained from a 
list of members. Despite these attempts this access was not given by any of the trade 
unions, all of which cited confidentiality and union rules in justification. A 
compromise solution was therefore needed. The unions did agree to distribute the 
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questionnaires via key officials who acted as 'gatekeepers'to the occupational groups 
concerned. These 'gatekeepers' would then distribute the questionnaires according to 
sampling instructions given by the author. Considering the dissagregated nature of 
this data and the impossibility of identifying individuals it could only be concluded 
that the request was perceived as an intrusion on the time and resources of the 
organisation concerned. I offered to fund the costs of any search but was again 
refused access to the data. Despite my best attempts at re-assurance and promises to 
sign any documentation relating to anonymity and confidentiality, the records were 
not made available. This then presented the problem of trying to ensure that the 
distribution of the questionnaire was as random as possible, with neither the detailed 
records with which to select a random sample, nor the opportunity to ensure a proper 
representation of employees by region, trade union, gender and other relevant 
categories. I then asked the organisations concerned to distribute the sample on the 
basis of my instructions and was assured that this was done. Returns based on postal 
dates indicated no significant difference between late response and non-response. 
(Wass 1994: 106. ) The co-operation of busy union officers at a time of considerable 
industrial unrest and organisational upheaval was greatly appreciated, and the author 
could not reasonably expect these officers to prioritise an issue such as this. There 
was, however, a great deal of support from the unions concerned and a great deal of 
belief in the importance of a neutral survey. 
2.3.8 Returns and Non returns: Sonw Issues 
There was a significant disparity in return rates between the TGWU and other unions, 
with a corresponding over representation of ground handling staff within the TGWU 
sample. There were no returns from cabin crew, which may well have been 
institutional . 
13 The bunching of a large cluster of returns on similar dates suggested 
there might well have been a non-random distribution on a 'convenience sample basis' 
to certain groups that could not be discounted. It can be contended that whilst very 
13 Although the surveys were distributed via the union's national Airline Officer George Ryde, who is 0 
also the major official dealing with cabin crew, it was assumed that the surveys would be distributed 0 
amongst cabin crew as the sampling instructions indicated. The returns sug est that there was no 00 &V CD 
systematic distribution to cabin crew, suggesting that for reasons unknown they were excluded from 
distribution. One explanation might be that the cabin crew section of the TGWU (BASSA) has a 
separate group of officials and separate union offices. This may have rendered the inclusion of cabin 
crew less likely. 
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step was taken to ensure random and representative distribution, the real institutional 
constraints of the industrial relations environment made this extremely difficult and 
even theoretically impossible. 
The belief that only statistics generated from a random sample possess validity is 
widespread within the industrial relations/employment research literature. Yet the 
author would argue that even if it had been possible to ensure that the data were 
perfectly random, the skewed nature of the data would have made it difficult to 
conduct meaningful statistical tests. Should the data then be discarded as 
inappropriate? There are reasons for arguing this should not be the case. First of all 
the replicability of sample surveys in industrial relations is under severe question (see 
Hartley and Barling 1998). Many such surveys take place at a particular time and 
place and can do no more than obtain a snapshot of the views and attitudes of those 
whom they seek to measure. In another sense it could be argued that a survey of the 
attitudes of human beings cannot be expected to measure attitudes in the same way as 
an experiment within the natural world. Human agents on both sides of the research 
experience, both 'experimenter' and 'subject' are informed by their own mores and 
values, n-dsgivings, instincts, intuitions and beliefs. Given the highly contested nature 
of industrial relations and business policy at British Airways and at many other firms 
undergoing a cathartic process of restructuring, we could not expect anything else. 
Yet many social scientists expect to be able to measure attitudes and then predict the 
behaviour of others from that set of initial conditions. (Godard 1994: 13. ) The survey 
was designed to examine several key hypotheses about the processes of deregulation 
and employment. It was supplemented by a number of other methodological 
approaches from interviews with key official and managers, to a detailed investigation 
of secondary data. Validity should be seen from the point of view of the 
methodological stance and the role of the survey, which was to provide some test of 
the attitudes of workers. 
The main quantitative data aspect of the study is an illustrative case study designed to 
look at the theoretical issues developed throughout the thesis. Whilst it is intended to 
provide some information on these criteria it does not seek to exhaustively or 
comprehensively test them. Firstly that would be impossible to justify given the 
I 
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nature of responses, which made it difficult to obtain the preconditions for even the 
most basic inferential tests such as Chi square. Secondly, it would be unnecessarily 
reductionist to ascribe the aspects of one case study to the entire industry on the basis 
of one set of employee attitudes. However sound the statistical basis for such a 
generalisation the theoretical basis would not support this. The airline industry exists 
in a multiplicity of political and economic contexts and market environments. Each of 
these environments is governed by an overarching set of regulatory and market 
pressures which to some extent encourage airlines to adopt common policies. These 
policies such as outsourcing, the creation of internal low cost strategies and the 
formation of alliances are all common trends within the industry. However it is 
necessary to temper these pressures towards a form of common strategy with the 
reality of the industrial relations environment. A case does in such a context provide a 
worthwhile illustration of the trends, which are developing within other airlines and 
their employees. This is especially so if it is designed specifically to look at industrial 
relations issues. (Kitay and Callus 1998: 111. ) 
In a sense the questionnaire goes beyond the usual 'snapshot' example whereby a 
questionnaire is used to say something about the issue at a specified point in time and 
place. The questionnaire in this study is the culmination of a careful and thorough 
examination of the development of employment change within the industry. It focuses 
on British Airways as a carrier poised at a particular point in the evolution of the 
European airline industry. In any case, representativeness in attitudinal surveys is not 
a clear-cut issue. Whilst a traditional positivist research methodology would question 
the validity of a questionnaire which could not infer from a sample population, few 
such treatments deal specifically with industrial relations issues. When they do deal 
with such issues, many approach the field from the disciplines of psychology and 
economics where predictive validity is paramount. 
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Hartley and Barling, for example, articulate fairly well the preoccupation of 
psychologists with what they themselves term "psychometric issues. "
'It is sometimes suggested that psychologists are overly concerned with 
psychometric properties of their research instruments (most notably 
reliability and validity), but these are key aspects of questionnaire 
design and hence research design. In addition a lack of reliability and 
validity may well affect any inferences that can be made. If a 
quantitative measure of a variable has poor reliability or low validity, 
then the researcher is not in a position to make confident 
interpretations of the research data, because variability in scores may 
be as much a function of instrument error or of random responding as 
any "true variation" within the sample. ' (Hartley and Barling 1998 
: 167. ) 
In this survey predictive validity is less important than the issue of construct validity. 
Construct validity refers to the ability of the survey to carry out the task for which it 
was designed. It can be argued that in looking at specific debates and issues around 
the issues of employment change, globalisation and deregulation the survey fulfilled 
its purpose. It measured a sub-sample of BA employees across a range of bargaining 
groups, and highlighted a particular group of employees; those involved in ground 
handling and engineering as fairly typical of the general workforce within the 
industry. The survey was also divided into those employed within the engineering and 
ground handling functions. The results of the survey, bearing in mind its deficiencies 
and inadequacies, provide a good summing up of the survey and its methodological 
framework. 
2.3.9 Questionnaire Method and Industrial Relations Research: Some Observations 
Whilst it is necessary to strive for random distribution the realities of industrial 
relations research in a conflictual environment render this difficult. In times of 
increasing closure and secrecy from the actors themselves, it becomes very difficult to 
pursue any type of organisationally focused enquiry. The possibility of obtaining any 
information is increasingly jeopardised. The possibilities of obtaining access on terms 
which allow a fully validated random sample, are becoming rare. Often this level of 
access is only granted in cases of 'partnership research', or 'action research' whereby 
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academics act as 'change consultants'to a particular organisation. In both companies 
and trade unions obtaining total access and therefore a likely high response rate is 
often only possible at the expense of objectivity. Organisations invite this kind of 
research only on the basis that it can be seen to affirm organisational goals. 
Management, for example, would not allow the survey to take place at a time of 
conflict. Conversely trade unions actually wanted the survey to take place before 
issues went 'off the boil'in the minds of their memberships. The researcher then faces 
the problem of reconciling two sides of a contentious debate. Indeed nowhere is the 
attitudinal. fissure between employee groups and management better exemplified than 
in the brokering of a questionnaire into a fraught industrial relations environment. 
Given the aims of the research and the need to address issues identified through the 
early interview work, and the ever-encroaching time factor, access had to be obtained 
on some basis. The need for data was unavoidable and yet there were many reasons 
for waiting until a more favourable 'window' arose. This was attempted waiting for 
access to management who were pre-occupied with the announcement of the 
BA/American alliance, and had promised co-operation(June 1996). There was in 
addition to a possible strike of pilots a large scale management re-organisation, which 
led to the redeployment of some key management contacts. 14 
Conclusion 
The methodological approach employed in this thesis seeks to provide a framework 
for the study of employment regulation and deregulation within the airline industry. 
As we have noted the political economy approach is used to develop an analysis of 
change and continuity within the sector, by relating it to other sectors thus developing 
a series of questions about the nature of labour market deregulation. This involves the 
development of several models of labour market deregulation, which are used 
throughout the thesis to examine the airline industry. Next the thesis looks specifically 
at the regulated period of the industry developing several key propositions on the 
14 This re-organisation saw the HRM director moved to another post and many HRM professionals 
moved into other functions. That managgers were able to afford any time to the project was remarkable 
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effects of industry regulation, structure and product market upon airline employment. 
Using this broad framework the thesis then examines the impact of deregulation on 
pilots as a key occupational group. The next set of questions addresses the effect of 
deregulation upon a particular carrier and its workforce using a detailed survey and 
case study method. British Airways provides a 'critical case'with which to examine 
subsequent developments in the industry. Thus the issue of management strategy in 
response to deregulation and of worker response are examined. The wider experience 
of European airline workers is then examined with regard to costs and productivity, 
wage premia and changes in regulation and management strategy. Finally the 
emerging regulatory, product market and labour market framework are discussed in 
terms of the global product market convergence model of employment deregulation. 
This allows us to develop an understanding of the emerging context of airline 
employment, and the nature of both management and trade union strategies. 
and is deeply appreciated. 
71 





As a BA employee you will know that a great deal of change has 
occurred and will continue to occur with deregulation. Please help me by 
completing this questionnaire which looks at employee attitudes towards 
employment changes resulting from deregulation. The questionnaire is 
aimed at members of the major BA trade unions. 
This is NOT a management or trade union commissioned survey but part 
of a long term university research project. Your co-operation will help to 
provide important data. Your anonymity is assured, as the data will only 
be presented in statistical form. If you have any queries relating to the 
questionnaire, and/or would like to be sent a copy of future findings, then 
please contact me on any of the telephone numbers below. 
John McGurk, University of Glasgow, (0141) 339 8855 ext. 2337 
evenings (0141) 423 9324 
Please read the questionnaire carefully. Most questions ask your attitude towards BA 
policies. In some cases you may not feel strongly one way or the other in those cases 
please tick the: (PTO) 
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THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATISATION AND DEREGULATION ON BA 
"Neither agree/nor disagree" box 
If you have no opinion or cannot answer then and only then tick the 
"No opinion" box 
1. About Your JOB. What category describes your current job? 
Please CIRCLE the box provided 
Pilot 1 
Flight Engineer 2 
Cabin Crew 3 
Maintenance and Overhaul 4 
Ground Handling 5 
Administration 
Sales and Marketing 6 
Other (please specify below) 7 
2. About Your LOCATION: Where are you based? Please CIRCLE the number of 
the box which describes your location. If your base is a regional call centre or sales 
outlet then circle the nearest city. 
1. Heathrow 5. Manchester 8. Aberdeen 11. Highlands 
Islands 
2. Gatwick 6. Glasgow 9. Edinburgh 12. Cardiff 
3. Birmingham 7. Belfast 10. Newcastle 13. Other 
(please 
specify) 
3. Which SECTION of BA are you cuffently employed within? 
Please CIRCLE the section within which you work 
BA Europe I 
BA World 2 
BA Regional 3 
Euro Gatwick 4 
BA Engineering 5 
BAMC 6 
Cargo 6 
Other (please Specify below) 7 
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4. About your TRADE UNION or Staff Association. Please Circle the number which 





Which National Sectional Panel (NSP) within BA represents you in negotiations 
with management? 
1. "A" Scales 
2. Flight Crew 
3. GSS 
4. Craft bargaining Unit 
5. Non -craft bargaining Unit 
6. Cabin Crew 
7. Other (please specify) 
5. Were you employed within a company that was taken over by BA? Please CIRCLE the 
number of the company within which you were previously employed. 
BEA I 
BOAC 2 
British Caledonian 3 





6. If you previously worked for an airline now part of BA how did you view your general 
terms and conditions of employment at that airline? Where they: (Please CIRCLE the box 
number of the statement you most agree with). 
Better than now I iI 
No different from now? 1 2 
Worse than now 13 
7. How LONG have you worked for BA? (Including predecessor companies BEA and 
BOAQ (Please enter your length of service to the nearest year in the box below. 
I 
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8. About you current employment tenns. On which basis are you currently employed? (Please 
CIRCLE the box number which applies to you) 
Full time permanent I 
Part time permanent 2 
Full time Temporary 3 
Part time temporary 4 
Fixed contract temporary 5 
Other (please specify) 6 
Section 2: BA's Current Eml2loyment Policies 
9. What is your opinion of the following sorts of employment policy? 
recently introduced at BA? (Please TICK the statement you most agree with for each 
category. 
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly No 




activities to low cost 
areas of Britain and 
Europe. 
Setting up regional 
operations with 
lower pay and 
conditions than 
mainline staff. 
The use of Franchise 
operators to provide 
certain services. 
Greater use of part 
time and temporary 
contracts 
Separating off 
certain areas such as 
engineering from the 
main business. 
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Perhaps you have your own particular views about BA employment policies as they 
affect you or your colleagues. Please enter your views in the box below. 
10. In common with other businesses BA is seeking to extend the use of contract part 
time and temporary staff. In your opinion regardless of whether or not you are 
employed on such a contract what will this mean for you as an individual employee? 
Strongly Agree Neither Strongly Disagree No 
Agree agree nor Disagree Opinion 
disagre 
More flexible 
hours will help 
with commitments 
such as family. 
I will get lower 
wages due to the 
reduction of 
hours. 
I will get fewer 
benefits than full 
time staff. 
Flexibility for the 
company will 
mean greater job 
security for 
everyone 
including those on 
contracts. 
The company will 
use flexible shifts 
to cutout 
overtime which 
will reduce pay 
I will accept it 
because the airline 
business needs 
people to be 
flexible. 
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11 BA management is constantly examining whether certain operations should be placed out 
with the airline. If this happened to your job what would you miss in being transferred outside 
BA? Please list in order of their importance to you. 
Very important neither Not very unimporta no 
important important or Important nt opinion 
unimportant 
BA travel facilities 
and other perks 
BA terms and 
conditions. 
The common 
purpose of working 
exclusively for BA. 
The protection of 
national trade 
union agreements. 
The job security 
which a large 
airline like BA 
provides. 
Section 3. BA's Current Global Strategy and BA Employees 
12. The following business strategies are being pursued globally by BA. Please TICK the 
statement within each row to indicate whether you support/oppose etc. these strategies. 
Strongly Support Neither Oppose Strongly No opinion 
Support support/ oppose 
Oppose 
Cost reduction as the 
overriding priority 
Increasing 
productivity as much 
as possible 
Offering lower fares 
than other carriers 
Involving Staff more 
in the running of the 
company 
Lobbying for access 
to airports and 
services currently 
denied to BA. 
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Lobbying for an end 
to state aid for our 
competitors 
Taking over or 
acquiring holdings in 
other airlines 




with other carriers 
to expand but not 
necessarily using BA 
Aircraft and Crews 
Moving some 
functions to lower 
labour cost locations 
If you feel staff should be involved more in the running of the company, in which ways would 
you like to become more involved. Please use the box below to record your views 
13. Your Views on what BA's global business strategy means for BA staff. Please TICK the 
box/boxes which best describe your attitude towards the statements on the left-hand side. 
Agree Strongly Neither Agree Disagree Strongly No Opinion 
Nor Disa ree Disagree 
More competition 
leads to less job 
security 
Some jobs will be 
moved to low labour 
cost countries like 
India and China 
It brings a new sense 
of purpose knowing 
that we are 
competing against 
the big global 
carriers. 
Alliances could mean 
less flights and 
threaten jobs. 
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Jobs are more secure 
all round because we 
can win new 
business. 
We have no choice 
but to use these 
strategies because 
that's the reality of 
the airline industry 
today. 
14. What do you think BA's business strategy will mean for your own terms and conditions? 
(Please TICK the box or boxes with your preferred statement i. e. Agree, Disagree etc.. ) 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree Disagree Strongly No 
Agree Nor Disagree Disagree Opinion 
Reduced wages, 
through greater use 
of part time work 
and contracts 
Greater use of profit 
share or performance 
related pay which 
might increase wages. 
A reduction in fringe 
benefits such as 
travel concessions 
and medical benefits. 
Greater flexibility to 
allow us to respond 






and shift rates 
through the use of 
new shift patterns 
such as annualised 
hours and split shifts. 
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15. Which of the following do you think would result if BA abolished national bargaining? 41 (please TICK the box which covers your opinion of the changes listed below. 
Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly No 
Agree Agree Nor Disagree Opinion 
Disagree 
Our power to 
influence 
management would 
be severely reduced. 
We would be in a 




We would be under 
constant threat of 
franchising, or 
contracting out if we 
did not agree to 
changes within our 
part of the business. 
We would still have 
the unions to 
represent us as 
before. 
Management would 
try to bypass the 
unions and negotiate 
directly with staff. 
We would be able to 
focus on our own 
part of the business. 
Pay rates and 
conditions would fall 
as management tried 
to cut costs. 
We might become 
more involved in the 
management of our 




Please CIRCLE 1 or 2 here to indicate your gender. 
1 MALE 2 FEMALE 
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3 
Regulated Control: The Dynamics of Product 
and Labour Market Regulation In the US and 
UK Airline Industries 
This chapter examines the nature of product and labour market developments within 
the US and UK from around 1920 -1978 in the US and 1920-1980s within the UK. 
However, the bulk of the period covers the period from about 1930 till 1975, when the 
labour market and industrial relations was under varying degrees of regulated control. 
In examining this era we look firstly at the early growth of product regulation and 
industrial relations within the USA, describing their impact upon the airline labour 
market. We then shift our focus to that same period in the UK, examining the growth 
of the industry and industrial relations within the formative period of airline 
development. Having examined these periods we then reflect on the clear differences 
and similarities between them, in particular, analysing the role of the state. We then 
proceed to analyse the period of later regulation, where the consequences of the 
regulatory and industrial relations structures erected in the earlier period become 
manifest. Having done so we then draw together some observations on the nature of 
these product/labour market regimes building upon the models of labour market 
regulation encountered in chapter 1. This provides a historical and theoretical context 
for later chapters were the effects of both product and labour market deregulation are 
examined in detail. 
In both contexts, airline industry regulation has had specific impacts upon the airline 
labour market. The process of regulation brought power and prestige to key 
employees, particularly pilots who, aided by the state and their own bargaining 
ability, managed to command exemplary terms and conditions. Later as the industry 
grew and pilots used their bargaining power, the state acted to re-align the balance of 
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power permitting management to organise against pilot demands. Throughout the 
regulated era, changes in the regulatory structure had pronounced effects upon the 
labour market. However, not until the process of deregulation, did the impact of 
changed regulatory structures alter the labour market and industrial relations structure 
of the industry in wholesale fashion. 
The story is similar in the UK, which is broadly representative of the European model 
of regulation, where the regulatory process is effected primarily through state 
ownership and national level regulation. Although the pilots, and later other groups 
such as engineers, enjoy a high level of bargaining power, this is contained and 
effectively neutralised within corporatist bargaining structures. (Blain 1970. ) 
Nevertheless, the effective power of organised labour is always below the surface. 
Eventually, the combined effect of product market and technological change and a 
perception of declining fortunes provokes the disruptive power of pilots and other 
groups. Each change in the regulatory and product market has consequences for the 
labour market and industrial relations. Given the position of the US originating a 
major airline industry and its later role in leading the path to regulatory reform, it is 
useful to examine the early US experience of product and labour market regulation. 
The next section provides this essential context to our study. 
3.1.1 Early Industry Regulation and the Labour Market in the USA 
The US airline industry grew rapidly from the mid 1900s but had been characterised 
by an element of barnstorming chaos and a lack of economic stability. (Hopkins 1992: 
12. ) Competition for government contracts meant carriers operated at and sometimes 
beyond the very margins of safety. In order to ensure growth in the fledgling industry 
administrators created a regulatory system, which would deliver both safety and 
stability. Government intervention became inevitable, despite the free market 
orientation of the Hoover administration under which the first steps to regulation were 
taken. (Ibid. ) The principal acts of product market regulation involved a complex 
subsidy system for government mail contracts, which up till then accounted for the 
major share of traffic. However, to develop the crucial passenger aspect of air 
transport a more interventionist method of regulation was needed. In order to provide 
the much more rigorous safety environment needed for the safe transport of 
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passengers, government engineered a regulatory framework. Broadly, the new regime 
built on earlier legislation to formalise mail contracts, guarantee markets and spheres 
of influence to the airlines and wages and conditions to airline labour. (See Kahn 
1980: 319. ) Thus in the New Deal period around 1932-35, a swathe of regulatory 
initiatives impacted upon the air transport sector. The system of regulation provided a 
framework of collective bargaining and protection for, and extension of, work rules. 
This was particularly important for pilots who obtained favourable productivity and 
scheduling rules, acting in effect as a conduit for technical regulation. 
The foundations of labour market regulation within the industry were the Railway 
Labor Act (RLA) (Title 11) of 1936 and various directives of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) (1938) which together legislated on terms and conditions, prescribing a 
framework for the conduct of collective bargaining. The CAB also regulated the 
wages and hours of pilots in its role as guarantor of safety and licensing. The 
cumulative effect of both tiers of regulation was favourable to labour and, more 
specifically, pilots. As Taneja (1976: 224) argues, the adoption of an award to pilots 
known as Decision No. 83 and passed by the National Labour Board (NLB) in 1934, 
ensured that pilots would receive a substantial part of future productivity increases in 
the shape of increased wages or reduced hours. (Ibid. ) 
Decision 83 was the culmination of an astute campaign by the newly formed pilots' 
union, the Airline Pilots' Association (ALPA). ALPA grew from pilots' concerns in 
the depression period between 1929-1932 that wages would be ratcheted down and 
hours progressively increased. The prospect of a general onslaught of the type, 
initiated by the fervently anti-union entrepreneur E. H. Cord of Century Airlines in 
1932,15(lbid. ) sent the pilots looking for political influence particularly within 
Congress. (Ibid. ) In fact, the deflation of the late 1920s actually improved the 
position of pilots as prices plummeted downwards and the real value of their wages 
increased. Though pilots (as their official historian George E. Hopkins argues) were 
motivated "more by the fear of changes than the fact of them" they had legitimate 
15 Cord sacked the entire pilot workforce of the airline after provoking a strike ostensibly to that end. 
I lis actions were instrumental in the formation of ALPA the pilots union, and attracted the distaste of 
congress and of other operators. The establishment of a state-regulated floor on labour conditions was 
advanced as a method of indirect regulation in response to his buccaneering activities. (Cohen 1990: 
308-23. ) 
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concerns. (Hopkins 1992: 14. ) By lobbying Congress to deny a federal mail contract 
to Cord, ALPA was able to manoeuvre its way into a favourable position. There was 
considerable sympathy for this union. ALPA was able to marshal support from 
politicians such as La Guardia and Roosevelt himself. (Ibid. ) Indeed, La Guardia 
publicly criticised Cord for paying pilots "less than a union truck driver gets in New 
York" (Ibid. ) This kind of heavyweight political support was important in ALPA's 
growth and in ensuring that technical regulation was effectively enacted through the 
terms and conditions of pilots. Using the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
code pilots sought and obtained a better agreement than either government nor 
operators were initially prepared to grant. (Kahn 1980: 341. ) By 1934 the union was 
able to secure its own unique deal in respect of Decision 83. (Capelli 1987: 137. ) 
Thus the role of the pilot union was of crucial importance in producing a structure of 
product and labour market regulation, which benefited labour. In particular, they 
benefited pilots to such an extent that the ability of these workers to capture 
productivity increases in the shape of higher earnings became a major pre-occupation 
of proponents of deregulation in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Before World War IL therefore, pilots depended to a great extent upon the support of 
the state. Paradoxically, ALPA's bargaining strategy in the 1930s was based on its 
intrinsic weakness, cultivating political support based on its prestige and desisting 
from all but the most defensive industrial action. Although ALPA had won the 
Century strike against E. L. Cord in 1932, the union was wary about taking further 
industrial action. This was a rational policy at a time of increasing legislation and 
when government was anxious to push forward a new spirit of corporatism (Dubofsky 
1990). This position can be contrasted with militant use of the strike weapon after the 
Second World War. 
Government's own rationale can be explained by the structural problems of the 
industry. In the mid to late 1930s government was prepared to tolerate an increasingly 
concentrated industry structure in its attempts to develop a stable and profitable 
industry. One aspect of that stability was a degree of workplace harmony, in 
particular, a method of solving disputes, which stopped short of strikes and lockouts. 
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Both accidents ýnd strikes were all too common under the old subsidised competitive 
regime of the 1920s, proving a major obstacle to industry stability. A highly 
structured and codified framework of craft-based collective bargaining replaced the 
low trust, purely 'contractual' basis of the earlier employment relationship. As labour 
grew in strength and organisation and as the major airlines benefited from 
oligopolistie competition, compliance with the RLA became a condition for market 
entry. From 1938 the newly created super-regulator, the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB), made RLA compliance a prerequisite for the granting of a Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity (PC&N). When pilots were granted a 
comprehensive pay and productivity deal, in the shape of Decision 83 the state sought 
to use labour conditions as a form of indirect regulation. By the end of the period, 
labour had begun (with the protection of the state) to enjoy a high level of bargaining 
power and had the potential to pursue its demands to the full. 
3.1.2 Industry Regulation and Industfial Relations: the UK 
The development of the UK industrial relations framework followed a different track. 
In many ways, macro level differences such as the voluntarist nature of UK Industrial 
Relations shaped labour management interaction, complementing developments 
within firms and the industry. However, the smaller scale, scope and potential of the 
UK airline industry compared to the US must also be borne in mind. Though the UK 
industry was vibrant with routes offered from almost every point in the country, it was 
consistently unprofitable. (Dyos and Aldcroft 1969: 271-283. ) This environment 
provided the background and context to the system of industrial relations. There were 
superficial, if predictable, similarities with the USA given the nature of the industry. 
As in the USA, pilot disaffection led to the formation of the first and strongest airline 
union in the UK. Safety concerns were a major issue in pilot strikes given the high 
fatality rate for both passengers and aircrew. (Bagwell 1988: 271. ) Pilots had 
originally been affiliated to the Transport and General Workers Union and the TUC, 
through the Federation of British Civilian Airline Pilots (FBCAP). (Blain 1971: 49. ) 
That union was involved in an early strike against Imperial Airways in 1924. 
Although only 24 pilots belonged to the Federation, the employers responded 
vigorously with members of the fledgling pilot organisation dismissed and blacklisted 
(ibid. ). The dispute was ostensibly about remuneration, though a complex array of 
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grievances and resentments were expressed through the pay aspect. The first airline 
union was defeated in the strike. According to an unpublished official history of the 
successor flight deck union, the British Airline Pilots' Association (BALPA), the 
Federation members "being mainly ex-service tended to regard themselves as 
'Officers and Gentlemen' and feeling uncomfortable having done something so 
ungentlemanly as striking, they allowed their federation to quietly die. " (The Log 
1987. ) Despite the earlier setback, the need for trade union organisation in an industry 
with similar problems of safety and stability as experienced in the US remained. 
Nevertheless, obstacles remained in respect of the nature of pilot representation. In the 
vacuum after the Imperial Airways strike, the Guild of Airline Pilots and Navigators 
(GAPAN), represented professional and technical interests, deliberately eschewing a 
trade union orientation, as its Livery Company status demanded. However as pilots 
faced a tough management regime at the major carrier, Imperial Airways, the 
importance of effective trade union organisation became clear. The shortcoming of 
GAPAN became all too apparent as the new union sought a pay deal. Both the 
Chairman of Imperial Airways and his managing director refused to recognise the 
union or even to negotiate. 
As The Log jubilee edition of 1987 argued, one of the problems was the failure of 
GAPAN to present a credible threat to autocratic airline management: 
'GAPAN had no teeth with which to get its way and once commerce 
got in the way the old boy network simply did not work. Secondly, as 
the numbers of pilots increased it became impossible to maintain the 
same level of personal contact with Management. This was especially 
true in Imperial Airways as it expanded rapidly and based pilots in 
several down route stations, further weakening lines of personal 
communication. 16 
This recognition of the failure of GAPAN's gentlemanly advocacy, and the implied 
breakdown in the traditional paternalistic work culture, prepared the way for the 
growth of BALPA as the first airline trade union. BALPA was modelled on the US 
pilot union ALPA and borrowed from the organisational talents of its founder David 
Behncke. BALPA founding member, Captain Eric Lane-Burslern had pursued a flying 
career in the United States having joined ALPA from its formation in 1931. On 
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returning to the UK in 1933 inspired by this experience, Lane-Burslern resolved to 
begin an UK pilot union. Lane-Burslern became even more convinced after his 
repeated complaints to management about the safety of Imperial aircraft were ignored. 
Given the dominance of Imperial in UK civil aviation these misgivings came to the 
attention of government via his persistent lobbying. 
As in the USA, legal enactments benefited the early pilot organisations. The Air 
Navigation Act (1936) probably operated in a more indirect way than US legislation, 
which favoured labour explicitly. Its main effect was to enshrine a two-airline strategy 
as official policy with some labour provisions. The national government of the period 
took the opportunity of introducing a form of product market regulation, which led as 
in the US, to higher levels of concentration. Labour regulation can be viewed as part 
of the compact, which would ensure safety and stability. However the primary 
concern was probably (as in the US industry) stability. Nevertheless, the 1936 act did 
ex tend the scope of labour regulation considerably, even if it only specified a floor for 
remuneration. The act guaranteed minimum wages and conditions in the industry, 
specifying that: 
The wages paid by any "subsidised persons" to that person's 
employees in connection with the carriage of air passengers or goods 
may not be less favourable than those observed under (those applying 
to) government contracts'(Cmnd. 1032 1936 Air Navigation Act. ) 
However, although such measures were important to the extent of setting a floor on 
wages, remuneration was not the sole issue. At the heart of the Imperial Airways 
dispute was the issue of power and prerogative. Safety was often used as a proxy for 
these issues. BALPA criticised both the management and safety regime that prevailed. 
When Lane-Burslern himself suffered near disaster due to these safety deficiencies in 
1936, his determination to form an independent and assertive pilot association was re- 
aff irmed. 
However the extension of product market regulation, to control the UK industry, 
provided the impetus to both trade union organisation and labour market regulation. 
Again this has to be located within the national industrial relations context (Gospel 
16TIze Log 1987 Jubilee edition "50 years of BALPA" (pa( ge 9) 
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and Palmer 1993: 155). Both unions and management favoured this form of labour 
market regulation and legislation of the type encountered in the USA would have 
conflicted with this voluntarist tradition. The voluntarist nature of industrial relations 
in the UK as a whole has to be offset against the general atmosphere of industrial 
relations in the aftermath of the general strike and depression. Despite defeats, labour, 
as Fox argues, was still: 
'Enjoying the protections and constraints of constitutionalism and the rule of 
law, ... (and) could exercise that function despite mass unemployment, and 
weakened bargaining power. Unemployment had weakened unions but it had 
not destroyed collective bargaining. ' (Fox 1985: 337. ) 
Within the airline industry, the truth of this statement was verified when the Cadman 
Commision of 1938 boosted trade unions and collective bargaining through the 
extension of Whitley councils. (Blain 1970. ) The extension of this standard 
framework of civil service collective bargaining and joint consultation was again 
effected at a time of further industry consolidation. The Cadman Commission 
consolidated all imperial and European routes into a duopoly, and rationalised 
subsidies and fares. It was an attempt to kick start a stable air transport industry. 
(Dyos and Aldcroft 1969. ) BALPA was able to win substantial majorities 
representing the pilots' interest on those bodies. The eve of World War 11 therefore 
witnessed the formation of both a key trade union and official recognition of 
collective bargaining in the UK airline industry. This arose, as in the USA, from the 
safety concerns of pilots and was facilitated not just by the goodwill of politicians but 
by the careful and tactical approach of the fledgling union. 
3.1.3 Early Product and Labour Market Regulation in the US and UK. - A Comparison 
It is important to reflect on both the similarities and differences between the early US 
and UK experiences of labour market regulation. As in the USA, pilots in Britain 
became organised over safety fears and the experience of dealing with an autocratic 
management. To a great extent, the issue of safety and trade union representation 
cannot be separated. Militant organisation was necessary in an environment of 
victimisation and managerial autocracy. Pilot pushing in the USA under the US Postal 
Service led to the formation of the first pilot organisation and later to ALPA. In the 
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UK the despotism of Imperial Airways led pilots to form their own militant 
association in 1924, though this was stillborn. GAPAN's low key strategy was 
exhausted by the technical and organisational. arrogance of Imperial, which their 
genteel lobbying was ill equipped to confront. Furthermore as Blain (1970) contends 
increasing complexity within Imperial and the wider industry caused alienation 
between management and workers. The close knit organisational. intimacy, common 
in the airborne services, was lost and the previously accepted military style discipline 
and hierarchy was now being contested. 
In this early period of regulation we can see some clear similarities between 
essentially weakened fledgling unions, seeking and obtaining the protection of the 
state through the mechanism of regulation. Bearing in mind the differences between 
the airline industry in both nations, we can point to several key differences in the 
application of product and labour market regulation. In the US, government chose to 
harness the regulatory system towards the goal of industry growth and stability and 
the clear use of labour market regulation, as part of that overall blueprint is evident in 
the product and labour market legislation discussed. There was a clear interconnection 
in the USA between product and labour market regulation, the clearest evidence being 
the stipulation of RLA compliance as a condition for market entry. The technical 
constraints on efficiency and the distribution of the gains of productivity to labour, 
was a conscious design of the regulatory system. 
In the UK there was a more fitful if equally extensive form of product market 
regulation, with the state encouraging first a long distance monopoly airline in the 
shape of Imperial Airways, and then a 'dual airline policy'under Cadman. The smaller 
size of the UK industry necessitated this level of concentration, which can be 
contrasted with the more basically competitive forms of consolidation, which the state 
sponsored in the USA. Again, as in the USA in response to pilot and misgivings 
about Imperial's cavalier attitude to safety, the government of the 1930s initiated a 
series of protective labour clauses within general industry legislation. These provided 
basic wage and licensing protections for aircrew and were later extended in the 1938 
Cadman act to include the Whitley model of collective bargaining. There is less 
evidence of the state actively using labour regulation to promote wider industry goals 
as occurred in the US. The extension of a protective floor to wages and conditions and 
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of collective bargaining was entirely consistent with the voluntarist nature of UK 
industrial relations in the period, and as a modem industry air transport was subjected 
to it. 
We are left therefore, in analysing the early period of regulation with a clear 
divergence between the liberal corporatist intervention of the USA and the quasi- 
regulated voluntarism of the UK. Both models reflect wider state goals and industry 
structures and much is explained by the superior size and scope of the US industry. 
Nevertheless there are clear differences in the extent to which the state is prepared to 
intervene within the industrial relations environment, even when its goals of safety 
and stability are essentially similar. Having mapped the early experience of regulation 
within both countries, and explained the key product and labour market differences, 
we now go on to examine how product/labour market regulation actually operated in 
the industry regulated beyday' period, broadly from the 1940s till the eve of 
deregulation in the mid 1970s. 
3.2 Regulation and Industrial Relations in the Post War Period 
3.2.1 Post War Regulation and Industrial Relations in the USA 
Within the US, the foundations provided by the RLA and the effects of industry 
regulation secured a favourable position for airline labour in the post war period. The 
industry reaped the benefits of passenger growth and increasing scale, allowing labour 
to push for greater representation. From 1939 collective bargaining became 
widespread, fundamentally altering the balance of power between labour and capital. 
This fact encouraged the view of later 'deregulationist' writers such as TaneJa (1976) 
and Caves (1962) that labour enjoyed despotic power in the industry. This has to be 
qualified with reference to the labour legislation with its enforced mediation 
provisions, which potentially restricted the power of even the strongest occupational 
groups. (Kahn 1980: 343. ) Nevertheless, the important issue from the point of view of 
the study, is that labour enjoyed a period of considerable power and influence and the 
state tended not to use the sanctions at its disposal in order to challenge that power. 
Indeed, according to Nothrup (1977), the RLA afforded labour too much power and 
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fundamentally weakened carriers. The craft based nature of bargaining encouraged 
union competition and fragmented representation, especially in the case of pilots 
(Northrup 1977: 364-372). 
Product market growth led to a huge expansion in the labour force. The crisis 
conditions of the immediate post war period disappeared, replaced by a precipitate 
expansion of world air travel from the 1950s. In the US between 1945 and 1955, 
passenger evenue miles increased six-fold from 3.9 billion to 24.2 billion or 521 per 
cent (Capelli 1985a). Overall between 1955 and 1985 there were only 6 unprofitable 
years. (ICAO 1994. ) Within that environment of industry growth and optimism, 
labour prospered. Pilots in particular were able to take advantage of the growth 
conditions, in order to pursue their sectional aims. Their strategy was aided by the 
nature of bargaining within the industry which favoured labour groups with disruptive 
power and a unified representational structure. With almost total coverage of the pilot 
workforce ALPA benefited from this bargaining environment. The option of 
substituting high cost with lower cost employees was effectively closed-off to 
operators by virtue of the certification aspect of regulation. Whilst there would 
normally be an incentive in any business to raise profits by cutting costs, this 
efficiency 'driver' was effectively dampened as a consequence of the regulatory 
regime. Capelli describes the prevailing labour market environment: 
In short, under regulation, employment levels did not vary along 
with employment costs. Unions had little to lose by pushing up 
labor costs, and the carriers had little reason to resist their doing so 
because industry average costs were passed on to consumers 
through fare increases. Although holding the line on labor costs 
would have improved profits, airline managers typically thought 
that profit increases would not be worth the costs of a potential 
strike. ' (Capelli 1987: 139. ) 
The fragmented nature of bargaining in the US industry was also a key factor in the 
ability of pilots, in particular, to secure their demands. (Capelli 1987: 56. ) Using a 
mixture of craft exclusivity, tactical awareness and militancy, US pilots were 
incredibly successful in securing those interests. Whenever their interests were 
threatened, they were prepared to strike the individual carrier until their demands 
were met. Few workers in or out of the airline industry had this kind of bargaining 
prowess. With no national negotiating body given the differing ownership patterns of 
91 
the industry, there was little carriers could do. In effect there was post hoc national 
bargaining. That is to say, though individual carriers negotiated with union 
representatives at carrier level, agreements and disagreements were always subject to 
the intervention of the federal authorities. The state often intervened by initiating 
inquiries into strikes and other episodes of disharmony, however it seldom found 
against labour (Krolick 1966: 136). 
ALPA's bargaining power grew in tandem with the growth in the overall workforce, 
between 1950 and 1955. The extent of this power was reflected in their ability to 
influence technological change within the industry. Larger four engine piston aircraft 
were introduced, and after intense battles between the union, aircraft manufacturers 
and operators, these aircraft carried an extra crew member - the flight engineer. 
(Leveen 1982. ) However, despite the victory over crew complement in the late 1940s, 
ALPA faced a less certain future than the frenzied growth of the 1940s and 1950s 
suggested. The crucial break period was the introduction of jet aircraft around 1955- 
58, witnessing much slower growth in the flight deck workforce, and a precipitate 
expansion in the growth of these grades, particularly the skilled technical and 
maintenance staff needed to service these high technology aircraft. (Table 3.1). In the 
period between 1955 and 1965 there was a huge increase in industry output expressed 
as revenue passenger miles (RPM), but little corresponding change in the rough 
composition of staff. Crucially, there is a mere 19 per cent increase in the number of 
pilots, reflecting the lower crewing requirements of jet aircraft. 
Table 3.1 Growth of US Airline Personnel, 1935-1960 
1935 8352 995 213 1518 3008 ------- 
1945 68281 5897 1046 9447 23904 20051 
1950 82786 7277 1521 12256 31138 20338 
1955 122203 10857 2762 19114 45030 29666 
1960 162771 12967 3618 42568 34855 71106 
* Includes co-pilots. 
**Includes grades such as purser, stewardesses and stewards. 
***Includes other flight personnel (radio operators, navigators, flight engineers, plus 
traffic and commercial grades. Source: FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation 1957 
and 1962 
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The jet revolutionised many aspects of the industry, particularly the time and distance 
which could be travelled, and the capacity which could be offered. But its least 
recognised effect is the manner in which it changed the nature and structure of 
industry bargaining. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
3.2.2 Jet Re-Equipment and the Mutual Aid Pact: The Airlines Strike Back 
As the foregoing section explained, ALPA utilised what have been referred to as 
'whipsawing' tactics on a regular basis in the 1950s, pursuing a dispute with one 
carrier that led to a generalised settlement. (Capelli 1987: 163. ) The introduction of jet 
aircraft rendered the continuation of this level of bargaining power disastrous for 
carriers. Although airlines were profitable in the 1950s, there were problems on the 
horizon. If pilots were allowed to choose the method of compensation for jet aircraft, 
if they could decide on crew complement, and if they secured favourable scheduling 
agreements as with four engine transports, then jet re-equipment would be disastrous. 
Even limited industrial action would saddle carriers with massive debts, as hugely 
expensive hardware was immobilised. From a productivity viewpoint, in order to 
make jet aircraft pay, carriers had to maximise utilisation from the outset. That would 
mean modifying the generous scheduling rules the pilot union had secured. 17 It stood 
to reason that operators had to effect a change in the bargaining situation that 
delivered so much for pilots. Yet the combined effect of both Decision 83 and the 
crew complement ruling was to boost ALPA's effective right of veto over jet 
utilisation. In order to effect a change in the situation, airlines needed the 
acquiescence of government. As ALPA strategy depended on 'picking off individual 
firms, the operators had to respond by rendering this tactic more difficult. They 
reasoned that if pilots were unable to select individual carriers, by virtue of some 
strike insurance pact, allowing carriers to preserve revenues and re-direct passengers, 
then the monolithic power of ALPA could be challenged. 
17 Under D83 pilots managed to secure a maximum monthly flying hours limit of 85 hours. A standard 
which they improved upon, and which defined the parameters of bargaining given the importance of 
scheduling in flight deck negotiations. (See Kahn 1979: 34 1. ) 
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The Mutual Aid Pact (MAP) of 1958 was designed to neuter ALPA's whipsaw 
strategy. However, it could also be seen as a first step in the eventual re-alignment of 
industrial relations, allowing carriers the scope to challenge cherished work rules such 
as Decision 83 and the crew complement ruling. Under the agreement, (subirtitted for 
approval to the CAB in 1959), operators refunded extra revenues generated through 
the replacement of a struck carrier. The pact achieved significant critical mass as the 
six majors controlling the bulk of domestic and international traffic signed up 
immediately. (Krolick 1966: 266. ) All unions in the industry protested the plan, and it 
is interesting to note their principal objections and the attitude of government as an 
indication of the changing nature of regulation. The unions argued that the pact would 
allow 'costless confrontation' on behalf of carriers and, thus, seriously impair the 
industrial relations environment. Secondly, they argued that the move was an attempt 
to impose industry wide collective bargaining and as such contravened the letter of 
the RLA. The act permitted industry wide bargaining only with mutual consent. 
They also reasoned that the arrangement for remitting revenues to struck carriers 
constituted unlawful collusion under the Sherman anti-trust legislation. However, 
despite these objections, the CAB/FAA and NLB moved from a policy of neutrality to 
declare that: 
'Labour and management owe the public an obligation to take all 
possible steps to avoid stoppages, especially disputes which are 
of a jurisdictional nature. Or which result from the failure of parties 
to give adequate weight to the wishes of Presidential Boards. 
(Krolick 1966: 267. ) 
The rationale for allowing the measure was that it would cause parties to "reflect on 
the circumstances of strike action. " (lbid. ) Since unions tended to initiate strike 
action, all tended to view MAP as a direct assault on their effective power. By mid 
1960 nine major carriers were involved in the pact. The unions' dilemma was clear. 
For a strike to be effective it would have to be industry wide. As contract negotiations 
were set on different dates, it was impossible for the unions to co-ordinate in this way. 
The overall effect of MAP was to prolong the duration of strikes by engendering an 
atmosphere of trench warfare. Indeed one academic critique of the plan suggested 
that carriers even had a perverse incentive to endure industrial action as many ended 
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up more profitable during a strike than in a normal operating climate. The writers 
went on to conclude: 
'To date at least, airline strike insurance, -appears to have promoted 
escalated costs and benefits, and encouraged longer strikes, but little 
else. It is a lesson in the adverse consequences of strengthening the 
weapons of industrial warfare without any evidence of countervailing 
benefits. ' (Unterberger and Koziara 1975: 26-45. ) 
One consequence of the MAP was a shift in the occupational basis of industrial 
action. The power of pilots was curtailed, but other groups of workers were prepared 
to use the strike weapon in a different fashion, often rethinking strategy to circumvent 
the pact. Walsh describes the Machinists strike of 1966. This forty-six day strike was 
conducted against five carriers in an attempt to short-circuit the MAP, and became a 
landmark dispute for other reasons. (1994: 57. ) By mutual agreement and contrary to 
the usual industry practice, the maintenance and ground crew union, the International 
Association of Machinists (IAM) negotiated jointly on behalf of employees at all of 
the carriers. (Ibid. ) The targeted airlines were paralysed by the strike, although they 
did not attempt to operate. Replacement was not an option, even from the military, 
given the highly specific certification for maintenance procedures within individual 
carriers and the acute shortage of skilled workers. (Walsh 1994: 57. ) The strike was 
only settled with the intervention of the AFL-CIO. Other less powerful groups such 
as flight attendants pursued long strikes, which become in effect lockouts. The main 
consequence of the MAP was to re-align bargaining power within the industry, 
providing evidence of the ways in which regulatory action can impact upon industrial 
relations. The unalloyed power of the pilots and other groups under craft bargaining 
was frustrated and contained by the state's willingness to licence this carrier cartel. 
Whilst still enjoying the protections of the regulated era, airline workers faced an 
environment which was infinitely more hostile. The state, by permitting the MAP, in 
truth already signalled the end of the bargained corporatism of the regulated period. 
Considering the longer-term effects of the introduction of MAP and the re-alignment 
of industry bargaining, two principal questions have to be addressed. Firstly, did the 
MAP curtail the number of strikes and increase the power of airlines in relation to 
their employees? Secondly, was there a pronounced re-alignment in bargaining within 
the industry? These issues, which define the nature of employment relations in the late 
regulation period, are the subject of the next section. 
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3.2.3 Enforced Hartnony or Enforced Conflict? US Airline Industrial Relations 
Strategies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In discussing the flight deck industrial relations environment of the 1960s, it is 
difficult to escape the looming influence of the mutual aid pact. ALPA keenly felt the 
effect of the pact. From the outset it occasioned a re-alignment in flight deck union 
organisation which was to prove detrimental to ALPA. The pact destroyed their 
strategy in the short-term eroding the unions' two key advantages. Firstly, it 
challenged the whipsawing tactic, by bringing disputes to a strike when previously 
they had been settled by the threat of a strike. Secondly, and less commonly 
acknowledged, the pact fractured the unity of ALPA, fragmenting the pilot union into 
two principal constituencies following a strike at American Airlines in 1963.18 The 
1963 strike over crew complement on jet aircraft revolved around the representation 
issue for third operative on the complex jet flight deck. ALPA wanted these new 
workers to be pilots but a new flight engineers union, the Flight Engineers 
International Association (FEIA), sought to represent these workers separately. As a 
consequence of the dispute, American Airlines broke away from ALPA and formed a 
separate company union. This weakened ALPA for a considerable period of time, and 
continues to do so. (Kahn 1980 : 349. ) In sanctioning the MAP, regulators had been 
persuaded that it would enforce harmony within the US industry. However, as the 
strike record shows, this was not the outcome. There was a shift from short duration 
strikes where pilots obtained their aims over management to a situation of prolonged 
and embittered standoff. This war of position, indicated the reluctance of carriers and 
unions to concede even on basic issues and a hardening of their bargaining stance 
generally. The changing dynamics of industrial relations within the industry and the 
fact that other grades of airline labour were becoming involved in the vanguard of 
strikes is a crucial factor. The major strikes in the period from 1970 to 1978 are given 
in the chart below. 
Is Ile strike over crew complement on jet aircraft revolved around the representation issue for third 
operative on the complex jet flight deck. ALPA wanted these new workers to be pilots but a new flight 0 
engineers union, the Flight Engineers International Association (FEIA), sought to represent these C, 
workers separately. As a consequence of the dispute, American Airlines broke away from ALPA and 
formed a separate company union. This weakened ALPA for a considerable period of time, and 
continues to do so. (Kahn 1979: 349. ) 
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Figure 3.1 Strike Activity at Major US Carriers in the 1970s. Working Days Lost 
(%N'1)1, )(per employee) 
DURATION OF STRIKE ACTIVITY AT MAJOR CARRIERS USA 1970-78. 












Source: Compiled from Airline Industrial Relations Conference, National Mediation 
Board and Unions. Presented in Kahn Mark, L. Airlines in Somers (ed. ) Collective 
Bargaining: Contempormý, American EVerience. IRRA Cornell 0 980) (pp. 315-72) 
In contrast to the combative sirate-ies ol'other unions, ALPA's hai-ainim, strategy in 
the 1970s and up until the period of deregulation became one of caution. (Walsh Z, 
1994: 59. ) However, the union was still involved in major strikes. (Figure 3.2) 
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Figure 3.2 Proportion of Working Days Lost (per employee) by Occupational 
Group 1970-78 
Percentage Share of Working Days Lost by Occupational 
Group at US Airlines 1970-78 
Clerical 24% 
Pilots 56% 
Cabin Crew 10% 
0- 0 Mechanics 1 ,o 
Source: Compiled froin Airline Industrial Relations Conference, National Mediation 
Board and Unions. Presented in Kahn Mark, L. Airlines in Somers (ed. ) CoIlective 
Bargaining: Cotiteiiil)oi-(itý, Atiiet'it-titi Lyerience. IRRA Cornell (1980) (pp. 315-72) 
Many of the disputes involving ALPA were around defensive issues related to staffin" 
and contracts, as carriers responded to a changing industry structure in the 1970s. 
Again, the interaction between product market and labour market regulation is clear. Z-- 
As a second wave of jet re-eqUipment occurred between 1969 and 1975, the operators 
took the opportunity to differentiate their product by increasing the level of service. 
Often they offered larger seats, greater frequency, and refineinents including 
passenger lounges even on relatively short flights. This led to a huge increase in costs, 
incurred primarily in the purchase of' new 'wide bodied' aircraft, well before the 
existing equipment had depreciated. Given the nature of airline competition every 
carrier had to emulate the service differentiation strategy. (Hanlon 1996: 33. ) In the 
midst of the resulting financial crisis, airlines sought to reduce labour costs. Figure 3.2 
above indicates the share of working days lost by each occupational group, 
aggregating strike activity for any trade union representing that group of workers. 
Although pilots seem to account for a disproportionate amount of strike activity, 
excluding the Alaskan action, they account for only 12 per cent of disputes. Obid. ) 
Other groups of' airline workers, particularly flight attendants and maintenance 1ýý 
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personnel, were responsible for much strike activity in the late 1960s to mid 1970s. 
Later, regulatory adjustments to rate setting and market entry all presented problems 
for carriers and continued to expose their cost structures. 
The overall bargaining environment of the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s had changed 
markedly. Changes in the product market, adjustments in the regulatory regime and 
the proliferation of jet aircraft represented a significant departure from the 
environment of the previous decade. The employment relationship became more 
conflictual with the impact of the MAP lengthening and entrenching strikes, and the 
economic and operating environment compelling the state to re-align the bargaining 
environment in favour of employers. In the process, the state went from a position of 
upholding single carrier bargaining and, therefore, ALPA's strength, to undermining 
that position. Unions continued to lobby and adopted new strike strategies. By the 
1970s, therefore, the regulatory environment had changed significantly; from one 
which favoured the untrammelled, bargaining power of organised labour, to one 
which allowed carriers to actively resist that pressure. This marked a significant break 
from the period of the 1930s to the 1950s. Before going on to discuss the implications 
for our models of labour market regulation it is necessary to describe the course of 
product and labour market regulation within the UK. 
3.3 UK Regulation and Industrial Relations in the Post War Period 
3.3.1 Industry Growth and the Development of Collective Bargaining 
As the UK aviation industry matured in the aftermath of World War 11, its industrial 
relations structure also matured. The industry was nationalised in 1946 in various 
stages with a European and a transcontinental carrier in the shape of British European 
Airways (BEA) and the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAQ forming the 
core of the industry. This policy of nationalised duopoly effectively describes the 
method of product market regulation, with prices, routes and schedules tightly 
controlled through various government ministries. Again, however, the product 
market and the nature of regulation had significant impacts upon the industrial 
relations and labour market environment. 
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Collective bargaining was embedded within the Civil Aviation Act of 1947. The act 
extended and strengthened collective bargaining, creating a new body, the National 
Joint Council for Civil Aviation (NJC CAT). These revamped industrial relations 
structures provided stability and predictability in airline labour market as other forms 
of regulation did in the product market. The NJC CAT laid down an elaborate 
bargaining framework for the air corporations, and the wider industry, extending the 
Whitley Council model as recommended by the Cadman Report of 1938. Its structure 
was characterised by the national level bodies, sectional panels and local councils, 
pursuing issues of local concern. Like most such negotiating forums, the NJC CAT 
prescribed a resort to arbitration in cases of disagreement between the parties. This 
usually meant reference to the industrial courts with a binding decision. Whilst these 
issues were dealt with under the heading of negotiation, wider issues including staff 
welfare, health and safety and company efficiency were the subjects of consultation. 
(HMSO1 Onnd. 6605. ) This clear split between negotiation and consultation allowed 
management effectively to retain sole power over strategic decision making within the 
various airlines. Nevertheless the new structures were popular with management and 
union representatives. Investigation of the annual reports of both major air 
corporations show the commitment of management and unions to the operation of the 
new system in an industry previously identified with poor industrial relations. In its 
1946-47 Annual Report, BEA is laudatory: 
The subjects dealt with have covered the whole range of the 
corporation's activities, specific agreements have already been 
concluded on a whole range of issues and in only one case has it been 
necessary to refer a question to the industrial court. It can therefore be 
said that the National Joint Council is one of the most successful 
examples of its kind and unlike most others, covers all sections of 
staff. '(BEA 1946/47. )
Crucially, the bargaining framework afforded stability in a difficult period as the 
inflationary effect of the Korean War led to a generalised wage push throughout 
British industry. The constitutionalist nature of the bargaining machinery ruled out all 
but the most official strikes, and then only after an elaborate series of referrals to 
conciliation and arbitration. Such controls and limits on potential disruption were well 
appreciated by the airline: 
'A measure of its success (NJC) is that of the large number of complex staff 
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problems which arise in complex organisations of this kind. In the present 
inflationary period only eight differences were recorded at Local Panel 
Committees for reference to national panels. '(BEA 195 1. ) 
In addition the presence of the NJC CAT and the corporatist bargaining environment 
allowed carriers to control costs in a period of extreme instability. In the United 
Kingdom, the concentration of the industry into a dual monopoly increased the 
importance of labour costs as a component of overall costs. 19 As the short haul 
operator in a highly competitive route structure, British European Airways (BEA) had 
a keen interest in securing cost reductions. The table below gives the labour costs as a 
proportion of major operating costs for selected years. 
Table 3.2 Simplified Operating Cost Breakdown For BEA 1953/4-1955/6. 
Pay and Allowances 42% 38.5% 39.5% 
Maintenance and Overhaul 9% 10.3% 10.3% 
Fuel and Oil 15% 12% 11.5% 
Source: BEA Annual Reports 1953/54,1954/55,1955/56. 
The importance to companies like BEA and BOAC of controlling labour costs was 
linked with their need to enhance productivity, which helped both airlines to eke out 
an existence in an industry which though growing, was often marginal and cyclical. 
(See BEA Annual Report 1956-57 for an illuminating passage on the cyclical nature 
of the industry. ) (1958 HC 251/252. ) As Gourvish (1991: 128) indicates labour 
productivity in both BEA and BOAC outstripped that of UK nationalised industries 
generally, averaging 14 per cent between 1948 and 1958. However this performance 
owed much to the development of technology. As Lyth (1994) indicates that 
technology required a corresponding increase in demand, which though buoyant was 
not inexhaustible. (1994: 83. ) In addition, there were considerable differences in costs 
between the long haul and short haul arms of the industry. When we examine 
operating costs (table 3.2) we can see that they account for about 60 per cent of 
overall costs. Crucially, operating costs are the most variable or 'escapable' costs, that 
is a reduction in these costs can reduce overall costs in the short term. (See Doganis 
1995: 120-22 for a discussion. )
I'M 'dual monopoly'concept is the most accurate description of two separate zonal monopolies BEA 
and BOAC whittled down from a tri-monopoly after the merging of BSAA and BOAC in 1949. 0 
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Whilst the industrial relation structure of the industry provided a stable environment, 
its stability was premised upon the containment of the aspirations of the various 
grades of airline labour. Like their US counterparts, key skilled groups such as pilots 
and maintenance staff had considerable disruptive power and as long as they were 
contained within the NJC CAT, the airline corporations would continue to derive the 
benefits of stability on labour costs and to minimise disputes. However, if these 
labour groups decided to exercise their power, that stability was immediately 
threatened. The next section describes how the relative docility of pilots turned to 
aggressive militancy as they sought to remedy a perceived deterioration in their 
relative position. 
3.3.2 Conscious Pilots: Pilots versits Management in the 1950s and 1960s 
Industrial relations in the UK airline industry in the 1950s, as in the USA, were 
dominated by flight deck concerns. At issue were familiar questions of cockpit 
complement and crew scheduling. Whilst other groups of airline workers, such as 
engineering, ground staff administration and sales where developing, cockpit crews 
continued to be at the forefront. In the 1950s British airlines which had favoured the 
faster turboprop aircraft over US piston types faced a similar set of crew complement 
problems as their American counterparts. The introduction of aircraft such as the 
Bristol Britannia leading to the phasing out of specialist functions, such as the radio 
operator and later navigator on long haul flights, was one issue. The airlines favoured 
a multi-skilled third operative who would sit between the pilots and share technical 
and navigational workloads. BOAC pilots however wanted to obtain additional 
payments for supervising these additional workers. Eventually these functions were 
integrated into the job of the pilot often with considerable acrimony between pilots 
and other flight deck grades. The parallels with the US situation and earlier crewing 
disputes are apparent. (See Blain 1970: 323 for a detailed discussion. ) The problems 
caused by turboprop aircraft were trivial however compared to those posed by the 
introduction of jet aircraft in the UK. Jet re-equipment in the UK came early to long 
haul operations in the early to late 1950s. Britain led with the introduction of the 
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world's first passenger airliner the De Havilland Comet. 20 BEA however made do 
with the relatively advanced turboprops until the 1960s when competitors and 
passenger demand made it impossible not to operate jets even on short haul routes. 
This introduction of jet aircraft again had major consequences. 
Given the consequences of their introduction the need for higher productivity from jet 
aircraft was paramount in UK airline strategy. As we have seen from the change in 
management bargaining posture during the jet transition period in the USA, this 
technical advance drove a great deal of industrial relations change. It is no accident 
that the only prolonged period of strife in the British airline industry followed the 
introduction of jets. Jets created pilot unemployment and, more importantly, they 
slowed the entire promotion process for junior pilots. As Blain argues, the issue of 
scheduling was at the root of pilot concerns. 
Management in the UK airlines wanted to use scheduling as an element of 'non price' 
competition, reflecting the need to concentrate on costs and productivity in order to 
deliver some form of profitability. Using the technical licensing standards of the UK 
regulator and the collective bargaining machinery, pilots had successfully constructed 
a web of restrictive work rules, as had their counterparts in the USA. UK pilots, 
however, had fallen behind considerably in the pay league and felt (with some 
justification) that their higher productivity should be better rewarded. As jet aircraft 
increased the required skill and responsibility of the pilot, they developed an acute 
occupational consciousness. Pilots had tended to see themselves as flyers and aviators 
before jet technology, with the low speeds of piston aircraft allowing more room for 
motor based flying skills. The jet era demanded a different type of pilot, one trained in 
technology systems and complex procedures, whose job was related more to the 
efficient and safe planning and operation of flights than the physical operation of 
aircraft. Increased complexity in air traffic control accompanied the growth of jet 
fleets, producing a perception among pilots that these new skills needed to be 
recognised. 
2' Comets were introduced in 1949 on prestige routes but were withdrawn after a series of disasters, C, 
notably Rome in 1953. The US built Boeing 707 then shared these routes from the late 50s with later 
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Their acute sense of occupational identity gave them different problems and concerns 
from other airline workers. These attitudes led to a temporary withdrawal from the 
NJC CAT in 1967 and a series of bitter, prolonged and effective strikes by pilots. 
(Blain 1970: 321. ) The main reason for strike action in the late 1960s was the issue of 
pay. Though pilots were able to cornmand an average differential in 1968 of 38 per 
cent over other airline workers, excluding management, they felt underpaid. (Blain 
1970: 327. ) Blain argues that management of the time, as in other industries, resisted 
pilot demands because of the 'spilllover' effect on the wage expectations of other 
employees. This feature of the airline labour market meant that an increase of 10 per 
cent in pilot salaries led to a 'spillover' of 2.5 per cent. Given government's desire to 
impose pay restraint and the need for companies to contain cost pressures, a pay 
campaign by pilots was a serious threat. Furthermore, BALPA was in a more 
favourable position to secure its aims than its American counterpart. The structure of 
the nationalised airline industry allowed BALPA to close down the bulk of the 
scheduled airline industry instantaneously. Short one-day strikes and work to ntle 
actions had the effect of dislocating the airline's domestic and international route 
networks. Against a general background of financial problems for the major carriers, 
these disputes would bring the concerns of pilots before Parliament. The government 
initiated two major inquiries into particular disputes at BOAC. (HMSO Onnind 
3789. ) The enquiry on the BOAC strikes recommended closer lines of communication 
between BOAC and its pilots, but it also severely criticised BALPA for its bellicosity. 
(Blain 1970: 327. ) 
The union was certainly in no mood for compromise before the strikes began. The 
May 1967 edition of The BOAC Pilot Local Council (PLC) newsletter warned that: 
'This year will be a year of decision for us all. Before 
it is ended we shall have had to choose between two 
alternatives. Either accept token salary increases and 
resign ourselves to a lower position in the company 
than any other airline pilot outside Britain, or we can 
establish ourselves as a strong and n-fflitant body prepared 
to use all legal means to obtain a just reward. ' (Blain 1970: 518. ) 
(and safer) comet variants. Short haul jets were not widespread until about 1963 onwards. (See Davies 
1964) 
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The 'sovereignty'of the PLC was a major factor in all disputes. The fact that militant 
local representatives (pilot stewards) were given negotiating authority within the 
BALPA constitution often prolonged disputes. The power of local stewards to disrupt 
and undermine nationally agreed structures of negotiation, often at variance with the 
wishes of their national leadership, was a focus of the influential Donovan report on 
industrial relations of the period. The structure of pilot representation illustrated 
local/national bargaining tension par excellence. An inquiry under Sir Jack Scamp in 
1968, identified BALPA's representational structure as a major factor in the disputes. 
Full-time officials within the association, such as the General Secretary, were allowed 
to negotiate only on PLC orders. (HMSO Cmmnd. 3551. ) The 1968 strikes alone, cost 
the carrier some E15 million. (BOAC 1968/9 . )21 The airline was eventually pressured 
into conceding to BALPA demands. Ironically considering that BALPA's withdrawal 
from the NJCCAT was the touch paper for their action, it was intervention on the part 
of other unions which brokered a settlement. 22 (BOAC 1969no. ) New pay and 
scheduling agreements were introduced from 1969 in response to the main pilot 
concerns. Strikes at BEA and BOAC were mimicked by strikes at various 
independent carriers, reflecting seepage of industrial relations unrest into the private 
sector. (Blain 1970. )
The pilot strikes turned the spotlight onto the UK airline industry, and soured its 
reputation for good industrial relations. Other workers followed the lead of pilots. 
BEA engineering staff conducted a work to rule policy in protest at the wage freeze; 
fire crews employed by the British Airports Authority (BAA) struck, closing down 
Heathrow in early 1969. BAA baggage handlers also struck in the winter of 1968. 
(Ibid. ) There is some evidence of an imitation effect of pilot strikes on other 
occupational groups, as evidenced from US pilot strikes in the early to mid 1960s. 
BOAC faced a pilot boycott of the new Boeing 747, which was only later resolved 
with the concession of a generous bonus system for flying these heavier aircraft. In 
securing this award, BALPA was securing the gains of increased weight, speed and 
range in an agreement, which set the scene for later long haul allowances. 
2 'BOAC Annual Report and Accounts 1968-69 HC 379. 
22BOAC Annual Report and Accounts 1969-70 HC 45 
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Industrial relations in the UK airline industry came under increasing scrutiny towards 
the end of the 1960s. At a time of increasing workforce militancy in general, airline 
workers were at the forefront of industrial action. Praise for the adaptability and 
flexibility of the system was replaced on the management side by anger at the way in 
which the machinery allowed various groups of workers to maximise disruption at 
different times. With increased flight frequency and massive capital investment in jet 
fleets, the harmful effect of strike action was enhanced. In addition the changing 
product market and technology, increased conflict as airlines sought to increase 
utilisation and therefore profitability. (BEA Annual Report and Accounts 1970. ) 
Successful strikes were often followed by the action of another occupational group, 
destroying the stability and cost containment, which the industry had previously 
enjoyed. Airlines were faced with the problem of escalating equipment costs and an 
increasingly militant workforce. 
In a spirit of dogged optimism, the Edwards Report of 1969 into the Civil Aviation 
Industry strongly defended the collective bargaining framework of the industry. The 
report even identified the lack of inclusion of independents within the NJC-CAT as 
the biggest problem facing the industry. (HMSO 1969 Cmmnd 4018. ) Subsequent 
policy developments, in particular the creation of a single unified state carrier in the 
shape of British Airways in 1973n4, led to a greater concentration of bargaining 
power within the various occupational groups. However, encouraged by the various 
enquiries, the pilots revamped their organisational structures, employing a full time 
general secretary and professional industrial relations officers, in order to develop a 
more constructive industrial relations strategy with the new airline. The relative 
quiescence of pilots in the period after 1970 indicates that they were successful in 
this, although major pay deals in settlement of the earlier strikes played their part. In 
the UK the mantle of industrial action passed towards less skilled grades, particularly 
cabin crew and baggage handlers, whose combative strikes of the late 1970s and early 
1980s mirrored, to an extent, a similar pattem of pre-deregulation strike activity in the 
US. This also reflected the power of the Transport and General Workers Union 
(TGWU), whose objections to the low cost strategy of the pre-privatisation chairman 
Sir Roy Watts in 1979 led to its withdrawal. (British Airways 1980/81. ) Nevertheless 
the push towards commercial objectives, and the progressive withdrawal of the state 
from the airline meant that by privatisation in 1987, there was relative industrial 
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relations peace, although as we shall see, the effective power and influence of the 
unions was preserved. Having examined the UK case the concluding section draws 
together our discussion by relating this to the models of product market/labour market 0 
regulation operating in the post war period. 
3.4 Comparing Post War Product and Labour Market Regulation in the 
USA and UK 
3.4.1 Airline Labour Regulation in the USA: Strong Regulated Control? 
In the USA the pre-war legislation, which enshrined collective bargaining, carried 
many more implicit and explicit labour market effects than in the UK. Labour market 
regulation in the US was much more interventionist, producing a particular set of 
employment relations. Though the RLA was central, there was also the role of the 
National Mediation Board and other aspects of the New Deal legislation. In the 1940s 
and 1950s, pilots exploited the power, which the system of collective bargaining and 
the structure of regulation afforded them. Employers acted to confront that threat 
through the Mutual Aid Pact in 1958. The process of collective bargaining was altered 
fundamentally. Instead of pilots whipsawing all operators into a general settlement, 
through judicious use of the strike weapon at a key carrier, strikes became more 
entrenched and less susceptible to early settlement. In effect, each side had roughly 
similar power. The state by permitting the MAP, allowed a significant re-alignment of 
industry bargaining structures, and through this distinct change in regulatory policy 
cncouraged a step change in industrial relations within the industry. The reform, 
however, did not necessarily produce industrial relations peace, nor did it cause the 
sides to re-evaluate their position, rather it led to further entrenchment and a 
lengthening in the average duration of strikes. 
How can this system be viewed in terms of the models of labour market 
regulation/deregulation discussed in Chapter I? Given the characteristics of high level 
industry regulation, the existence of oligopoly power in the shape of the big five' 
trunk carriers, and the power of organised labour, the US situation can be analysed as 
an example of the regulated control model. To be more specific, the US example 
describes a situation of strong regulated control. Initially, the impact of the state upon 
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labour through its use of the apparatus of regulation and through the operation of 
wider labour market regulation, was to encourage the growth of collective bargaining 
and unionisation in the formative period of industry growth. By 1938, however, 
through the principal regulatory body the Civil Aeronautics Board, the state oversaw a 
significant re-alignment in labour's favour through various aspects of legislation. It 
can be speculated that in providing a framework for collective bargaining, and in 
encouraging the craft power of the pilots in particular, the state was providing some 
measure of balance to the potential power of the carriers. Furthermore, the state was 
persuaded by the safety-based arguments of the pilots on issues such as Decision 83 
and crew complement. Pilots' harvested this combination of state protection to 
promote their interests. By the late 1950s however changes in the product market and 
technical environment caused the state to permit an employer strike insurance pact 
(MAP). Given the later economic problems of the jet re-equipment period, and the oil 
crises, this was probably to be expected given the states overall aim which was to 
oversee the health and stability of the industry. In any case the strong regulated 
control model adequately describes a situation where the labour market and industrial 
relations were directly affected by decision taken in the regulatory arena. 
3.4.2 Airline Labour Regulation in the UK., Weak Regulated Control? 
In the UK, by contrast, even in the post war period, the state regulated the labour 
market primarily through the mechanism of ownership, with the nationalisation of the 
industry in 1946. However with nationalisation the state took a more interventionist 
role in prescribing a strengthened framework for national bargaining. Again, the 
nature of collective bargaining in the UK industry was much weaker than the craft 
bargaining of the US industry. The voluntarist nature of UK industrial relations 
explains much of this, but so does the relative size of both the industry and its 
workforce. In the US the industry was much more high profile, as passenger services 
grew, compared to the UK, which showed relatively low growth even in the 
immediate post war period. 
The pattem of industrial relations was totally different from that of the USA, with 
national bargaining actually constraining and limiting the power of key occupational 
groups, and disappointing the expectations of pilots in particular. In the 1960s, with 
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the impact of technology and national pay policy, throughout the state-run industries, 
there was a backlash from pilots and skilled staff. The state's solution to these 
problems was to strengthen the structures and coverage of collective bargaining. This 
faith in voluntarist methods of industrial relations was typical of industrial relations 
policy in the period. Thus, in the UK, the state continued to believe that the 
preservation of national collective bargaining could provide a framework of stability 
for the industry. Further developments arising from the Edwards Report of 1970, 
culminating in the creation of a unified nationalised airline in the shape of British 
Airways, reinforced this policy. 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the development of both product 
and labour market regulation within the USA and UK diverge markedly. In the USA 
the system of product market regulation was more systematic and structured than the 
generally ad hoc and reactive system which arose in the UK. US product market 
regulation was concerned with rectifying market failure and was designed to produce 
viable trunk carriers whose market position and profits were assured and who were 
largely insulated from the threat of competition. One area where regulatory 
intervention was strong was in the area of mergers and acquisitions, with laws 
forbidding the merging of route structures. This aspect of economic regulation has to 
be seen in tandem with the effects of technical regulation, which in many ways 
boosted the power of organised labour. The crucial aspect of compliance with the 
principal labour market statutes of the industry dictated the pattern of industrial 
relations, as craft based and unionised. The system of technical regulation also 
benefited specific groups of organised labour. The award of Decision 83 allowed 
pilots to obtain a disproportionate share of the 'rents' extracted from consumers in 
higher fares. Their ability to influence crew complement in the 1940s further 
cnhanced that power. It might be argued that government saw labour market 
regulation as a way of pursuing goals of safety and stability. This also reflected a 
New Deal consensus, which encouraged big labour and big capital to come together, 
but with an emphasis on protecting labour from the power of the large airlines. 
The UK industry was smaller and more diffuse and given the parlous state of the 
product market only state control could provide a framework of growth. 
Paradoxically, although there was a nominally higher level of intervention in the UK, 
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(state sponsored monopoly as opposed to industry regulation) this was markedly 
weaker in its influence over both the product and labour market, than the American 
model. In other words the effect of intervention is more important than its extent. 
Although this is very much a question of degree, the degree of difference between the 
two systems is crucial to understanding how labour regulation occurred. 
The passive 'control'model of the UK with its 'one off'product market initiatives and 
voluntarist industrial relations solutions, can be contrasted with the active legislation 
and market intervention of the USA. To explore this point we have to consider both 
the labour and product markets. In product market terms, compared to the muscular 
activism of US policy, UK regulation was relatively ineffectual. The UK industry 
was still insignificant and faced a struggle to develop competitive pricing strategies in 
order to compete realistically with inland and sea transport. (See Dyos and Aldcroft 
1969: 374-396. ) In the early period there was only one significant large firm, 
Imperial Airways, which was allowed to operate as a private company, though prices, 
particularly for freight and mail were closely controlled. By 1938 and the Cadman 
Commission a duopoly of Imperial Airways and British Airways had been established 
as the 'chosen instruments' (Dyos and Aldcroft 1969: 389). Notwithstanding a period 
of total monopoly when Lord Reith assumed the Chairmanship of Imperial (later 
BOAC), the UK policy was one of reluctant if generous state subsidy. While product 
market regulation was in evidence it was effected primarily through subsidy and the 
control of mail rates. However it did not regulate the industry to the extent seen under 
the weaker era of US regulation before the CAB. In effect the British state's 
regulatory interventions were reactive and episodic demonstrating little of the 
sophisticated stewardship witnessed in the USA. The relative insignificance of the 
UK industry however did not forestall controversy, especially when the fledgling pilot 
organisations rebelled in the face of management autocracy and the perceived safety 
failings of Imperial. Yet the government's solution was rooted entirely in the spirit of 
British industrial relations voluntarism, with one exception. The floor on industry 
wages, enshrined in the 1936 Air Navigation Act appeared to be an attempt to filter 
out the unsafe smaller operators, though the later monopolisation superseded this. 
More typical was the extension of the Whitley system into the industry, bringing a 
similar industrial relations framework to the nationalised utilities and the civil service. 
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These labour market interventions were far weaker and carried far less impact than 
the pre-war labour market regulation enacted by the US Government. 
This can be contrasted with the domestic and international vibrancy of the US 
industry, which had graduated from the nursery of subsidy and was becoming viable 
and profitable. The wide scope and variety of regulatory initiatives on both product 
and labour market reflected this. With post-war nationalisation and the development 
of the NJC, the costs and conflict within the industry were contained and channelled. 
The disaffection of pilots in particular, but later other groups of workers, led to an 
increase in costs and conflict. In contrast to the USA, the different structure of the UK 
industry allows pilots to take advantage of the jet re-equipment period in order to push 
their demands. 
Throughout the period we can view the UK system as one of weak regulated control, 
with neither labour nor capital enjoying particularly strong support from the state, and 
with the state unable to use product market regulation to prod the parties in its 
preferred direction. With the state unable to use regulation directly, to develop a 
stable and profitable industry environment, this can only be provided by the industrial 
relations system. The NJC CAT and the bargaining structure work for a time, but 
when the industry context changes with jet re-equipment, and as pilots begin to assert 
their power independently of the machinery, this method of indirect ad hoc regulation 
is found wanting. Though the state does have some influence and uses this through 
the development of committees of enquiry and wider industrial relations legislation, it 
is incapable of exercising power over the industry as witnessed in the US. The 
industrial relations situation reflects this. 
Conclusion 
The clear trend in both countries was for product market regulation to have 
pronounced direct and indirect effects upon the labour market. However, as the 
chapter has shown, clear differences existed between both nations and although we 
can use the regulated control model to explain how the labour market was affected by 
product market regulation, we need to differentiate between the strong and weak 
variants. The strength and weakness of these labour market effects can be seen in both 
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industry regulation and the industrial relations legislation affecting the industry. The 
consequences of these systems of regulation can be seen in the response of both 
labour groups and management at specific periods. There were clear periods in the 
USA when labour was in the ascendancy and enjoyed almost untrammelled power, 
but arguably its power was licensed and authorised by the state. When the state 
allowed airlines to challenge that power by permitting the Mutual Aid Pact, pilots' 
faced a less certain bargaining environment. Nevertheless they continued to profit 
from regulatory statutes such as Decision 83 which directed productivity 
improvements into flight deck pay, and from generous scheduling rules. The UK 
pilots were much less successful. However the state's support in helping the spread of 
trade unionism and later developments in collective bargaining, helped pilots establish 
a voice from a position of marginal influence. Industry regulation had much less 
impact in the UK beyond certain licensing and technical requirements. The pilots in 
the UK did have bargaining power, certainly from about the 1940s, but they were 
constrained within the system of industrial relations introduced in 1946. Thus, in both 
nations the combined impact of industry regulation and industrial relations determined 
the nature of employment. Within both nations, the regulated control model can be 
used to examine these developments and with appropriate modifications describes the 
type of labour market regulation, which operated in the period up till the onset of 
deregulation. Did the onset of deregulation represent a decisive break with the 
industrial relations of the regulated period? The next chapter considers the impact of 
deregulation and examines these impacts, again by concentrating on the experience of 
pilots. 
112 
0 Appendix 3.1 Dynamics of Product/Labour 
Market Regulation in the USA 1920-1977: 
Strong Regulated Control 
Period Industry Employment Employer Employee Level of Effect on 
structure relationship strategy strategy labour bargaining 
market power of 
regulation parties 
1920s multi-firm Unitarist/low Redefine pay Seek to Non- Employers in 
competitive/ trust/cost cutting formula/ oppose existent, ascendancy/ 
subsidy Individualised increased through some labour 
based/unstable pay structures/ work unionisation regulation of dependent 
high risk/reward intensification/ political external 
wage lobbying/ safety etc. 
reduction/ seek to 
oppose govt secure 
labour market labour 
intervention legislation 
Mid Stable Pluralist/low Seek to Seek Increasin- Labour enjoys 
1930s regulated trust promote imposition with D 83 increased 
multi-firm on legislation of RLA on (1934)and power 
basis of postal which will basis of D83 schedule 
contracts superseded limitations 
prolabour and section 





Pluralist Seek to resist Seek to have CAB Labour enjoys 
1930s oligopoly with imposition of D83 and (section 40 1) high level of 
controlled D83 RLA imposes bargaining 
market entry enshrined in D83/protects power , 
and exit/rate new right to through 
regulation regulatory bargain for legislative 
framework better protection 
deal/imposes employer 
RLA freedom to 
compliance alter labour 
as condition market 
of PC&N I restricted 
_J 
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Period Industry Employment Employer Employee Level of Effect on 
structure relationship strategy strategy labour bargaining 
market powerof 
regulation parties 
1940s ReoUlated Pluralist Seek to Seek to Cab sets Labour enjoys 
oligopoly with With conflict mitigate C extend D83 D83 very 
high level CP 
controlled legislation/ to account decision for of BP, and of 
market deploy new forincreased new legislative 
entrylexittrate technology to speed generation support. 
regulation undercut weight/ aircraft/ Employers 
labours increase FAA makes constrained 
bargaining base wages 80,001b seldom win 
strength by through rule/ strikes 
forming strategic eliminates 
employers strikes etcJ direct 
association seek to subsidies to 
(ANC) retain fli-ht carriers 
deck 
complement 
on new tech. 
aircraft 
Late As above with Conflictual/ Seek to Seeklegal 0 CAB Labour faces 
50s-70s tighter price pluralist introduce injunction permits reduced 
controls MAP against MAP MAP, and bargaining 
allows power because 
increased costs of 
coverage disputes are 






etc. but strikes 
I continue 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration; set up in addition to CAB as technical and 
safety regulator of the Airline industry. (1958) 
MAP Mutual Aid Pact; Employers strike insurance organisation set up 1958. 
TAM International Association of Machinists. The main mechanics (ground 
engineer) union. 
ANC Airline Negotiating Conference (Employers bargaining front abandoned 
1947). 
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Appendix 3.2 Dynamics of Product/Labour 


















Private Unitarist low Maximise Defend Non Employers in 
1920s subsidised trust aircraft existing existent, ascendancy/ 
carriers later utilisation and wage some labour 
developed into staff control, structure indirect dependent 
state offload based on regulation of 
controlled surplus staff retainer plus external 














1930s Nationalised Unitarist/low Maximise Seek to Increasing C' Employee 
monopoly on trust/cost cutting aircraft oppose with Air power 
major long Cý utilisation and through Navigation tý enhanced, but 
and short haul crew unionisation Act (1936) labour still 
routes schedules/ Political providing dependent 
suppress lobbying/ wage floor 
unionisation/ seek to based on 
uphold secure imperial/ 
managerial labour Cadman 
prerogative legislation/ Ctee (1938) 
focus on extends 
safety Whitleyism 
to airlines I 
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Period Industry Employment Employer Employee Level of Effect on 
structure relationship strategy strategy labour bargaining 
market powerof 
regulation parties 
1940s Nationalised Bargained Seek to focus on Seek better Increasing Weak labour 
duopoly, corporatism commercial terms for with CAA enjoys 
restricted by aspects of employees and (1948). recognition 
treasury operation union Section 22 and 
imposed cash including labour t, recognition for r5 Inaugurates C, enhances limits costs and unrecognised NJC and effective 
rationalisation groups national bargaining 






1950s Nationalised Bargained Focus on cost Depends on Govt Labour 
duopoly corporatism reduction, large craft. intervention bargaining 
increasingly scale job losses Pilots seek at level of power 
threatened by and productivity enhancements Dept of contained. 
macroeconomic increases. forreduced Labour into Pilots' 
instability and Seek to refer fli-ht deck 0 lon- runnin- 00 wages 
fall C, 
poor equipment. outstanding complement. disputes sets behind 
(Differences disputes to Mechanics norms, comparators, 
between long C, government increased which are mechanics 
and short haul. ) arbitration. basic rates normally on below 
resist incomes employers industry 
policies etc. side. rates. 
Navigators Employers 
and Radio have upper 
Officers seek hand. 
to defend jobs 
etc. 1953 
1960- Nationalised Bargained Seek to increase Mechanics Govt. sets up Craft labour 
1970s monopoly corporatism productivity and and pilots seek boards of has high 
subject to utilisation of to obtain enquiry level of BP, 
increasing cash pilots, increased pay (Scamp, and of 
limits. mechanics, and bonuses Pearson) to legislative 
cabin crew etc. /oppose mediate on support. 
with increased pilots' Employers 
introduction of utilisation. dispute, forced to 
jets. Pilots launch major concede 
Reorganise breakaway enquiry into demands on 
corporation from NJC and industry. pay and 
structure to initiate series Recommend scheduling, 
prioritise labour of strikes greater Craftlabour 
management arbitration. has upper 
etc. I etc. I hand. 
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4 
Pilots and Management Under Deregulation: 
The USA and Europe 
4.1. Pilots and Deregulation in the USA 
In our previous discussion we examined regulation and collective bargaining within 
the US and UK focusing on pilots. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the 
effects of deregulation, again by focusing on pilots. Has there been an erosion in their 
bargaining position as deregulation gives rise to managerial empowerment, non-union 
competition and other pressures for restructuring? Have these key workers managed 
to defend core terms and conditions benefiting from high skill specificity and the 
general expansion in demand for their services? Pilots present an interesting and 
indicative example of the effects of deregulation upon the labour market. Thus it is 
useful to try and chart their bargaining fortunes in the USA and Europe as a barometer 
of the effects of deregulation on a key airline group. The product market/labour 
market framework used in the previous chapter will be used to evaluate the nature of 
labour management relations in both countries. 
In order to examine the experience of pilots under deregulation a three-pronged 
approach is necessary. Firstly, we will evaluate the evidence on pilot wages because, 
as the previous chapter indicated, under regulation both US and European pilots were 
deemed to have captured significant benefits as a result of their uniquely potent 
bargaining power. Such 'rents' (if they existed) might be expected to decline as 
deregulation promoted an environment of cost control and competition. Pilot earnings 
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provide a good indication of the extent to which this has actually occurred. Secondly, 
we will look at the extent to which pilots in both settings have been able to protect 
their bargaining position. In particular we look at the post-deregulation effect on long 
standing work rules particularly in the area of scheduling. This will provide a good 
indication of the extent to which the position of pilots has been maintained or 
otherwise. Thirdly, it is interesting to look at the extent to which pilots have altered 
their negotiating stance, directing attention towards issues such as job security and 
involvement as opposed to the strategy under regulation which concentrated upon the 
boosting of wage levels and the protection of work rules. In examining the nature of 
deregulation we will again build on the models introduced in Chapter 1. Whilst 
recognising initial differences and nuances between the USA and UK experience, we 
point towards an emerging convergence towards a more global pilot labour market. 
In order to commence our investigation it is necessary to examine the trend in pilot 
earnings in both the USA and Europe. This will allow us to provide a context to later 
discussions of bargaining and provide an essential reference point for later discussions 
of the fortunes of other airline workers. 
4.1.1 Pilots and Deregulation in the USA 
Increasing disenchantment with the US regulated airline industry culminated in the 
Airline Deregulation Act passed by the Carter government in 1978. The act lifted 
barriers to entry and price setting within an industry used to the dominance of major 
trunk carriers. For the forty years of its existence the CAB did not allow a new entrant 
on any city-pair route. (Hanlon 1996: 33. ) The service and frills competition which 
characterised the regulated era, had left a legacy of rising fares rendering arguments 
of deregulationists, such as Caves (1962), Kahn (1970), that the measure would lead 
to lower fares unanswerable. The experience of unregulated intra state carriers such 
as Pacific Southwest proved that lower fares were possible. (Levine 1965. ) The 
immediate results were impressive and bore out the predictions of 'prophets of 
deregulation' such as Caves and Kahn. There was a three and a half fold increase in 
the number of carriers offering trunk service between 1978 and 1986. The market 
share of the largest trunk operators, the big five'. fell by 17 per cent over the same 
period. 
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Pilots, like other labour groups, were fairly ambivalent about deregulation. They saw 
the opportunity to roll back the hated Mutual Aid Pact and to take advantage of their 
bargaining power. From the outset of deregulation pilot unions were instrumental in 
inserting a clause into the Airline Deregulation Act known as Section 43, which 
sought to protect labour from the consequences of deregulation. The act sought to 
ensure that employees directly affected by deregulation would be compensated for 
any adverse consequences. (Capelli 1985: 316-38. ) Unfortunately, section 43 proved 
a dead letter. The provisions of the clause were not implemented as there was a clear 
methodological problem for labour courts in assigning a particular set of job losses or 
pay cuts to a complex phenomenon such as 'deregulation'. As Cordes et al (1989) 
argue, this looked like sleight of hand: 
'Skepticism is warranted because the provisions were at least in part 
included in the legislation to buy off the legislative opposition of 
employees likely to be hurt by deregulation. ' (Cordes et al 1989: 35- 
55. ) 
These writers go on to argue that once deregulation was in full swing there was no 
need to take account of the labour constituency which had effectively been neutralised 
by the clause. In operation it was difficult to identify effects, as measurements of job 
loss were conducted on an industry wide rather than a firm level basis. (Ibid. ) 
Nevertheless, despite the weakness of the labour protection clause, the fact that it 
became enshrined in the deregulation legislation shows that pilots had some input into 
the process, even if they were unable ultimately to influence the process. Whilst the 
legislative protections for collective bargaining and negotiation continued in the shape 
of the Railway Labor Act, these applied only to the pre-deregulation trunk carriers. 
Consequently a new, non-union, sector was unleashed upon the industry. As 
Northrup, a fervent proponent of labour market deregulation, argued: 
'By the end of 1981... the labour market climate in the airline industry 
had changed substantially. A sizeable group of new carriers entered the 
market, many of which were non-union, or operated as non-union 
adjuncts of unionised carriers (double-breasted). A non-union 'alter 
ego' subsidiary of Texas International called New York Air was 
created and regional carriers expanded. Major carriers suffered serious 
losses and enormous pressure was put on unions to reduce wages, 
abolish restrictive work rules and modify their demands. The nature of 
competition had change from that of service to price, putting pressure 
on carriers and unions. ' 
119 
Ehrenberg had earlier questioned the view that airline workers captured significant 
rents within the regulated period. Firstly, he pointed to the statistical problem of 
isolating an effect such as regulation from the interaction of other variables. Secondly, 
he believed that negotiated wage increases did not immediately translate into higher 
fares, giving management an incentive to resist labour demands. Thirdly, he asserted 
that price increases were granted upon an industry-wide basis rather than on a firm 
basis. With no pattern bargaining, he argued carriers had an incentive to resist wage 
demands. (Ehrenberg 1979. ) Though his latter point appears to ignore the ability of 
strong unions to deliver pattern bargaining through the whipsaw strategy, Ehrenberg's 
findings suggest that the unionised rents postulated by the deregulationists were not a 
clear-cut issue. Such an interpretation would see the subsequent resilience in earnings 
as proof that regulation had not significantly boosted earnings. Whilst Ehrenberg may 
be right about earnings his analysis concerns the late regulation period which was 
qualitatively different, from the 'heyday' period of regulation. The later stages of 
regulation from about 1970 onwards, when overcapacity, expensive re-equipment and 
rising fuel prices forced airlines to confront labour, and when the mutual aid pact 
allowed them the ability to combat the whipsawing strategies of ALPA and the IAM, 
is a distinct period in the industry's regulated history. As such it has to be viewed 
distinctly from the 'heyday' period of regulation where earnings were boosted through 
the effects of regulation and state sponsored unionisation and collective bargaining. 23 
Thus the rents identified by writers such as Caves (1962), and Taneja (1976) were 
real and pronounced. This temporal qualification provides yet another example of the 
problem in using earnings in airline labour market research. We will now go on to 
examine the evidence on earnings. 
4.1.2 The Literature on Deregulation and Earnings 
The seminal study on deregulation, Morrison and Winston's (1986) counterfactual 
exploration of the costs and benefits of the reform, argued that deregulation delivered 
$8.5 billion savings, at 1977 prices, with two thirds of those accruing to passengers. 
(Morrison and Winston 1986. ) These two writers re-confirmed their thesis with some 
2' This period is to be measured as pertaining roughly between the late thirties and the late sixties. C, 
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qualification when in 1995 they revisited the deregulation debate. (Morrison and 
Winston 1995. ) However, most important from the point of view of this chapter is the 
hypothesis advanced by Morrison and Winston that deregulation did not significantly 
affect the earnings of airline workers. Basing their analysis on the real earnings 
position of 1977 with that of 1985, Morrison and Winston saw no "significant 
reduction" in earnings for any labour group. (Morrison and Winston 1986. ) Whilst the 
use of earnings has become a proxy for labour's fortunes in the industry, the effects of 
deregulation go well beyond the question of earnings and issues such as bargaining 
environment and the relative power of labour and capital within the industry have to 
be considered. Indeed a central argument was made that it was the prevalence of high 
wages and restrictive work rules which caused operators to increase fares. With the 
threat of these low cost carriers and the influx of non-union low cost operators such as 
People Express and New York Air, we would expect to see downward pressure on 
pilot earnings. To what extent has this actually occurred? Bailey and her colleagues 
examined the union relative wage effect for pilots at larger airlines. 24 Low cost 
operators paid their pilots less whilst utilising them more intensively, as figure 4.1 
below demonstmtes. 
Table 4.1 Costs Per 20OMile Flight for Major US Operators on Boeing 737 
Aircraft 1984. 




Source: Bailey et al 1985. 
It would be reasonable to assume, therefore, that the entry of low cost, non-union 
carriers would affect pilot terms and conditions. Nevertheless, earnings are the only 
consistent data available and by focusing on the earnings experience of US pilots, we 
can begin to build an understanding of the effects of deregulation upon labour 
earnings in general. To what extent did deregulation affect pilots? Did their fortunes 
fall, rise or remain neutral? What was the effect on incomes and bargaining of the 
24 The URWE is simply the difference in average earnings between workers employed in a union firm C, C, 
as compared to a non-union firm. Labour economists Freeman and Medoff compared a range of 
estimates and settled on an overall US Figure of 8-10 %, premium for unionised workers. For airline 




wave of new entry which took place between 1978 and 1986? To what extent if any, 
was - 
labour affected by the later trend towards bankruptcy, take-over and 
consolidation? In highlighting the experience of pilots we should be able to arrive at a 
measured assessment of these effects. The first task is to examine the evidence on 
flight-deck earnings. 
4.1.3 Pilot Earnings Under Deregulation: The Evidence 
Pilot wages and conditions preoccupied many early commentators on US airline 
deregulation. In an early study Hendricks et al (1980) predicted little change in the 
bargaining environment when they assessed the impact of deregulation in the early 
years. Indeed these writers argued that after controlling for skill levels, experience, 
unionisation and the level of industry concentration, there was no significant 
difference in earnings between airline employees and external employees. (Hendricks 
ct al 1980: 67-81. ) This finding was in line with Card's earlier research on the wages 
of mechanics, which noted no significant decline in earnings for the first five years of 
deregulation. (Card 1986: 527-38. ) Yet earlier Hendricks had demonstrated 
pronounced positive effects upon airline earnings arising from regulation. (Hendricks 
1977: 483-96) (Thornicroft 1989: 165-181). Dooley (1994: 169-90 ) also offered 
optimistic assessments of post deregulation labour earnings and bargaining power and 
Northup even argued, albeit rather early in the process, that deregulation would 
benefit labour. (Northrup 1983: 167-181. ) Capelli, however, did demonstrate the 
extent of concession bargaining, which eroded pre-deregulation earnings. (Capelli 
1985: 316-38. ) Given the conflicting assessments of the position of pilots within the 
deregulated environment it is necessary first of all to look at the evidence on long- 
term wage rates for pilots. This analysis is used as a framework with which to explore 
more qualitative issues. 
The official evidence on pilot earnings seems to suggest that wages have not been that 
affected by deregulation per se. If we take average earnings in the 'big six' US 
carriers, as shown in table 4.2 below, we can clearly see that earnings have continued 
to rise. This is true basing earnings on 1980, as the early period of deregulation and on 
airline premium identified a pilots' premium of 59% over their military equivalent, mechanics 28% 
and cleaners 82%). 
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1985 as the high point of concession bargaining. On both indexes we can clearly see 
that earnings continued to rise. 
Table 4.2 Pilot Earnings in the US Airline Industry 1978-1997 (Constant US 
1978 1980 1985 1995 1997 1 
American 68,898 49,365 95,587 115,484 135,319 
US Air 48,192 68,516 99,031 128,971 136,810 
Continental 31,4501 59,037 41,888 90,461 124,152 
Delta 41,938 65,537 104,225 129,329 131,507 
Northwest 41,937 67,143 87,536 154,586 125,414 
TWA 44,765 71,477 106,577 85,240 89,306 
United 45,909 84,242 90,317 140,280 152,408 
Average 43,034 66,473 89,380 120,621 127,845 
Index 
1980=100 








48 74 1 100 134 143 
Source: ICAO Fleet and Personnel Data 
The first task is to compare eamings between the regulated and deregulated period. 
The seminal work was Card's (1989) study of the impact of deregulation on airline 
earnings. Building on earlier work which had concentrated on mechanics, he found 
between 1977 and 1988 an overall decline in real earnings for all employees of about 
10 per cent. Recent work by labour economists has afforded a more long-term view of 
earnings, supplementing earlier analyses. Peoples (1990), for example, found that the 
earnings advantage enjoyed by airline employees was eroded by nearly a quarter for 
craft workers and about 7 per cent for clerical/non-craft workers. 
Johnson (1991) argues that the only significant declines in earnings for any group 
including pilots were in the early period from about 1978-84, which she attributes to 
changes in flight schedules and a (probable) corresponding reduction in overtime. She 
concludes analysing both the early and late deregulation periods that: "The aggregate 
analyses provide limited support for the hypothesis that earnings decreased with 
deregulation, but there is only minimal evidence of significant decreases by craft in 
either data set". (Ibid. ) Nevertheless, for pilots her regression results show that 
deregulation accounted for 12 per cent of the downward variation in earnings between 
1978 and 1984. This compares to a9 percent fall for mechanics and a slight increase 
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in earnings for flight attendants. (Johnson 1991: Table 4 . )25 Johnson also provides 
additional evidence of decreased union fortunes under deregulation. 26 
Using a more comprehensive dataset Cremieux (1996: 223-242) examined the effect 
of deregulation upon wages over a much longer period. In contrast to most 
approaches, which used cross-sectional data, Cremieux's analysis looked at time 
trends over some 34 years of regulation and deregulation ( years 1959-92). His sample 
covered 85 per cent of industry revenues and the range of occupational groups and 
represents the most comprehensive analysis to date. Criticising the smoothing bias of 
cross sectional models Cremiueux counsels us to be aware that fluctuations in 
earnings are experienced as falls at some point in the earnings cycle. Finding similar 
earnings levels in 1975 and 1983 he cautions might mean the peak was in 1980 with 
very pronounced fluctuations either side of that year. Another problem he sees with 
existing data is lack of sufficient post deregulation observations, further hampering 
analysis. Cremiuex is thus concerned to examine the earnings data in the light of this 
problem. Using this long-term methodology he finds that deregulation eroded the 
earnings of pilots by around 12 and 22 per cent. Cremiuex's data is obviously more 
useful for long-term trends, but is also worthwhile despite limitations in the short- 
term data, as identified by Cremiueux, to examine how wages were affected in the 
short term. 
25 However, as Ehrenberg (1979) argues, it is almost mathematically impossible to dissagregate the 
effects of deregulation from other industry processes and labour market variables. Johnson's 
sophisticated and thorough statistical analysis does not avoid that problem, though it provides a 
reasonable estimate. 
26 Another aspect of Johnson's study investigates union expenditures; this throws some interesting light 
on the fortunes of occupational groups under deregulation. The rationale for examining union 
expenditures is that deregulation is supposed to make the industry harder to organise by (theoretically) 
ending the union monopoly, and it also incurs higher expenditures in maintaining its current 
membership as (again theoretically) existing unionisation and collective bargaining come under threat. C, C, C, On this measure a union which incurred low increases in union expenditure would be doing relatively 
well under deregulation, as it does not have to confront the challenges referred to above. The results 
indicate that pilots incurred minimal extra union expenditures during deregulation. The less skilled and 
more replaceable flight attendants incurred expenditures 35 per cent greater than under deregulation. 
These workers faced the threat of non-union organisation and competition for members from other 
unions. We can see therefore that on these measures only flight attendants faced a more difficult C, 
situation in the wake of deregulation. (Johnson 199 1: Table 5. ) However, these aggregate figures 
conceal considerable variation within different airlines and even within the same broad occupational 
groups. Although they provide a reasonable picture of earnings between the late regulated and early 
deregulated period, Ionger-term. analysis which covers the heyday period of regulation and the mature 
period of deregulation might provide better estimates. (Johnson 1991: 154-165. )
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As we know considerable pressures were exerted upon pilot remuneration throughout 
deregulation. How then, did the widely acknowledged combination of non-union 
competition in the early phase of deregulation, and concession bargaining 
environment of the mid to late 1980s threaten pilot compensation? Again differing 
methodologies and time frames are employed and there are a variety of 
interpretations. For example, Johnson's research points to resilience in flight crew 
wage levels. For Johnson, pilots emerge in a relatively good position, when weighted 
against general declines in wage levels in the production labour force. (Johnson 1995: 
103. ) The change in wage levels for senior pilots is given in Figure 4.1 below. 
Figure 4.1 Pilot Earnings At Major US Carriers 1984-91 ( 1982 actual $US) 









Source: Collated by Johnson from Airline Industrial Relations Conference 
(AIRCON) data. Table 9.4 (pg. 108) In Capelli ed. (1995) 
So although the real earnings level of senior pilots shows a significant fall, Johnson 
attributes this to the overall decline in wage levels in non-farm employment. 
Measured in constant prices, non-farm incomes (using 1982 dollars) declined in real 
terms by some 13 per cent between 1979 and 199 1. The decline for top scale pilots at 
4 per cent was less than a quarter of that for industrial workers generally. Yet a 
decline of 8 per cent was registered in the year 1988 compared to a fall of 3 per cent 
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in general earnings. If non-farm earnings and airline pilot earnings are compared from 
1984 to 1990 they declined at exactly the same rate (5 per cent). This indicates that 
the decline in wages as Johnson argues, was not out of line with industry trends when 
taken over the entire period. (Ibid. ). 
The established pilot wage data might simply indicate the ability of senior pilots to 
protect their position. A better measure of the impact of deregulation upon earnings 
might be found by examining the trend in entry-level wages. In an insider labour 
market, characterised by high levels of seniority we would expect any effects to 
manifest themselves at the bottom of the pay scale, where workers are not protected 
by their seniority and we might reasonably expect any downward pressure to be 
evident within junior pay scales. However if we look at entry level pay for airline 
pilots (Fig. 4.2) we see that on this indicator too pilots have maintained their position. 
Examination of wages for entry-level pilots over the same comparison period of 1984 
to 1990 shows an increase of 7 per cent. As Johnson argues, the rise in pilot wages at 
the bottom may simply reflect the fact that post deregulation expansion significantly 
increased the demand for pilots. (Ibid. 103. ) The real increases are fairly spectacular 
given the context. Nonetheless, this trend seems to reinforce the Morrison/Winston 
thesis that airline deregulation in and of itself has not significantly eroded the earnings 
power of pilots. (Morrison and Winston 1986. ) If anything, the effect has been on the 
insiderlsenior pilots, contrary to what might be expected. Such research, however, 
fails to capture the longer-tenn transition between a regulated and deregulated 
environment. 
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Figure 4.2 Entry Level Wages At Major US Carriers 1984-1991 (1982 actual 
$US) 









Source: Collated by Johnson from Airline Industrial Relations Conference 
(AIRCON) data. Table 9.4 (pg. 108) In Capelli 1995 (ed. ) 
Deregulation initially leads to market entry and some labour shortage as carriers 
expand, thus in the short term the earnings effects can appear neutral. However, a 
longer-term perspective with base years in the regulated and deregulated periods 
provides a more complex interpretation. 
Returning to Cremieux's measure of the effect of deregulation on pilot incomes 
(Cremieux1996: 233) we note the ambiguity of deregulation's effect on earnings. 
Processes can have seemingly contradictory effects. Firstly, the removal of 
bankruptcy protection and rapid market entry will tend to exert downward pressure. 
Secondly, there should be an improvement in labour's bargaining strength as a 
consequence of hub concentration and the abolition of the Mutual Aid Pact. (Ibid. ) 
Controlling for all of these effects, Cremieux's measure is more pessimistic, finding 
that when measured at two points in the deregulatory cycle 1985 and 1992, earnings 
were some 12 per cent and 22 per cent lower respectively over the period. (Ibid. ) 
Again, Cremieux rightly cautions "much of the loss in pilot earnings is consistent with 
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slower growth of earnings for comparable workers, and is not necessarily attributable 
to deregulation itself' (Cremieux 1996: 235. ) Nevertheless, his longer-term analysis 
provides a richer set of observations on which to base our analysis. 
On earnings we can summarise that whilst deregulation led to falls in pilot 
compensation they do not appear to have been drastic. Whilst there are falls and, as 
Cremieux argues, these might well have been large at some points in the bargaining 
cycle, they are no higher than those of general industry when we control for other 
factors. Whilst there is considerable difficulty and ambiguity in the measurement of 
earnings, we now have a basis for examining how the pilot workforce experienced 
these falls. Arguably, a more thorough understanding of the impact of deregulation 
requires analysis of the bargaining environment. The shifts in bargaining which we 
noted under the regulated period also occurred within the deregulated period. Product 
market deregulation exercises effects upon the labour market, which influence the 
bargaining environment. In the next section we look at these trends in bargaining to 
assess the impact upon pilots. 
The analysis here has concentrated primarily on the demand side as influenced by 
product market and regulatory change. However the supply side is also important, as 
increased demand had definite effects on the labour market. Clearly, the increased 
passenger demand would occasion an increase in demand for pilots, and labour 
market theory would suggest that the supply of pilots and the elasticity of that supply 
would ultimately affect earnings. With an increased demand for pilots, and an 
effective union duopoly, and a highly regulated training system the supply was 
limited in any case. However restrictions on work rules, which pertained throughout 
the deregulated period meant that pilot unions were able to control the supply of 
trained pilots. The non-union companies either ended up part of the union monopoly 
through merger and acquisition or had to increase wages to cope with the problem of 
turnover. The ability of the pilots not just to regulate, but to effectively control the 
supply of pilots was therefore an important aspect. This dimension is addressed in the 
next section, which looks at the bargaining fortunes of US pilots. 
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4.1.4 Bargaining Under Duress? US Pilot Fortunes in the Bargaining Arena. 1978- 
1997 
Flight deck terms and conditions were identified as the major labour cost within the 
industry. (Bailey et al 1985. ) Pilots had seemingly captured the benefits of increased 
aircraft size, whilst maintaining effective control over issues such as flight duty hours 
and crewing. (See chapter 3. ) These advantages accrued over time as Bailey et al 
indicate in their 1985 analysis. Firstly, despite technological advance, pilots flew 
fewer productive hours in the 1980s than they did in the 1930s. The table below gives 
pilot hours throughout and the permitted ceiling on flying hours. 
Table 4.3 Average Pilot Hours and Federal Limits 1930-1980. 
Year Average Monthly Flying hours Permitted Monthly flying hours 
1930 85 85 
1950s 75 85 
1960s 60-65 100 
1970s 50 100 
1980s 44.3 100 
Source: Bailey (et al 1985) 
Airlines continued to face constraints in their utilisation of pilots who benefited from 
a complex web of work rules and regulatory dispensations. (Ibid. ) Deregulationist 
literature expected market liberalisation to diminish such costs. Just as the fares 
charged by intrastate carriers were much lower than the trunk carriers, so too were 
their compensation structures. 27 Evaluating cost differentials between the low cost 
carrier Southwest and two established operators Bailey et al (1985) illustrated the 
likely effect of the lower cost carriers. ( See Table 4.1 above. ) 
Although there is some disagreement about the overall effect of deregulation on flight 
deck earnings, evidence for the bargaining arena indicate that US pilots came 
increasingly under pressure after deregulation. As the highest paid airline workers, 
they faced enormous pressure for concessions as airlines faced plummeting revenues 
and spiralling fuel costs especially in industry downturns. (Capelli 1985: 316-318. ) 
27 Early deregulatory initiatives allowed interstate carriers to be established, primarily Southwest in 
Texas. Although their impact on the trunk carrier was negligible and they competed mainly with other 
transport modes, their freedom in pricing and their concentration on efficiency made them an important 
benchmark against which the larger carriers measure their labour costs. Bailey (et al) showed that 
Southwest pilot costs were a third lower than that of Piedmont and about half that of United for the 
same aircraft type. (Bailey et al 1986. )
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Whereas before operators could pass such price rises onto consumer fares, the 
competitive environment rendered this tactic impossible. (Ibid. ) Airlines had to turn 
towards internal costs and efficiency, and labour costs especially those of more 
privileged groups were an obvious target. Between 1980 and 1988, as new entrants 
grew on the basis of lower wages, greater utilisation and flexibility, managers at the 
major trunk carriers were encouraged to seek labour costs concessions. 
Studies of concession bargaining in the industry point to a universal trend with most 
operators seeking wage cuts, the introduction of two tier wage levels, pay and 
pensions restructuring and less successfully, changes in work rules. In an econometric 
analysis of concessions, Nay (1991) considered the impact of institutional, strategic 
choice and other factors, in order to determine how concession bargaining had 
affected the US airline industry. (1991: 307-23. ) She concluded that 'ability to pay' 
measures were the best predictors of concession bargaining. In other words, carriers 
under financial duress were most able and likely to exact 'embedded'concessions such 
as two tier wage agreements, lower entry-level wages and long term wage freezes. 
Thus, carriers such as Eastern, Continental, TWA and Pan Am exacted a large number 
of concessions mainly in the form of wage cuts and benefit reductions merely to stay 
afloat. Pilots bore much of the concession burden. (Walsh 1994: 73-75. ) 
However, though ability to pay factors were at the heart of much concession 
bargaining, this explanation understates the opportunistic nature of management wage 
bargaining strategy throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s. 28 In many cases airlines 
with a reasonably sound financial position sought opportunistically to exact major 
concessions, lending credence to Daniel Mitchell's argument about demonstration 
effects. (1986: 43. ) Continental Airlines, for example, was thrown into bankruptcy 
proceedings in the summer of 1985 allowing existing labour contracts to be 
abrogated. It is widely acknowledged that the parent company, Texas Air 
Corporation, used the ultimate sanction of bankruptcy after a strike by the 
International Association of Machinists. (See chapter 8 for a more involved discussion 
of bankruptcy and its effects on labour. ) However the Continental policy represented 
2s Mitchell (1991 435474) in a key analysis of concession bargaining pointed to the existence of 
demonstration effects as firms in profitable sectors such as hotels and food processing demanded 
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a paradigm shift in bargaining strategy by airline management. The carrier was able to 
ride out an almost total strike by unionised pilots and flight attendants and to continue 
operating with non-union labour. (See Cohen 1990 308-323. ) In part the effectiveness 
of the carrier's stance was due to its divide and rule strategy in take-over situations. 
Continental skilfully manipulated inter-union rivalries within the carrier therefore, 
fracturing potential solidarity. (Walsh 1994: 53. ) 
Increasingly, as carriers perceived weakness amongst organised labour, they pushed 
for concessions even when these were not strictly necessary with 'demonstration 
effects' again coming into play. The types of concession sought from pilots ranged 
from wage cuts to lay-offs. The type of concession sought varied with the industry 
and business cycle. For example, it is hardly surprising that in the years 1981-86 wage 
cuts were the most prominent form of concession sought by most carriers bargaining 
throughout those years. These were years of relative recession and downturn. 
Published bargaining data indicates that average wage cuts for pilots under major 
collective bargaining contracts (i. e. in excess of 1000 workers) were in the order of 15 
and 20 %. 29 (Calculated from Monthly Labor Review 1981-1986. )
This evidence calls into question the earnings data discussed above, and indicates that 
major falls in pilot terms and conditions did occur outside the periods referred to by 
most writers. Data, which begins in the years 1984 and 1985, simply fails to capture 
the marked decline in fortunes of pilots and other grades of airline labour which 
occurred primarily from about 1981 to 1986. In many settings pilots at both the entry 
and senior levels did suffer quite severe cuts in wages and conditions. 
concessions. Furthermore he argues that these concessions became institutionalised, to the extent that 
even in the growing economy of the mid eighties, wages remained depressed. C, 0 29 Monthly Labor Review 1981-86. Calculated from available negotiation data in various issues. C, 
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To obtain a more meaningful overview of the bargaining fortunes of pilots we have to 
examine the range of concessions made and not just overall earnings trends. 
Table 4.4 Occurrence Level of Types of Concession in the US Airline Industry 
1981-95 




Two Tier Wage 
Fringe Benefit Reduction 
Pay Supplement Reduction 
Change in Working Conditions/Work 
Rules 
Reduction in Job Security (Lay-offs) 
Source: Calculated from Monthly Labor Review 1982-95. 
Total Coverage ** Majority Coverage * Low Coverage 
Table 4.4 gives an outline of the types of concession secured from the pilot 
workforce in major contracts between 1981 and 1995. It can be seen that wage cuts 
were almost universal in the first period 1981-86, becoming less common in the years 
1987-95. Wage freezes, though less universal than in the first period, continued to be 
used extensively up till 1995. However most of the carriers who secured freezes did 
so for relief from imminent bankruptcy or collapse as in the case of TWA and 
Continental. By the late eighties and nineties airlines were less concerned in securing 
crisis concessions than in instigating long-term work rule changes, which became an 
increasing feature of the period. Operators were well aware that concessions extracted 
in crisis periods might be 'clawed back' in better times and therefore sought to vary 
wages and conditions permanently through two tier wage agreements. Capelli (1985: 
316-38) and Card (1986: 527-38) have argued that these concessions brought no cost 
to incumbent workers and in many cases guaranteed union expansion as carriers 
developed new services on the basis of lower costs. 
The idea that such concessions were costless to existing employees has to be 
qualified. Reductions in entry level wages erode the position of established employees 
by instituting lower wage rates at the bottom, which may well exercise an effect on 
more senior workers. Pilot unions are aware of this, which is why many negotiations 
involve 'catch up' or parity clauses for lower tier employees. Many agreements are 
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confined to certain types of aircraft, in order to avoid encroachment on upper scales. 30 
In addition, as Walsh argues, when introducing two tier wages airlines often had 
designs above and beyond the restructuring of wage costs. Two-tier wages for cabin 
crew were, he argues, not just intended to restructure the cabin service career structure 
and increase turnover. They were, he argues, partly designed to signal an end to the 
bargaining and labour market environment of the regulated era. (Walsh 1989: 50-62. ). 
For pilots, the use of two tier wage rates can be viewed similarly with the benefit of 
compressed pay scales was much more practical in a highly paid seniority based 
workforce. 
For management, the value of these agreements in terms of institutionalised low costs 
can be seen in table 4.5 below. This 1986 data provides evidence on two-tier 
agreements when they were most prolific within the industry. The data list key 
airlines,, giving approximate level of reduction and year of parity (when lower tier 
scales are equalised with existing scales). In those agreements involving a higher and 
lower range, the average reduction in 1986 was some 24.5 per cent. This represents a 
significant cost saving for airlines available at a less fraught price than reductions in 
existing wage levels. 
Comparable two tier contracts were negotiated for mechanics across the same number 
of carriers, whilst flight attendants average reduction was 22 per cent across a smaller 
sample of carriers. 31 
30 These attitudes are clear from the negotiations studied and from subsequent research. 
31 Thomas et al (1996) (2) pointed to the fact that financial markets tended to value wage cuts in their C, 
assessment of carrier viability above more Istructural'changes in wage costs. Structural factors involve 
those changes, which lead to a permanent lowering of wage costs, rather than temporary savings. The 
implementation of two tier wage agreements discussed above is one such innovation. This seems 
counter-intuitive given the evidence on the resilience of wages over the long term. Short-term wage 
cuts are by their very nature unstable. They often include restoration clauses (snapback provisions), 
which may or may not coincide with a carrier's ability to pay. In many cases, a carrier unable to meet 
snapback provisions (such as Northwest Airlines in 1994) faces industrial action, which certainly 
erodes the benefit of any short-term wage cut. Nevertheless, the perceptions of finance capital are of 
major importance in the viability of airlines. By valuing wage cuts, Wall Street seems to be applauding 
tough strategies ftom airline management regardless of the overall effectiveness of such strategies at a 
business level. On the other hand, the institutions may well be devaluing the impact of two tier wage 0 C, 
agreements as they tend to lead to a competitive expansion on the basis of lower costs, and do not add 
significantly to profits. (Thomas et al 1996: 203-217. ) 
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Table 4.5 Two Tier Wage Agreements 1986 
Carrier Approximate pay Year of Parity 
reduction 
Aloha 15% 5 years 
American 50% Future negotiations 
Frontier 10% 6 years 
Piedmont 21% Future negotiations 
Republic 11% Future Negotiations 
TWA 15% Future Negotiations 
Unit 
, ed 
34-50% Future Negotiations 
US Air 40-45% Future Negotiations 
Western 25% Does not reach parity 
Source: AIRCON Data March 1986 
In addition, airline unions bargained away Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA), and 
increasingly accepted lump sum payments in lieu of percentage rate increases. 
Although these concessions were relatively minor, they do indicate a marginal decline 
in bargaining fortunes. 32 Another area where concessions have been prevalent within 
the airline industry is in the area of benefits. The incidence of reduced paid vacation 
time, curtailed health benefits and weakened pension provision has been a facet of 
concession bargaining. The reductions have particularly affected pilots given their 
higher level of remuneration, rendering small reductions in benefits important, as cost 
savings. Reductions in holiday pay and pension fund bolidays' originated with crisis 
stricken carriers such as Eastern, which reduced entitlements at particular periods of 
crisis. Other carriers, such as Delta and United, began to exact similar concessions 
towards the late eighties and early 1990s, as financial crisis particularly with the onset 
of the Gulf War gripped the industry. The situation within the US industry, therefore, 
is contradictory, when we consider the overall impact on pilots. The quantitative 
evidence indicates that entry-level wages rose, whilst there were slight falls in wages 
of senior personnel. This evidence suggests little effect on overall earnings in terms of 
real wage trends within the US economy. Contrasting this relatively short run 
32 Indeed if we look at those other deregulation affected industries we can see that the incidence of 
lump sum payments is as correspondingly high as COLA payments are low. The average of lump sum 
payments for all private industries is 45 per cent and the airline industry is well below this average. 
Railroads however with 96 per cent of workers covered Urban Transit with 79 per cent and trucking C, 
with 62 per cent of workers covered, have well above average levels. This suggests that deregulated C, industries are subject to the twin scissors of falling cost of living adjustment payments (which though 000 
less important in disinflationary periods may assume more importance in future) and the increasing Cý 
prevalence of non-compounded wage increases. Either way this can be seen as a decline in bargaining. 
fortunes. ( Monthly Labour Review Bargaining Agreements in US industry (1978-1997). 
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evidence, with the longer run evidence of Cremieux suggests that the effects of 
deregulation on pilots have been fairly profound. It is difficult, however, within the 
context of general wage and labour market trends since the late 1970s to ascribe this 
decline to deregulation. More qualitative evidence on the effects of deregulation can 
be obtained from detailed analysis of the bargaining data, which indicates wage cuts, 
wage restructuring, and changes in work rules. This data provides a long run 
representation of bargaining fortunes at the firm level, and as such, provides more 
insight than average earnings trends alone can provide. 
Labour was able to recoup some of this lost ground as the industry grew more 
competitive, and as external economic conditions began to affect the sector but 
managers increasingly looked towards deeper forms of restructuring as well as 
profound reform of working practices. This move towards restructit ring, rather than 
short-term concessions, represented a new phase in the labour market impact of 
deregulation. The fact that labour costs dropped from 43 per cent of industry costs to 
around a third by 1990, at a time of rapidly plummeting fuel prices, indicates that 
, 
major savings were made. (Morrison and Winston 1995. ) This change in the industry 
cost structure reflects a wider long term reshaping of the airline bargaining 
environment, where, traumatised by the impact of bankruptcy and wage cuts, airline 
unions have attempted to adopt a more dynamic bargaining stance. Pilots have been at 
the forefront of this new more integrative bargaining agenda, looking to trade wages 
and work rules for job security and participation. This late deregulation phase of 
industrial relations is discussed in the next section, bringing our analysis of the effects 
of deregulation on US pilots up to date. 
4.1.5 United We Stand? US Pilots and Management in the Era of Late Deregulation 
The changed competitive environment of the 1990s has led to a major re-appraisal of 
airline management strategy. Where even in the immediate post-deregulation period 
management had been content to bargain on short term issues such as temporary wage 
cuts and the like, their approach in the 1990s reflected an increasing impatience with 
the institutional resilience which characterised labour long term bargaining. The 
comments of the former chairman of United Airlines, Stephen Wolfreflect this new 
turn in managements' labour relation strategies: 
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"Without question traditional labour management relationships have been 
successful in producing an airline industry that historically has afforded its 
employees an unparalleled combination of benefits and working conditions. It is 
an achievement that can be pointed to with pride. Neither labor nor management 
however, can afford to sit back and assume that approaches that worked in the 
past will continue to produce such positive results in a markedly changed 
operating environment. Established carriers are under assault from all sides and 
losses of the magnitude the industry has experienced in the early 1990s, cannot 
long be sustained. Failure to compete effectively with lower-cost competitors 
will force established carriers into permanent decline or, alternatively, result in 
significant structural change. " (Wolf 1995: 231-22. ) 
Whilst management sought to attain control of labour costs and to rescind work rules 
it viewed as inflexible and costly, labour traditionally sought to protect these. Given 
the perishability of airline services, the catastrophic effect of airline strikes on both 
service and employee morale and the fiercely competitive operating environment, a 
different approach has become necessary. Such a policy might be viewed as one of 
limited and strategic co-optation. Policies such as ESOPS typify this approach, as do 
other forms of limited financial participation and worker involvement. Pilots are often 
the main targets of such policies, as pilot labour is extremely powerful and union 
density is extremely high. 33 However, these cost reduction strategies apply across the 
whole airline labour force. 
ESOP programmes have increased in importance. In 1989, for example, employees 
held only 4 per cent of airline stock; by 1995 when the United deal was finalised, that 
proportion had risen to 21 per cent. The United deal, which delivered $5 billion in 
cost savings for a majority employee stake, builds on an earlier trend. This growth in 
'equity based concession bargaining' can be traced back to the early 1980s where 
virtually every airline included some kind of ESOP programme, with shares traded for 
wage and benefit cuts. (Wever 1989: 600-609. ) Though as Wever argues in the case 
of Western, the ESOP programme could be a long term restructuring policy, the 
normal trend was to use ESOP in a more short-term fashion. Distressed carriers, 
whose financial position meant at best a long wait for capital gain, were more likely to 
offer such programmes. If anything the ESOP programmes of the early to mid eighties 
33 Even the most recalcitrant anti-union employers such as Delta and America West have been unable 
to stop pilot unionisation, even where they have steadfastly refused to recognise unions for other 
employee groups. 
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were symbolic. Pilots favour ESOPS in particular because they provide a more 
multilateral context for bargaining. ESOPs can be viewed as equity based concession 
bargaining where labour is co-opted into the process of restructuring, in return for 
large-scale concessions. These concessions are often of such magnitude, that they 
could not be delivered during 'normal' concession bargaining. In return for equity 
however, labour has been prepared to concede major changes on wages and work 
rules. These work rules have proved much more resilient in unionised carriers such as 
Northwest, TWA and United than at other carriers, but resistance is not confined to 
these higher cost carriers. In 1996 Delta, for example, succeeded in having pilots (the 
sole unionised group) agree to the formation of a low-cost subsidiary with higher 
utilisation levels, significantly lower pay and longer flight hours (Airline Business 
November 1996). 
Despite its similarities with other ESOP deals, the United Airlines' Employee buyout 
can be seen as a landmark example in employee participation. It was expressly 
designed to co-opt both pilots and mechanics, the highest skilled groups into the 
management structure. Given their level of remuneration, industry specific skills, and 
socio-economic status, pilots tend to be the main drivers in employee buy-out 
programmes. (Wichman 1994. ) One 'supply side' reason for the prevalence of pilots 
within buy-out situations is the fact that they tend to offer greater concessions than 
other airline workers given that they account for a higher proportion of labour costs. 
Whilst there has been a great deal of rhetoric about partnership and co-management, 
the deal has allowed wage reductions for ALPA members of nearly 16 per cent. This 
has enabled the carrier to establish a low cost airline, with a no strike agreement and a 
commitment to emulate the productivity and wage structure of Southwest airlines. 
(Avmark September 1994: 13-16. ) Viewing the concession over the longer term, the 
cost reductions are severe. Salary reductions will amount to $3.95 billions of benefit 
reductions to $1.2 billions, and work rule changes to $1.5 billions. (ibid. ) 
Whatever the reasons, ESOPs have become increasingly popular and are increasingly 
driven and even controlled by pilots. Even though the entry fee into the management 
structure is high, pilots are prepared to pay the price, as they see greater rewards in the 
future. Pilots have traditionally sought to gain influence within the political arena and 
within regulatory structures such as safety and technical bodies. They continue to try 
137 
and influence these bodies and have been successful in maintaining licensing 
conditions and protecting scheduling rules. However, the ESOPS trend sees pilots 
seeking influence within the firm. This would suggest that US pilots have traded some 
degree of compensation for job security and accepted a level of renewed influence 
within the industry, rather than resolutely defending work rules. This is an adaptation 
to the new regulatory environment, where tightly oligopolistic competition demands 
efficiency in labour costs and new forms of risk sharing. In a cyclical industry, the full 
irnport of this shift in bargaining strategy will only become clear over time. Overall, 
however, pilots managed to maintain their earnings though at specific periods they 
faced significant reductions in wages and conditions. This evidence should be borne 
in mind when we commence our analysis of the effect of European deregulation on 
the pilot workforce, which is the subject of the next section. 
4.2 Europe: Restructuring the Flight Deck 
The progress of the European airline industry towards deregulation has been less rapid 
than in the USA. However, the change in the fortunes of organised labour has to an 
extent been more pronounced. This can be explained, firstly, by the nature of 
ownership within the European industry, with a long history of state control exercised 
through nationalisation. With economic reform and the advent of EU competition 
doctrine, particularly that relating to subsidy, carriers have been forced to restructure 
costs more quickly than in the US. Secondly, the wages and productivity of European 
airline workers, accounting for differences in stage length and equipment type, have 
been diagnosed as more generous and the productivity performance inferior to that of 
their US counterparts. Thirdly, a process of globalisation and concentration, following 
deregulation, has superimposed itself on an already difficult environment. It is 
important to briefly sketch the development of European airline deregulation, which is 
more complex than the straightforward 'one offreform of the US industry. We will 
then chart the effects of regulatory reform on pilots as a key occupational group. 
Again we will analyse the earnings and bargaining fortunes and the regulatory and 
political 
, 
influence of pilots within the European industry. For earnings, we will use 
the official earnings statistics collated by ICAO, which despite gaps and omissions 
allow companson with the US data. We will therefore examine general trends for key 
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years 1975 and 1995. These are convenient comparison points, providing evidence of 
the late period of regulation, the initial deregulation period around 1980s and the later 
European deregulation period from about 1990, commencing with the first package in 
1988 and 1995, and later developments. 
In the USA we used comparison data between entry level and senior pilots in order to 
chart whether there had been generalised effects on pay at the top or bottom of the 
pilot occupational scales. As consistent aggregate data on entry-level wages is 
unobtainable, for Europe we will look at the BALPA pilot pay survey for the same 
years as the ICAO survey data 1995, in order to determine whether or not there has 
been a trend towards fragmentation in flight deck pay. In addition, we will be 
concerned with more qualitative aspects such as effects on bargaining and industrial 
relations. We will then assess the manner in which flight deck staff reacted to the new 
regulatory environment in terms of issues such as crew hours, cross border licensing, 
and training in order to defend their interests. Although the issues confronting 
European flight deck staff are slightly different and the data are not comparable, we 
should be able to outline the contours of a comparison, which can be more fully 
developed in our discussion in chapter 7 on European restructuring. 
4.2.1 Deregulating European Air Transport: Liberalising In The Face Of Constraints. 
Unlike US deregulation, which was rapidly introduced as a sort of policy experiment, 
European initiatives were steadfastly cautious, due to the divergence between the 
various countries and between those who favoured outright deregulation and a more 
measured approach. (Button et al 1998: 11. ) The co-existence of a vibrant low cost 
charter sector and limited deregulation with certain EU countries had already exposed 
the high cost nature of the industry and high consumer fares in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The trend towards deregulation of European air transport services can be seen within 
the context of four distinct phases. (Button et al 1998: 28. ) Firstly, there were a series 
of domestic reform initiatives coupled with privatisation and state divestment, most 
notably in Britain and the Netherlands. In the mid 1980s the UK regulator, the Civil 
Aviation Authority, sanctioned limited market entry and fare setting to allow smaller 
airlines limited scope to compete. (UK CAA 1988. ) Secondly, privatisation, coupled 
with labour market deregulation within the wider context of liberal labour market 
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regimes, allowed flag carriers such as British Airways and KLM the potential to 
operate on the basis of lower costs and higher productivity. A more liberal 
environment of bilateral air service agreements, notably between the UK and the 
Netherlands (1984), UK/Belgium (1985) and UK/Ireland (1988) accompanied this 
phase. Barrett (1997: 67-73) estimated that the benefits in terms of lower fares from 
the latter agreement amounted to E42 millions by 1996. Thirdly, this limited zonal 
deregulation was accompanied by a more encompassing and supranational series of 
regulatory initiatives notably the ongoing 'Open Skies' agreements between the UK 
and the US/Canada in 1994. (Button et al 1998: 30. ) However it has to be emphasised 
that although the trend is towards liberalisation the industry still operates on a 
mercantilist basis with states protecting and upholding the rights of their flag carriers 
and major airlines. The apparent success of US deregulation was tempered with 
concern about market failures and the European project was designed to avoid the 
perceived failures of US deregulation. As Button et al argue, the debate has often been 
characterised as a choice between the shock therapy of the US solution and the more 
measured gradualism of European policy. (1998: 54. ) European authorities were 
constrained by geography and topography, as well as the divergence of state 
competition and labour market policies. These issues and contexts are covered by 
other accounts (Button et al 1998), (McGowan and Seabright 1989: 283-344). 
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For the purposes of the current work it is necessary to outline these liberalising 
measures, although the very real interplay between such policies and the labour 
market is fully analysed in Chapter 7. The principal deregulatory packages are 
outlined below in Table 4.6 
Table 4.6 EU Air Transport Reform: The Three Packages. 
Ist package (Jan 1988) 21 package (Ist Nov 1990) 3 rd package (Ist Jan 1993) 
Fares Discounting of up to Improved automatic non- Powers to intervene against 
45% without regulatory approved discounts excessive basic fares (in relation 
approval to long run costs). Continued 
downward development of fares 
Designation/capacity Multiple according to Reduced flight and passenger All designation capacity 
passenger numbers and numbers for multi- restrictions removed 
flights: designation. 
45/55 capacity split Jan Gradual increase in capacity 
88 share up to 60%, allows 
40/60 Oct 1989 increase of 7.5% p. a. 
Access. 1competition Improved 3"j, 40'and 5 th Enhanced 3" and 4" Full access to all EU routes*, 
freedoms freedoms, 5h freedom up to unrestricted cabotage from April 
Limited capacity co- 50% of capacity. 1997. 
ordination, rules on slot PSO/protection new regional Reformed PSOs. 
allocation, CRS and routes/scope for distribution Greater scope for traffic 
ground handling control on environmental distribution intervention re: 
grounds congestion and environmental 
factors 
Licensing Not addressed in earlier packages Uniform across EU, notion of EU I 
ownership, lighter regulatory 
I 
requirements for smaller carriers 
Source: Summarised from table 2.5 in Button et al. 1998 
* excluding Greek islands and Azores 
It can be seen from table 4.6, that the process of deregulation was attended f irstly by a 
relaxation of restrictions, benefiting flag carrier airlines. Secondly, there was a 
gradual introduction of fare discounts, and greater freedoms to operate services within 
other European countries. Complete liberalisation was signalled by the removal of all 
restrictions and designations with full fare setting authority and the ability to operate 
between and within other European states. Within this context of market 
liberalisation, we can ask the same broad questions about the outcome for labour. 
Given the identification of pilots with a culture of high earnings and low productivity, 
how did pilots fare under deregulation? The first task is to examine the impact on 
eamings. 
141 
4.2.2 European Pilots: Flying On Borrowed Time? 
Following the US literature on regulated industries, Windle (1991: 31-49) and Neven 
and Roller (1995: 933-940) identified rent sharing between management and unions 
as a significant factor in the higher relative costs of European airlines. In common 
with others, such as McGowan and Seabright (1989: 283-344), Windle (1991: 31- 
49)(), they identify significantly lower productivity and correspondingly higher wages 
for Europe than for the US industry. As we have seen, US pilots under regulation and 
in the immediate post deregulation period were viewed as less productive. Managers 
have regarded their European counterparts as both overpaid and less productive. As in 
the US, the legacy of a web of regulatory rules, national labour market policies and 
the significant bargaining power of pilots themselves has benefited them enormously 
as a group. 
In order to develop our analysis it is necessary to consider the nature of pilot earnings 
in Europe over key comparison points between the regulated and the deregulated 
period. The first task is to look at the official data, which in the case of European 
carriers is incomplete. ICAO data on fleet and personnel used here has been analysed 
by estimating mean earnings firstly for all European carriers listed, and secondly for 
flag carrier airlines, where high earnings have traditionally been prevalent. 
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These raw data are given below. 
Table 4.7 Estimated Flight Deck Earnings in the European Airline Industry 
1978-1997 (Constant US $) 
1978 1980 1985 1995 1997 
Sabena 62,606 49,365* 76,639 80,637 75,243 
Air France 52,437 94,652 71,297 218,791 ** 75,243* 
Lufthansa 31,450* 49,365* 57,750* 80,637* 75,243* 
Aer Lingus 24,608 35,750 46,955 80,637* 75,243* 
Alitalia 42,533 49,365*1 57,750* 80,637* 75,243* 
KLM 31,450* 116,062 95,747 80,637* 75,243* 
TAP 28,422 49,365* 41,392 144,970 126,650 
SAS 50,145 85,004 57,750* 161,950 159,378 
Iberia 42,688 75,577 60,6021 192,383 75,243* 
Swissair 56,280 108,681 94,5581 76,972 75,243* 
British Airways 16,186 42,802 38,436 111,719 119,766 
British Midland 14,756 39,125 27,383 78,614 86,362 
Air UK 31,450* 23,079 57,750* 80,637* 56,979 
Virgin ----- ------ 34,600 82,432 79,372 
Mean 39,727 66,736 62,969 102,527 94,650 
Index 
(1980--100) 60 100 94 154 142 
Index 
(1985=100) 63 105 100 163 150 
Source: calculated from ICAO Fleet and Personnel Statistics inclusive years. 
* Missing data with mean value for year inserted to allow comparison. 
"Affected by Air France take-over of UTA and Air Inter. 
TABLE 4.8 Estimated Flight Deck Earnings within European Flag Carrier 
Airlines (Constant US $) 
1975 1980 1985 1995 1997 
Aer Lingus 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
Alitalia 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
Air France 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
A 16,186 42,8021 38,436 111,719 119,766 
befia 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
m 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
fthansa 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
abena 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
AS 50,145 85,004 88,123 161,950 159,378 
ww issair 44,450* 77,682* 88,123 140,332* 144,523* 
AP 23,942 77,682* 41,392 144,970 126,650 




W-100) 54 100 105 186 188 
ndex ý1985=100) 
51 95 100 177 179 
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Examining the index for all European pilot earnings in table 4.7 we can see that 
earnings appear to have fallen in two distinct periods. Firstly, between 1980 and 1985 
when the effects of the business cycle occasioned cost cutting, secondly, and more 
importantly, between 1995 and 1997, the most intensive period of restructuring. This 
is the case where the rate of change is calculated using both 1980 and 1985 as base 
years. However given the incomplete nature of the ICAO data the real level may well 
be downplayed by the fact that industry mean earnings have been substituted for 
missing data. The base year of 1975 has been chosen for the European flag carrier 
comparison, because the data were more complete. Since much of this missing data 
relates to high earning state run carriers the mean is artificially low. Assuming that 
average earnings increased at the same rate as other flag carriers, and we have reason 
to suspect that they in fact outpaced other flag carriers, we can provide a more 
meaningful if still imperfect comparison, given in table 4.9. Here the average 
earnings of the highest European carriers were compounded with the mean earnings 
of US big six'carriers shown earlier in table 4.2. The index, which is based on 1985 
earnings, the high point for European earnings, shows that there has been a steady 
upward trend throughout most of the comparison period with a pronounced slowing of 
earnings growth over recent years. On the face of it, both this data and the US data 
suggest that the long term effect of deregulation is to increase pilot earnings. The 
ICAO data for Europe are much less complete than for US carriers who tend to report 
their earnings more frequently and accurately. 34 The data are also more complete for 
the US giving a truer reflection because of the better response from US carriers. 
European earnings data are patchy and inconsistent, we can therefore only take these 
data as indicative guides . 
34 A factor in European carrier under-reporting is the pronounced reticence of employee groups and 
management at high cost airlines to divulge earnings data lest they provide ammunition for critics. The 
author continues to find a reluctance to secure this data in his current position as head of research for 
the British Airline Pilots Union. 
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Comparing the US and I-Airopean data we can see that the Irend in earnings growth is 
remarkably similar. 
Table 4.9 Comparison of European Flag carrier and US 'Big Six' Carriers. 
Flight Deck Earnings using (index base = 1980/1985) 
1975 1980 1985 1995 1997 
Europe 1980 54 100 105 186 188 
US 1980 65 100 134 181 192 
Europe 1985 51 95 100 177 179 
US 1985 48 74 100 134 143 
Source: Constr ucted from ICAO Fleet and Personnel Statistics (inclusive years). 
There are of course differences between the earnings trends for both the US and 
Europe. These reflect the fact that both nations experience essentially the same statre L- 
of deregulation, and its labour market effects, namely competitive disengagement at 
different times. The US pilot workfOrce experienced this stage of' deregulation C- -- 
between 1980 and 1985, whilst in Europe the same period is roughly between 1995 
and 1997. The overall effect thOLIgh is reasonably neutral. The period should be seen 
as an 'adjustment' rather than as a fundamental re-alignment of earnings. I 
Figure 4.3 Trend in European and US Earnings 1978-1997 (base =1980) 
Comparison of Trend in European/US Flight Deck 
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It is however clear that earnings for flight deck crews have tailed off somewhat 
towards the end of the comparison period. It is difficult at this stage to tell whether 
this is an indication of deregulation exerting a downward trend, or whcther this later 
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stage represents a blip as the period 1985-1990 clearly does in Europe. However the 
convergence evident between the two in the late 1990s suggest the beginning of a re- 
alignment of air transport earnings. 
Looking at country level data we can focus to a greater extent on any changes. The 
levelling off trend is again apparent for the major flag carrier airline in this case 
British Airways. Figures 4.4 to 4.6 below provide a trend comparison of basic salaries 
for UK airline captains. Looking at entry-level salaries for example (figure 4.4 and 
4.5) it is clear that pay within this category has indeed levelled off after a strong 
upward trend between 1985 and 1990. (figure 4.5. ) After those years airlines, 
especially the larger operators such as British Airways and Britannia, the largest 
inclusive tour operator, introduced lower salaries for new entrants, in part reflecting 
the increased costs of training. A levelling off is also apparent in middle scale salaries, 
again after growth between 1985 and 1990. At the upper scale there is a continued 
upward trend reflecting the increased returns to seniority and the fact that many more 
operators are involved in long haul flying, particularly the charter operators. (figure 
4.6. ) Only British Midland whose operations during the survey period where 
exclusively short to medium haul were excluded from this trend. Therefore any 
increase in pay for captains has tended to go towards the top of the seniority scale. 
This is in marked contrast to the picture revealed by Johnson in her analysis of US 
pay where we saw an effect on the top scale pilot earnings. Looking at co-pilot 
earnings we can see that the picture is similar with salary growth at this level within 
British Airways slowing to reflect the increased cost of training at the entry level of 
the market. 
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Salaries for the middle scale of pilots have tailed off but the upward trend seems set to 
continue. There is increased demand for relatively experienced pilots given the 
buoyant labour market. 
Deregulation therefore seems to have been accompanied not by an increase in pilot 
earnings generally, but in a redistribution of earnings. Again the top scale of co-pilots 
continue to enjoy high earnings. These earnings, especially the middle scale, relate 
mostly to jet aircraft and large scheduled or charter carriers. These are used because 
they have been in existence for the life of the survey, and data is readily available. 
However there is another story indicating pressure on pay at the lower end of the 
spectrum. This is discussed in the next section. 
4.2.3 Pilot Pay in Bfitain and Europe: Pressurefrom Below 
Ile data in figures 4.6 to 4.8 provide only evidence of the impact on salaries at the 
top end of the airline market. Given the influence of a few high salaries within an 
airline, such data can lead to severe distortion. In order to provide a more realistic 
comparison of the effects of deregulation upon flight deck earnings it is necessary to 
introduce some supplementary data which consider the impact upon earnings at the 
lower end of the industry. The UK flight deck union BALPA has published yearly 
pilot pay analyses since 1975. These give data on minimum and maximum salary 
levels, providing an illuminating insight into the development of pilot remuneration. 
The data compare base salaries at the entry and n-dddle level for British Airways, the 
UK flag carrier, and for a number of independent airlines for whom corresponding 
data exist. The trend shows that pilot remuneration has in fact increased since 1975 
with a levelling out in this pay trend towards the end the 1990s. This may reflect a 
lower inflation environment; there is no evidence that it reflects lower pay for flight 
deck crews, either at the top, bottom or middle of the scale. 
However across the range of airlines salaries for comparable aircraft types (Boeing 
737) can be as much as one third lower. Pilots are very sensitive to pay variations for 
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identical aircraft types on identical route networks. The variation can be seen even 
more clearly if we compare BA Regional with British Midland (BM). British Midland 
operates a network of short haul business routes from London Heathrow in 
competition with BA. Its fleet mix is identical to that of BAR, but comparing 
maximum salaries, British Midland captains are some 19 per cent behind their 
counterparts at BAR. Easyjet salaries however are even lower with much higher 
productivity. Again comparing the salaries of Boeing 737 captains, we can see from 
table 4.10 that Easyjet pilot salaries are some 31 per cent lower than those of BAR. 
One of the major pressures on pilot salaries is the effect of regionalisation. and 
franchising. For example salaries again for the ubiquitous 737 at Maersk, a BA 
franchise, are only 65 per cent of those for BA Regional, demonstrating the threat to 
flag carrier type salaries from this sort of business strategy. Jet salaries for the BA 
regional operations Euro Gatwick and British Airways regional (BAR) differ 
markedly from those of other regional airlines. Importantly, Manx, GB Air, and 
Maersk are all BA franchise operations. This shows the extent of the possible threat to 
pilot salaries at BA. The case of Maersk, the Danish owned regional carrier operating 
a radius of European routes from Birmingham, confirms the fear that trade unions had 
when the 
_BA 
threatened to sell the regional business to this operator. Maersk 
maximum pilot salaries are some 20 per cent lower. Many regional operators offer 
lower salaries than established carriers such as BA and British Midland. However, 
within BA the pilots' union, BALPA, has been able to gradually recoup the lower 
regional and Gatwick salaries, culminating in a 'snapback provision' for Gatwick and 
regional salaries. Operative from 1999, this deal ironically, part of the pilots' business 
efficiency savings, has restored regional and Gatwick based pilots back into the 
fcommon pilot workforce'. The deal suggests that concession bargaining of the type 
seen in the USA is at least as prevalent in the UK. 
This follows a trend established in the US, whereby, commuter carriers were 
integrated into major operators, in order to feed main hubs. In Europe however, the 
trend has been one of dis-integration as the regional operations are spun out as 
profit/cost centres, often with lower pay. Nevertheless, there remain pockets of 
relative low pay on the flight deck, and the threat from low cost operators is very real. 
Using current (1998) data for jet salaries, we can see the threat to pilot salaries from 
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the bottom of the airline market. Many of the operators paying lower salaries are BA 
franchise operators and their activities have extended recently. Many are new 
entrants. Significantly the long standing scheduled operators such as British Midland 
and the charter operators Britannia and Monarch are much closer -to the BA regional 
salary. 
Nevertheless even Virgin long haul pilots are quite significantly below BA salaries 
especially when allowances and increments are taken into account. 
Table 4.10 1998 Upper Scale Jet Pilot Salaries for UK Regional Operators 








Maersk* 53,278 66 34,695 62 
British Midland 64,257 79 40,383 73 
British Regional Airlines 52,509 65 36,500 66 
CityFlyer Express* 48,760 60 30,475 55 
British Airways (Regional) 81,207 100 55,610 100 
Easyjet 56,000 69 35,500 64 
KLM UK 63,111 78 38,256 69 
Jersey European 53,400 66 32,000 58 
Virgin Atlantic 73,950 91 48,070 86 
Average Jet salary exc. 58,158 72 36,984 66 
BAR 
Source: BALPA Annual Pay Survey December 1998 
The basic salary level is a good indication of the trend in remuneration within the 
pilot profession. Those carriers paying high basic salaries tend to have higher levels of 
incremental benefit and, conversely, the lower paying carriers offer a limited range of 
benefits. The discussion of pilot pay would suggest that pilot earnings have been 
variable within the UK. This might be expected given the extent of deregulatio n 
within the UK and the existence of an independent, low cost and charter sector. 
However in other European countries there is still a strong perception of high earnings 
and low productivity. This has led to constant attempts by airlines to seek concessions 
from pilots. These issues are examined in the next section 
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4.2.4 Productivity and Efficiency in The European Pilot Workforce 
Pilot productivity has always been a source of dispute between airlines and flight 
crew unions. Depending on the measure used very different results can be obtained in 
any measurement process. The output of pilots conforms to the basic framework of 
airline economics, namely decreasing costs over a longer distance and vice versa. 
Various measures control for the effects of distance and time, the most commonly 
used by management is costs per block hour. This measure records only productive 
'seat time'and ignores unproductive periods in between. Pilots are reluctant to use this 
as the sole measure as it underestimates the preparation and planning which goes into 
a flight. A 1995 comparative study by consultants, Towers Perrin, for KLM 
management for example showed that pilot costs per block hour for comparable 
aircraft types were 20 per cent, 30 per cent and 40 per cent higher than those at 
Lufthansa, British Airways and Singapore Airways respectively. A rival study 
conducted by Cranfield University and Deloitte Touche showed that KLM pilot costs 
were, on average, 25 per cent below those of the other eleven airlines and their net 
income half that of the other carriers. (Odell 1997 :. ) The measurement of pilot 
productivity is therefore fraught with methodological problems given the complexity 
of different output measures, and interacting variables such as route length, aircraft 
type and speed. However despite disagreement over the type of measure most 
analyses, have found that European pilots considerably underperform compared to US 
and Asian counterparts. However, in an analysis of world airline labour costs, Merz 
(1995) indicates that the negative performance of European flight deck staff in this 
regard is exaggerated. 
Table 4.11 Pilot Labour Costs at Major Airlines 1980-1991 
Total staff 
1980(%) 




Total labour cost 
1991(%) 
USA 11 20 10 26 
EUROPE 6 17 6 17 
ASIA 7 
1 
18 9 21 
Source: Merz and Lufthansa (1995) in Capelli (ed. ) Airline Labour Relations in The Global 
Era. (Pg. 9 1). 
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Merz indicates that European pilot labour costs, as a percentage of total airline labour 
costs, have remained stable whilst the percentage of pilots and other flight deck staff 
of the total workforce has fallen slightly. The trend in recent years has been for pilot 
costs to increase, however, these increases in the size of the workforce have been 
accompanied by rises in productivity. (Alamdari and Morell 1997 53-66. )(Vass 1997. )
Though there are many omissions in the data due to under-reporting, the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) collects data periodically on staff costs. Using 
this data to look at the total expenditure on flight deck wages as a proportion of 
overall labour costs, provides an imperfect but useful comparison . 
35 Table 4.12 
(below) provides an outline comparison of costs. Whilst US pilot costs as a proportion 
of total labour costs have fallen overall since 1980, costs in Europe have risen albeit 
from a lower level. In the US, pilot wage costs actually rose as a proportion of overall 
wage costs, throughout most of the deregulated period, but started falling by 1995. 
This reflects the long run effect of deregulation. We might expect to see a similar 
trend within Europe, with deregulation being accompanied by a rise in flight deck 
costs, falling only after a long period of adjustment, where a lower cost base is 
established. However the overall trend evident from table 4.12 and 4.13, below, 
which takes the analysis up to 1995, is one of pilot expenditure rising as a proportion 
of total labour costs. 
Table 4.12 Long Run Comparison of Pilot Wage Costs 1980-1995 
% of total labour cost % of total labour cost % of total labour cost 
1980 1991 1995 
USA 20 26 22 
EUROPE 17 17 23 
Source: calculated from ICAO Fleet and Personnel 1981,1992,1996 
The trends suggest that expenditure on pilots including their training and expenses 
becomes greater as traffic and route networks expand under deregulation. Ibis is clear 
from the increase in pilot cost in the USA. It also reflects the fact that the bargaining 
35 The ICAO data on fleet and personnel costs are incomplete. The data is good for the USA were most 
airlines report fully and consistently over time. For Europe however, there is seldom continuity 
between years for the same carrier and data on major operators such as Air France, Alitalia and 
Lufthansa are missing completely. The proportion of pilot expenditure for Europe has therefore been 
extrapolated from the previous percentage difference between the two years for the available carriers. 
The average difference was then calculated for those carriers for whom data is missing. C, 
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power of pilots has increased, as deregulation has grown the market. This explains the 
pattern of rising post deregulation earnings, and pilot wage costs. 
Table 4.13 Comparison of Total Labour Expenditure Pilots 1991 and 1995 
Airline Total Expenditure 
on Flight deck 
costs 
1991 ($US) 











United 732,541 17 1,033,299 20 
US Air 558,622 22 589,915 21 
Delta 820,848 20 1,079,509 26 
TWA 204,590 14 179,631 15 
Continental 272,777 19 341,037 26 
Iberia 283,410 19 222,972** 22 
Swissair 212,769 17 N/A 23** 
Austrian N/A N/A N/A 23** 
Lufthansa N/A N/A N/A 23** 
SAS 171,719 14 233,475 21 
TAP 59,124 17 63,787 24 
Finnair 45,292 17 ---- 23** 
British 
Airways 
290,580 18 342,782 17 
Virgin Atlantic 9,509 15 22,911 24 
Lauda Air 3,433 24 26** 
Source: ICAO Fleet and Personnel Statistics ** extrapolated. (See footnote 10) 
An examination of differences between the USA and Europe shows that pilots in 
Europe have faced greater short-term pressure on wages and work rules than those in 
the USA. There are several pressures combining to affect the European pilot 
workforce. FirstlY, the ongoing pressure of restructuring and privatisation and 
secondly, the effect of new global management strategies. (See Hanlon 1996: Chapter 
7) and Verchere EfU 1993. )
Table 4.13 indicates the level of expenditure on pilot costs undertaken by major 
carriers. Many of the highest paid pilots, such as those of Iberia, operate in the state 
sector. Although even in carriers where there is a nominal state holding, high levels of 
remuneration exist. For example Swissair where there is a 20 per cent holding, have 
high levels of remuneration. However, as the case of TAP indicates state ownership 
need not go together with 'excessive' levels of remuneration. The comparison 
between 1991 and 1995 shows a closing of the remuneration gap between European 
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and US pilots. For instance the gap between the highest paid US pilots was almost 50 
per cent in 1991 and is now just over a quarter. But European flight deck earnings 
are set to come under pressure as management deploy business strategies which 
threaten the compensation and work rules enjoyed by European pilots. This issue is 
explored in the next section. 
4.2.5 Management Strategy and Employee Resistance in Europe 
In Europe, pilots currently face a number of related pressures. Firstly, restructuring 
and privatisation have led carriers to exact wage and benefit cuts in short term cost 
reduction programmes. How permanent these cost reductions will be is as yet 
unknown. Secondly, the pressure of deregulation and liberalisation has licensed a 
new breed of low cost operator, many of whom tend to be non-union, thus threatening 
the union wage as established carriers seek to replicate such strategies. Thirdly, as 
carriers adapt to the deregulated and globalising airline market, they are trying to 
internalise low costs. This is being achieved through the use of franchising and by the 
creation of low cost regional subsidiaries. In most cases pilots are coming under 
increasing pressure to provide wage cuts and productivity improvements. But, more 
importantly, pilots face continued pressure to alter the pay structure, through the use 
of two-tier strategies and through demands for increased productivity. Pilots at BA 
demonstrated this in 1996 when they threatened to strike ostensibly over the company 
pay deal, but essentially as a warning shot to BA not to proceed with its plans to 
introduce differentiated pay scales for pilots. The fact that pilots at Euro Gatwick and 
BAR secured proportionately larger wage increases than those in the mainline fleet, 
indicates the extent to which pilots value the importance of holding the line on wages 
and conditions as operators sought to reduce costs. Nevertheless they face an 
impatient and often nervous set of management, who see an environment of fierce 
competition coupled with pressure on yields. 
In responding to the changed competitive environment of deregulation carriers have 
responded in several ways. Arguably, the major strategy for airlines has been the 
development of franchising and the creation of low cost subsidiaries. The use of such 
strategies allows carriers to procure lower costs and at the same time to demonstrate 
the possibility of lower costs to the parent airline. These strategies have become more 
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common as strong carriers such as British Airways and KLM utilise them to bring 
down costs. In a deregulated European airline market other carriers have to respond. 
Alitalia, which faces massive restructuring problems, has been forced to trade equity 
for concessions in the manner of many US carriers. Cuts of $340m. over four years 
have been given in exchange for equity stakes of between 20 and 30 per cent (Airline 
Business November 1996). The carrier is also actively an internal low cost airline, 
through the launch of Alitalia Team. Pilots normally able to insulate themselves from 
the demand for labour concessions have been among the most severely affected. 
Athough the pilots' union ANPAC orchestrated concerted action, including a mass 
'sickout' in the summer of 1996, the plans have been pushed through. (Hill: 1995. ) As 
a result of the restructuring programme many will be transferred to Team under 
contracts assuring productivity levels of 30-40 percent greater for lower wage rates. 
However, pilots have escaped relatively lightly compared to cabin staff who face 
wage cuts of 50 per cent. (Ibid. ) Given that the carrier will operate long haul as well 
as short haul routes, it may well supersede Alitalia completely. Such policies are akin 
to 'double breasting', as pursued in the USA, only in most cases the realities of 
European industrial relations are respected by allowing unions to exist at such 
secondary carriers. In another case of the use of low cost strategies, Iberia has utilised 
its low cost subsidiary carrier, Viva Air, as a direct competitor against the state carrier 
in major markets such as Barcelona-Madrid. 36 With restructuring and privatisation, 
pilots face downward pressure on wages and conditions. The potential for major 
reductions in pilot salaries across Europe is most pronounced in the state owned 
airlines where both costs and productivity are a problem and where industrial relations 
structures are largely unreformed. Iberia pilots, for example, struck in 1995 against 
management plans to reduce pilot salaries by as much as 40%. At KLM, pilots forced 
management to drop plans for an extension of the retirement age by undertaking strike 
action, the first time since 1958. (Van De Krol 1995. ) Pilot strikes also took place at 
SAS, Air France and Air Inter, largely over issues of restructuring. The withdrawal of 
36 Productivity at charter carriers is often far superior to those of scheduled operators. Charter carriers 
tend to have higher levels of utilisation of both aircraft and staff and incur lower infrastructure costs, as 
they tend to operate from secondary airports. These factors allow them to harvest significant 
productivity gains. According to the International Air Charter Association (IACA) an Iberia pilot might 
fly 45 hours per year whilst a Spanish charter carrier will fly some 800 hours. Increasingly, carriers are 
pinpointing such low cost comparisons in negotiations. 
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state aid and the insistence of the European Commission that subsidy could only be 
used for 'one last time' restructuring was a major factor in industrial action. 
In the Southern European carriers the pressure for restructuring was more acute and 
the level of conflict higher. Here the state retained its involvement both as an owner 
of airlines and gatekeeper of bilateral rights, gradually relinquishing these as 
liberalisation took hold. In Europe the higher pay and lower productivity of the 
regulated era was tackled by major restructuring initiatives. Commencing in the 
1990s, the position of Europe's pilots was challenged by a series of concerted 
restructuring initiatives. These were met by a series of strikes and threatened strikes, 
continual dispute over new business strategies, which threatened to undermine 
common pilot remuneration structures. External threats from low cost carriers, 
competition from other flag carriers and the removal of subsidy, led to an internal 
focus on costs. In the northern European context carriers such as BA, KLM and SAS 
and Lufthansa deregulation gave rise to a number of cost reduction initiatives which 
broadly followed those developed in the US. The development of franchising and the 
creation of internal low cost operations was met with concerted challenge by powerful 
pilot unions but ultimately pilots have been able to control and police these strategies 
firstly by using 'scope' clauses to protect employment, and secondly by utilising their 
bargaining power to push for equalisation of pilot salaries. Nevertheless this has not 
halted a general erosion of pilot salaries from the low cost and regional operators 
whose lower earnings and greater utilisation present a constant threat. 
Conclusion 
The discussion commenced with a central question. Has deregulation helped or 
hindered the fortunes of airline pilots? This question was addressed by investigating a 
number of sub-questions such as those on flight deck earnings, the preservation of 
work rules and bargaining power. In order to conclude it is necessary to return to the 
bargaining environment product/market model developed in chapter 2. (See appendix 
1). In the USA, government and regulators, by outlawing the MAP and instituting 
limited labour protection statutes, seemed on the face of it to strengthen labour's 
position. - However, government increasingly intervened via presidential board 
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decrees, forcing labour into rearguard negotiation. Deregulation with rapid entry, 
bankruptcy and consolidation, fostered an employment relationship characterised by a 
high degree of contestation. Employers sought to undermine union power and 
conditions through the use of benchmark comparisons with the low cost providers, 
whilst unions defined the labour contract and sought to protect work rules in the face 
of this onslaught. The environment was typified by concession bargaining, which 
unions often treated as tactical withdrawal to be recouped in good times. The overall 
effect of such an environment was to benefit capital within the industry, but to leave 
labour in a state of relative combativity and to preserve the potency of its bargaining 
power. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, a situation of 'mature deregulation' had 
been reached with the onset of oligopoly and hub domination. Industrial relations 
within this environment were more negotiated, with a tendency towards equity based 
concession bargaining, as employers sought to co-opt unions into restructuring. 
Unions prioritised job security and the protection of union contracts, often negotiating 
on that basis. Those factors explain the resilience of pilot earnings, which despite 
'adjustments'in the wake of deregulation, have always been restored, especially in the 
wake of industry expansion. These issues come across in the earnings data analysed 
earlier. 
However whilst many wage concessions could be refunded through 'snapbacks'. these 
can in turn be claimed back in recessionary times. The overall effect of deregulation 
on US pilots has been firstly, to open pilots up to non-union competition, which 
though currently weak could re-emerge as a threat if some major carriers were to 
derecognise the pilots' union. Secondly, pilots have been forced to accept wage rates 
and contracts which are largely dictated by the business environment of the airline 
concerned. No longer does the 'cost plus' pricing model, identified by Capelli and 
others, operate. Thirdly, the precarious economics of the industry means the threat of 
another major series of bankruptcies and consolidations is a constant threat, especially 
in downturns. Pilots have also gained new influence and involvement within the 
industry as indicated in their driving role within ESOP programmes. Given their role 
within ESOPs, it could be expected that other airline workers might be expected to 
surrender more under the next wave of concession bargaining. The involvement of 
pilots as a driving force in major ESOP programmes such as that of United indicates a 
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search for influence within the firm, as explicit regulatory intervention becomes more 
opaque. 
By the late 1990s the industry benefited from a much more inclusive and less 
nominally adversarial industrial relations environment. Most typical are the 
restructuring plans at Northwest (1994) and TWA (ongoing), which have resulted in 
worker representation on airline boards and limited equity in exchange for major 
concession on wages and work rules. Less typical, but perhaps symbolic is United 
Airlines where massive labour concessions ($5.3 billions) have been traded for a 
controlling employee ESOP. However the key fact is that as predicted by Hendricks et 
al at the outset, labour's bargaining power within the industry, especially that of 
pilots, has been preserved and even enhanced. Arguably, that power has been 
preserved by a judicious policy of co-operation, although there have been many 
examples of more combative strategies. The recent American pilots' action against 
commuter pay structures, and the victory of Northwest pilots in restoring pay cuts and 
eradicating two tier wages, indicate the continued power of combative militant action 
within US bargaining. (See Airline Business November 1998. )
European deregulation affects pilots in different nations to varying degrees as befits a 
diverse environment. The labour market environment in countries such as the UK and 
the Netherlands was characterised by enhanced product market regulation but this did 
not stop pilots from securing and enhancing collective agreements. The situation is 
one of relative stability, where labour is prepared to co-operate in strengthening the 
carrier's global position at a crucial time, and management is prepared to uphold the 
unified nature of the firm. Nevertheless, management increasingly seeks to develop 
low cost strategies such as franchising and regionalisation in order to serve lower 
yield markets on a more cost-efficient basis. The phased introduction of deregulation 
allows a more measured adjustment in nations like the UK, Netherlands and Ireland. 
A marked change occurs in the 1990s, although there have been minor episodes of 
restructuring in the 1980s, most notably the re-organisation of BA's Highland services 
(Colling 
, 
1995). By the early 1990s, international and domestic competition 
intensifies, and management's search for cost reductions, produced several episodes 
of industrial action most notably, a threatened BALPA strike in July 1996 and 
disputes involving pilots at KIM (See Airline Business July 1996). 
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In the other European airlines, mostly those in Southern Europe, there is much more 
conflict and contestation over restructuring. Pilots at Air France, Iberia and Alitalia 
are among those most involved in industrial action as they seek to insulate themselves 
from restructuring and cost reduction. As state airlines seek to survive in a hostile 
climate these pilots have become a major target, given their traditionally high levels 
of remuneration and low productivity. Again, carriers try to develop low cost 
strategies, using internal subsidiaries to undermine the higher terms and conditions of 
pilots with limited success. The disruptive capacity of the pilot unions, whose ability 
to disrupt carriers, to challenge restructuring and to concede much less in relative 
terms than other airline workers, is a constant concern of both management and other 
unions. (See Blyton et al 1998b. ) European pilots face an additional unified threat 
from regulatory changes. Most notably, as the EU contemplates increased flight duty 
hours, under the JAROPS proposals. BALPA, for example, adopts a strategy of 
seeking to protect pilot wage levels and of pressuring regulators in order to protect 
work rules. Another threat comes in the shape of cross border registration and the so- 
called 'flag of convenience' issue. Pilots also face attempts to harmonise certification 
and licensing, although these are generally welcomed as aiding mobility. 
One key similarity between the US and Europe is witnessed in the interaction 
deregulation and business strategy. In the USA the low cost threat was provide by the 
new entrant carriers, encouraged into the market by deregulation. Regulators wished 
to see a direct challenge to the high cost major carriers, and operators such as People 
Express and New York Air provided it for a time. However with merger and 
consolidation the low cost carriers were absorbed into the majors, but as they faced 
the threat of Southwest and the former Valujet the majors themselves introduced low 
cost internal subsidiaries. Many perished on the rock of employment relations. For 
example Continental Lite and Shuttle by United, were hampered by the fact that they 
tried to in-fitate southwest, but were unable to garner the labour flexibility and 
commitment, which the widely admired carrier enjoyed. (Pfeffer 1998: 57. ) They 
relied on lower wage rates with corresponding low morale. Pilots were among the 
most disgruntled employees, given their attachment to common compensation scales. 
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In Europe majors instigated low cost internal operations themselves primarily to pre- 
empt the low cost threat of Ryanair, EasyJet and a host of smaller airlines. BA's 
creation of GO at Stansted and KLM's attempt to use a low cost subsidiary to operate 
services from Stansted are pertinent examples. (Gallagher 1999: 11) The ratchet effect 
of this rush to the low cost route has driven BA to allocate many Gatwick short-haul 
routes to its wholly owned ultra low cost subsidiary Cityflyer Express, and again 
pilots are the most directly affected. Though the routes will be operated by Cityflyer 
staff who earn on average 30 per cent less than BA short haul pilots, the move is a 
threat to the future of short haul services. Other flag carriers will probably attempt to 
follow this. 
As in the USA, pilots in Europe have not lost a great deal under deregulation. They 
have lost some of the regulated rents, which they previously enjoyed (as the case 
studies of Iberia, Alitalia and Sabena pilots indicate). They also continue to face many 
threats to their labour market position. The bargaining power of pilots has been 
crucial in protecting them from the worst ravages of the new airline labour market. 
However, the emerging market structure of interfirm collaboration and free market 
entry within prescribed regulatory jurisdictions could provide the co-ordinated 
counterpoint where national bargaining power might be irrelevant. Open skies and 
globalisation may yet allow management to break open the cockpit door. Nevertheless 
the relative success which stronger pilot unions within the more successful flag carrier 
airlines have had in controlling and confining the spread of regionalisation and 
internal low cost carriers suggests that in the long-run pilots may preserve their 
position even where they appear to have lost ground. 
The issues of franchising, regionalisation, the creation of internal low cost carriers, 
and the spectre of outsourcing are crucial for airline labour. The attitudes, perceptions 
and response of employees to such change are crucial in evaluating the future of 
airline restructuring policies. As yet, there has been no systematic attempt to gauge 
employee views, which can be seen as crucial given the highly unionised context of 
the industry. Although we have used pilots as an exemplar of the contrast between a 
regulated and a deregulated employment environment, their high degree of skill 
specificity and potent bargaining power renders them more able to protect themselves, 
and therefore less ill-disposed to management policies in many cases. Policies such as 
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outsourcing and regionalisation have tended to affect more general airline workers 
such as those employed within ground handling, engineering and support services, 
whose non-industry specific skills render them more vulnerable. Premium wages and 
conditions for these workers have been increasingly eroded as airlines seek to 
restructure costs. In the next two chapters these issues will be addressed using the 
case of British Airways, whose restructuring policies have increasingly led the 
industry, particularly in Europe. 
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Period 1980S 1990S 
Industry Rccclitlý dc1cl-'uhted, conlpciitiýe ý\itll Mature derc., nilmion. hinited niche competition. 
Structure tendency to nier"Cl, ; 111(1 Olwopolv pre,, ailin- olioopoly. 11111) concentration etc. 
Employment Conflictual pluralist. high contestation Less conflictual, low key contestation. routine co- 
relationship operation, negotiated L- 
Employer To undermine union power throu"ll To co-opt employees into restructurin". to promote 
strategy 11011-1111ion entry, to reform inside[- low cost internal strate"ies with inferior ternis and 
waoes and heriefits. to use threal of conditions. to cede equity for concessions'. 
hankruptcy to oain concessions. generally. pursue olohal ýilliances 
Employee/TU Defend union contract, purstie le"al Co-operate in restructurino. seek equity for wape 
strategy protectioný 1011" tern) stiikesý etc. reductions. and proniote. job securitv. Fvend union 
Concede Mid 110pe to I-CC, 1ptUI-e jurisdiction into boardroom 
concessions. prioritise job secui ity and 
unionisation 
Level of (; o\t outlmks MAP. and inslilutcýs Minimal, thou, oh t,, o\t continue,, to intervene in 
labour market employment protection legislation S. dispute,. 
regulation increasingly interNenes on presidential 
hoard hasis to settle disputes 
Effect on (', ipital enjoys Iii,, Ii level ol'bar-aining Capital en oys high lc\cl ofcontrol. but has ceded 
bargaining pmkcr, and lahour is ý\eakcncd hut some po"cr in terms ofequitý. Labour still potent 
power of coinhati\c. but empliasises firm surýival. 
panics 
ADDendix 4.1 Bars--aininii, Under Dereutilation in the USA 
Appendix 4.2 Bargaining I Inder Deregulation in the UK 
Period 1980S 1990S 
Industry ('011celitiMcd Algop()hstiý (10111c"11C Collteslcd dornestic re"iOnal and international 
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yield 
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relationship 
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i strategy quality, to restructure costs in crisis subsidiaries. OUtS0111-Cin, ", increased UliliSaIiOrl and 
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strategy national ('13, broker chanoe where basis ofjoh concede , ýages and benefits 
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agreenients. regulators etc. to protect work rules. Collaborate on 
own terms injob redesign. training- recruitment etc. 
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regulation work rules. Furopean intluence 
minimal. 
Effect on StabilitN Unstable. Management uses product market to 





Deregulation, Business Strategy and 
Employment Change At British Airways: 
Context and Issues 
5.1 Globalisation, Deregulation and The Deregulation of Employment 
The previous chapter considered the impact of deregulation upon pilots as the most 
powerful occupational group within the airline industry. We now turn our attention 
towards the general labour force within the industry by examining a case study of 
employment change and employee attitudes at British Airways. As the previous 
chapter has shown British Airways (BA) typifies the emerging global trend towards a 
deregulated global airline industry. The carrier has benefited from early privatisation 
and the UK's 'liberal' labour relations environment, and has grown through 
concentration and acquisition on a European and global level. With the freedom 
accorded it in the UK, BA has pioneered a number of management strategies, namely 
franchising, regionalisation, the creation of separate business units and outsourcing. 
These strategies are becoming widespread in the European and global airline industry. 
In all of these measures BA has been the 'first movee within Europe changing and, 
adapting to the pattern in the US and arguably going further. In fact, US trunk carriers 
have been slow to outsource and have had difficulty in introducing internal low cost 
operations, due to the power of airline unions. British Airways has pushed these 
changes to a greater extent, benefiting from the UK institutional context. 
Nevertheless, this apparent model of corporate change and adaptability has to be 
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qualified. Until the early 1990s, British Airways managed to push through most of its 
desired restructuring objectives with a minimum of conflict. This ability to implement 
change was a consequence of product market buoyancy but the structures of industrial 
relations were also important. Collective bargaining and the industrial relations 
systems of the regulated era helped the carrier to restructure regional operations, to 
outsource major maintenance, to absorb a number of other carriers and smoothed the 
process of redundancy in periodic downturns. Whilst unions protested these changes, 
they have generally been willing to submit to restructuring in the face of adversity. 
(interview TGWU 11.9.98. ) Thus significant changes were carried through at 
Highland Division in 1988, at BA Regional in 1991 and in Gatwick short haul 
operations in 1993. Normally there has been a backdrop of crisis and possible threat 
to concentrate union minds. For example, the 1988 restructuring of Highland services 
took place within the context of a threat to sell these loss-making routes to Loganair 
or Manx. The Regional operations were created under the threat of transfer to the 
Norwegian low cost operator Maersk. Similarly, the Gatwick operations were 
restructured in the aftermath of the Dan Air bankruptcy. The carrier took advantage of 
this situation to develop a low cost route network from Gatwick, in order to rival and 
expose operations at London Heathrow. In all of these situations the unions were on 
the defensive and agreed to restructuring. In mainstream operations, however, 
especially those based around the buoyant Heathrow services, management has found 
change a difficult and protracted process. Whilst there has been progress in cost 
reduction, the prevailing story has been one of high labour costs, based partly on 
expectations derived from the regulated and less competitive era. This phenomenon, 
which can be termed 'the regulatory overhang, exists in most airlines. and can be 
viewed as a set of perceptions held by employees, unions and to extent managers, 
about the nature of the labour contract in the airline industry. These issues are 
discussed in the next section. 
5.1.1 The British Airways' Bargaining Environment: Regulatory Overhang and 
Stnictural Necessity 
As we have seen in chapter 3, during the regulated era an often-cumbersome set of 
industrial relations institutions delivered an element of stability, with unions operating 
as intermediaries in brokering change to groups of workers for the benefit of a wider 
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constituency. In advance of greater commercialisation and eventually privatisation, 
management attempted to refashion the organisational culture. This involved the 
introduction of human resource management initiatives to create an essentially 
unitarist culture beneath the traditional frameworks of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining. Unitarist employment policies had to be reconciled with the strong and 
voluble presence of trade unions. This situation of ditalism, was a typical response to 
the high levels of unionisation found in the industry. (See Blyton and Turnbull 1998. )
Lundy and Cowling describe this process of cultural change within BA with its 
emphasis on training for front line employees. (Lundy and Cowling 1996: 355. ) This 
type of cultural change subtly shifted the emphasis towards corporate identity and a 
customer focus. However, whilst the role of culture has been an important one in 
undermining and short-circuiting trade union involvement, the situation at BA, as in 
many dualist environments, was more complex. 
BA management of the 1980s were both pragmatic and opportunistic about the role of 
trade unions, de-emphasising their role as much as possible, but exhorting them to 
"help manage change" when financial crises such as the 1991 GAP closure 
programme made this necessary. (Blyton and Turnbull 1998: 74. ) Management of that 
period, which can be termed the King-Marshall era after the serving Chairman and 
Chief Executive, made no concerted attempt to vanquish trade unionism, nor did they 
make any'noticeable attempt to try and estrange BA workers from their trade unions. 
In any case, past experience suggested that the company would not have been able to 
push unions out of the picture. 37 
Interestingly, the period of the 1980s was similar at least structurally to the era of 
regulation. In Europe, combined growth rates for domestic and international traffic 
averaged 5 per cent between 1978 and 1988. The Asia Pacific market averaged 8 per 
cent within the same period. (Doganis 1991: 8, table 1.2. ) Throughout most of the 
period the industry was regulated on a global and regional basis. BA had virtually 
37 The previous chief executive, Roy Watts, saw his price cutting/low cost strategic change programme 
sunk by trade union opposition. (Lundy and Cowling 1996: 355. ) Watts wanted to shift the marketing 0 C; 
emphasis towards leisure traffic, which he wished to see account for 80 per cent of BA traffic 
(Campbell-Smith 1986: 12. ) The trade unions and middle management frustrated this plan which 
included a recruitment freeze, arguing for expansion in international and high yield markets. (Ibid. ) 00 
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unchallenged control of two of Europe's major airports; there was only intermittent 
competition from niche carriers such as Virgin Atlantic. Low cost carriers did not 
exist and city pair routes were shared in revenue pooling arrangements. As Bass 
argues: 
'Despite the rhetoric of market forces attending privatisation, 
significant product market competition was virtually absent 
both before and long after flotation. During the eighties, civil 
aviation was a highly regulated market and competition was 
managed through close though not always harmonious 
relationships between airlines, their competitors and 
governments. ' (Bass 1991 cited in Button et al 1998. )
Where competition existed on the main transatlantic routes only Virgin Atlantic 
posed a significant threat. The leading U. S. carriers, such as Pan Am and TWA, 
though undercutting BA in terms of price, were less able to capture the higher yield 
business passengers. Heathrow was the major European international hub and the 
code sharing and alliance building that became so prevalent in the 1990s was little 
more than a strategic blueprint for most airlines. British Airways was challenging to 
operate across borders and to enter markets where it felt there was insufficient 
competition. The carrier pursued a strategy of becoming the quality international 
carrier and, backed by often inspired marketing, became a major profitable global 
airline. This 'choice' of business strategy is crucial in understanding later 
developments. Capelli (1987) and Kochan et al 1986, explain how choice of business 
strategy ultimately impacts upon industrial relations. Their observations on the US 
industry of the 1980s can now be applied to the global airline industry, although one 
would be wary of shoehorning carriers within the sorts of typology developed by 
Capelli (1987). Nevertheless, this analysis of the dynamics of product market strategy 
and labour market change is a useful one; Kochan (et al) argue: 
"in the airline industry as in other industries, the middle tier of 
industrial relations are affected not only by changes in the 
environment, but also by diverse strategic business decisions made at 
higher levels. In turn, in some cases the quid pro quo for concessions 
have produced fundamental changes in the structure of industrial 
relations within the firm, by re-aligning the roles of management and 
unions at strategic and workplace levels. This provides further support 
for our thesis that a complex interaction occurs between the 
competitive environment and the shaping of key business decisions, 
interaction that produces options and diversity in IR outcomes". 
(Kochan et al 1986: 127-128. )
167 
The King-Marshall strategy was based on quality. These strategy choices shaped the 
industrial relations policies of the company. However, they did not solely define it. As 
Colling argues, even in the 1980s, when the company was pursuing an avowedly high 
quality strategy they could not simply choose a strategy from a menu of options, often 
that choice was constrained by structural necessities like the airline's role as the UK 
flag carrier. So, whilst the strategic choice framework is a helpful one, it should be 
seen as a heuristic device rather than a distinctive category. Whilst the industry and 
product market environment changed markedly with privatisation and limited 
deregulation, the system of industrial relations persisted because the 1980s, though a 
period of great change and dynamism in UK industrial relations, was a period of 
relative stability within the airline industry. 
This is an important issue, as there is a crude tendency to associate rapid product and 
regulatory change with weakened unions. There is an assumption that product market 
and regulatory reform automatically decrease the bargaining power of trade unions. 
(See chapter 1. ) However, for labour's fortunes to be affected there has to be a 
complex combination of changes affecting the regulatory, firm and product market 
environment at different levels, changes as described in chapter 8. 
Having looked at the impact of change on the macro/industry level it is important to 
consider the impact of such changes on unionised workforces. What do unionised 
workers, those who are most expected to change, actually think of the process of 
regulatory and product market reform? Are workers opposed to these policies since 
such policies are assumed to undermine union bargaining power, thus ultimately 
wages and conditions? Within these general driving questions are a number of 
specific questions, which are listed in the methodology section. It would be interesting 
to examine this. It is argued in the next section that such a focus is of value in 
assessing these issues. 
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5.1.2 Putting Profit First? Changing the Industrial Relations Structure in an Altered 
Competitive Environment 
BA's competitive environment has changed significantly since the 1980s. In the first 
place, the weakened and limited competition of inefficient state carriers has given 
way to a more efficient challenge as even the weaker carriers restructure. Secondly, 
competition on lucrative transatlantic routes from weakened carriers such as Pan Am 
and TWA, which pertained for much of the 1980s, has been replaced by the vigorous 
impact of carriers such as United, American and Delta. The bilateral accords, which 
locked many of the more efficient US carriers out of BA's Heathrow hub, have also 
benefited BA's virile long-haul competitor, Virgin Atlantic. Thirdly, domestic and 
European competitors have formed alliances with some of the stronger US and 
European carriers, feeding UK originating tmffic into their major hubs. The growth of 
the Star alliance with two giant and efficient carriers, United and Lufthansa at its 
ccntre, benefits BA's domestic and European competitor, British Midland, which 
profits from its links with SAS, and later Lufthansa as a Star Alliance 'partner. British 
Midlands' stated intention to operate transatlantic routes from Spring 2000, is yet 
another challenge to BA. Indeed the combined transatlantic dominance of BA's 
principal alliance partner, American Airlines continues to inhibit a formal alliance. In 
addition to these carriers, which compete for overseas long haul traffic, a number of 
highly innovative and nimble low cost carriers spawned by the new regulatory 
environment now compete with BA on major European leisure routes. 
Driven by such global product market pressures, British Airways management has 
emphasised the need for flexibility and adaptiveness. In pursuit of those goals, 
management are building their own network of alliance partners instituting a 
competing low cost carrier and accelerating the process of outsourcing and 
franchising. They seek to alter employment conditions with an implicit threat to the 
management union compact, which previously existed. Management has become 
increasingly impatient at what they perceive to be the rigidities of historically 
imposed industrial relations systems. The airline's Chief Executive, Robert Ayling, 
recently criticised what he termed the "civil service bureaucracy pervading the 
operation. " "It's more hierarchical than I remember the civil service being and 
certainly more than some of the better managed British companies of today. " 
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(Davidson 1995; 54. ) Ayling's criticism was not solely directed at the management 
structures, which had become hierarchical and were comprehensively re-shaped. (See 
Airfinance Journal 1996: 8. ) There was also an implied criticism of the collective 
bargaining apparatus, which continued to pervade the airline and a new impatience 
with the 'baggage' of the regulated era. This admission, after a decade of privatisation 
and (what appeared to external observers to be) a period of avowed cultural change, is 
testimony to the resilience of systems which might, in Metcalf's words, have been 
expected to "wither on the vine" given the raft of legislative changes in the bargaining 
arena. (Metcalf 1991: 1-31. ) Nevertheless, it reflects the survival of traditional 
industrial relations in the wake of privatisation as witnessed in other industries. 
(Pendleton 1999. )
Traditionally, airlines have operated as 'primary' firms with little segmentation and 
differentiation in labour market terms and conditions. Airlines tended to be vertically 
integrated entities. Workforce reductions, work-rule changes or adjustments in terms 
and conditions were carried out on the basis of cyclical factors. An example would be 
the period of pre-privatisation where employment was dramatically reduced. 
(Campbell Smith 1986: 42. ) A later example was the GAP closure programme (See 
chapter 6) of the early 1990s when there was major redundancy and significant 
restructuring. (Colling 1995: 26. ) It is argued here, that trade unions accepted such 
cyclical cost reduction as inevitable, given the peaks and troughs of the airline 
industry, and even accepted a limited degree of outsourcing and the establishment of 
internal business units in order to preserve job security, structures of bargaining and 
trade union involvement. Their acceptance of such change was largely conditional 
upon the type of regulatory and product environment witnessed in the pre- 
privatisation period and in the 1980s. In this era, employees obtained insider 
conditions and would be expected to view any segmentation and fragmentation of 
corelprimary labour market conditions negatively. This 'primary/unified' firm focus 
persisted after privatisation, particularly when there were first mover advantages such 
as access to hubs, a favourable labour market environment and the ability to finance 
long run change. These structural certainties reduced the 'costs of agreement' for 
labour in accepting large-scale change. 
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This structural labour market environment had several effects at the level of the 
workplace. Firstly, workers become accustomed to certain job characteristics and a 
certain framework of employment relations. Any worker entering British Airways 
until the early 1990s would be accustomed to higher wages than those outside for the 
same job (the airline premium, see chapter 7). Secondly, workers would be used to 
national collective agreements albeit within the framework of dualism described by 
Storey. (1992: 243. ) Thirdly, workers would be employed in a unified BA. Fourthly, 
that worker would be competitive in terms of unit labour costs with most other 
European carriers. (See Vass 1997. ) Within such a context, management pursued a 
strategy based on quality, emphasising training and culture, as they sought to change 
the mindset of employees towards a 'premium' service orientation. Deregulation and 
industry restructuring have changed all of this. As Blyton and Turnbull argue: 
The emphasis on human resource management shifted 
discernibly from quality to cost, and changes to collective 
agreements within the company are geared to facilitating what 
is visibly a more hard-nosed commercial approach. ' (B lyton and 
Turnbull 1998: 74. ) 
Within the emerging competitive environment, there is new focus on labour flexibility 
and efficiency. This goes beyond the traditional model of 'cyclical/crisis cost 
reduction'where periodic downturns would lead to an attempt to rein in costs; rather 
the situation is one of 'constant/dynamic cost reduction. Such are the competitive 
threats in the deregulated global environment, costs need to be reduced well in 
advance of any obvious crisis, and the need to manage costs is independent of any 
business cycle. This reality has given rise to an ongoing process of restructuring as 
carriers seek to adapt to the new competitive environment. It is a process that has, to 
varying degrees, been played out across other European carriers (see chapter 7). 
BA's position is especially significant, given the carrier's early adaptation to this 
changed environment, and the strength of its trade unions. An interesting way to 
analyse management's intention to alter the character of industrial relations is to 
consider the cycle of union derecognition. One of the key writers in the area argues 
that employers go through phases of derecognition, starting with reduced union 
influence within collective fora, the creation of new structures to bypass unions and 
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culminating in management determination to avoid unionisation of uncovered 
workers. Finally the process of derecognition is implemented. (Beaumont 1986: 33- 
34. ) Beaumont's view ascribes most of the agency to employers, though unions often 
dictate the continuation of unionisation in the face of employer hostility but his 
observations are useful when studying British Airways. Management have 
'streamlined' existing collective bargaining procedures by abolishing the National 
Joint Council for Civil Aviation (NJCCAT), in 1996. This was undertaken in the face 
of concerted union opposition which frustrated management's goal of abolishing both 
the NJC CAT and the more strategically important National Sectional Panels (NSPs), 
effectively undermining national bargaining. The NJC CAT, which had become 
redundant in the face of the withdrawal of other UK airlines, has been replaced by a 
consultation forum, which acts mainly as a communication outlet. 
Most bargaining is now conducted at local/business unit level but through National 
Sectional Panels, which preserve the essential features of national bargaining. There 
is, however, considerable local variation within these nominally national structures of 
negotiation. For example, there is no unified pay and conditions structure for ground 
handling staff, all such staff have a minimum framework agreement but wages and 
conditions are negotiated according to business needs. (Interview TGWU 21.9.98. ) In 
addition, the structure of bargaining with key product areas such as engineering is 
undergoing a process of transformation towards a more explicitly unitarist 
'partnership' focus whereby union and management agree to conduct negotiations 
around an agreed priority of business need. This involves the development of 
negotiating skills for union stewards but directed much more towards the efficient 
functioning of the workplace, than the negotiation of terms and conditions. (Interview 
AEEU 6.8.98. ) The company has also developed structures, such as product groups 
and company briefings, to enhance communication at local level, with a sole emphasis 
on business processes. Similar structures of representation exist within regional 
subsidiaries, which given the perilous nature of regional services, are often dominated 
by exhortations from management for increasing cost efficiency. (Interview TGWU 
8.10.98. ) Whilst trade unions have been suspicious of BA motives in this regard, 
arguing that there is an agenda of derecognition, there is as yet little evidence for this. 
The unions are still firmly entrenched within the various occupational groups and 
though there may be rationalisation of union representation within product areas, it is 
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unlikely that derecognition. is being considered. A more insidious threat to union 
organisation is to be found in the policy that the unionisation of future activities will 
be on management terms. In this regard, Beaumont's point about the process of 
derecognition being presaged by an employer desire to resist the unionisation of 
unorganised employees, can be seen in the context of the new low cost carrier GO. 
Established in 1997 to operate low cost routes out of a new Stansted hub in 
competition with Ryanair and EasyJet, the recognition arrangements at GO indicate an 
adaptation to the changed industrial relations environment under the new Labour 
government. The fairness at work agenda of the late 1990s makes it difficult for 
employers to avoid recognition, but they can pre-empt that process by a number of 
means, which can be divided into suppressionist and substitutionist approaches. 
(Beaumont 1991. ) Suppression strategies towards union organising include policies of 
intimidation and unequal treatment of union and non-union members. Substitution 
strategies involve the replacement of the union demand by the creation of a 
comprehensive pay and conditions package, which at least replicates and usually 
exceeds the union mark-up. (See also Gall and MacKay (1994: 433-48) 4However, 
companies can also use a strategy of 'co-optation', choosing a union 'partner' who will 
embody a more moderate approach as occurred within Nissan and the Docklands 
Light Railway. (see Garahan and Stewart 1992. ) The latest manifestation of this 
strategy is BA's decision to select the AEEU as the representing union for non-pilot 
grades at GO. The AEEU has agreed a three-year pay freeze for employees it has yet 
to recruit. (Walsh 1998: 9. ) The GO concept is synonymous with greenfield 
developments in this regard and suggests that rather than derecognition, the company 
is pursuing a policy of containment against the principal trade union the TGWU, in 
this case co-opting one of its main industrial and political rivals. The representation 
contest between the TGWU, Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union 
(AEEU), Manufacturing Science and Finance union (MSF) and the General and 
Municipal Workers (GMB) was arguably designed to exclude the major general 
union. The decision reflects the impatience of management with the principal union, 
the TGWU and its desire to shape the structures of bargaining to a much greater 
extent. Within the GO concept is a clear commitment to flexibility, new terms and 
conditions and a different employment relationship. The GO episode represents a 
significant development within airline trade unionism and industrial relations. 
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5.2 Workforce Attitudes: A Missing Dimension? 
In pushing forward changes in bargaining structure, management intends to disrupt 
and fragment the corporatist bargaining structures of the post war period, identifying 
within these structures the roots of a high cost airline culture. In forcing the trade 
union to bid for representation at GO, the airline signalled its desire to influence the 
behaviour of the trade unions themselves. BA wishes therefore to create a much more 
dynamic and flexible airline culture within which it expects employees to accept and 
even embrace change. In seeking to influence employees and to create an appropriate 
culture for the challenging environment it now faces, management has increasingly 
emphasised the background of deregulation, competition and globalisation when 
communicating with the workforce. This strategic shift in management labour 
relations was apparent from the early 1990s but was accelerated in autumn 1996 with 
a number of major decisions; primary among them a massive cost reduction 
programme known as the Business Efficiency Programme (BEP). BEP was a five 
year programme which sought to deliver cost savings across the whole of BA to the 
tune of 1.5 billion pounds. BEP was articulated as a major change programme, which 
would go beyond productivity improvements, fundamentally altering the entire cost 
structure of the airline. Thus it involved regrading and delayering within management 
and administrative roles and the introduction of two tier wages, wage freezes, 
outsourcing, and more intensive work schedules within operational grades. 
This strategic shift in policy towards cost reduction has obvious consequences for 
employees. Embodied within it is a fundamental attempt to dismantle the employment 
certainties of the regulated era. Firstly, the creation of separate regional carriers and 
the extension of franchising, outsourcing and benchmarking challenges the 'unified 
firm'nature of terms and conditions. Secondly, the ongoing challenge to patterns of 
trade unionism and industrial relations undermines the power of unions to enforce 
unified terms and conditions. Thirdly, management is seeking to undermine premium 
terms 
' 
and conditions of employment, and fourthly, the improved productivity and 
efficiency of European carriers is eroding the justification for those terms and 
conditions as BA seeks greater productivity and efficiency. Thus the entire edifice of 
regulated airline- employment has come under threat. However, the existence of this 
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threat does not imply its realisation. Trade union power and influence is still a strong 
constraint on management's desired strategy, and the commitment of workers to the 
BA type employment package means that these terms will not be surrendered lightly. 
Whilst a good deal of research has been carried out on management strategies and the 
efficiency aspects of airline restructuring, little detailed work has been done on 
employee attitudes. Arguably, these attitudes which help define the regulatory 
overhang are crucial in the study of restructuring, and for that reason the remainder of 
this chapter and the next chapter will concentrate on this. 
Employee attitudes have tended to be ignored in the airline employment debate. 
Indeed, so far as a debate can be deemed to have taken place, it has very much been 
without the input of employees. Many studies have been conducted at a high level 
using aggregate data and have therefore not considered employee responses. (Mertz 
1995: 79. ) This study seeks to address the imbalance and to locate employee interests 
and viewpoints within a wider debate about the future direction of the industry. 
Employee surveys are a useful method for eliciting the views of employees and 
challenging assumptions that such workers think alongside either management or the 
union hierarchy. Hopefully, to paraphrase E. P. Thompson, "rescuing worker attitudes 
from the enormous condescension of history". (Thompson 1969: 13. ) 
There are signs that BA staff and their trade unions were beginning to adopt an 
increasingly sceptical attitude towards employment change. Staff had previously been 
willing to accept crisis led cost reduction, but with BEP the cost reductions were 
asked for when the airline was enjoying consistently high rates of profitability. Most 
interestingly, in lessons learned directly from the US, many staff are seeking a new 
type of employment relationship based on greater employee participation before they 
agree to changes. Given these cross-currents, a survey was distributed looking at the 
attitude of employees. (See methodology section chapter 2. ) Autumn 1996 was a 
particularly apposite time to evaluate the attitudes of unionised employees, as many of 
the issues, which were to occasion conflict, such as the pilots' threatened strike of 
July 1996, were 'live' at the time. In addition, although BEP savings targets had not 
been distributed until October, survey returns were being received well into December 
giving these issues time to bed down into the consciousness of respondents. 
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5.2.1 Issuesfor Analysis 
The survey was based on a sample of BA employees (see Chapter 2 for methodology 
section for detailed description). The following section describes the issues examined 
and the results obtained, the remainder of this short chapter outlines the context of the 
issues examined. 
Internal business units, outsourcing and franchising 
This issue was investigated due to the salience of low cost business strategies within 
the airline industry. Firstly, cost reduction strategies primarily involve segmentation 
into different product markets based largely on yield. The strategies being 
implemented to this end are regionalisation and franchising. In order to service lower 
yield routes from airports such as Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow, BA has 
introduced regional pay rates to reflect the low profitability of these services. 
Regionalisation also involved particular functions such as telemarketing and 
Information Technology (IT) which it was felt could be sourced from lower cost 
locations whilst maintaining quality. Initiatives have included the relocation of 
telemarketing call centres to Newcastle and Glasgow. (Interview Nov. 18 1996 
TGWU. ) Similar initiatives are being undertaken at the carrier's European based 
operations, indicating management's intention to exploit regional labour market 
factors across Europe. In Germany, the former shipbuilding area of Bremen was 
chosen as a call centre location in preference to relatively 'high cost' Berlin. 
(Interview BA management June 23 1996. ) Thus worker attitudes to this sort of policy 
might be influenced by the region and bargaining unit within which workers are 
employed. Secondly, the airline has pursued a policy of expansion into regional 
markets relying primarily on the use of franchising. Franchised operators such as 
Brymon, Cityjet and Loganair often have much lower costs than BA, but staff are to 
all intents and purposes, BA staff. The franchised carrier then becomes a direct 
comparator for the cost structure of the main airline where similar routes are operated. 
Employee attitudes are vital in assessing the implications of such strategies. 
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Flexibility 
The next major issue was the question of flexibility. One of the consequences of the 
'unified firm focus' has been the preservation of an almost universal pattern of full 
time patterns of tenure. In an era of shifting competition, uncertainty and where cost 
reductions become a major priority, management require greater flexibility and 
diversity in employment tenure. That way labour can be deployed more effectively, 
thus, management will seek greater temporal flexibility. Other types of flexibility, 
such as cross utilisation, are also being attempted but a simple and understandable 
measure of management's demand for flexibility is the extension of atypical contracts. 
Interestingly, most workers are employed on full time tenure, which renders their 
attitudes towards the extension of atypical contracts a simple comparison. 
Outsourcing 
As airlines seek to reduce costs in the face of increasing global competition, they seek 
to concentrate on core high yield routes and to outsource non-core functions such as 
catering, cleaning, engineering and maintenance. Just what services are core and non- 
core is the subject of some debate (Feldman 1997: 51-55. ) Exploratory interviews 
with employees found almost universal opposition to the policy of outsourcing and it 
was decided to frame the question in terms of what workers would miss compared to 
working for a core carrier like British Airways. It was hypothesised in an exploratory 
fashion that workers would miss various aspects of being outsourced and having their 
conditions transferred to a contractor. One major issue, which arose from interviews 
with union officers and rank and file workers, was the perceived loss of job security 
and identity of working for a large airline like BA. It would be interesting to see 
whether employees ranked this above, say, the protection of national level wages and 
conditions or even the loss of travel facilities, which proved crucial in the July 1997 
outsourcing of long haul catering. 
The threat of subcontracting is increasingly used as a bargaining tactic, often to secure 
union co-operation in radical cost reduction. In many ways, this is a process 
analogous to the compulsory tendering process in public services, whereby employees 
bid down existing wages and conditions to retain a contract 'in house. ' (Crabbe 1992: 
11. ) Often the threat of contracting out was more apparent then real though the 
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process was used to force workforces into offering wage concessions. With little in 
the way of legislative and regulatory controls on employer power, most workers in 
such services delivered the desired cost reductions. 
Within BA this has been the case with the creation of BA Regional where a threat to 
spin off the operation which in management's words, "concentrated minds" on 
delivering the appropriate cost reductions. (Interview BA management 23.1.96. ) The 
formation of British Airways Maintenance Company (BAMC) at Cardiff, to 
undertake heavy maintenance and inspection work on Boeing 747s, was negotiated 
under the threat of sell off. BAMC was set up in 1992 as a separate company with its 
own terms and conditions although it was eventually sold to the engineering 
conglomerate GEC in 1995. (Interview notes AEEU 27.2.96. ) In the case of BA, 
benchmarking on the basis of market rates was used to threaten staff within ground 
handling. Similar threats were being used to secure cost reductions in line 
maintenance operations within BA Regional. 38 Implicit within staff attitudes at such 
times is a feeling of the loss of working for a carrier which, for all its faults, is viewed 
as one of the few globally viable operators. Related to this question was a set of 
questions on how BA policies might impact specifically on terms and conditions of 
employment. In other words, did unionised workers feel that their conditions would 
be enhanced or reduced? A number of questions were designed to elicit employee 
attitudes to this. For example, how would workers see cuts in wages, increases in 
flexibility, the introduction of new payment systems and other such issues? 
Attitudes towards globalisation 
The development of the world airline industry from one of stable regulated 
competition towards one of increasingly global competition has been seen as 
something which workers in strong carriers such as BA would support, given their 
superior position (at the time) in having a network of global alliances and the 
possibility of large scale alliances with other carriers. It could thus be hypothesised 
that workers will support 'general' types of global policy such as the formation of 
alliances, the take-over and acquisition of other carriers and fare strategies. These 
38BADocument- Aircraft replacement[Business efficiency programme; Future of RegionalAirport 
Ground Handling. (Presentation to UK Business Group, December 1996. ) 0 
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policies will be supported because they increase the size and dominance of the firm 
and thus increase the position of unionised inside workers. Thus globalisation for 
workers in large carriers can be seen as a way of continuing and reinforcing core 
terms and conditions, as the market grows and their own carriers assume a dominant 
position. Yet there are very real threats to employment from the spread of 
globalisation, discussed below. 
Globalisation: Specific employment impacts 
As these issues are posed in terms of employment, the response may be more 
ambiguous. Unionised workers are less likely to be in favour of globalisation policies 
when they are phrased in terms of direct employment effects such as outsourcing and 
code sharing. There has been relatively little outsourcing of airline functions to low 
labour cost countries since the survey was conducted. BA moved computer 
diagnostics to India, but other threats of outsourcing failed to materialise. 
Nevertheless, at the time of the survey the issue was live and attitudes towards the 
policy are interesting. 
Future of Collective Bargaining. 
The strong position of trade unions is a major obstacle to British Airways 
management in terms of their attempts at corporate restructuring in the face of 
deregulation and globalisation. National collective bargaining is the fulcrum of this 
system underpinning the institutionalised power of trade unions. A simplistic rent- 
sharing hyp othesis would imply that when management is empowered -through 
privatisation and product market reform, unionised workers will lose the rents they 
previously enjoyed. (Neven and Roller 1996: 933-940. ) This is patently not yet the 
case, at least in aggregate. Airline industry remuneration, in which BA is the UK 
market leader, remains considerably higher than in other industries and seems robust. 
There is no basis to assume that management would automatically seek to drive down 
wages and conditions, as there are a wide range of considerations to be taken into 
account such as the impact on service quality, turnover, and worker commitment. 
However, management might reasonably be expected to promote change through 
policies such as regionalisation, outsourcing, increased flexibility and franchising. 
179 
The cost of introducing these changes was increased by the action of trade unions. 
Unions increased the cost of introduction of such policies, neutered and controlled 
their effects, and often extracted protective agreements to ensure that immediate cost 
savings would not result. It can be argued that the King-Marshall era was one in 
which the focus of management on service quality and productivity improvement 
made it easier to work with trade unions although management still sought to pare the 
national negotiating machinery. Under the new management regime of Robert Ayling, 
with its emphasis on corporate restructuring and dynamic cost reduction, national 
trade unions and collective bargaining have been seen as a fetter on corporate change. 
Thus, the carrier embarked on a major campaign to reform bargaining, in effect 
proposing the abolition of national collective bargaining and its replacement with a 
series of 'business units'. Management's intention was to orient these new bargaining 
forums away from their previous role of negotiation and consultation to one of 
information and communication. These new business units would provide a forum 
where employees could meet to discuss the aims of the business. Thus it would be 
interesting to obtain the views of unionised employees -a broad driving hypothesis 
might lead us to believe unionised employees will oppose the abolition of national 
bargaining as a threat to premium wages and conditions. 
Finally, the survey provides some evidence of the nature of employee perceptions of 
the employment impacts of the transition from a regulated to a deregulated 
environment. The overall survey evidence provides an insight into the regulatory 
overhang which, as later chapters will show, hinders airline industry restructuring 
throughout Europe. Attempts by management to reduce costs and encourage greater 
productivity are hindered by the view of workers across the range of occupations, that 
airlines should pay higher wages and offer better terms and conditions than outside 
industries. 
Having contextualised the principal issues for investigation we now proceed in 
Chapter 6 to the detailed survey evidence. Given the time period in which the survey 
was conducted we should be wary of reading back from recent events, especially the 
recent cabin crew strike, but the survey provides a broad analysis of some of the 
issues which have been implemented as well as those yet to be resolved. 
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6 
Deregulation and Employment Change in the 
Global Airline Industry. Employee Attitudes at 
British Airways. Results 
6.1 Introduction 
As chapter 5 indicates, the nature of employment restructuring at BA was examined 
using a large-scale survey and detailed interviews with both managers and trade union 
officials. A total of 700 questionnaires were distributed. 400 were sent to members of 
the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and 150 members each at the 
British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) and the Amalgamated Electrical and 
Engineering Union (AEU). Returns were variable with the best response achieved 
from the TGWU, from whom 193 returns were obtained (34% rounded). Returns from 
other unions were much lower with around 10% from each. Due to access problems, 
distribution was facilitated via trade union officials. These 'gatekeepers' were given 
instructions on stratified sampling to allow an equal representation on the basis of 
skill, region and gender. This forced choice obviously has several methodological and 
practical implications which, with other limitations of the study, are addressed in the 
methodological section. If used with care and qualification, the survey facilitates a 
snapshot of feeling among airline workers at a crucial stage in the deregulation and 
corporate change process, allowing an insight into employee attitudes at a critical 
period in the restructuring of the industry. The questionnaire categories are analysed 
below. 
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6.1.1 Contours Of the Data. The Descriptive Statistics. 
Initial analysis was undertaken utilising basic descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations, 
and exploratory bivariate measures, such as Spearman's Rho and Chi square. 
Problems of low cell frequency in many observations made it difficult to justify the 
use of Chi square as a measure of independence, even when the data was collapsed. 
These tests are therefore omitted and the frequencies are used. This problem in the 
data indicates an asymmetric pattern of responses with answers tending to go in a 
certain direction. This problem of low cell frequency could be corrected using Lawal's 
1980 method, which boosts the cell frequency by using the geometric mean. (Lawal 
1980: 292-298. ) It is important to bear in mind that these statistics are non parametric, 
i. e. they do not represent a given distribution and therefore can only provide some 
meaningful snapshots of employee attitudes. The data is described in turn below with 
some of the main measures used in its analysis. 
6.1.2 The Key Independent Variables 
Occupation 
The majority of workers are employed on ground handling tasks (71%) although a 
significant proportion are also involved in the maintenance function (26%). The 
AEEU represents mainly craft workers in the engineering and electrical trades. A 
residue of TGWU respondents was involved in administration. The categories of 
ground handling and maintenance staff present a reasonably full range of occupations 
for analysis. Significantly, no returns were received from cabin crew members. There 
is no reason at this stage to suspect any other reason than inadequate distribution for 
this anomaly. 
Table 6.1 below gives an occupational breakdown for the survey on the left-hand side, 
whilst opposite a range of examples in the two foremost categories is included. 
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Table 6.1 Breakdown of Principal Occupational Categories 
Principal Categories GROUND HANDLING MAINTENANCE & 
OVERHAUL 
Maintenance/ Overhaul 26 Baggage handler Storeperson 
Ground handling 71 Ground despatcher Spares support 
Maintenance 3 Push back driver Labourer 
Flight Deck I Ground transfer and staff Semi- skilled mechanics 
transport driver 
Cargo handling Maintenance clerk 
Customer service Driver 
Refuelling Vehicle mechanic 
It can be seen that these categories of worker provide a good cross section of the 
range of non-specialist functions within the airline, precisely those most subject to the 
demands of deregulation and internal labour market reform than more specialised 
labour. The occupational range goes from baggage handlers, who are in many ways 
analogous to those of general skilled/semi-skilled labour, through to those involved in 
'frontline' customer relations, particularly terminal staff. On the maintenance side, 
respondents tended to be within the less-skilled categories, given the Amalgamated 
Electrical and Engineering Union (AEEU) role in representing more skilled 
categories. 
6.1.3 Location, Region and Section 
In terms of location, 76% were located at the main base, Heathrow, and a combined 
24% were located at the regional bases of Manchester, Glasgow and Birmingham. 
When asked to choose which section of BA they operated under, most indicated BA 
mainline principally the airline's worldwide and European operations. About 13% 
saw themselves as currently employed by BA Regional. The figure for ground 
handling staff was higher than for other groups because those groups were able to 
retain their employment with the mainline carrier after the main BAR agreements of 
February 1995. (Interview TGVVU 6.2.96. ) 
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Table 6.2 Location and Section Employed. 
LOCATION SECTION 
London 76 13A Furope 30 
Heathrow 
Manchester 5 BA World 26 
Birmingham 7 BA Revional 13 
Glasgow II Euro Gatwick 0.5 
Gatwick BA Enoinecring 24 
BAMC 5 
Caroo 6 
6.1.4 Bargaining Group and Tenure 
Bargaining units within BA are defined as National Sectional Panels (NSP) covering a L- 
wide range of airline workers and negotiating on national issues. Recent modifications 
to the bargainin, - procedure have seen NSPs inarginalised and the effective 
undermining of national level pay bargaining. However, national level bargaining still C, 4-1 C, -1 
operates on key issues such as annual pay negotiations, pensions and restructuring. A 
basic breakdown of the NSP units covered within the questionnaire is given below. 
These need explanation. The summary table is given in figure 6.1 below. Z- 
Figure 6.1 Bargaining Group of Respondent 
F 







Flight Crew ''A'' Scales 
11% 21% 
'A' scale covers a large subgroup of employees ranging from chauffeurs to computer 
processing staff'. It is broadly an administrative grade covering the majority of such 
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staff, but also covers those in support functions and within recently expanded areas 
such as sales and marketing. GSS stands for Ground Services Staff and covers those 
involved in most ground handling functions. There is considerable jurisdictional 
overlap with the 'A'scales, especially for newly defined categories of staff. The craft 
and non-craft bargaining units respectively cover those employed within the 
maintenance sector and together account for a significant proportion of the sample. 
6.1.5 Seniority and Tenure 
Seniority is an important variable in employment research, as it is often assumed that 
newer workers are more 'proactive'and prepared to embrace change more readily than 
older workers are. Some methodological and theoretical assumptions underpin this 
notion. Older workers, by virtue of their longevity, are often assumed to be more 
conservative in defence of union objectives than younger workers, as they are 
assumed to be less prone to unemployment resulting from higher wage demands, or 
the defence of work rules, than junior workers. (Farber 1986: 1043. ) For the study, 
seniority is important as it allows workers to be separated into pre- and post- 
deregulation cohorts. More senior workers have invested more of their lives and effort 
within the firm, have previously enjoyed more 'generous'terms and conditions, and 
are less mobile due mainly to age discrimination within the labour market. Although 
there is evidence that age and wage effects are smaller than theory would postulate, 
the combined effect of increased fringe benefits and protection from redundancy 
benefit more senior workers. (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 131. ) In the case of BA 
workers, their earning position might not be replicated at another airline. BA has 
made a concerted attempt through early retirement and accelerated recruitment to alter 
the distribution in favour of more junior workers. These assumptions can be tested 
using the BA data. The seniority variables are given below in figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 Seniority Distribution of Respondents 








1-5 years 6 10 years 
11 20 21 30 31-40 41 Years 
Years Years Y ears Plus 
pSeriesl 9 35 30 24 
1.5 0.5 
Seniority band 
It can be seen that in terms of seniority. those with service of 11-30 years account for 
almost 60% of the employees who responded. Newer workers, defined as those with 
up to ten years service, account for below 40%. With privatisation occurring in 1987, 
those in the 11-30 age group have served under the nationallsed carrier and its 
predecessors BEA and BOAC. Correspondi naly, those with less than 10 years service 
have known only a privatised regime. Those in the seniority range of 1-5 years have 
been 'weaned' in a deregulatory environment. They have witnessed policies such as 
regional i sation, franchising, outsourcing, and emergency cost cutting initiatives such 
as the Gap Closure programme of 1993. Are these workers more inured to change and 
more adaptable than those who have grown up under a regulated industry? The survey 
will shed some light on this issue. 
With its coverage of unionised workers, the sample is, by definition, biased towards 
those on full time tenure. Given the foregoing discussion of change within the 
industry, we might expect more workers than turned out to be the case, to be 
employed on other than full time permanent employment. The overriding majority 
(93%) are employed full time, whilst only the remainder are on so called atypical 
contracts, such as part and full time temporary work and those on fixed contracts. The 
accepted threshold of 20 hours as the full time working benchmark may well have 
been ignored and a question qualifYin, o actual hours worked may well have provided 
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better information. Nevertheless, the amount of part time and temporary work remains 
low. This may well be because the sample is unionised and unions tend to represent 
full time workers more than part time workers. It may also reflect the increasing 
correction from empirical evidence of the true extent of atypical work within the UK. 
According to one labour market observer, the level of part-time working has not 
significantly altered since 195 1. (Robinson 1997. ) Certain assumptions are often made 
in the labour market literature about workers on atypical contracts. They are expected 
to be more flexible and less resistant to change then full time workers, again owing to 
their lower level of 'investment' within the firm, and their tendency to be recruited 
from those groups less inclined to identify with 'traditional' male dominated trade 
unionism. This will be tested in the subsequent analysis. 
The high degree of full time tenure identified within the sample is nonetheless an 
interesting finding and has a number of implications. According to the principal study 
of UK industrial relations, (Millward et al 1992: 338, table 9.4) 18% of UK workers 
were covered by atypical contracts. Numerical flexibility is the aim of many 
employers and airlines, with their seasonal nature and variation in daily traffic flows, 
might be expected to benefit from this, as have other service industries. (Beatson 
1995: 12-13. ) Is this lack of proliferation of such flexibility a function of trade union 
resistance, management inaction, or is it simply impractical given the shifting nature 
of the airline industry? Such issues can be examined in the survey. 
6.2 Staff Attitudes towards Business Strategies and Deregulation 
Having described in outline, the main nominal variables, we will now go on to 
investigate staff attitudes towards specific policies. The analysis is broken down into 
six sections. Attitudes were measured along a Likert scale with the categories strongly 
support, support, neither, oppose, strongly oppose and no opinion, representing 
respectively scales of agreement, indifference/neutrality and disagreement. 
The attitudes explored related to the following broad areas: 
Internal outsourcing, regionalisation and franchising 
Flexibility 
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" Management strategy 
" Globalisation 
" Outsourcing 
" Future of collective bargaining 
6.2.1 Attitudes Towards Internal Outsourcing, Regionalisation and Franchising 
The first set of variables tested attitudes towards internal restructuring. One might 
expect to identify a regional variation in levels of acceptance towards such policies as 
outsourcing, franchising and the creation of regional operations. Those employed 
within the regions may welcome investment of this sort and we might expect to see 
hostility from those at mainline bases. Regional cross tabulations might be expected 
to show a distinct difference between regions when these initiatives are considered. 
One regional engineering official termed the London bases as "the black hole where 
all the good jobs go and we are left with the rubbish" (interview with regional AEEU 
steward November 12 1996). The threat of lower wages and, or, terms and conditions 
is therefore implied with the relocation of maintenance capacity from the London 
bases to the regions. 
Workers within the sample will oppose regionalisation on lower pay rates, which 
will be seen as an attempt to segment the labour market. There will be few 
occupational differences within the sample and there will be no differences in 
terms of location. 
Only 8% of workers sampled declared support/strong support for outsourcing 
initiatives of this type, whilst an overwhelming majority (combined 82%) were 
opposed/strongly opposed to such initiatives. On the question of establishing regional 0 
operations, fewer than 4% were in favour and 93% were against. The descriptive 
statistics for all the variables in this set are given below. 
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Table 6.3 Attitudes towards Outsourcing: Regionalisation and Franchising(%) 
Variable Description Strongly 
Support 
Support Neither Oppose Strongly 
Oppose 
BALOCOST Moving certain C, 8 5 5 31 51 
activities to low cost 
areas of Britain and 
Europe 
BAREGOPS Setting up regional 1 3 4 20 73 
operations with lower 
pay and conditions than 
mainline staff 
BAFRANC The use of franchise 1 14 14 21 50 
operators to provide 
certain services 
BATEMP Greater use of part time 1 6 5 23 64 
and temporary contracts 
BAOUT Separating off certain 1 2 4 17 75 
areas such as 
engineering from the 
main business 
Importantly, those at the major bases of Heathrow and Gatwick are equally concerned 
about regional changes. Again these questions will be addressed in subsequent 
detailed analysis. Two thirds were opposed to franchising, another policy which is 
increasingly being used by British Airways. Increasingly, franchise operators are 
being used to operate regional routes (O'Toole 1998: 34. ) Employees, especially 
unionised ones, can be expected to be opposed to a policy which in effect 
subcontracts routes which they might have operated to an external carrier, often using 
lower paid, mainly non-union labour. Another aspect of the impact of both 
regionalisation and franchising can be identified from the Summer 1997 cabin crew 
strikes. Here, franchise operators, such as Brymon and Maersk, effectively 
undermined strike action at Gatwick. Taken with the routes operated by regional 
subsidiaries, Euro Gatwick and BA Regional, Gatwick was largely immune from 
strike action which, given its role as a major and growing hub, should be a matter of 
alarm for airline unions. Regardless of the individual feelings of many employees, 
laws on secondary action make it difficult for co-ordinated national action to take 
place, although the unions have shown adeptness in tabling major issues, facilitating 
coincidental action, albeit over differing issues. Should franchising and internal low 
cost operations make greater inroads into, say, shuttle services or short haul European 
routes, then effective trade union action could be further undermined. Employee 
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misgivings about franchising and low cost operations can be understood within this 
context. Figure 6.3 indicates the strength of opposition to the policy detected in the 
sample. 
Figure 6.3 Employee Attit tides Towa rds Franchising 








Crosstabulations and Associations. 
In order to consider any differences which might arise between employees in the 
sample, a number ofindependent variables were used to enable cross-tabulations to be 
made. Thus the key trade union, regional, gender and skill variables were utilised. In 
terms of the proliferation of' low cost strategies, the REGION variable was used to C- 
look at levels of opposition evldcnt in the initial frequency distribution. In particular, 
the results were examined to see if there were differences between London and 
regional locations. Using as the key dependent variable BAREGOPS (see appendix), 
there was little difference in terms of' levels of opposition or acceptance of regional 
operations when considered in terms of location. Those in the London area, who 
might have been expected to be less opposed to regional operations given their 
insulation from such policies, were as opposed as those employed in the regions. This 
is probably due to the fact that London based workers perceive regionalisation as both 
the thin end of the wedge in terms of cost reduction and a threat given the high cost 
nature of most London locations. The London bases carry high overall costs, 
particularly when earnings premiums are taken into account. 
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Strongly SI Ippol Neithet Oppose Strongly 
support oppose 
It can be seen that within this sample of unionised workers, those at the London bases 
are roughly as opposed (91%), than those in the regions (100%). 39 However, it does 
provide a comparison between two of the principal groups on the use of temporary 
contracts which would be a feature of regional policies. Again, a rough concordance 
of opposition was found between regional and London based workers. A similar story 
emerges on low cost carriers where both sets of workers are equally opposed to the 
policy. In terms of overall levels of opposition, only franchising has levels of 
disagreement below 80%, though again, the differences between the respondents in 
the sample is small (about 10%). In terms of the average overall difference within the 
sample on all measures of regional isation, the difference is about 8%. 










Agree Neutral Disagree Agree Neutral 
4(7) 7(11) 89 (140) 2 (1) 7 (3) 
2 (3) 
2(3) 
4(7) 94 (160) 4(2) 7(3) 
2(3) 96(156) 
12(20) 6(10) 83 (142) 6(3) 






100 (47) 3.393 
83(39) 3.243 
66(31) 4.948 
Plain numbers are percentages summed from row total. Parentheses are overall cell frequencies, 
summed from row total. 
** X2 insufficient cell frequency for Chi square test. AM Chi square tests are insignificant at the 0.05 
level unless otherwise stated. 
6.2.2 Seniority 
In terms of seniority we earlier hypothesised that we might expect to see some 
difference between those workers who were recruited in the previous era (before 
privatisation and deregulation) and those recruited in the privatised/deregulated era. 
The precise frequencies for the re-coded seniority variable are given below. We could 
hypothesise: 
39 Due to a structured asymmetry in cell values (too many people are opposed to distribute cell 
frequencies evenly to give a distribution for the chi square test) this finding has no statistical 0 
significance from an inferential or confirmatory point of view. Problems with the distribution method 
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Those employees within the sample who are more accustomed to the regulated and 
collectively bargained conditions of the pre-privatisation era (the 31 years plus 
group), would be more likely to oppose policies of regionalisation, than those 
workers at the other end of the seniority distribution (1-10 years) who have 
experienced only eitherprivatisation or ýre-privatisation'. 
In the event, the results suggest little difference within the sample in terms of 
seniority, with 97% of the 1-10 year group registering opposition to the proposal and 
90% of the older seniority group. Indeed the small gap between the 'newer'and 'older' 
employees shows that the evidence is going in the opposite direction to that which we 
might have expected. Younger (or newer) workers are usually expected to be less 
'conservative' towards change than their older counterparts, this result contests that 
finding. The explanation might lie in the fact that workers within the former group 
have experienced a great deal of change and have perhaps become as embittered as 
the more senior workers. Another explanation is that junior workers, with less 
seniority in a seniority driven context, would be more affected by policies such as 
regionalisation, bearing the brunt of the lower wage rates for example. Either way, the 
evidence from the sample shows that young workers are if anything more ill disposed 
towards the policy than the older cohort. 
In trade union terms, we might reasonably assume that the general union (TGYVIU), 
with less industry specificity and less skilled workers than the more specialist unions 
(BALPA and AEEU), might perceive a greater threat from regionalisation. Of the 
TGWU workers in the sample, 72% opposed "the creation of regional operations with 
lower pay rates than mainline"; 57% of AEEU respondents opposed, whilst 78% of 
BALPA members were opposed. BALPA's opposition might be described in terms 
of the threat to pilot incomes and conditions of early regionalisation such as BAR. 
AEEU workers may be less opposed because of an acceptance of the inevitability of 
regional operations. The AEEU has already accepted outsourcing of the core 747 
heavy maintenance programme to GEC in 1991 along with vehicle maintenance, 
undercarriage and avionics. Given this empirical difference between the occupational 
groups, we can compare the bargaining group variable (NSP) which allocates workers 
to specific bargaining units based on occupation. Can we detect a lower level of 
mean that no inferences can be made. Subsequently chi square results are presented for information 
only. (See methodology chapter. ) 
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opposition to regional operations from the craft bargaining units? These cover 
primarily AEEU members whilst 'A'scales GSS and 'non-craft'category more likely 
to cover TGWU members. The survey suggests that within the sample, AEEU 
members are no different in their opposition than TGWU members (92% and 93% 
respectively). In terms of gender there is no difference between male and female 
workers in their levels of opposition to regional operations with lower pay rates. 
6.2.3 Employee Attitudes towards Flexibility 
The next set of variables sought staff attitudes towards flexibility. The term flexibility 
needed to be operationalised to reflect workers' perceptions and experiences. The 
item tested attitudes on the extension of part-time and temporary work, so called 
teinporalflexibility as an aspect of flexibility. Given the nature of traffic flows and the 
cyclical nature of the industry, the attainment of more atypical working patterns can 
be seen as a management goal. Conversely, the retention of full time jobs would be 
expected from unions and their members, notwithstanding gendered preferences for 
part time work identified in the flexibility literature. (Beatson 1995 196 table 2.4. ) 
A variety of reasons might account for supply side aspects of atypical work. The jobs 
ponfolio trend, which many labour market analyses point to, might to some extent 
lessen opposition. (Beatson 1995 Jbid. ) The portfolio argument posits an 
increasingly varied and fragmented set of job choices with the holding of multiple 
jobs a feature. Again there was a very small incidence of part time workers within the 
sample. 
Those workers who are employed on such contracts might be expected to be less 
hostile to atypical work seeing it as an accepted part of their pattern of working. (See 
Hewitt 1993: 23. ) However, in general we might expect the following attitudes to be 
displayed: 
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Workers within the sample will resist the extension of atypical work, seeing this as 
an attempt to create a segmented workforce. Regardless of gender or conditions, 
they willfavour a fidl time job andfidl time wage. 
Table 6.5 Employee Attitudes Towards Increased Use of Temporal Flexibility 
Variable Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
FLEXFAM More flexible hours will help 2 11 14 34 37 
with comn-dtments uch as 
family. 
FLEXREDN I will get lower wages due to 38 43 2 4 11 
the reduction of hours. 
FLEXBEN I will get fewer benefits than 41 37 8 5 7 
full time staff. 
FLEXSECU Flexibility for the company 4 8 10 29 49 
will mean greaterjob security 
for everyone including those 
on contracts. 
FLEXCUT Flexibility for the company 42 34 4 14 5 
will mean cuts in jobs and 
benefits. 
FLEXWILL I will accept it because the 2 11 20 42 24 
airline business needs people 
to be flexible. 
Rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing values. a 
Only 13% of respondents were of the opinion that more flexible working would help 
with family commitments (a popular social justification for the introduction of part 
time work), with around 71% disagreeing that this would be the case. Some 81% felt 
the policy would lead to a reduction in hours and thus pay. Only 12% agreed that 
flexible working hours would mean greater job security. Some workers might seek 
part time working as a consequence of childcare, and/or lifestyle factors. We would 
then expect to find some gender difference if women regard part time and atypical 
work less suspiciously than men do. 
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The crosstabulation technique was used to assess differences by gender as this was 
felt to be the most important independent factor in the analysis. 
Table 6.6 Attitudes to Use of Temporal Flexibility by Gender (%) 
0- Male Female 
Agree Neutral Disagree t5l Agree Neutral Disagree el X, 
FLEXBENI 77(145) 14(26) 10(18) 65(17) 15(4) 19(5) 2.446 
FLEXFAMI 14(27) 18(34) 68(130) 24(6) 32(8) 4401) . 455** 
FLEXCUTI 77(149) 7(14) 16(30) 69(18) 8(2) 23(6) . 988** 
FLEXREDI 78(147) 7(14) 15(28) 88(23) 4(l) 8(2) 1.576** 
FLEXSECI 12(23) 9(18) 79(152) 19(5) 27(7) 54(14) 9.050 
FLEXWILL 12(23) 22(42) 66(127) 15(4) 23(6) 62(16) . 304 
Plain numbers are percentages summed from row total. Parentheses are overall cell frequencies, 0 
summed from row total. "Insufficient cell frequency for Chi square test. All Chi square tests are 
insignificant at the 0.05 level unless otherwise stated. 
The number of female respondents in the survey was small (26) given the distribution 
of returns mostly from male dominated occupational areas. Nevertheless, the 
frequencies can be compared within the sample. On the question: "I would get less 
benefits than full time workers" (FLEXBEN1), there was a minor (statistically 
insignificant) difference between male and female workers. Over three-quarters of 
male workers agreed whilst about 65% of female workers agreed. This constituted a 
16% difference. There was a slightly bigger difference between male and female 
workers on the question of whether increased flexibility: "Would help with 
commitments such as family" (FLEXFAMl). Given the role of women in the family, 
a quarter of female respondents agreed compared to 14% of men, amounting to a 35% 
difference. The most consistent finding in terms of gender here is the overall 
difference between male and female workers within the sample (22%) although these 
results cannot be inferred outside the sample. 
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6.2.4 Contracting Out and Outsourcing 
Another major issue within the airline is the question of outsourcing. Outsourcing 
takes many forms. Subcontracting either to a new supplier or 'spinning out' an 'in 
house'provider as an independent business unit are examples. The intention being to 
place such activities at 'arms-length' from the core operation. This is an attractive 
proposition for management, bringing lower costs and perhaps more importantly, 
greater overall cost transparency, helping efficiency at least in the short run. Arguably 
higher transaction costs can be associated with outsourcing. As the Department of 
Employment Flexibility Study indicates: 
'However, there are also costs involved in monitoring subcontractors' 
performance and ensuring that agreed standards are met and these can 
exceed the costs of direct employment. Furthermore, once a contract is 
entered into it may be difficult to change (and hence inflexible). ' 
(Beatson 1995: 11. ) 
The concept of higher transaction costs would most apply to areas where highly 
regulated and codified 'procedural' operations are outsourced. For example, in 
engineering certification requirements, regulatory rules on periods of inspection and 
the airline's own quality standard increase the monitoring costs of such operations. 
The recent Valujet crash in Florida in 1996 has prompted a rethink amongst advisers, 
given the co-ordination problems involved in a span of 32 suppliers (ITF 1997). (See 
also chapter 7. ) With less complex operations, however, such as catering and 
cleaning, lower costs can be achieved by outsourcing. The introduction of market 
rates, albeit temporarily protected by legislation such as TUPE, brings a rapid 
reduction in costs. However, in service industries a separate issue arises in terms of 
commitment. Will outsourced employees, providing services for a wide range of 
suppliers, achieve the same focus and commitment as in-house employees? Cost 
reductions can of course be achieved in highly processed, procedural and technical 
areas such as engineering. The tendency is towards new work techniques based on 
variants of lean production/Business Process Re-engineering (BPR). For example, 
within engineering a variant of BPR known as Fully Engineered Task (FET) has 
enhanced the jobs of both licensed engineers whose roles have become more 
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enriched, and those of less skilled engineering labour. (Interview AEEU steward 
19.3.97. ) 
In each case costs are reduced, though the primary focus is not on cost reduction. Yet 
the carrier could well outsource line maintenance as it has with heavy overhauls on 
specific aircraft types. Whilst engineering functions have been subjected to new work 
initiatives, reform of other functions is by contrast in terms of reduced labour costs, 
'working cheaper'rather than smarter. It can be hazarded at this stage, however, that 
BA preferred outsourcing rather than internal labour market flexibility as their 
preferred strategy. This desire to obtain flexibility through contracting was at the 
centre of the dispute between BA and its catering employees, resulting in the 
outsourcing of the mainline catering function to Swissair's catering subsidiary Gate 
Gourmet. (Hill 1997: 105. ) 
Although these savings can be exaggerated when the protective effect of legislation 
such as the Acquired Right Directive (TUPE) is taken into account, they are 
increasingly used as a virility symbol to external competitors and outside interests that 
management literally mean business. At the time of the survey in autumn 1996, 
management were putting forward various outsourcing options, so staff attitudes 
towards these initiatives should prove interesting. 40 We might hypothesise that: 
Workers will be nwst concerned about the loss o the tenns and conditions when f 
considering the possible outsourcing of theirjob. 
Employees value working for a large carrier such as BA, seeing security and 
advancement within such a large company. However, it became clear from interviews, 
that whilst the BA identity was important, it was difficult to pinpoint which aspects of 
working for the carrier were perceived as most important in the event of outsourcing. 
Most are opposed to outsourcing, as became evident from earlier exploratory 
interviews, thus the question was framed to gather information on those aspects of 
working for BA which were most valued. 
40 A number of initiatives including the outsourcing of ground fleet maintenance, Heathrow catering 0 C" 
and the possible extension of outsourcing to ground services were being put forward by BA C, 
management. 
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A useful measure of the concept would be one which ascertained the importance 
which employees placed on certain facets of their employment with BA. The 
preliminary results are given below. 
Table 6.7 Respondent Ranking of Factors in Working for BA (%) 
Variable Description Very 
important 
Important Neither Not very 
Important 
Unimportant 
TRANTRAV BA travel facilities 34 34 12 12 8 
and other perks 
TRANTERM BA terms and 67 24 4 2 1 
conditions. 
TRANCOM The common 52 31 8 3 3 
purpose of working 
exclusively for BA. 
TRANPROT The protection of 67 23 4 2 2 
national trade union 
, reements. ag TRANSECU The job security 77 17 1 3 1 
which large airlines 
like BA provides. 
Rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing values. 0 
One of the major areas often highlighted by staff themselves when subjected to the 
threat of outsourcing is the fear that they may lose core conditions. Travel facilities, 
long seen by the wider public as one of the most significant fringe benefits in airline 
employment, are less of a priority within the sample. 41 Nearly a fifth of the sample see 
the loss of such benefits as either not very important or unimportant, with the 
proportion who regard such benefits indifferently bringing this up to a third. Whilst 
more precise statistical tests will be needed to ascertain the strength of the 
relationship, this roadmap of the data does point to a direct convergence of views for 
those who ranked BA terms and conditions and the protection of national trade union 
agreements as: "Very important. " Around 70% of respondents ranked these variables 
exactly equally in importance (see table 6.7 above). This might suggest that BA terms 
and conditions and the protection of national trade union agreements are viewed 
similarly. There would be good intuitive reasons for this. The phrase terms and 
conditions tend to be associated with union negotiation, and collective bargaining. 
Trade unions may be the passive beneficiaries of employee identification of both. 
The principal issue in the August 1997 outsourcing dispute between BA and Heathrow catering staff C00 
was the desire of staff many who have families in the Indian subcontinent to retain staff travel 
facilities, which constitute a core condition. The outsourcing agreement preserved these perks for a 
limited period. 
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However, the unionised bias within the sample means we cannot make too much of 
this finding, though we can look at the overall level of union membership within the 
airline which is high. 42 Interestingly, there was relatively less support for the notion of 
losing the 'common purposeof working for a large company like BA. This variable 
was designed to give some idea of 'unitarist' views of the employment situation, 
although a unitarist frame of mind need not be a prerequisite for such a view. Workers 
may well see common purpose as neutral and simply relate to the statement about BA. 
In any case, respondent ranking gives some idea of the importance attached (52% 
strongly agreed). When company identification variables are made more explicit, for 
example, converted in terms of job security, then a different initial picture emerges. 
For the statement that an employee would miss the job security of a large carrier like 
BA, 77% ranked this as 'very important'. 
This finding is not surprising given the success of BA, and its steady expansion. 
Table 6.8 Ranking of Factors in Working for BA by Trade Union 
TGWU AEEU 
Important Neither/no Not so Important Neither/no Not so X, 
opinion important opinion important 
TRANCOMI 84(145) 15(9) 7(12) 74(20) 19(5) 7(2) 3.418 
TRANPROI 91(155) 4 (7) 5(9) 96(26) 4(l) - 3.627** 
TRANSECI 94(161) 1(2) 5(8) 93(25) 7(2) 2.317** 
TRANTERI 90 (152) 6 (10) 4(6) 100(26) - - 5.493 
TRANTRAI 66(144) 12(20) 22(38) 81(22) 15(4) 4(l) 5.493 
Plain numbers are percentages summed from row total. Parentheses are overall cell frequencies, 
summed from row total. ** Insufficient cell frequency for Chi square test. All Chi square tests are 
insignificant at the 0.05 level unless otherwise stated. 
Table 6.8 provides and crosstabulates the views of the major trade unions, TGWU and 
AEEU, on the issue, bearing in n-tind the problems in the data due to the large 
difference in response rates. As expected from the frequencies, high prioritisation is 
placed upon the protection of national agreements and the terms and conditions 
42Union densities as at the time of the survey are as follows: Administrative Staff 50% (which includes 
front line Customer Service Staff), Engineering 70%, Ground Support Staff 90%, Cabin Crew 80% 
Flight Crew 90%. 
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offered by a large employer like BA. There is little difference between AEEU and 
TGWU members in their prioritisation of aspects of being employed by BA. Only on 
travel facilities is there a significant gap between the two, with AEEU members 
placing greater priority on travel benefits. This could be explained by the larger 
impact on engineering workers of outsourcing at the time of the survey. Some 
engineering workers have seen the perk of travel facilities eroded with the outsourcing 
of BAMC and are therefore more aware of the issue. In any case, travel facilities tend 
to be less valued than terms and conditions and the protection of national agreements. 
The results for BALPA members were almost identical. Not surprisingly, workers are 4-: - 
overwhelmingly wedded to the concept of employment with a major carrier such as 
BA. 
6.3 Attitudes towards British Airway's Global Strategies 
6.3.1 Employee Perception of General Global Strategies 
The views expressed above could change with further restructuring within the global 
market, requiring greater segmentation and the eventual disintegration of the 'whole 
airline concept' to which workers are so attached. Thus employee attitudes towards 
wider policies affecting the airline product market shoul 
,d 
be of interest to the research 
on airline employment. Do workers actually support policies of globalisation? There 
is evidence that within the framework of an increasingly concentrated international 
industry, unionised workers support general policies of globalisation, often reasoning 
that this increases job security within the carrier, at least for those employed within 
the core. Globalisation policies, which include 'expansionary' strategies such as take- 
overs, alliance building, and the development of 'fortress hubs, can be seen as a 
continuation of the stability discussed in relation to the regulated and post 
privatisation era. With the growth of large 'constellation alliances, ' the industry is 
developing on the basis of interfirm collaboration, thus reducing the uncertainty of 
competition. Such strategies may find favour with the employees of carriers well 
placed to reap such advantages. Thus it is interesting to look at employee perceptions 
in this context. 
As the airline industry assumes a global form, so do employment relations. Many 
within the industry assume that employees of airlines such as BA are more committed 
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to a global strategy and thus to far reaching employment change than at other airlines 
such as Air France and Lufthansa. (Hill 1996: 23. ) It is widely believed that BA 
employees, through privatisation, have become more adaptable and less resistant to 
change, perceiving such change to be in their own ultimate interest. (Reed 1989, 
Corke 1990. ) In order to examine this assumption, a set of questions attempted to 
ascertain the level of commitment of this group of employees and whether they 
agreed with the perceived aims of a global strategy. The elements of this strategy 
were specified within the question categories to include the most widely cited types of 
policy pursued by the carrier. The guiding hypothesis was framed thus: 
Workers within the sample will support general management strategy on 
globalisation. Stich strategies are perceived to be expansionary enhancing the 
wages andjob security of workers. 
These included policies such as continuous cost reduction and continuous 
improvements in productivity, acquiring other carriers, forging global alliances and 
the relocation of certain activities to low labour cost countries. The initial results are 
graphed in figure 6.4 below. Significantly a large proportion of staff, 34%, support the 
notion of cost reduction as the 'overriding priority'. with a further 22% registering 
either neutrality or indifference on the issue. This is an important finding suggesting 
that answers reflect the generality of such strategies. Later questions address more 
localised and specific aspects such as the effect on employment. Although we must be 
mindful of the preliminary nature of the data, there is strong support for the notion of 
'increasing productivity as much as possible'. Two thirds of respondents agreed with 
this statement indicating broad general support for the need for increased performance 
in a more threatening global environment (table 6.9). 
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Figure 6.4 Employee Perceptiolls of BA Global Strategies (f7c) 
Globalisation means more alliances and fewer home 
based jobs. 
Strongly disagree 4 
Disagree 17 
C 
U Neither 122 
CD 
CL 
Strongly agree 21 
Agree 34 
05 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
Note: See chapter 2.4ppendIX / for variable descriptions 
Table 6.9 Employee Attitudes towards Global Business Strategies(%) 
Variable Description StrongI3 Support Neither Oppose Stronglý 
Support Oppose 
STRATCOST Cost redtiction as the 3 30 20 30 15 
overriding priority 
STRATPROD Increasing productivity as L- 
9 65 13 8 4 
much as possible 
STRAFARE Offerino lower fares than 9 39 29 15 5 
other carriers 
STRASTAFF Involvino staff more in the 54 39 4 1 I 
running ofthe company C, 
STRATLOB Lobbying for access to 43 44 5 1 1 
airports and services 
cLirrently denied to BA 
STRATAID Lobbying for an end to slate LI 55 27 10 1 3 
aid for onr competitor,.,, 
STRATAKO Taking over or acquiring V Z' 24 49 17 5 4 
holdings in other airlines to 
help expand market 
opportunities 
STRATAL Milding alliances with other 9 34 26 17 13 
carriers to expand bill not 
necessarily tising BA aircraft 
and crews 
STRACHEA Moving some functions to 4 8 8 37 40 
lower labour cost locations 
Rows may not slim to 100 dne to rounding and inissing. values. 
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We must be aware, however, of whether this is a case of general agreement with one 
of the industry's often repeated verities, or if workers in fact would concede on 
certain issues in order to increase productivity. In addition, we must be mindful of the 
notion, often encountered in trade union circles, that productivity improvement is 
costless to current employees. The negotiating rhetoric over efficiency savings during 
the introduction of the 1996 Business Efficiency Plan (BEP) saw the unions 
emphasise productivity almost as a costless solution. However, management has 
increasingly focused on core terms and conditions as the only true reflection of a 
reduced cost base (interview TGWU steward 21.3.97). It is difficult to discern 
whether employees are reacting to management's agenda of increased efficiency or 
the unions of increasing productivity. Such issues can be explored from other angles. 
It would be interesting to look at cross tabulations and associations around the 
globalisation variables. It would be interesting to explore this issue in terms of 
skilled/industry specific or unskilled categories of workers who might be expected to 
have different views. To investigate this issue a new variable (SKILL) was 
constructed. This involved merging the craft bargaining and flight crew units as those 
who represent industry specific skills and who might be expected to be more secure in 
a stable oligopolistic industry. The non-craft, GSS and 'A' scales workers might 
expect (with global alliances perhaps reducing duplicated staff) to be less favourable 
on a general basis towards management strategy of globalisation. Was this actually 
the case? 
Interestingly, there was a lower level of support and higher opposition from the more 
skilled workers as table 6.10 below demonstrates. 
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Unsurprisingly, both industry specific and non industry specific workers are opposed 
to strategies which involve moving operations to low labour cost countries 
(STRATCHEM), an increasing threat even in skilled areas of employment. 0 
Table 6.10 Attitudes to Globalisation Policies by Skill Category 
NON INDUSTRY SPECIFIC INDUSTRY SPECIFIC 
Support Neither/no Oppose Support Neither/no Oppose X-' 
opinion opinion 
STRATPROI 76(121) 13(21) 9(14) 62(38) 16(10) 21(13) 7.024 
STRAFARI 50(77) 32(50) 18(28) 44(27) 30(18) 26(16) 1.804 
STRASTAI 97(152) 3(4) 0.63(l) 85(52) 10(6) 5(3) 10.104 
STRATLOI 92(140) 7(10) 1(2) 87(53) 10(6) 3(2) 1.639 
STRATAII 83(129) 13(20) 4(6) 85(51) 10(6) 5(3) . 449 
STRATAKI 73(113) 20(31) 7(11) 75(46) 13(8) 11(7) 2.194 
STRATALI 44(67) 26(40) 30(46) 43(26) 28(17) 11(18) . 067 
STRACIIEAI 13(20) 7(11) 80(123) 13(8) 13(8) 74(45) 1.972 
STRACTCOI 34(52) 21(32) 46(71) 33(20) 22(36) 46(28) . 017 
Plain numbers are percentages summed from row total. Parentheses are overall cell frequencies, 
surnmed from row total. ** Insufficient cell frequency for Chi square test. All Chi square tests are 
insignificant at the 0.05 level unless otherwise stated. 
6.3.2 Attitudes Towards Specific Global Strategies 
Again, a further set of variables seek to measure more specific attitudes. Alliance 
building, equity holdings, and to a lesser extent, take-overs are major features of the 
emerging pattern in the airline industry. At the time of writing, BA has received 
government approval for a major alliance with American Airlines, in addition to 
major equity holdings in QANTAS and a myriad of smaller operators. The survey 
sought staff attitudes towards such strategies. Are staff broadly supportive, as they 
might be expected to be in a large long haul 'network carrier'such as BA? Do staff 
perceive a threat to their own position from such strategies? The variables 
STRATAKO and STRATAL ascertain employee attitudes on both types of strategy. 
There seems to be more support for take-overs and equity holdings (74%) than for 
alliances, which often imply expansion using the alliance partners' routes and 
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equipment. Though the employment effects of global alliances are as yet untested, the 
perception among many workers is that such arrangements could lead to job losses. 
(ITF 1992: 33. ) This condition is specified in the variable STRATAL and support for 
the alliance strategy is much less strong (43%), although those who are either neutral 
or indifferent account for over a quarter of the sample. Only a third of workers are 
opposed to this strategy. Again these variables can be crosstabulated with other 
measures of globalisation as it specifically affects employment. So far we have looked 
at generic business issues' rather than specific labour market ones to see whether 
employees accord with or dispute the management agenda for the future of the airline. 
It is now necessary to look at employee views, in order to examine the labour market 
issues introduced in chapter one. When the implications of global business strategy 
are operationalised into specific employment effects, we can analyse these labour 
market/employment aspects. The labour market implications of globalisation are 
addressed in the next set of questions, which ask employees' views of globalisation as 
it affects BA staff. Here the findings are different, seeming to confirm the intuitive 
point that the very generality of the previous statements may have been responsible 
for high levels of agreement. Descriptive statistics are given below (table 6.11). 
I 
Table 6.11 Employee Perceptions of Broad Employment Impact of Globalisation 
Strategies (%) 
Variable Description Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Neither Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
GLOBCOMP More competition leads 31 13 24 24 6 
to less job security 
GLOBOUT Some jobs will be moved 23 26 6 13 31 
to low labour cost 
countries like India and 
China 
GLOBPURP It brings a new sense of 29 10 30 18 9 
purpose knowing that we 
are competing against the C, big global carriers C, GLOBAL Alliances could mean 33 20 23 18 4 
fewer flights and threaten 
jobs 
GLOBSEC Jobs are more secure all 17 8 23 38 13 
round because we can 
win new business 
GLOBREAL We have no choice but to 13 5 26 35 19 
use these strategies 
because that's the reality 
of the airline industry 
today 
Rows many not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing values. 0 C, 
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6.3.3 Perceptions of Competition and Collaboration 
The variable GLOBCOMP asked employees whether more competition would lead 
to less job security. A combined 45% felt that it would, but most interesting here is 
the level of neutrality and/or indifference with 24% of respondents opting for the 
neither column. If we combine these with the disagree responses, we can say that the 
majority do not believe, or are indifferent to, the notion that more competition leads to 
less job security. Further light is thrown on this issue by responses to a subsequent 
statement. A small majority of this sample of unionised airline workers disagreed, or 
were indifferent to, the notion that jobs would be moved to low labour cost nations. 
Some 44% felt jobs would not be moved abroad. This is interesting in the sense that 
the unions sampled represent many workers most vulnerable to such activities. Even 
so, the majority of the sample are employed within 'sunk' functions such as ground 
handling which by definition cannot be moved abroad. Though these functions are 
vulnerable to domestic outsourcing, the concept of international outsourcing may not 4: 1 
be sufficiently understood as a threat to existing jobs. A small majority felt that 
alliances would mean fewer flights and fewer jobs (GLOBAL). As yet there is little 
indication from BA's current global alliances of an effect on home-based 
employment. 
Unions within the industry fear that alliance activity, by combining flights between 
carriers to some destinations, will lead to an overall net decrease in jobs, unless there 
is a corresponding net increase in services. (ITF 1992: 23. ) This concern, notably of 
trade unions, sees alliances as a form of rationalisation. It is particularly feared that 
there will be such a rationalisation of capacity on some'lower yield' routes. (Cameron 
1997: 50-52. ) The explicit motivation in building strategic alliances is to build joint 
marketing relationships. However, implicit motives, such as pooled training 
maintenance, marketing effort and aircraft servicing, could impact upon employment. 
Many carriers already operate 'crew sharing' arrangements whereby the staff of both 
carriers are represented in the cabin crew complement. At the moment, costs are 
higher given the diverse levels of regulation on issues such as crew rest, but these 
practices could become more widespread. (Ibid. ) Employees at BA have yet to be 
involved in an alliance where their employees have lost out. BA staff replaced US Air 
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in long haul routes such as London-Philadelphia and Charlotte after BA's now 
discarded alliance with US Air. However, with the BA/American alliance there could 
be a different outcome. Rationalisation may well take place with carriers assigning 
each other routes for the sake of efficiency and to avoid duplication. 
The message propagated by airline management is that globalisation might lead to 
greaterjob security. A related question, therefore, asked respondents to record their 
level of agreement with the notion that jobs would be more secure all round as a result 
of globalisation (GLOBSEC). Management and industry analysts often argue that 
despite the short term impact of global integration leading to a reduction in home 
based employment, globalisation as a strategy will bring more jobs, expanding the 
overall market and thus allowing a massive expansion of services. This assumption 
behind the globalisation policies of most airlines is often articulated to staff as an 
"expanding market more jobs" argument or more negatively as the "bottom line" or 
"reality" of the airline industry today. Both assumptions are measured in the variables 
GLOBSEC and GLOBREAL. Excluding the neither category, a narrow majority 
disagrees with the former statement, with just under a quarter of the sample agreeing. 
On the latter variable about 54% disagree, whilst only 18% agree. The difference is 
not large and seems to indicate that both statements are viewed as analogous to each 
other. This initial finding may again indicate a lack of apparent employment effects 
with globalisation to date. So far there has been no systematic attempt to measure the 
effect of the main globalisation strategy of code sharing and alliance building upon 
employment. 
6.3.4 Perception On Link Between Overall Policy On Local Terms And Conditions 
Question 14 asks employees what they believe will be the effects of BA's business 
strategy on their own terms and conditions. In constructing this set of variables, it was 
hoped to obtain some measure of employee perceptions of the employment changes, 
which might arise from BA business strategy. This was yet another way of attempting 
to cross measure employee attitudes towards change, taking the question from the 
global business environment right down to the level of individual workers' jobs. 
Workers within the sample will be less favoltrable towards global policies when 
posed directly in tenns of employment. 
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When these issues are posed in terms of the immediate effect on terms and conditions, 
the response of unionised workers becomes pessimistic. A set of questions which 
elicited employment response on the perceived effect upon their own terms and 
conditions of management policies under deregulation, was based on the following 
hypothesis: 
When operationalised in terms of effects on specific tenns and conditions 
employees within the sample would be expected to be pessimistic about the effect 
on their own terms and conditions. 
The questions asked respondents to indicate their view on the impact of BA's 
business strategies on their own terms and conditions. The responses are given below 
in table 6.12 
Table 6.12 Employee Perceptions of Effect of Global Business Strategy on Their 
Own Terms and Conditions (%) 
Variable Description Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Neither Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
OWNWAGE Reduced wages, through 53 25 3 12 7 
greater use of part time 
work and contracts 
OWNPRP Greater use of profit share 8 25 15 33 17 
or performance related 
pay, which might increase 
wages 
OWNFRING A reduction in fringe 29 38 8 11 13 
benefits such as travel 
concessions and medical 
benefits 
OWNFLEX Greater flexibility to allow 7 27 26 29 8 
us to respond to our 
competitors 




OWNSHIFr Reduced overtime and 32 19 5 20 23 
shift rates through the use 
of new shift patterns such 
as annualised hours and 
SDlit shifts 
Rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing values 0a 
Around 80% felt their wages would be reduced through the use of greater part-time 
work and contracts. Half of the sample believed that such policies would mean 
reduced overtime and shift premia, with the introduction of annualised hours and split 
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shifts. About 38% believed it would mean accepting lower allowances and 
enhancements, though a larger proportion disagreed that this would be the outcome. 
Significantly (given the low coverage of such arrangements within the manual grades 
at BA), around a third believed that the changes might lead to increased wages 
through profit sharing and performance related pay (PRP). The same proportion of the 
sample responded positively to the statement that 'greater flexibility will allow us to 
respond to our competitors'. Given the unionised nature of the sample and the type of 
workers it represents this is initially a very interesting finding. It may well be a case 
of respondents adopting the language of deregulation, but it may also represent a shift 
in attitudes towards a more unitarist employee mentality. This may be simple 
pragmatism, given the competitive environment of which employees are well 
informed. Nevertheless, the survey was carried out before BA's Business Efficiency 
Programme (BEP) of November 1996 was put to the workforce. This radical cost 
reduction plan might have led, in the post survey period, to a considerable hardening 
of employee attitudes given the unionised, less skilled nature of the sample. On the 
question of reduced fringe benefits long associated with the airline industry, including 
discounted travel, social clubs and health facilities, about 67% saw these as 
threatened. BA has already curtailed travel facilities for many grades of staff, hedging 
their availability with restrictions. 
Table 6.13 below provides a crosstabulation of views between the two main unions - 
TGWU and AEEU. AEEU members tend to be less pessimistic about the possibility 
of wage reductions, although a majority still felt this might occur. Four fifths of 
TGWU members within the sample felt that this would be the case. TGWU members 
were also more pessimistic on the future of shift premia with over half believing that 
these would be reduced as a result of management policies. AEEU members, 
reflecting their moderacy in comparison to the TGYvIU, were less prepared to accept 
the proposition that "greater flexibility will allow us to respond to our competitors", 
an oft-quoted management statement to which approximately half of AEEU members 
in the sample objected. 
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Table 6.13 Employee Perception of Impact of Management Policies On Their 
Own Jobs and Conditions by Trade Union 
TGIVU AEEU 
Agree Neither/ Disagree P5 Agree Neither/ Disagree X' 
no no 
opinion opinion 
OWNFLEXI 34(58) 30(51) 36(62) 29(8) 21(6) 50(14) 3.102 
OWNALLOI 38(64) 16(27) 46(76) 32(9) 14(4) 54(15) 2.470** 
OWNFRINI 67(16) 9(16) 23(40) 68(19) 7(2) 25(7) . 847** 
OWNPRPI 34(59) 17(29) 49(84) 21(6) 14(4) 64(18) 8.210 
OWNSHIFI 52(91) 5(9) 42(73) 39(11) 7(2) 54(15) 20.621 ** 
OWNWAGI 80(138) 2(3) 18(32) 68(19) 7(2) 25(7) 10.076** 
** Denotes insufficient cell frequency for chi-square test. 
Overall, the hypothesis that employees would view the effect of globalisation more 
negatively when posed in the context of their own terms and conditions, is proven. 
Posing the question in terms of direct pay and benefits effects leads to a markedly 
more negative response than that obtained when generalised questions of globalisation 
were presented in the subsequent chapter. The link between globalisation and terms 
and conditions brings us to the next section, which examines the views of workers 
towards proposed changes in collective bargaining. Arguably changes in the nature 
and role of trade unions and collective bargaining could have major impacts upon the 
terms and conditions of respondents. In order to evaluate this hypothesis section 6.4 
addresses those perceptions. 
6.4 Employee Perceptions of Proposed Changes to Collective Bargaining 
During the completion period of this survey, BA management proposed a complete 
overhaul of collective bargaining within the airline as chapter 7 indicates. The airline 
tried in the Summer of 1996 to move away from national collective bargaining 
towards a system of local business unit based bargaining. In effect, this would mean 
the abolition of National Sectional Panels (NSPs) and the devolution of major 
bargaining areas such as pay and conditions to local level. Whilst the unions have 
conducted a national campaign to resist these measures, there has been a creeping 
erosion of national bargaining. Major items such as pay are still subject to national 
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level negotiation but the trend is towards localised bargaining. Both trade unions and 
management have advanced a number of arguments on the question of the future of 
collective bargaining. The questions were formulated to the general hypothesis: 
Employees within the sample will resist the break up of national bargaining, 
perceiving it to lead to lower terms and conditions and to threaten stability of 
employment. 
Table 6.14 Employee Perceptions of the Effects of Abolition of National 
Bargaining (%) 
Agree Strongly Neither Disagree Strongly C, C, C, 
BARGINF Our power to influence 67 26 4 1 2 
management would be C, 
severely reduced 
BARGBET We would be in a better 2 6 7 36 47 
position to negotiate through 
our local representatives 
BARGTHRE We would be under constant 55 26 6 6 6 
threat of franchising or 
contracting out if we did not 
agree to changes within our 
part of the business 
BARGTU, We would still have the 9 13 16 36 26 
unions to represent us as 
before 
BARGDIR Management would try to 60 26 6 6 2 
bypass the unions and 
negotiate directly with staff 
BARGBUB We would be able to focus 4 7 21 39 27 
on our own part of the 
business 
BARGPAY Pay rates and conditions 72 22 2 3 1 
would fall as management C, 
tried to cut costs 
BARGESOP We might become more 7 10 13 36 33 
involved in the management 
of our own business through 
employee shareholding and 
greater involvement 
Rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing values C, 
6.4.1 Perceptions of Role of Unions Without National Bargaining 
There was a strong level of agreement with the trade union argument that the abolition 
of national bargaining would lead to employees being marginalised. (BARGINF) 
(98%). This may reflect the unionised nature of the sample or the success of the joint 
union campaign to raise awareness of the threat to bargaining among their 
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memberships. 43 In seeking to move away from national bargaining, management has 
emphasised the benefits of local negotiation, typically arguing that local negotiations 
would be more attuned to local needs than centralised and bureaucratic national 
procedures. Given that a limited form of devolved bargaining had already been 
introduced within the regions with the establishment of BA Regional in 1992, 
operating on different pay and conditions from the mainline operation, it would be 
interesting to see if there where any differences between the regions and the London 
area. It can be seen from table 6.14 that workers within the sample who are based at 
regional locations are, if anything, more hostile to the proposed changes. The 
abolition of national bargaining has great significance to workers within the airline as 
chapter 4 indicates. 
Table 6.15 Perceptions of Abolition of National Collective Bargaining by Region 
LONDON REGIONS 
Agree Neither/ Disagree Agree Neither/ Disagree X, 
no no 
opinion opinion 
BARGBUBI 11(18) 24(41) 65(110) 13(6) 17(8) 71(34) . 330 
BARGBETI 11(18) 24(41) 65(110) 13(6) 17(8) 71(34) . 210** 
BARGDIRI 88(149) 6(10) 6 (11) 82(41) 8(4) 10 (5) . 330 
BARGESPI 17(29) 17(28) 66(111) 16(8) 12(6) 71(35) . 816 
BARGINFI 84(159) 5 (8) 3(4) 96(47) 4(2) - 1.473 
BARGPAYI 95(162) 2(4) 3(5) 92(46) 2(l) 4 (2) . 956** BARGTIIREI 78(132) 8(13) 15(25) 84(42) 8(4) 4 (8) . 977 BARGTUI 25(42) 17(29) 58(98) 22(11) 14(7) 63 (31) 1.106 
Plain numbers are percentages ummed from row total. Parentheses are overall cell frequencies, 
summed from row total. ** Insufficient cell frequency for Chi square test. All Chi square tests are 
insigpificant at the 0.05 level unless otherwise stated. 
The employee responses to this statement are given below in figure 6.5. One of 
management's key positions in the bargaining debate was that without the 
impediment of national bargaining, workers would be able to focus on their own 
business unit. The harsh realities of the marketplace in that particular segment, it was 
43 The unions launched a campaign in the summer of 1996, which included a well-stag ., ed 
lobby of the 
company AGM, and a number of major publicity and propaganda campaigns. The principal mover was 00 
the TGWU, and other general unions. The AEEU though supporting the campaign, had already 000 
accepted the principle of business unit bargaining at outsourced subsidiaries, and the NJC was C, increasingly being marginalised by business unit level negotiations. The NJC has since been abolished, 
although other levels such as the National Sectional Panels (NSPs) have been preserved. The NJCs 
replacement, the BA Forum, has no negotiating role, although the NSPs remain powerful organs of 
national level collective bargaining. 
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argued. should drive pay and conditions rather than national level negotiations. Fioure 
6.5 below sou-ht views on the Introduction ol'bus'ineSS unit based bar-ainim, 
Figure 6.5 Perceptions of The Abolition of National Bargaining 
We would be in a better position to negotiate through 
local representatives 
The high level of disagreement fi-om this view would suggest that management's 
message about independent hLlSines, -, UnIt, has not been well receked aniong the 
unionised workforce. Less than 10'/( accorded aoreement with the statement and the 
low level of ncutrality/indiffercnce is a fLn-ther indication of strength of feeling. The 
response to another statement (BARTHRE) may provide some clues to this. The 
trade unions responded to management's advocacy of local or 'business unit 
bargaining' by highlighting the isolation, which would result. Management, they -1 -- I- Z- 
argued, would use the threat ofcontracting out and franchising to secure aereemen( to 
any change they fell necessary, whilst there would be no national organisation to co- 
ordinate resistance. 
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6.4.2 Trade Union and Management: The Battle for Hearts and Minds 
The high level of agreement with the statement, that 'without co-ordinated national 
bargaining, employees would be constantly under threat' indicates the success of trade 
union responses. Management, to a certain extent, foresaw this perception and 
cmphasised the continuing role of the trade unions in local negotiations. Again the 
trade unions argued that organised labour would be frozen out and marginalised. Only 
about 20% agreed that trade unions would still retain a prominent representational 4-ý 
role, with over 60% believing they would be unable to perform their current role. The 
trade unions also emphasised the threat to pay and conditions with the abolition of 
national collective bargaining. 
The overwhelming majority of those sampled (95%) believed that pay rates and 
conditions would fall in the absence of national bargaining. The lack of ambiguity on 
this question is reflected in the low level of neutral responses (2%). Another factor, 
which has often emerged from the bargaining debate, is the extent to which local 
managers and workers might share in the risks and rewards of their own business. 
Management's emphasis on segmentation into product areas has provoked a great 
deal of insecurity from workers across the airline who are unsure whether their part of 
the operation in a standalone sense would be profitable enough to maintain existing 
pay and conditions. 
One possible way in which management might overcome this suspicion and unease is 
through the introduction of greater employee participation, perhaps involving 
ManagementlEmployee Buy Outs (MEBOS) and Employee Share Ownership 
Programmes (ESOP). Management and analysts have been the main advocates of this 
view and trade unions have been largely critical, arguing that workers would be 
forced into concessions with little real prospect of reward. In fact, BA is adamantly 
opposed at the moment to the use of ESOP within the business, believing it would 
lead to conflict and a dilution of shareholder interests. 44 Evidence from the United 
States suggests the policy is also responsible for a great deal of inter-union conflict. 
44 The pilots union BALPA is actively pursuing an ESOP programme with BA, and is much more 
positive towards the issue than general unions like the TGWU. 
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(NValsh 1994: 126. ) However, one of the strategies in promoting bargaining refon-n 
has involved alluding to increased employee involvement. The questionnaire revealed 
that only 17% of employees actually believed that they would become more involved 
in this way. 
6.5 Employee Attitudes: Wider Issues 
The preliminary findings point to a high level of scepticism and anxiety about the 
effects of deregulation on employment. Whilst management has sought to engineer a 
culture of acceptance of change among employees, there is often a feeling among 
employees that 'change has gone too far' or is for 'change's sake'. This feeling comes 
across in many of the written comments on the questionnaire. Many employees feel 
that a profitable and successful airline should not ask employees to bear the burden of 
deregulatory change. Employee comments were invited in the questionnaire and these 
provide some interesting observations. A selection of such comments is given below. 
These comments related both to employment policies and to company strategy and 
practice. One ground-handling employee complained: 
"Since privatisation, BA has followed a year on year 
programme of segregation and off-loading of certain key 
elements and performance areas bringing us to this point in time 
whereby a massive cost-cutting package is BA's next target in 
reducing costs and increasing profits. Employees will instead of 
feeling proud and happy to have worked for BA, now be feeling 
robbed and cheated working for a franchise or subsidiary 
company. '945 
6.5.1 Employee Perceptions of Shareholder Orientation and Short Terinism. 
A common complaint concerned the shareholder orientation of BA management. A z-;, 
privatisation success of the 1980s, BA has always prided itself on delivering 
'shareholder value'. Perhaps influenced by recent debates on stakeholding and 
employee involvement, employees, many themselves shareholders, object to a narrow 
shareholder orientation. The following comment is typical: 
45 Employee comments questionnaire 
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"As a union member I feel the board should listen to workforce 
ideas instead of trZing to please the shareholder at any cost to 
the labour force. 'A 
A common issue was the perceived effect on morale amongst employees who felt 
they were being subjected to constant and disruptive change. An employee articulated 
the fears and concerns of many, and also their hostility towards management whom 
they perceived to be insulated from those effects: 
"Staff are the human cost in this search to please shareholders and 
the City of London, while the staff get poorer working conditions 
and pay, the directors get richer i. e. their pay and conditions, share 
options etc. This trend (changes in employment terms) makes your 
whole life unstable and takes away your ability to plan for the 
future. The feeling of insecurity is a terrible strain on life and 
relationships. " 
often this was ascribed to a prioritisation of shareholder value over employee 
commitment. Another Heathrow based ground handling employee wrote: 
"The company no longer respects or appreciates the hard work put 
in by employees ... the general 
feeling at the present time, is the 
company couldn't care less for its employees only it's 
, A7 shareholders. 
One pilot paraphrased the views of a famous 'quality of workforce' guru in advice to 
company Chief Executive Robert Ayling: 
"He would do well to read the works of Dr. Edwards 
Demming: Quality is more important than saving a few bob. 
Cheap labour = lower quality, lower morale and a poorer 
quality product to the customer. An engineer employed by 
BA itself will cost a bit more than one hired on the cheapest 
rates outside the company, but the quality of work on one 
flight (due to motivation, morale, pride in company etc. 
alone) will pay the difference, and it will bring the customer 
, A8 back next time. 
Another employee within ground handling articulated the same point. He also 
highlighted the paradoxical effect on shareholder value of such employment policies: 
46 Employee comments questionnaire 
47 Employee comments questionnaire 
48 Employee comments questionnaire 
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"Employment policies have changed to the point that they promote 
mistrust and are destabilising attitudes to work. Instead of 
concentrating on your job, you (are preoccupied with) fear for your 
job, fanffly and way of life. None of this can be good for the 
company. BA no longer cares for its employees, which in the long 
run will force conflict to the point that the airline's money base, i. e. 
share price etc. will be badly damaged. "49 
6.5.2 Cost Reduction in Crisis and Cahn: The Perceptions and Beliefs of Employees 
Most employees sampled accepted the need for cost reductions and increased 
productivity, but a common complaint was the manner in which change was 
introduced. Many complained of a lack of consultation. Several respondents referred 
to "only reading about changes to your own job in the papers. '950 Others complained 
of a lack of concern from BA managers of the 'human impact' of employment 
changes. This finding would accord with the perception now widely held among 
many staff of management arrogance and high-handedness, a factor which was said to 
be crucial in the propaganda battle between management and the TGWU in the cabin 
crew strike of Summer 1997. The dispute has been ascribed to a breakdown in trust 
between BA and its employees (Milne Financial Times 14.7.97). 
The following comment from a ground services worker at Heathrow was fairly 
typical: 
"in general, I think staff are aware of the need to reduce costs and 
increase productivity. What happens in the real world is that staff 
are not consulted but dictated to by both management and trade 
union. I feel it is time to find a way in which the company can talk 
to staff in an open and honest way without a hidden agenda. "51 
it is interesting that the respondent cites both trade union and management as 
complicit in the perceived problem of 'lack of consultation. BA management may 
well argue that the employment changes they wish to effect are necessary in the 
longer term for survival in an industry characterised by famine and feast. Although 
there is at least an acceptance by staff of the need for change, scepticism does point to 
at least a lack of staff accord with the way in which change is managed. In many 
49 Employee comments questionnaire (author's words in brackets) `0 Employee comments questionnaire 
51 Employee comments questionnaire 
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ways BA is experiencing the problem identified by Hopfl et al of reconciling staff 
commitment and organisational change. (1992: 24-38. ) These authors conducted a 
climate survey during the autumn of 1991 in the wake of BA's 'Gap closure 
programme'. This cost cutting initiative was implemented to 'close the gap' between 
revenues and costs and involved the disposal of 4,500 staff and the temporary layoff 
of some 2,000. Gap closure was one of the most painful episodes of corporate 
restructuring in the airline industry. The survey concluded that employees had not 
seen this traumatic period of downsizing as a betrayal of company values promoted in 
the 1980s. (Ibid. 29) 
The divergence between the Hopfl et at survey and the initial findings of this survey 
present an interesting conundrum. How do we explain the hostility and disaffection 
apparent within this sample of BA staff, and their findings in 1992? Furthermore, 
what if anything does it tell us about the effects of deregulation upon employment 
generally? In terms of methodology, this study provides a comprehensive survey of 
unionised employee attitudes, whilst the earlier study examined the process of 
restructuring at the corporate level, mainly by observing cultural change and the 
actions of managers. The Hopfl et at study was interview based. They came to the 
conclusion that most employees, whilst reluctant to accept job cuts and lay-offs, 
understood the need for such change. The ad hoc and crisis nature of the 1991 episode 
was apparent, as the Gulf War had effectively killed off international air travel for a 
period. (ATW March 1990. ) A crisis situation, which was obvious to the work-force, 
allowed radical cost surgery with reluctant union support. 
The present day situation is radically different. Airlines, such as BA, in pursuing their 
global strategies, are asking staff to accept ongoing and relentless cost reductions at a 
time when the airline is profitable. Staff are much less amenable to such demands. 
Furthermore, whilst in the wake of 1991, the carrier began to implement its 
deregulation strategy, inaugurating regional operations, acquiring stakes in European 
carriers, and pushing for changes in the bargaining machinery, it is now clear that the 
company -wants to go much further. Policies of global and local outsourcing, 
extended use of franchising and code sharing, greater proliferation of atypical 
contracts and demands, pay restructuring for cabin crew and general calls for much 
greater flexibility have all been prominent. 
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The carrier has become much more forceful in demanding changes to work rules and 
conditions. As the recent call for staff cost reductions in the order of fl. 5Bn (BEP) 
indicates, the carrier is determined to alter employee terms and conditions to fit 
business needs. These employment changes, designed to obtain cost leadership rather 
than survival, are not as well understood or accepted by employees, who see a 
profitable and healthy airline offloading the burden of change to its staff. Pilots in 
balloting for strike action in July 1996 indicated their own disaffection with this new 
culture of constant cost reduction. BALPA secured a huge mandate (94%) for strike 
action. A strike was only narrowly avoided. As this initial analysis suggests, 
management determination to deliver ongoing reductions in labour costs has met 
further employee opposition with the summer strikes of cabin crew and ground staff. 
Management has been developing contingency plans to deal with strike action by 
ground handling staff. Managers were recently trained at a Ministry of Defence 
facility ostensibly to replace striking baggage handlers (Independent 16.1.97). 
Management has been reluctant to negotiate on changes which they see as necessary 
for business survival. One issue of the company's house magazine, BA News, pointed 
to dire consequences if cabin crew pay restructuring and the outsourcing of catering 
did not take place (BA News 27.6.97). At the same time the company entered into a 
compact with the pilots' union, BALPA, which seemed designed to cultivate the 
pilots as the most potentially powerful labour grouping. (Taylor; Financial Times July 
4 1996. ) Pilots are looking enviously across the Atlantic towards the United and 
Northwest Employee Share Ownership Programmes (ESOPs) whereby the carrier has 
traded equity and worker representation on the company board for significant 
concessions. 
Many written comments in the questionnaire refer to an obsession with shareholder 
value often stating a desire for some kind of employee participation. There are 
indications, however, that BA is hostile to the notion of further worker participation 
of this sort. The company believes in employee share options as an incentive and 
discipline for its workforce but is unconvinced about the viability of an ESOP type 
deal. Yet in the written comments from the questionnaire, many workers openly 
advocate the use of an ESOP as a way in which they might be bought in to major 
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changes. These have been the preferred mechanism of restructuring at Air France, 
United, Northwest, Aer Lingus and a host of other carriers, which have managed to 
effect large scale restructuring without large-scale industrial action. 
Conclusion 
The identification of firm level responses implicit within this chapter provides a rich 
context to wider discussion about deregulation and employment. In particular, the 
inclusion of employee attitudes, albeit on the basis of a unionised sample, allows 
some key propositions about deregulation and employment to be tested. We have seen 
that in general, workers tend to view local initiatives such as regionalisation and 
increased numerical flexibility, largely negatively, probably because they provide a 
direct and material manifestation of the effects of deregulation. At the global level the 
issues becomes less definite. Employees in this sample accord with many of the 
broader management strategies, but when these are 'operationalised'at the local level, 
the belief is that jobs and conditions will suffer. The broad view is one of scepticism 
towards management and a belief that conditions are under attack. Few workers 
believe management assurances about deregulation and it is viewed as a process of 
worsening employment conditions. 
These perceptions are in line with the existence of the regulatory overhang 
representing a defence of regulated terms and conditions and scepticism about market 
driven employment change. This determination to defend the core terms and 
conditions of the regulated era is a constant whether we are considering the regional 
bases where change (at the time of writing and subsequently), had made the greatest 
inroads), and at the mainline London locations, where the threat was as readily 
apparent. It is apparent in every dimension of the questionnaire ranging from the local 
effects of franchising, outsourcing and low cost strategies, and the globalisation 
strategies driving the industry. At the time of the survey strong employee resistance 
was reflected in the defeat of proposals for outsourcing engineering and ground 
handling, although concessions were made, and the BEP programme made some 
inroads into regulated terms and conditions. However the fact of the regulatory 
overhang mean that these changes were often superficial and time specific, 
representing often little more than the periodic downsizing witnessed in other periods. 
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Having examined the nature of restructuring and employee attitudes at BA, we next 0 zn 
address the issues of employment restructuring within Europe where the regulatory 
overhang is deeper more embedded, and organically linked to a recent history of state 




Deregulation and Labour Market Restructuring 
in the European Airline Industry 
7.1 Deregulation and Labour Market Change in Europe: Context 
and Issues 
"Distressed state airlines in Europe at least, are characterised by very powerful 
unions and often by a multiplicity of different unions. Their power stems from 
the ability of almost every specialised group of workers to bring an airline to a 
halt. The union leaders have traditionally used their power and the threat of 
strike action to influence management decisions at every level. " 
(Doganis 1996: 26. ) 
in the previous chapter we looked in detail at management strategy and employee 
attitudes at British Airways. The airline was used as a critical case study of the 
emerging pattern of employment deregulation within the European airline industry. 
Building upon this case study we now widen our discussion to look at the process of 
employment change within the European airline industry. Whilst the picture within 
British airways was of relatively trouble free restructuring, despite the impact of the 
high profile cabin crew strike, in the wider European context this is far from the case. 
The comments of Professor Rigas Doganis above, an academic economist, made 
shortly after his resignation in 1996 as chairman of the struggling Greek carrier 
Olympic, are indicative of the intractable nature of European airline restructuring. 
They reflect his disenchantment at the power of government and trade unions to 
frustrate changes he believed were crucial to the airline's very survival. Doganis's 
comments provide a useful starting point for our assessment of the nature of 
deregulation and labour market change in Europe (Skapink-er 1996). Other airline 
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h. - 
executives face this problem of managing restructuring in a context of labour unrest. 
Thus, industrial relations have become a central feature of the airline scene. 
Such restructuring episodes and others at Sabena, Alitalia and Iberia seem to confirm 
the stereotype of European airline unions presented in most of the rent seeking 
literature. The unions are deemed to have become too powerful in defence of both 
wages and work rules. The wages of airline workers were seen as one of the last 
bastions of corporatist featherbedding, a product of rent seeking by powerful unions, 
who kept fares artificially high and pressured governments to preserve their Byzantine 
work rules, fostering an inefficient industry. Management inertia seemed to bolster 
the situation and allow unions free reign. This portrait of the situation of airline labour 
and management very much informed the policy debate around airline deregulation in 
the Europe up to and including the nineties. (Neven and Rbller 1996 933-940. ) In 
many ways, the situation within the European airline industry in the mid to late 1990s 
conforms to the labour inarket restnicturing model of deregulation discussed in 
chapter 1. The industry was perceived for many years by managers, government and 
academics to be in dire need of restructuring and labour and industrial relations were 
often the focus for criticism. In this chapter we will examine how these assumptions, 
particularly the belief that European airline workers were both over-paid and under 
productive, came to influence management strategy, and the effect of such strategies 
upon airline labour. 
In order to do this, the chapter addresses four key questions. Firstly, to what extent are 
labour costs and productivity in Europe, perceived as a problem by airline 
management in the deregulated environment? Secondly, how are management 
addressing this perceived problem and thirdly, how is organised labour within the 
industry responding to these challenges? The fourth and overarching question deals 
with the extent to which European airline res(ructuring conforms to the models of 
labour market deregulation, described in chapter 1. The chapter also points to a wider 
convergence addressed in the final chapter. 
To address the first question we will examine the evidence on airline pay and 
productivity within Europe using a variety of sources. Thus we will examine the study 
conducted by Avmark on behalf of the European Union, which conducted a pay and 
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productivity comparison between Europe and the US. Our second main approach in 
this section is to review evidence on the so-called airline premium, the additional 
waae and conditions benefit which has been identified as accruin,, to airline workers C) C. 
in Europe. (European Union 1994. ) Again this involves the use of Avmark, ICAO and 
UK earnings data in order to provide a fuller picture of the wage premium. Having 
identified the premium and the massive competitive pressures of the airline 
environment, we examine how carriers are seeking to reduce costs by targeting 
premium wage rates. 
For the second question, therefore, we will consider the strategies of airline 
management in securing lower labour costs within the deregulated environment. The 
strategies of franchising, outsourcing, the creation of internal low cost subsidiaries 
and the threat from low cost operations are all pivotal in airline strategies. 
Thirdly we examine the detailed process of restructuring using several case studies in 
addition to the BA example. The labour strategies of these European carriers 
operating within different labour market and industrial relations contexts will be 
examined, along with labour's response. It will be seen that the extent and depth of 
management and labour response is very much influenced by the regulatory 
environment within both the national and supranational context. In order to begin our 
discussion we need to quickly review the effects of deregulation upon European 
airlines. 
7.1.1 European Airline Labour. Caught in the Slipstream of Deregulation? 
Whilst many writers have voiced concerns that European airlines faced too many 
obstacles for effective deregulated competition, a new competitive product and labour 
market regime is being established. (Poole/CAA1989), Doganis (1994), Hanlon 
(1996). In many ways, European airline labour has had to adjust over a much shorter 
time period than airline labour in the United States. (Marin 1998: 903. ) The pressures 
can be attributed to three key factors related to the extent of competition, as 
liberalisation takes hold bringing a range of competitive threats. Firstly, the threat of 
'early adapting' carriers which have managed costs and developed alliance 
relationships in response to earlier deregulation and now threaten the core business of 
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weaker carriers. These strong competitors can draw traffic away from weaker carriers 
through their extensive hub and spoke networks and compete on internal routes in 
most countries. Secondly, a range of low cost entrants threatens incumbents with their 
abilit to compete on price and cost. These carriers expose the high cost base of such y0 
carriers and pose a threat to the more dynamic 'early adapting' carriers such as British 
Airways, SAS, KLM and Lufthansa. Thirdly, flag carrier airlines in most countries 
have traditionally benefited from state ownership and sponsorship, particularly 
through subsidy. These subsidies insulated even the most chronically inefficient 
carrier from the threat of bankruptcy. Now, as states increasingly offload that 
responsibility and as supranational competition rules render such policies illegal, 
these carriers must adapt or die. It is the very speed and extent of these processes 
which threatens the traditional compact between the state and airline labour. The 
European State has become increasingly concerned at the competitiveness of major 
industries identifying a significant cost disadvantage with US competitors. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to look at these issues of labour costs and productivity to set 
events in context. 
7.1.2 The Comparative Labour Cost and Productivity Debate 
Europe's airline industry has long been identified as a high cost sector. The diagnosis 
has come primarily from economists but also from management, and has been driven 
by a number of key analyses, all of which compare Europe unfavourably with the US 
(See chapter 4). Most studies, controlling for variables such as route length and 
aircraft type, have Europe's airline industry as one of high labour cost/low 
productivity. Earlier analyses such as Windle (1991: 31-49) have been supplemented 
by later studies such as the work of Neven and R61ler (1996: 933-940), Vass (1997: 
8), Ourn and Yu (1998: chapter 5). 52 
Some econometric studies have attempted to provide a more grounded understanding 
of the airline industry. Encoua, for example, showed that though in most cases 
52 Seabright P (1997: 509) 'European Airline Deregulation; An Analysis of Productivity and Cost 0 Factors' European Economic Review. codes for 'political interference' as though the role of the state 0 
were simply to interfere Whilst difficult factors such as the role of the state have to be modelled, the 
sophistication of systems of the econometric specification is often marred by quite crude assumptions. 
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deregulation is supposed to lead to short run efficiency gains, it often leads to a short 
run reduction in efficiency as carriers adjust to the new environment and structure 
their operation accordingly. This is the case even for late adjusting' carriers such as 
Iberia, Alitalia. and Air France. (Encoua 1991: 109-24. ) In a later study, Marin found 
that European airlines were becoming more efficient, identifying a closure of the gap 
between US and European carriers. (1998: 395-414. ) Alamdari also indicates that 
product market pressures arising from deregulation have rendered European airlines 
more efficient. (1997: 16. ) Earlier work by Alamdari and Morell showed that 
European airlines were achieving significant productivity increases, leading to 
reduced unit labour costs, although these were sometimes offset by higher wages. 
(Alamdari and Morell 1997: 53. ) So whilst labour costs have been seen as an 
important and even crucial aspect of the European airline restructuring debate, there is 
evidence to show that European labour costs may be less intractable than many 
authors have assumed. Other evidence on labour costs provides a more disaggregated 
picture. In order to examine the issue further we will now look at some such evidence. 
Whilst such models are useful in mapping out the terrain of the debate, there is a need 
for case based and long run data, which provides an understanding of the institutional 
richness and complexity of the airline industry. Since each airline is governed and 
regulated by its own unique industrial relations structures and the nature of its airline 
product market, more often than not real explanation lies within these areas. It is 
useful to look in some depth at premium wages because their existence informs much 
of the criticism of European airline labour. What is the scope and nature of the 
premium? Who receives it and how much, what are the ownership and 
institutional/national differences? The following section seeks to unpack some of the 
issues around the air transport premium wage. 
7.1.3 The Avnmrk Research Evidence on European Airline Labour Costs 
In 1995, Avmark the aviation consultancy, undertook a thorough analysis of labour 
costs and productivity for the European Union. Using 1993 data due to lags in the 
publication of later data, they attempted to measure labour cost between the US and 
The state can play a variety of roles and to assume its role is only that of 'political interference' is to 
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Europe. Though the evidence is time dependent, it provides a useful insight into 
perceptions of the airline cost and productivity problem, and indeed still shapes much 
of the latter day policy response. The report was prepared for the European Union 
Comiti De Sages, which was then grappling with the problem of European airline 
restructuring. Avmark's remit was to compare the differences in labour costs between 
the US and Europe comparing labour costs and the social cost of employment 
between 1988 and 1992. (Avmark 1993. ) The analysis provides a good comparator of 
later changes in labour cost which can be gleaned from IATA and ICAO productivity 
data. Absolute levels of labour cost in 1992 (defined in the report as gross salary plus 
social charges) were found to be $55,067 per employee for European carriers and 
$52,257 per worker for US carriers, a difference of 5 per cent. European gross salaries 
were found to be 10 per cent higher than US salaries, but this was offset by the fact 
that social charges were 9.8 per cent lower. (Ibid. ) As the Avmark researchers 
commented, "The finding that US social charges are above the European average 
challenges a widely held view in the European aviation industry". (Ibid. ) Key labour 
cost and productivity comparisons are given below in table 7.1 
Table 7.1 Change In key Labour Cost and Productivity Indicators USA/Europe 
1988-92 Four Year Average) 
Average Average Average Average growth 
growth growth growth 
Employees Salary costs Productivity Lab expenses 
European Average 1.7% 9.29% 5.08% 4.28% 
US Average 9.07% 12.60% 1.19% -0.34% 
Source: Avmark 1995 
The performance of US carriers lags that of the European carriers, though some 
qualifications should be made. Firstly, US carriers have already achieved significant 
productivity growth in the 1980s rendering relative gains predictably smaller. 
Secondly, both salary growth and employee growth are higher because the US is at a 
more advanced stage of deregulation, where there is more job creation. In addition, 
the effect of wage 'givebacks' may exaggerate the US wage figures. Nevertheless, 
adopt a particularly one-dimensional view. 
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there are signs of a marked improvement in European productivity, a restraint of 
employment growth and a reduction in labour expenditure (See also table 7.2). This 
would suggest initially that attacks on European salaries might exaggerate the airline 
premium, and that wages are seen as a recurring cost factor, which has to be driven 
down. 
It is also interesting to use the data to compare the performances of different European 
carriers; in particular we should consider both productivity and wage/employment 
growth. At Lufthansa, employment growth was double that of productivity. Iberia was 
long seen as one the most inefficient carriers in terms of overall productivity, yet it 
managed to increase productivity by 5 per cent Oust above average) whilst holding 
employment growth below average at I per cent. Aer Lingus, another carrier whose 
record on productivity has been criticised, was able to achieve a decrease in 
employment of 3-4 per cent whilst productivity increased by 8 per cent. The reasons 
for differing performance are complex and effects such as the margin for 
improvement should be taken into account. Nevertheless, the data does show that 
growth in employment was being carefully restrained whilst productivity was 
increasing. This at a time when European airlines were only beginning to emerge 
from state control and beginning to restructure. The comparison with US carriers 
below throws some further light on the extent to which European carriers were 
beginning the process of labour market adjustment. The country data and the 
comparison data were computed using the Avmark data. C) 
Table 7.2 Change In Key Labour Cost and Productivity Indicators for Selected 
Fiirnnpan Carriers. 1989-1992 








Employees Salaries Productivity Labour expenses 
Aer Lingus -3.57 2.3 7.76 -7.69 
Air France 4.10 10.84 1.52 -5.87 
Alitalia 0.38 13.52 7.64 -5.51 
British Airways -0.63 6.97 6.91 -0.15 
Iberia 1.29 10.43 5.18 3.54 
KLM 1.87 2.75 6.41 -7.15 
L. ufthansa 5.69 11.67 01) 2.92 0.97 
SAS -2.42 6.86 6.69 -1.57 
SwisLaLir 0.35 6.87 4.89 0.12 
TAP 3.82 15.74 3.11 0.64 
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Source: Avmark 1995 
Whilst change is proceeding in European airlines, it is often argued that wages and 
benefits are still large in comparison to external industries. Faced by failing yields and 
increased competition, management is targeting airline wages. Airline workers have 
traditionally been paid premium wages for comparable jobs, the so-called Airline 
Wage Premium (AWP). (See Dooley 1989: 169-190. ) is the difference between the 
the earnings of airline workers and those in comparable non airline jobs. The AWP is 
usually expressed as a ratio over national salaries. In 1992 the report of the Comite De 
Sages identified a significant premium within Europe in 1992 in terms of average 
national earnings, as table 7.3 indicates. 
Table 7.3 Comparisons of the Airline Wage Premium: Europe and USA 1992 
Europe AWP USA AWP 
Portugal (TAP) 2.8 Delta 1.1 
Italy (Alitalia) 1.7 US Air 1.0 
Germany (Lufthansa) 1.5 United 1.0 
Spain (Iberia) 1.3 American 1.0 
UK (British Airways) 1.2 Southwest 0.9 
Scandinavia (SAS) 1.1 Continental 0.8 
France (Air France) 1.0 
Ireland (Aer Lingus) 0.9 
Netherlands (KLM) 0.9 
Switzerland (Swissair) 0.9 
UK (Virgin) 0.9 
Austria (Lauda Air) 0.8 
UK (British Midland) 0.7 
European Big Six 1.1 US Big Six 1.0 
Avera2e Avera2e 
Source: calculated from Avmark 1995 
The 1992 comparison for example identified a European AVVT effect of as much as 
I. I. In other words, airline employment brought up to 10 per cent higher relative 
earnings than in outside industry. Part of the reason for this differential is the mix of 
relatively high earning occupations within the industry. Pilots and skilled technicians, 
whose earnings are, in any case, higher, are bound to inflate such comparisons. 
(Avmark 1993. )
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However within relatively low skilled grades such as cabin crew there is significant 
variation between different airlines, often reflecting the varied national and 
institutional contexts. 
Table 7.4 Cabin Crew Salaries Europe and USA. 
Cabin Crew Salaries In Europe $US 1975-1997 
1975 1980 1985 1995 1997 
Sabena 19,862 20,705 23,868 32,776 *37,372 
Air France 13,135 25,191 19,257 68,809a *37,372 
Lufthansa 14,914 29,889 23,318 59,131 *37,372 
Aer Lingus 5,929 10,721 16,632 32,776 37,372 
Alitalia 14,727 36,261 23,199 32,776 37,372 
KIM 8,607 30,044 23,595 32,776 37,372 
TAP 8,908 15,084 14,763 44,233 41,784 
SAS 15,188 23,913 23,199 60,486 60,224 
Iberia 14,683 25,737 23,199 68,122 61,695 
Swissair 8,607 28,632 24,540 32,776 37,372 
British Airways 6,407 15,870 14,181 29,550 29,957 
British Midland 3,035 10,971 10,689 21,221 28,860 
Air UK 8,607 7,430 23,199 32,776 17,535 
Virgin ---- ---- 9,887 19,283 19,242 
American 12,070 18,236 26,765 29,036 33,995 
US Air 13,379 18,936 29,657 34,996 36,501 
Continental 8,607 18,372 16,194 27,203 34,292 
Delta ý 13,315 18,934 28,703 29,985 34,952 
Northwest 8,936 18,881 27,541 30,927 29,975 
TWA 11,287 21,302 34,316 26,751 24,569 
United 10,114 21,251 27,293 43,496 32,257 
Mean 8,607 21,821 23,199 36,053 37,372 
INDEX 1980 39 100 106 165 171 
INDEX 1985 37 94 100 155 161 
Source: ICAO Fleet and Personnel Statistics (selected years) 
*estimated from high wage mean 
The cabin crew salary comparison provided above in table 7.4 demonstrates the wide 
variation between different nations and shows a definite ownership effect. The index 
shows a slowing of earnings growth since 1995. However it also shows that even 
within highly paid state carriers cabin crew earnings are coming under pressure. 
Carriers such as Iberia, SAS and TAP who continue to lead the field in cabin crew 
salaries have suffered real reductions. Iberia cabin crew earnings have declined by 10 
per cent in absolute terms between 1995 and 1997. There has also been a fall in 
earnings at the US carriers TWA and Northwest, where cabin crew have undergone 
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significant pay restructuring. Only the privatised airlines have registered significant 
increases, although they start from a much lower position than the flao, carriers. 0 
As the cabin crew comparison indicates there is a significant 'Southern European 
effect. ' A 1994 analysis identified a significant premium within carriers such as 
Alitalia, Iberia, and TAP. Their combined AWP effect at 1.9: 1 is twice that of average 
national salaries. The AWP seems to be higher for state carriers, but only just, though 
there are outliers such as TAP, where airline workers on average earn nearly two and 
a half times as much as those in other industries. This perhaps explains the eagerness 
of management at these carriers and others such as Sabena and Iberia for drastic cost 
containment. In addition, there is a large gap between the AWP levels for private 
(0.9: 1) and state-controlled carriers (13: 1). This differential suggests that for this 
sample of carriers at least, state ownership is a significant predictor of higher overall 
compensation levels (though this level is by no means uniform). Initial analysis also 
suggests that there is an institutional effect related to the nature of ownership. Those 
carriers, such as British Airways, KLM and SAS, which have been privatised have 
average combined AWP of I (i. e. airline workers' salaries are about the same as the 
national average). However in certain functions such as ground handling and 
unskilled maintenance jobs BA workers are paid significantly more. 
The survey in chapter 6 indicated the extent to which workers identified this regulated 
wage and conditions premium, indicating the scope, even after 13 years of private 
ownership, for reduction. From that point of view, average comparisons can be 
misleading. Interestingly, those airlines, which have never been in public ownership, 
had an AVYT around 20 per cent lower than those who had previously been state 
owned. This provides evidence for the concept of a 'regulatory overhang' in terms of 
the previous regulation/state ownership of the industry, indicating that even after 
privatisation, wages continue to outstrip those of exclusively private competitors. 
Vass identifies a productivity factor of 32 per cent attributable to ownership. (Vass 
1997: 26. ) The importance to our discussion of the AWP is that a perception exists 
among airline executives that costs can be reduced relatively easily because a surplus 
exists. (Neven and R61ler 1996: 933-940. ) Thus, managers can be expected to pursue 
reductions in wages and benefits, particularly in the high cost carriers. There is a 
counter perception among airline employees that airline wage premia are an expected 
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component of the employment package of large airlines, promoting resistance to any 
erosion, as we have seen in chapters 5 and 6 in the case of British Airways. Though 
the airline wage premium is given as an aggregate figure in the research literature, it is 
worthwhile comparing airline earnings with national salaries, in order to determine its 
extent. This is the task of the next section, which will compare wages in air transport 
with other sectors in order to provide a deeper look at the premium. 
7.1.4 The UK Air Transport Wage Premiltin 
Even within more deregulated labour markets such as the UK, airline workers have 
tended to preserve pay and conditions. The New Eamings Sun, ey provides useful 
comparative information on the nature of this premium within the UK. (Dept 
Employment/ONS 1984-96. ) Air transport wages were analysed and compared with 
wages prevailing in manufacturing over the tenyear period between 1986 and 1996. 
Although the data are disaggregated and it is difficult to obtain occupational data at 
the appropriate time periods, it gives a flavour of the overall trend. Figure 7.1 below, 
indicates the resilience of air transport wages generally, on the basis of gross weekly 
earnings, again an imperfect measure but one which captures the comparison between 
different sectors. Whilst we are unable to look at the earnings of particular groups, the 
data allow comparison between, for example, airline workers in general employment 
and outside comparators providing a broad picture of comparative trends. In 1986, 
one Year before the privatisation of BA, gross pay for male manual workers in air 
transport was around 20 per cent higher than in manufacturing, by 1996 and almost 
ten years of privatisation, that gap had actually widened by around a third. 
Even in nations where management has been empowered and where the external 
industrial relations environment is favourable, these higher then average earnings 
persist and more continue to rise. The wage trends demonstrated above are further 
amplified when we consider the distribution of wages in air transport in comparison 
with those in other sectors. It can readily be seen that pay is higher on average within 
air transport than within other industrial sectors. In 1996, the percentage of the air 
transport workforce surveyed earning less than E220 was only 66 per cent of that in 
surface transport. Taking the upper level figure, we can see that the percentage of air 
transport workers, whose gross earnings fell below E400, was only 40 per cent. It is 
almost certain that one explanation for this relatively high level of air transport 
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camings is the distorting effect of outsourcing around certain manual grades such as C C- Cý -- 
catering, cleaning and other ancillary services. These areas howeNer are still counted 
within the air transport category. and the aggregated effect continues to be one of 
higher earnings in air transport. 
Figure 7.1 Earnings Cornparison: Air'Fransport and Other Sectors 








1986 1988 1990 
C3 Manufacturing 
EServices 
13 Air Transport 
Source: Calculated from New Larnings Sw-vey (inclusive years) 
Figure 7.2 Earnings Distribution Coniparison: Air Transport and Other Sectors 











Source: Calculated fi-om New Earnings Survey (inclusive years). (Horizontal axis 
denotes % of sampled workers within sector in pay band. ) 
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With demonstrably higher wages in air transport than in the comparable service 
sector, it is little wonder that airline managers have embarked on a concerted policy of I-) 
cost reduction as they face a fiercely competitive environment. 
7.2 Targeting Labour: Management Strategy In the European Airline 
Industry 
As detailed in the previous section, the existence of premium wages and conditions 
are seen as a major obstacle to airline restructuring. The need for lower costs is driven 
by two principal factors, the existence of low cost competitors who exemplify the 
need for lower costs, and secondly by the emergence of a global division of labour 
within the industry, which has seen many activities once carried out as in-house 
functions, subject to outsourcing and other forms of cost control. Indeed innovation 
has proceeded to such an extent that many airlines have been accused by their trade 
unions of seeking to operate 'virtual operations, where the airline itself becomes a 
marketing asset, selling seats, and leaving other inputs to an array of subcontractors 
and franchisees. Whilst the industry is far from that model, the existence of low cost 
innovation, and the threat of consolidation has forced a re-examination of the airline 
industry's entire production strategy, in order to meet the demands of the new 
environment. This process has already taken place in industries such as auto 
manufacture and semiconductors but for the airline industry with its stable, 
operationally led culture, it is something of a revolution. The push towards these new 
strategies is examined below. 
7.2.1 Lean Production In the Air and Market Rates 
Airline employers have since the early 1990s focused on obtaining market rates; 
namely the rates of pay offered by the low cost providers, whether low cost airlines 
such as Easyjet and Ryanair or low cost 'service providers' such as Midland Air 
Services and Servisair. Pre-existing operations have also become the model for cost 
reduction, such as the charter sector demonstrates. 53 (See also chapter 3. ) Easyjet, for 
53 The marginal operating costs of the charter type service providers are low. They tend to pay wages C' 
below those of the scheduled operators, tend to have greater flexibility of employment, lower general 
overheads and much higher utilisation of both labour and capital (Doganis 1994: Chap 7). The charter 
carriers subcontract most support services, as they are necessarily seasonal in nature. These cost 
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example, has tended to subcontract aircraft and pilots from other carriers. Its 
marketing operation is based on the successful telesales concepts pioneered by 
financial services firms such as Direct Line, with a lean back office operation. Cabin 
crews are recruited from 'non traditional sources' and wear casual uniforms, 
deliberately breaking with the 'stuffy' dress code of scheduled airlines. Check in staff 
are subcontracted as are ground staff. (Feldman 1997: 23. ) Low cost carriers exercise 
just as much of an impact upon employment as they do on fares as the US experience 
has shown. The recent entrant low cost carriers such as Easyjet, Ryanair, and Virgin 
Express provide ready labour cost comparisons for major airlines, particularly on 
short-stage length low yield routes. On these routes, labour intensity is highest and 
labour costs are most crucial. (Perreira/ILO 1996 1-29. ) Low cost airlines are not the 
only threat to airline labour, there is a simultaneous impact from low cost service 
providers; this is discussed in the following section. 
In labour intensive areas such as ground services, labour costs typically account for 
some 63-78% of overall costs. (British Airways 1996. ) With relatively high 'national' 
rates resulting from national bargaining, there is considerable scope for wage 
reductions. In countries such as the UK, Netherlands and Ireland liberalisation of such 
services has already placed downward pressure on the airline premium. BA has 
already started to apply low cost strategies to ground handling. Two tier wage rates 
have been introduced in mainline and regional operations have been forced to offer 
concessions. All the while, senior workers have had their pay and conditions 
protected, in the belief that natural wastage will flatten pay scales and deliver a lower 
cost structure in time. In 1996, BA identified the need for savings of E7.5 million in 
ground handling to achieve competitiveness. The airline faces competition from rival 
ground handling contractors such as Servisair/Midland Air Services. The projected 
cost gap, for example, between BA at current wage rates, was estimated variously at 
between 6 and 9 million pounds. To give an example of this cost gap, at Glasgow, 
Servisair's cost structure is nearly one third lower than BA. Other providers such as 
Northwest Airlines have costs in terms of salaries, pensions, and overtime rules that 
are 40 per cent lower than those of BA. 
structures are reflected in new entrant carriers, who seek to emulate the charter operators but because of 
the nature of their operations are still relatively high cost by comparison. (Feldman 1996: 16. ) C, 
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Whilst the UK has seen fierce competition in the area of service provision, the 
existence of local ground handling monopolies has protected labour conditions at 
other European airports. Cost comparisons indicate that at airports where there are 
more than two ground handling companies, costs are markedly lower, as occurs in the 
UK. (Stockman 1996: 53. ) In response to ever increasing demands from airlines for 
lower costs, the European Union has recently undertaken a major initiative to 
deregulate airport ground handling, where costs are seen as an obstacle to market 
entry. (Parry 1996: 62, also chapter 8. ) Increasing regulatory intervention in areas 
such as ground handling is premised upon the need for fair competition, but 
undoubtedly helps airlines to manage and control labour costs. (See Bonassies 1996: 
4-8. ) The combined effects of both low cost operations and the threat of external 
providers in areas like ground handling are supplemented by another threat to airline 
conditions, namely the proliferation of franchising and outsourcing. In the next 
section, we look at these trends. 
7.2.2 Making the Local Global. Outsourcing and Franchising Strategies in Core 
Service Provision 
In order to appreciate the pressures on airlines and their labour forces, it is worth 
looking at some common strategic approaches used by management to assess their 
position within the global industry structure. One such approach is typified below in 
Table 7.5. This McKinsey analysis points to three emerging carrier types: the 
'network manager, the 'capacity providerand the 'service provider .' 
Table 7.5 Airline Types and Strategies After Deregulation 
Network To integrate a network of Access to global, BA, Air France, 
Manager services based on marketin- network, with major Lufthansa 
whilst purchasing both flying hub don-driation etc. 
and non flying services from 
other providers or suppliers 
Capacity To provide 'non core'flight Lower costs than Manx, Maersk, 
Provider operations (e. g. low yield, network manager, Brymon (BA), Viva 
secondary operations). To operational flexibility,, Air (Iberia), 
provide low cost services on an spare capacity or Transavia (KLM), 
ad hoc basis. To provide crew ability to procure it City express, 
and other resources Condor (Lufthansa) 
Service To provide 'non core'services, Low cost base (often Dobbs, Aviation 
Provider such as cleaning, catering and 30% below airlines) Catering, OCS 
maintenance cleaning, MAS 
handlins! 
Source: Adapted from McKinsey Avmark Report 1995 
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The trend is towards hetwork- managers' subcontracting aircraft and crews from 
"capacity providers. " The anticipated replacement subcontracting of low yield Cý 
services has not been much in evidence recently. This is probably because of the lead 
provided by 'network manager' type carriers such as British Airways and Lufthansa. 
Rather than subcontract low yield regional services, these carriers have created low 
cost subsidiaries within their own operations or have vertically integrated smaller 
operators into franchise type arrangements. In table 7.6 below, the employment 
options implicit in the transition from a regulated to deregulated environment are 
described. Most of the options described are already in progress as carriers seek to C> 
reduce costs to an absolute minimum. 54 Engineering, catering, cleaning, ramp services 
and ground handling have all been subjected to outsourcing in recent years. Airlines 
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increasingly view such services as peripheral to their core operations. 
Table 7.6 Labour Implications of Post Deregulation Strategy (Source 
NIcKinsey/Avmark) 
FLAG PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT ! -EMERGING EMPLOYMENT'- 
CARRIERS -SITUATION -TREND, - 
Flight Operations C, 
National level basic contract for all Access to low cost crew pool for 
crew regardless of aircraft type smaller aircraft 
Technical In house maintenance at home base, by Inter-carrier co-operation allows 
Maintenance national carrier, national union contract specialisation and scale subcontracting 0 
to third party increasing, use of low cost 
maintenance bases. Concentration of 
large-scale maintenance in regional 
bases to take advantage of regional pay 
differentials and labour pools 
Apron Services Monopoly at hub, with 'expensive' Entry of low cost providers with 
(catering cleaning, union contract for staff with national European scale 
servicing) carrier 
Ground Handling As above Entry of third party handlers, with low 
wage costs (MAS) 
Data Processing Performed in house Subject to JVs with other airlines and 
third parties 
Marketing In house, centralised, unsophisticated New focus on 
telemarketing/relationship marketing, 
yield management etc. Performed at 0 low cost centres (Glasgow, Newcastle). C, Increasing use of remote sourcing for 
technical functions (debugging CIC, "' 
I I I software etc. ) (BA, Bombay) 
_J Source: McKinsey/ Avmark 
'" See chapter 7 for a detailed rationale of the need for cost reduction as perceived by managgement. 
55 Trade unions and others challenge much of the view on the peripherality of support functions but the C) 
consultants seem to be fuelling a move toward the outsourcing of engineering and maintenance. a C, 00 Nevertheless, BA's stated intention to outsource enoineerin- was challenged by consultant advice, 0 C, 
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Even in engineering, many carriers have preferred to set up arms length subsidiaries 
56 
such as BA Engineering, Lufthansa Technik and Team Aer Lingus. These 
operations act as standalone businesses, which provided with 'weaning periods'; to 
either find Ihird party' work, or reduce costs drastically for the main carrier. Other 
carriers have a much less 'contractual' intention, using outsourcing as a 'cost discovery 
mechanism' for exclusively In house' work. (Smith 1996. ) The prospect of 
reductions in the order of 30 per cent in standard maintenance contracts makes the 
initial costs worthwhile. (Ibid. ) Whilst outsourcing of the type undertaken in 
engineering is widespread, another issue is the use of benchmarking in order to reduce 
internal costs. This process is described below with its implications for airline labour. 
Airline management have sought to develop strategies which utilise all of these 
capacities, and which separate functions into areas where they can be delivered at 
lowest cost. For some airlines this is a means of survival and amounts to the forging 
of alliances with major airlines and severe cost surgery. An increasing number of 
carriers, particularly those whose size makes them potential global competitors, have 
embarked upon a wholesale reappraisal of the business of the airline itself. Should the 
carrier compete on regional or domestic routes? Should it operate international 
routes? Should it employ its own low cost carrier to bring down costs? Should the 
airline outsource 'non core' functions? Most airlines have faced these questions and 
many have already taken significant steps towards implementation. British Airways, 
Lufthansa and SAS, which see a realistic chance of achieving a dominant alliance role 
and a strong regional position, have been foremost in pursuing these strategies. 
However, we need to be aware also of the institutional constraints and advantages, 
which apply, leading to differing levels of progress. 
7.2.3 Compulsory Competitive Threatening; Outsourcing Threats and Labour 
Concessions 
In response to the general product market pressures, many carriers are using the threat t) 
of outsourcing to secure major reductions in the wages and conditions of service of 
which emphasised the co-ordinational and quality benefits of in house provision. They might also have 
had one eye on the industrial relations fallout. 
56 Team Aer Lingus was sold to the Danish Engineering group FLS in December 1998. 
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their workforces. This is quite clear from the BA case in chapters 5 and 6, and has 
spread to other carriers. KLM considered using contractors for ground handling and 
the engineering functions. (Airline Business June 1996. ) Lufthansa has also 
established its Technik engineering subsidiary, with unions agreeing under the threat 
to move the function abroad. Operators are increasingly using global outsourcing 
strategies for back office' functions such as telesales and specialist computing. 
Swissair, for example, moved its reservations function to Mumbai, taking advantage 
of the huge difference in labour costs, whilst procuring a highly skilled and motivated 
labour force. (Hill 1995. ) British Airways has highly skilled Ide-bugging' technicians 
located in Delhi at a fraction of UK costs. (Oum and Yu 1998: 64) This migration of 
airline jobs, however, has not been as widespread as many observers first thought and 
is mainly confined to specialist technical functions for which recruitment is often 
difficult. (Oum and Yu 1998: 64. ) Although airline management has been adept at 
benchmarking their current cost structures against those available in low wage 41:  
nations, the floodgates do not seem to have opened as many unions feared and 
anticipated. When functions are technically difficult to move abroad, the trend, as 
exemplified by BA, is for these functions to be compared to low cost domestic 
providers. Discussing the recent trend towards outsourcing of information technology 
services, the consultants DPA argued: 
'Sometimes the real motivation behind outsourcing is to obviate employment 
protection and labour relation (sic) issues, faced particularly, by European 
carriers. By outsourcing a particular function, the airline can remove the 
internal IT personnel from its payroll, thereby reducing social charges. ' 
(Airline Business 1996 . 
)57 
In functions such as IT, there are whole ranges of other issues allied to the decision to 
outsource. Certain functions can become profitable standalone businesses on the basis 
of third party work. The carrier may have limited investment to allocate to new IT 
initiatives, but many motivations come down to the desire to secure services at market 
cost. Many carriers have opted for the internalisation approach. That is, they have 
turned such activities into profit centres. Air France, Swissair and SAS have all 
undertaken such initiatives. Others have adopted the stand-alone subsidiary approach 
such as Speedwing (British Airways); and the Lufthansa System subsidiary described 
57 Can You Do IT Better Airline Business April 1996. 
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below. The current view on airline outsourcing points to the provision of services at 
60 per cent of in house costs. (Smith 1995: 3 1. ) Within highly technical and skilled 
functions such as IT where there exists a considerable premium for skilled technical 
labour, the indications are that the cost reductions are less important. What seems 
more salient is the obsession which many have with spinning off 'non-core' services. 
in any case, there has been a major re-evaluation of outsourcing in maintenance as a 
58 result of the Valujet disaster in Florida in May 1996. Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of our analysis, we should accept the airlines' own definition of 'non-core' as 
summarised by Smith in his analysis of global outsourcing. (Smith: 1995: 56-59. ) 
AnalYsing European carriers, Smith identifies several carriers that have a high degree 
of outsourcing. The extent of outsourcing differs across carriers: 
Table 7.7 Outsourcing Profile of Selected European Airlines 
Heavy Light Engines Flight Catering 
Main Main training 
%0 W Air France 
1 





Ground IT Cargo 
Handling 
c0c 






. 4, k . 4ý1 13 
C 
)a 
Source: Selected From Wake Smith Airline Business August 1995. 
'40 Captive subsidiary AOutsourced to an independent provider C Internal profit 0% 
centre, 11 Internal department. 
From table 7.7 above we can see that globalisation strategies effectively require 
localised action to restrain costs. The phenomenon of thinking global and acting local 
operates as each carrier is then forced into adapting to the decisions of other carriers. 
58 The crash was caused by the loading of oxygen generators into the hold of an aircraft in a clear 
violation of procedure. As pressurisation took effect these exploded killing all on board. Valujet had 
carved a reputation as the ultimate lean airline' outsourcing virtually all ancillary and support 
functions. A post-accident safety audit by the FAA found major violations on maintenance procedure. 
A chain of II contractors, many of whom had in turn subcontracted, maintained the aircraft involved in 
the Everglades crash. The lack of central oversight and control was severely criticised by the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation in July 1996. This prompted a rethink among many 
airlines, and probably increased dramatically the transaction costs of monitoring maintenance 
contractors. The FAA was criticised for its reluctance to adequately oversee low cost operators; its 
principal officer forced to resign. The crash raises the question of the contradiction of charging C, 
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Given that the majority are employed within the airline's home country, any 
restructuring must necessarily take account of the industrial relations and wider socio- 
economic context within that nation. In order to reduce costs it is essential that 
national impediments to such business strategies be removed. It is often glibly implied 
that all airlines need to do is to circumvent national industrial relations structures. 59 
This is singularly the most difficult objective for airline management, and attempts to 
do so have resulted in strikes, disruption and problems of staff morale which have 
ultimately affected the airline product. These issues are addressed in the next section. 
7.3 Restructuring and Conflict In the European Airline Industry: Cases 
and Issues 
7.3.1 Strikes and Dispittes 
Whatever the debate about productivity and employment growth, there is clearly a 
good deal of scope for restructuring within the European airline sector. Management 
clearly wishes to prepare airlines for the new regulatory environment, whilst 
employees defend wages, conditions and work practices. Several examples of 
industrial disputes during the period give an indication of restructuring at the national 
and airline level. This turn towards conflict can be understood in terms of the 
withdrawal of state support and the emergence of a new regulatory framework-, which 
has empowered and emboldened management. The balance of bargaining power has 
shifted in management's favour, as privatisation and deregulation on a global scale 
increasingly dictate the nature of restructuring. (See Chapter 8. ) Labour, though, 
retains significant bargaining power and influence through national governments and 
regulators. Thus conflict becomes almost inevitable as management's need for cost 
reduction collides with the need for trade unions to defend the terms and conditions of 
their members. In this section, we will look at the incidence of strike action and a 
detailed description of disputes at a number of carriers. The following data (table 7.5) 
indicate the extent of strike action within the European airline industry. Gall points to 
the increasing incidence of strike action to highlight labour resistance. (Gall 1996: 
econornic regulators, with their 'productivist' orientation with aspects of safety oversight. (See 0 Woolfson and Beck 1997 for a discussion re the UK offshore oil industry. ) (Jennings 1996 : 74. ) 
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255-260. ) He argues that strike action was much more widespread in the European 
airline industry than Warhurst's 1995 analysis indicates (1995: 259-274) and that 
official records understate the real level of industrial action. 
Table 7.8 Strike Incidence In the European Airline Industry 1985-1995 
YEAR 'NUMBER OF STRIKES WORKING DAYS LOST 
1985 3 14 
1986 9 15 
1987 19 25 
1988 15 22 
1989 18 25 
1990 5 5 
1991 12 12 
1992 8 9 
1993 3 13 
1994 22 23 
1995 55 61 
Total 169 224 
Source: Compiled from Gall (1996) table 1. 
Table 7.8 provides the raw data on strike activity in the European airline industry. An 
upsurge in strike activity in 1994 and 1995, the most acute years of restructuring, is 
noticeable as can be discerned clearly from figure 7.3. Gall sees the resurgence of 
strike action within the airline industry from the point of view of effectiveness, 
believing that evidence of an increased incidence of strike action is a manifestation of 
labour's continued power within the industry. Though this assumption is questionable, 
it might equally be evidence of the weakness and vulnerability of labour; it reinforces 
Doganis's point about the disruptive power of airline unions, as figure 7.3 below 
indicates. 
The major upturn in strike activity took place in 1995, which was the high point of 
restructuring conflict within the industry. However, the high number of strike days is 
accounted for by a relatively small proportion of the labour force (pilots) and by the 
effect of continued disputes at both Iberia and Air France. To an extent these levels of 
strike activity were short-lived, although there is a continued threat of strike action 
from Air France pilots and cabin crew, as late as 1999. 
See Neven and R611er (1996) 'Rent Sharing and Profitability: Evidence From the European Airline C, 
Industry' European Economic Review March 1996 (pp 936-940) for an example of this. 
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Figure 7.3 Strikes In the European Airline Industry 
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Source: Calculated from Data in Gall ( 1996 and European Industrial Riations Rview). 
Aggregated strike data hOWCVCI- tell LIS little about the causes, processes, 
consequences or outcome of' strike episodes. In order to obtain detail on these issue,,, 
we need to look at a nUmber of case studies from airlines operating under different, C 
regulatory, product market, and industrial relations environments. Having considered 
British Airways in the previous chapter. this section allows us to gauge the extent to 
which strikes and unrest at other European carriers were driven by similar concerns. 
in analysing individual cases of restructuring, we will use the models of labour market LI 
restructuring introduced in chapter 1. 
7.3.2 Air France: Under New Management and Old Industrial Relations 
Perhaps the most notorious episode ofairline restructuring, and one which attracted a Z- 
great deal of international interest, was the Air France dispute of 1994. Air France's 
productivity rate over the period 1988-92 was the poorest by far of the European 
carriers and its growth in employment aniong the highest at the time of the dispute, I L, 
(see table 7.2 above). Much of' the conflict can be ascribed to the compressed time 
scale in which action had to be taken on costs. Under the direction of its flamboyant 
Chairman, Bernard Attali. the carrier embarked on a deep cost reduction plan, 
accompanied by massive organisational change. In fact, relatively minor job cuts of 
4,000 (6 per cent) were demanded from the manual labour force. However, there were 
a number of proposals to reduce pay and conditions within powerful sections of the 
airline's unionised workforce. The strike be-an within , round services, closing the 
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main domestic airport, Orly, involving runway blockades and open sabotage. The 
strike was fairly instructive in terms of the French industrial relations system. French 
trade unionism is characterised by low union density, with a corresponding absence of 
regional and local union officials to discipline local members. This, coupled with a 
high degree of proactive decentralised militancy, and anger at the perceived arrogance 
of management, meant the strike could not be channelled and controlled as in other 
European countries (see Goetzchy and Rosenblatt 1992: 404-445). The state 
eventually stepped in to lend an additional FFr. 20bn. to the carrier. As Eaton argues, 
this cash infusion can only be seen in the light of the industrial relations difficulties 
that ensued. (Eaton 1996: 20-21. ) The Air France episode is also a classic case of the 
labour nzarket restnicturing nwdel of employment deregulation identified in chapter 
1. The high costs and low productivity of the carrier forced government to pursue a 
drastic restructuring package, by French standards, and compelled management to 
confront labour costs as the airline's biggest problem. 
The action taken by management was, however, tactically naYve, confronting every 
occupational group simultaneously and concentrating on wage cuts and work' 
intensification, rather than on developing a long-term change programme. The 
precipitate nature of change, in such a trade union context and within such a 
strategically important industry, increased the likelihood of a militant response. When 
workers blocked runways and paralysed both major Paris airports, Bernard Attali was 
removed and replaced by the public sector executive, Christian Blanc. As in many of 
the other episodes of restructuring, a high profile manager was unceremoniously 
removed by government as strikes took place. The nature of Attali's replacement, 
however, gives some indication that the style of management and its tactical outlook 
is as important as the overall strategy. Importantly, Blanc was recruited from a public 
sector unionised environment, the Paris Transport Authority (RATP), and his 
approach of recognising the long-term nature of restructuring has been markedly 
different from that of his predecessor. He proposed a new longer term and more 
tactically astute restructuring initiative, concentrating on two-tier wage rates increased 
productivity and controlled expansion. This policy of expansion can be contrasted 
with Attali's policy of retrenchment and contraction and gave unions something at 
least to negotiate over. The Blanc proposals were only reluctantly accepted by the 
union side. (Ibid. 20-25. ) Industrial action continued at the Air France group of 
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companies with a 24 hour shutdown in the Easter of 1997, a pilot strike in the month 
of the 1998 World Cup finals and a series of 24 hour strikes in October 1999 - the 
latest episode. (Chuter 1998: 14, Airline Business (Gill 1998: 11. ) Strikes and disputes 
will continue partly because of the fractious nature of trade unionism in the sector, 
and partly because management, although more tactical, has not relented in the pace 
of change. Arguably, in a global airline labour market, the pressure on both sides will 
continue. 
Similar divergence between employees and management over the future of the carrier 
was to be reflected in later disputes at Iberia, Alitalia and British Airways. The 
dispute at Alitalia is important because it embodied many of the threats to organised 
airline labour now manifest in the emerging regulatory environment and is analysed 
below. 
7.3.3. Forza Alitalia! Rapid Restnicturing and Labour's Reaction at Alitalia 
In Italy the state faced similar problems in restructuring the national airline, Alitalia. 
Long part of a complex state transport and utilities monopoly, the airline suffered 
from a lack of focus, political pressures to duplicate its route structure from the North 
and South, inefficient fleet planning and a variety of other operational problems. One 
problem, which was clearly to be tackled, was the issue of staff costs and 
productivity. The state airline was widely believed to be suffering from poor 
management, when the Italian-American businessman Robert Schisano, was 
appointed to arrest the decline in 1996. Schisano instituted a corporate plan, which 
anticipated large reductions in staffing, wages and the creation of a separate low cost 
carrier to operate more marginal services. With costs 6 per cent higher than the 
European average, and labour costs particularly high in relation to competitors, the 
carrier commenced its plan in the face of union opposition. (Hill 1996: 17. ) This 
focus on labour costs again suggests a labour market restructuring model. The 
perceived strength of organised labour and its ability to capture rents, and protect 
restrictive work rules, was diagnosed as the major problem. One of the more 
provocative actions was the rental of replacement aircraft and crews to operate 
prestigious US flights. This 'wet leasing' enraged the pilots' union, which saw 
Schisano's move as a direct challenge to their powerful union, ANPAC, which had 
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secured extra high remuneration for transatlantic flight crew. The pilots' opposition 
led to the resignation of the Chairman and Chief Executive, indicating yet again, the 
problems of European airline restructuring in the face of union opposition. 
The action of pilots over wet leasing and wage cuts, involving a campaign of co- 
ordinated sickness reporting in lieu of strike action, has already been discussed in 
chapter 4. At the same time management faced co-ordinated action from ground and 
cabin crews, over the establishment of a new low cost carrier. Management has only 
recently secured approval for new working conditions and a low cost carrier 
christened 'Team' which will operate both European and intercontinental services on a 
much lower cost base. (Jones 1996: 24-32. ) The carrier commenced operations in 
1997 and will achieve costs 60 per cent lower than those of the parent carrier. The 
unions, generally, have agreed to reduce costs by $340 million over four years, with 
equity and board representation. The ground and cabin crew union (FIT) described 
their agreement to the deal as bom of a desire "to be in a position to discuss how we 
are privatised and have a say in our future. " This is an important point. The unions 
have effectively been outmanoeuvred, and have succumbed to cost cutting strategies 
although they have, as so often in the industry, secured the ceremonial scalp of the 
incumbent CEO. (Ibid. ) 
Returning to the labour market restnictitting model three issues strengthened 
management and forced the hand of the unions. Firstly, the progressive withdrawal of 
state subsidy and the impending privatisation of the carrier have weakened labour's 
position. Secondly, the carrier is in a parlous situation in regard to its product market. 
Alitalia has an inefficient and badly planned fleet, few major routes and the 
continuing, headache of servicing both Rome and Milan with direct international 
flights. The use of Ansett pilots on 'wet lease' arrangements demonstrated that these 
routes could be operated and further undermined the pilots and cabin crew bargaining 
power. An alliance between Alitalia and the US carrier Continental would have 
minimised the threat to transatlantic flights targeted by union action. Although 
Continental is much removed from the virulently anti-union carrier it became under 
Frank Lorenzo, the code-sharing situation would make it difficult for ALPA organised 
pilots there to take supportive action. Thirdly, Italian public sector workers are 
involved in a period of concession bargaining in order to protect job security within 
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Italy. Many of the employment practices common in the vibrant small to medium 
enterprise sector are being agreed in larger public enterprise. (Hyman and Ferrier 
1992: 524-681. ) These include the extension of part-time working and contracts, 
cross utilisation and other labour practices, all of which have been accepted at 
Alitalia. In Alitalia, the pace of change is the major worry for unions. This pace itself 
is dictated by the market position of the carrier concerned. Few unions have disputed 
outright the need for some changes. However, in Europe the withdrawal of state 
subsidy and the onset of globalisation have forced management into 'panic 
restructuring'. In that situation the process of restructuring was contested and 
challenged by labour and only when management took drastic or "climactic" action in 
Turnbull's phrase, (1991: 25) did labour eventually succumb. The contested nature of 
restructuring in carriers such as Air France and Alitalia and within other carriers such 
as Iberia, British Airways and Sabena has fuelled the perception that airline labour 
markets can only be reshaped through confrontation. However in at least one context 
this course of action was avoided. The final case looks at how restructuring was 
negotiated at Lufthansa, where the institutions of German industrial relations were 
used to implement wholesale restructuring with minimal industrial unrest, and where 
despite this negotiated restructuring the carrier has managed to develop policies of 
outsourcing and franchising albeit at a slower pace than its rivals, but where arguably 
it has sought lower cost through the alliance route. The example of Lufthansa is 
examined below. 
7.3.4 Lufthansa: Negotiated Restnicturing? 
Lufthansa commenced restructuring in the autumn of 1990. Wholly state owned at 
that point, the carrier faced a difficult time as the effects of the Gulf war and increased 
competition took their toll. The airline also confronted all the 'problems' of existing 
within the so-called German model of industrial relations, such as the co- 
determination system and the bargaining power of German industrial unions. (Air 
Transport World May 1995. ) Nevertheless, Lufthansa has been able to engineer a 
comprehensive restructuring whilst avoiding industrial unrest. How has this been 
achieved and what are the explanatory factors in such a transition? One analysis has 
settled on the unique nature of the German industrial relations system, which locks 
management and unions into seeking high road, or diversified quality production 
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systems of competition. Lehrer argues that Lufthansa has benefited from the 
constraints of the German industrial relations system to respond to a new era of 
'incremental change'. He contends that lifetime employment and consensus decision 
making support respectively the accumulation skills and equitable sacrifice in 
restructuring. This, he contends, allows better adaptation to the new airline product 
and regulatory environment. (Lehrer 1997: 115-140. )
In this view the carrier was forced to adopt a more long term and strategic business 
policy because the unions on its supervisory board constrained it from pursuing more 
aggressive short-term policies. The analysis suggests that because it was so 
constrained, the carrier developed more far-reaching and negotiated solutions to its 
internal cost problems. Several other factors have to be taken into account before 
ascribing Lufthansa's less confrontational experience of restructuring to the 
uniqueness of German industrial relations. Clearly a crucial factor was the carrier's 
position as flag carrier for Europe's major economy. Given this 'global platform, 60 
Lufthansa was clearly in a strong position. In addition a combination of external and 
internal factors caused managers to re-assess their entire market position in early 
1991. These factors, the arrival of BA in the unified German market through its 
Deutsche BA subsidiary, re-unification necessitating the painful absorption of the 
61 former Eastern flag carrier Interflug , and the growing threat of mega carriers from 
the US, concentrated the minds of both labour and management. Lufthansa had to 
decide on whether to re-align its international services towards the then growth 
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Management viewed their high cost 
base as problematic. Given the high non-wage costs in Germany, there was an 
obvious cost disadvantage in competing with the emerging breed of low cost carriers. 
In addition, the carrier's productivity performance up until 1995 worried managers, 
especially at the time of the Gulf War in 1991. A cost reduction strategy enacted by 
Chairman Jurgen Weber failed to lift that performance significantly and Lufthansa 
60 A global platform is a pre-existing advantage possessed by firms, usually some form of state support 
or institutional factor. In the airline industry global platforms can be obtained from route networks, 
whose extensiveness is related to a nations political and diplomatic resources. Other aspects might be 
favourable labour market institutions allowing flexibility of Iong-term partnership type arrangements. 
(See Porter. M: (1986) The Conipetitive Advantage of Nations Harvard 1986 for a full discussion. )
61 Adjustment required not just an integration of services, but also a strategic re-assessment of the 
Lufthansa hub network. Should it be centred on Frankfurt as was eventually decided; should Berlin be 
the source of more international flights? In addition the integration of the Eastern carrier, necessitated 
the usual wage equalisation agreements witnessed in other industries. C, 
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, %as forced to i-c-c\aluatc it-, cnorc cost structure. 
Table 7.9 hifthansa itN Ile rforina nce 1987- 1998 
1987 47,150 27.1 
1988 41). 056 27.9 
1989 1 ý942 30.6 
1990 7/ ý5 07 -3-3.8 
1991 1,791 32.4 
1992 33.0 
1993 00,514 33.1 ý! ý
1994 5, Sý 044 33.1 
1995 
, 57ý 586 
3 2.6:: ý 
1996 53). 218 30.5 
1997 27.3 
1998 26.2 
Alillual (a) Tonne Kiloiiieti*eý*Take-o\, ei- of' Inteilltig 
**Colliiiiciiccilicilt of' Wcbci- plall 
Like British Airways, Lufthansa inana(vement chose tile routc of business units, 
franchising and internal low cost strateoles to reform the Structure 01' the MI-1111C. 
Separate business units were set up for maintenance, information tcchnolo, (YN 'Ind 
cargo. These operation,,, vvere not formed oil tile basis of' lower pay rates and inferior 
conditions. The effect ofthis on labour costs can be clearly seen from table 7.6. which 
indicates the shift in labour stratc,, v towards OLItSOUrCin-, with a corresponding f, 11 in Z7, - -- -a 
labour costs as a proportion of turnover. The results are entirely due to the reino\al of 
subsidiary companies from the merall headcount. 
For example. Lul'thansa Svstem was estahli. shed in a joint venture with FDS, the 
American IT company, to provide coil 1pu 11 nzg and reservation SN'stelil Support to 
Lul'thansa. This invok ed mo\ im, (lie 1,080 people employed hy I-Lifthans'a to the neNv 
subsidiary. (Ihicl. ) Given the power of the principal trade unions the OTV and DAG, 
the carner WýIS L111,11)IC 10 SCIXWý11C the SUhsidianes from the I-LIfthansa pay and 
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conditions structure. A similar initiative was undertaken with Lufthansa Technik the 
maintenance arm. The subsidiaries, however, were expected to become profitable 
through third party work lessening their dependence on the airline, and to implement Z; ý 
the cost reduction initiatives introduced within the airline. There was little concerted 
change as the carrier prepared for privatisation between 1992 and 1996. However, by 
autumn 1996, the pace of change set out a plan to achieve cost cuts of $130 million. 
Central to this initiative was the introduction of a wage freeze for fiscal year 1996- 
1997 and a plan to increase the amount of foreign-based cabin crew with the benefit 
of lower wages and conditions. (Jones (1) 1996: 18. ) There was also a proposal to 
increase the number of part time and fixed term cabin crew. Lufthansa, facing fierce 
internal competition for the BA satellite Deutsche BA, felt that it needed similar 
proportions of staff on atypical contracts. Typically, Deutsche BA had 10 per cent of 
staff on part-time and 50 per cent on fixed term contracts. Comparable figures for 
Lufthansa, in Blyton et al's 1998 survey, were respectively 20 per cent and 5 per 
cent. (Blyton et al 1998b. ) In 1994, Lufthansa had almost no staff on part-time 
contracts. (Lufthansa Annual report 1994. ) As well as seeking increased temporal 
flexibility, the carrier also sought other avenues of labour restructuring. The search for 
cost reductions included a measure of global outsourcing, with reservations moved to 
the USA, following carriers like BA and Swissair, with the airline's choice of the US 
perhaps reflecting the relatively high cost of German based workers. 
Like British Airways' Business Efficiency programme, Lufthansa devised a named 
plan for cost reduction purposes known as 'Programme 15'. The 'Programme 15' 
initiative aimed at securing a reduction in Available Seat Kilometres (ASKs) per 
employee of around 12 per cent. (Ibid. ) The target is to be realised by the year 2000 
and shows the extent to which cost benchmarking pervades the industry. Management 
literature emphasises the importance of devolving business units in order to reap the 
benefits of market focus. Cargo exemplifies the policy. Spun out as a 'stand alone' 
business in January 1995, Lufthansa Cargo was able to re-define its market position. 
The change in market focus involved the use of Sharjah in the Gulf States as a 
strategic hub for the Indian subcontinent. 
The use of Shadah has been predicated on its low labour costs. One Lufthansa 
manager commented that the cost of building a pallet in Sharjah (the main 
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productivity indicator in cargo operations), is 15 per cent of the cost in Frankfurt. 
(Galla-her 1996: 28-30. ) The subsidiary also re-modelled operations around certain 
strategic hubs, benefiting from specialisation, scale and scope. Thus, the operation 
followed migrating multinationals such as Siemens and Volkswagen out of Germany 
as they pursued lower labour costs. As freight yields fall more precipitately than 
passenger yields, typically by around 3 per cent annually, the management of costs 
becomes crucial. Lufthansa cargo benefits from lower relative labour costs, as cost 
cutting and productivity increases are the only road to profitability in such an 
environment. Thus the carrier is placing more of its workforce on separate union 
contracts from Lufthansa. Indeed, 'cost transparency' seems to have been the major 
motivation for the spin off, initially paying a large fixed fee for the possession of 
Lufthansa passenger aircraft belly space agreements. These measures allowed the cost 
base to be exposed as never before. Lufthansa negotiated with trade unions, a 
requirement given the German industrial relations system and the high level 
involvement of labour within the supervisory board structures. These structures 
constrained the restructuring plan and brought labour into the restructuring process, 
by necessity, but with the result that Lufthansa has begun major inroads into labour 
costs without facing industrial action. This is despite the absorption of the inefficient 
East German carrier Interflug and the general labour environment within Germany. A 
major wage agreement signed in 1990 with the unions, led to cost savings of DM 65 
million (Lufthansa 1990). Lufthansa's next restructuring commenced in 1996 under 
Chairman, Jurgen Weber. Commenting on the plans to reduce costs Weber argued. 
-you have to have measures which do not involve brutal job cutting. " (Airline 
Business November 1996. ) This difference in approach can be attributed to two 
factors. Firstly, Lufthansa's pre-existing advantages make it less necessary for it to 
undertake the kind of labour cost fire-fighting witnessed at weaker carriers such as 
Iberia and Olympic, although it cannot afford to be complacent. Secondly, the 
institutional context of labour's involvement through supervisory boards makes it 
more difficult to pursue 'low road' type strategies such as job cutting and route 
rationalisation. This means working with the unions to develop a global leadership on 
costs and to make use of the virtues of the German industrial relations system. 
Management have in effect obtained through outsourcing, not cost savings, but a 
renewed focus for both the outsourced areas and the core airline. 
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Despite Lufthansa's much cited existence within the German industrial relations 
model, the process of negotiated labour market restnicturing still occurred. That it 
occurred within a more negotiated labour market context, does not detract from the 
fact that restructuring was necessitated by the product market and regulatory context. 
Thus whilst identifying the negotiated aspects of the restructuring, particularly the 
role of the trade unions in protecting labour during the outsourcing process, we can 
still see that management were determined to push through change. The powerful 
position of Lufthansa within the Star Alliance, arguably afforded employees more 
hope of a long term assured future given its dominance as a leading partner, within 
that grouping. So whilst the difference is important, it is in many ways a difference in 
emphasis and approach, mediated through the specific labour market context, than in 
any distinctly diverging approach. 
Whilst there has been a great deal of restructuring within the European airline 
industry it is difficult to discern the extent to which this has had any lasting impact. 
Recent improvements in productivity can be seen in table 7.10 below. Alitalia for 
example currently has productivity levels for both pilots and cabin crew, which are 
among the best in Europe. Its overall productivity levels are the highest, and the 
percentage of turnover accounted for by labour cost is the lowest and well above 
European and global performance. 
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Whilst these figures are snapshots, and the low base issues explains much of the 
improvement in many carriers, they nonetheless indicate a tentative upward direction 
in productivity amongst some of Europe's worst performing carriers. 










British Airways 34,741 7,848 2,081 26 
Alitalia 34,559 12,158 2,294 24 
KLM 34,278 10,502 2,098 26 
Sabena 26,130 9,055 1,279 26 
Swissair 25,682 8,314 1,639 26 
Iberia 25,607 9,741 1,356 30 
Air France 24,883 7,869 1,520 30 
TAP 21,607 6,683 1,101 30 
Lufthansa 20,383 7,035 2,203 26 
Finnair 18,037 6,302 1,900 na 
SAS 11,090 6,498 1,008 30 
European average 25,581 8,364 1,679 24.9 
Global average 20,121 9,121 1,600 28 
Source: IATA/Airl ine Business 1999 
Nevertheless table 7.10 also indicates that in Air France, for example, performance is 
currently well below average, as it is within Lufthansa. The table shows that 
productivity amongst pilots and cabin crew continues to be problematic. 
Conclusion 
The idea of stability in airline industrial relations, a trend identified in previous 
chapters seems to have disappeared. The old compact of high wages and exemplary 
conditions in return for industrial relations peace has been fractured, as airlines search 
for lower costs. Deregulation, competition, the entry of low cost carriers and a wave 
of Product and pricing innovation have promoted strategies of outsourcing, 
benchmarking, franchising and wage cutting. These policies have, at their core, a re- 
shaping of labour relations. This belief that labour relations are the principal problem 
in the European airline market is a strong and persistent one. In this chapter we have 
used the labour niarket restritaltring niodel to analyse the recent period of 
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restructuring and labour unrest within Europe. Reform of state aid and the reluctance 
of governments to subsidise loss making airlines, in any case, have forced a rapid 
adjustment, the threat of home market penetration by strong global carriers and the 4ý 
challenges and opportunities of alliances mean that labour costs have to be addressed. 
in most of Europe's state run and previously state run airlines the high costs and low 
productivity identified by economists, politicians and management has been 
comprehensively targeted, often with considerable success. As a result Europe's 
labour costs are now much lower, and its productivity much higher than previously. 
The gap between Europe and the USA has closed considerably. The lagging 
performance identified by earlier analyses such as the Avmark reports has in fact 
improved considerably. Nevertheless the process of change in Europe has been slow 
and often conflict ridden. 
Workers defending the prize of premium terms and conditions have resisted change 
for as along as possible and in airlines such as Air France, Olympic and Iberia 
resistance continues. Industrial relations are the key issues in the European airline 
industry throughout the 1990s. Airlines increasingly seek to retain on core contracts 
only those staff that are necessary for more profitable operations. Many other 
activities, as we see, can be outsourced, benchmarked, franchised or the risks shared 
with another operator. This is a major threat to airline labour. Already there has been 
a considerable reduction in the directly employed workforce as the outsourcing and 
integration of key services such as catering and cleaning takes place. Even in areas 
such as maintenance the continued pressure on costs suggest that 'in-house' airline 
maintenance operations are likely to be the exception rather than the rule in future. 
With these two effects a considerable part of the bottom and top end of the airline 
labour market could be removed. Premium wages for workers such as pilots and cabin 
crew continue to be a problem. 
Yet the very real constraints imposed by industrial relations systems have altered and 
shaped these policies to specific institutional requirements. Thus Lufthansa's unique 
form of outsourcing and the failure of Sabena management to relocate short haul 
pilots' to Luxembourg are examples that the process of cost containment will 
continue, but with national and institutional characteristics. Rather than move to 
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Luxembourg the Belgian pilots' union agreed to a lower scale for short-haul pilots, 
probably delivering the same cost reductions, but through a different route. 
Within the deregulated environment at least at this stage, the locomotive of 
management strategy continues to be labour cost reduction, although there are signs 
that in a situation of falling yields, and increased competition, reduced labour costs 
are not enough. Some analysts are now beginning to question the fixation with labour 
costs, as indeed are some airline executives. The CEO of Continental Airlines, 
ironically given its role at the forefront of downward directed cost oriented strategies, 
recently questioned the obsession with cost and the corresponding neglect of 
revenues. (Odell 1995. ) However, Bethune's airline benefits from among the lowest 
costs in the US industry. There are variations on this theme in Europe, British 
Airways, for example, which, having pursued cost reduction to the point of damaging 
strikes and low morale, has gone for a quality based strategy involving new 
investment and capacity re-alignment. For most European airline workers the future 
is still one of increasing demands for change, as management concentrates upon cost 
reduction. 
These episodes of contestation and conflict were analysed using the labour market 
restructuring approach to employment. Within this model labour costs and 
productivity are identified as the principal obstacle to restructuring. Policies are 
therefore designed to challenge the accumulated rents and protective work rules of an 
airline labour force Teatherbedded' by regulation and public ownership. 
As privatisation and restructuring takes place there will be more conflict on both the 
early adapting and late adapting carriers. Yet the industry cost structure in Europe is 
improving, as labour market restructuring takes place. However there is a limit to 
which restructuring can take place on a national basis. The influence of institutions is 
only one dimension but there is increasing evidence that supranational and structural 
considerations will determine the nature of restructuring in future. Deregulation and 
liberalisation, merger and acquisition and the growth of alliances have combined in a 
developing trend towards global product market convergence. This trend is 
accompanied by a pronounced change in the scope and structure of regulation, with a 
turn towards 're-regulation' on the basis of the interests of large airlines allowing 
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management the freedom of action to target labour costs in an era of falling profits. 
These issues and the wider global impact of deregulation and product market change 0 
upon the airline labour market are discussed in the final chapter. 
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From Regulated Control to Global Product 
Market Convergence: The Emerging 
Regulatory Framework and The Airline Labour 
Market 
8.1 Deregulation Market Power and Labour Costs In the Airline Industry 
In essence, this chapter provides a concluding overview of the long-term 
interconnections between changes in regulation, industry structure and the product 
market, identifying their pronounced effects on employment. As the industry evolves 
on the basis of global collaboration, large firms are able to control the market and to 
an extent the industry. By developing a political economy of restructuring within the 
airline industries of the USA, Europe and globally, we will expose the permissive 
stance of regulators towards concentration and market power as a feature of both the 
US and Europe. As earlier chapters demonstrated during the regulated era, the state 
protected the terms and conditions of labour, reasoning that this would help pursue the 
state's growth and stability. With deregulation however, the state's priorities have 
changed markedly. The state continues to promote the airline industry, on both a 
domestic and supranational basis, but, given the importance of labour costs and labour 
flexibility to the competitive success or survival of carriers, is unwilling to protect 
labour from the ravages of deregulation. 
In order to explore these issues and to outline this new industry framework, we will 
firstly look at the process of market entry, bankruptcy and consolidation in the USA. 
Staying with the US, we will then examine the specific labour market effects of the 
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mergers and rationalisation, which followed. Next, these processes are located within 
trends towards state toleration of market power and the enhanced domination of the 
major carriers. Again, the rationale for this is the need for continued growth and 
stability. We will then look at the effects of the limited competition provided by low 
cost operators, pointing to their labour market implications. It is argued overall that 
such a structure of competition and market entry allows capital the room to 
continually reshape labour costs, which have became increasingly important. 
In the case of Europe, a more measured process of deregulation actually resulted in 
more pronounced labour market effects. Firstly, the state has been forced to withdraw 
from airline ownership as competition rules outlaw direct subsidy. A corollary of this 
is the fact that aid can only be given for restructuring, which normally involves 
attacking labour costs. Secondly, given the allocative benefits often claimed for 
deregulation, it will be seen that, despite high profile low cost entry in certain 
markets, major carriers still, as in the regulated era, dominate the industry. The 
reluctance of regulators to enforce competition where majors enjoy a stranglehold is 
then contrasted with the willingness of competition and sector authorities to promote 
supply side measures that allow carriers to enjoy further labour cost reductions. 
Thirdly, as carriers seek to exploit the deregulated European airline labour market and 
'open skies'. they increasingly pressure regulators and governments for greater labour 
utilisation under the fig leaf of harmonisation. This issue is illustrated in terms of 
proposals to alter flight duty time limits for European flight deck and cabin crews. 
The chapter then draws together the experience of the USA and Europe to investigate 
the emerging trend towards alliance and oligopoly within the industry., This trend 
towards enhanced concentration is described with some observations about the likely 
implications for airline labour. It is argued overall that these are pushing the industry 
towards a model of global product market convergence whereby overarching global 
markets and large scale dominant firms have the power to influence and control 
national and global labour markets within particular sectors. The airline industry 
provides a powerful example of this trend. Whilst these, issues present major 
challenges for airline labour, it would be a n-dstake to see them as unambiguously 
detrimental. The dynamics of shifting product market structure have, as Blyton et al 




chapter therefore concludes with an evaluation of labour's responses and attitudes 
towards global restructuring. 
8.1.1 Market Power and Labour Deregulation 
in looking at the process of US deregulation it is easy to be seduced by short term 
factors, such as the fairly rapid entry of low cost carriers between 1980 and 1986, into 
believing that a new competitive structure emerged to replace the dominance of the 
'big six' carriers who profited from regulation. Taking a much longer-term view 
however, we can see that the post deregulation situation can be better described as one 
of the competitive hegenwny of the majors. In his account of long run regulatory and 
product market trends, business historian Richard Vietor (1990) describes 
deregulation as a process of short run market entry, followed by a period of large 
carrier adaptation and response. This he argues often resulted in the integration of low 
cost entrants through mergers and acquisitions. After an initial threat from new 
entrants, such as People Express and New York Air, the large carriers were able to 
match the fares of these low cost carriers and out-compete them using'economies of 
scale and scope. 62 
As chapter I indicates deregulation brings forward a series of major changes in 
industry structure and product market which can affect the labour market. In chapter 4 
we looked at how initial US domestic airline deregulation can be described as a 
process of coinpetitive disengagenwnt. Here the state's withdrawal from overt 
economic regulation of the industry affects the labour market. However as argued in 
chapter I the labour market effects of regulation and deregulation are dynamicAn this 
chapter we will gain an overview of how the dynamic of deregulation in its various 
phases impacted upon the labour market through time. 
One of the key determinants of the effect of deregulation upon labour ývas the rapid 
change in industry structure, which occurred in the wake of deregulation. In the initial 
phase of deregulation there was a flood of new entrants, and an expansion of services 
62 Economies of scope simply include superior hub and spoke networks, proprietary Computer ý 
Reservation Systems (CRS, ) brand loyalty promotions and vertical integration. These options are 
related to size and scale (see footnote 3 below). 
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by existing carriers. However as competition become widespread, profitability was 
affected by the decline in yields as carriers offered seats at wafer thin margins, failing 
to cover long term and fixed costs. (Dempsey and Goetz: 1992: 293. ) This 
competitive frenzy, coupled with reckless speculation and debt leveraging, resulted in 
a cycle of bankruptcies and cost cutting facilitated by the provisions of Chapter II of 
the US bankruptcy code. Bankruptcy allows not just a re-allocation of poorly 
performing assets into better productive use as the neo-classical literature assumes, it 
also affects the labour market, as the next section explains. 
8.1.2 Seeking Protection from Laboitr. ý US Deregulation Bankniptcy and The Contest 
for Cost Reductions 
The US bankruptcy statutes are designed to allow the restructuring of the bankrupt 
company on a long-term basis, effectively providing a shelter from the pressures and 
demands of other parties. As such, they are biased in favour of the debtor, allowing it 
to avoid obligations and to price at marginal cost. The result is a market distortion 
well recognised by airline executives like the former United Airlines chief, Stephen 
Wolf. 
In a truly free market the oversupply would be temporary. That is the least 
efficient producers will exit the market. US bankruptcy laws however, in effect, 
displace the realities of the marketplace and have now become a barrier to exit. 
Carriers are able to operate literally for years without repaying their debt 
obligations; consequently, their capacity is artificially retained in the system, the 
result is economic havoc for all. '(Wolf 1995: 13. ) 
Among the principal creditors are workers and their trade 
' 
unions, who find 
themselves under two main pressures. Firstly, they have to see the abrogation of fairly 
negotiated contracts reducing their standard of living. Secondly, workers more 
generally can suffer from the atmosphere of concession bargaining which results. 
Employers like Continental and TWA were in the forefront of using bankruptcy in 
this way. 63 These carriers made opportunistic use of bankruptcy to withdraw from 
fairly negotiated labour contracts. Using the exit/voice dichotomy of Hirschmann, 
63 Both Frank Lorenzo of Texas Air, the owner of Continental and Eastern, and Carl Icahn of TWA 
used bankruptcy to escape from labour contracts. Lorenzo rehired all employees on new non-union 
contracts at significantly below pre-bankruptcy terms. (Demspey and Goetz pp. 69-73 and 133-14 1. ) 
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(198 1) the use of bankruptcy as a bargaining threat can be regarded as the ultimate 
withdrawal of voice by the threat of wholesale exit. Firstly, as bankruptcy takes place 
there is a huge reduction in jobs at the bankrupt carrier. After Continental filed for 
bankruptcy in 1983, their pilot work-force was reduced by 75 per cent. An overall 
reduction in jobs of all grades took place as it reduced its route network by 40 per cent 
between 1984 and 1989. Secondly, even viable carriers are 'whipsawed' into 
following the labour cost cutting strategy, regardless of whether their revenues are 
actually falling. Bankruptcy has the effect of allowing a retrenchment of labour costs 
and a generalised dampening of labour expectations. Restructuring takes place on the 
basis of wage cuts, furloughs, two tier agreements and reductions in pensions and 
medical benefits. In addition, the onset of bankruptcy usually voids the collective 
agreement, leading to a re-negotiation of wages and work rules. 
The experiences of Continental, TWA and America West are cases in point. The 
effects of bankruptcy were not confined to the workforce of the 'stricken' carrier. An 
atmosphere of anxiety and fear was transmitted throughout the industry. Firstly, in 
concrete terms, cost cutting was necessitated by the predatory pricing policies of the 
bankrupts. Secondly, bankruptcy was understood by workers as a sign of industry 
sickness and thus lowered general labour demands and expectations. The industrial 
relations climate is crucial in this regard. In the USA of the 1980s and early 1990s, an 
atmosphere of concession bargaining and employer hostility created a mood of job 
insecurity and anxiety, even among highly skilled unionised workers. (See Moody 
1988: 64, Walsh 1994: 48. ) The prolonged nature of bankruptcy protection amplifies 
all of these effects. Bailey and Dong (1995: 473) question the viability of bankruptcy 
statutes, which allow extended and prolonged survival and ask why such market 
distortions are not tackled. It can be argued that whilst the rationale of regulators and 
government is the preservation of competition, the disciplinary effect on labour of the 
policy is equally important. As Belzer argues in the case of trucking, prolonged 
bankruptcy increases the chances of a generalised effect on employment terins and 
conditions throughout an industry. Carriers are obviously disadvantaged by the 
ruinous pricing strategies of bankrupt carriers but the labour effects can be seen to 
benefit them. (Belzer 1993: 17. ) Regulatory and governmental tolerance of such 
practices should therefore not be viewed as irrational and counterproductive for 
bankruptcy is the ultimate management bargaining, 'position. Moreover, in most 0 
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cases bankruptcy leads to liquidation (under Chapter 7) and eventual merger, 
benefiting the major industry carriers who profit from reduced competition and 
acquire assets, including aircraft and routes at extremely low cost. Whilst labour 
lobbied Congress to modify the bankruptcy code, the scope remains for companies to 
scrap labour contracts because of the creditor bias of the law. The next section goes 
on to describe how carriers' interests are upheld and labour's interests ignored in this 
process of consolidation and merger that follows bankruptcy. 
8.1.3 Merger, Consolidation, and Scale: The Effect on the Labour Market 
As chapter 3 indicated, one consequence of the regulated era was a protection for 
workers from the consequences of merger and acquisition. The CAB and its 
successors oversaw a relatively stable industry structure, with little entry on trunk 
routes and with strictly controlled mergers. One consequence of deregulation 
bankruptcy and financial instability within the US industry was a trend towards 
concentration as the routes and assets of failed operators were acquired by their major 
competitors. With carriers like Ozark acquired by Northwest, People Express by 
Continental and Piedmont by US Air, competition within major airports and routes 
virtually disappeared. Consolidation took place in the aftermath of merger. Airlines 
such as TWA, United and Northwest became the target for leveraged buyouts (LBOs) 
and burdened with debt to pay for the acquisition. (Dempsey and Goetz 1992: 226- 
228. ) When the bankrupt carrier is acquired, then economies of size can be derived. 64 
64 Many airline econoniists refuse to term these advantages economies of scale. Doganis for example C, 
cites Strazheim's 1969 study which identified a positive correlation between increased carrier size and 
reduced direct operating costs. 64 (Doganis 1991: 106. ) As Doganis explains however since deregulation C, 
researchers do not regard these effects as attributable to scale but to the innate differences between 
large and small carriers in terms of route structure, aircraft type etc. This is of course true. Airline size 
alone does not bring failing, costs over a rising output. Increasingly the advantages which airlines C, C, 
acquire through size are ascribed to scope not scale. In Willig's words: "with economies of scope, joint 
production of two goods by one enterprise is less costly than the combined cost of production of two 
speciality firms. " (Willig (1979: 346. ). However a large airline would have to be particularly inept in 
its pursuit of strategy if it did not choose to maximise activities such as Computer Reservation Systems 
(CRS), Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFP), and hub and spoke networks. These key scope economies 
alongside integrated purchasing, vertical integration and the like tend to be related to scale. As Hanlon 
argues scope is often related to network size, which in turn is related to airline size. (I lanlon 1995: 39. ) 
It does seem a semantic distinction to arolle that such costs which do fall with increasing output are not 
due to scale but scope. Scope econon-des can be viewed as similar to economies of scale because scale 
is necessary to benefit from scope. In any case a review of the literature on economies of scale in the 
industry argue that recent findings on the multiproduct nature of the industry, show potential benefits in C, both scale and scope for cost advantage. (Hayes and Ross 1996 493-509. ) Taking account of the C, C, 
network basis of airline services Starr and Stinchcombe (1992: 1-21) argued that hub and spoke 
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In the aftermath of merger, although difficulties can arise in the process of integrating 
the two airline 'cultures' and prioritising goals, one goal which seems uppermost is 4D 
staff rational isation. Bankrupt airlines were bought over in a huge wave of merger and 
consolidation beginning in the mid-eighties. The permissive attitude of the DOT 
under the Reagan administration to such mergers in 1987 and 1989 exacerbated this 
effect. 65 The majors vertically absorbed precisely 120 new entrants, in many cases 
commuter/regionals. Prices plummeted in the short term but once the competitive 
frenzy was over fares began to creep up. Table 8.1 below collates information on hub 
domination using a measure of dominance developed by the author, namely single 
carrier market share. This measure provides a reliable indication of the stability of 
concentration over time. Whilst aggregate measures of concentration such as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index appear to have fallen slightly since 197966 , the evidence 
below in table 8.1 shows a consistent and increasing trend towards monopoly at major 
airports. 
Table 8.1 Concentration Over Time: Selected Airports: 1977-1997 Pre- 
Deregulation until Present 


















Baltimore 24 US Air 60 USAir 36 55 US Air -5 31 
Cincinnati 35 Delta 68 Delta 33 92 Delta 24 57 
Detroit Met 21 Delta 65 Northwest 44 79 Northwest 14 58 
Houston 
Intcl 
20Continental 71 Continental 51 76 Continental 5 56 
Memphis 40 Delta 87 Northwest 47 n/a n/a n/a 
Minneapolis 50 Northwest 82 Northwest 32 81 Northwest -1 31 
Pittsburgh 44 US Air 2 83 US Air 39 85 US Air 3 1 St Louis - 
t 
3-9- TWA 82 TWA 43 74 TWA -8 
* Merged with Delta in 1986 
Sources: Dempsey and Goetz (1992) and Airline Business Jan 1997. 
networks confer economies of scale as each additional city included in the network increases traffic 
density to all other cities. They argue that on the basis of such an analysis, the industry can be viewed 
as natural monopoly. It could be argued that adhesion to the notion of the absence of economies of 
scale and the refusal to relate economies of scope to size helps deflect regulatory criticism of mergers. 
Empirical evidence, which points to a reality of increasing concentration and natural monopoly 
characteristics, might promote a less indulgent regulatory response. 0 
65 Dempsey, S Goetz, A Airline Deregulation and Laissez Faire Mythology (p 227). 66 The 11111 which squares the market share of the largest firms in terms of sales revenue. An 11111 of 0 
indicates a high number of competing similar size firms. An IIIII of 10,000 indicates pure monopoly. 
The IIIII depends very much on the type of concentration situation measured. The US airline industry 
11111 according to Belobaba and Van Acker (1994), was 4920 in 1979,3360 11985 and 4020 by 199 1. 
Given the importance of the HHI measure in the evaluation of mergers by the US Dept of Justice and 
other anti-trust authorities, it is surprising that few other studies have been undertaken. 
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It can be seen from table 8.1 that there has been a significant increase in the market 
share of the major carriers over the period of nominal deregulation. The trend of 
concealed consolidation pertains even in an era of increasing low cost entry. The data 
are based on weekly seat capacity. These levels of market power cement the already 
strong position of the major operators. 
Whilst most airline economists have argued that such levels of concentration are 
unproblematic, detailed evidence points otherwise. In a major study of concentration 
in the US industry, Kim and Singal (1993), compared consumer fares (product prices) 
in both pre-merger (announcement) and post-merger (completion) periods. They 
identified two distinct types of mergers, that of distressed carriers and normal carriers. 
The financially distressed carriers tried to stem passenger losses in the pre-merger 
period by offering fare discounts. However, post merger, Kim and Singal found a 
positive correlation between higher price levels and higher concentration levels. Their 
data dispute the notion that efficiency gains were the dominant outcome. They argued 
that most mergers resulted in increased market power usually exploited in the form of 
fare increases. The US General Accounting Office found that during 1988-90, fares 
were 27 per cent higher at concentrated than 'non-concentrated' airports. (ITF 1994. ) 
The level of hub concentration shown above certainly points to the possibility of such 
effects. One certainty of merger policy is that it allowed firms to consolidate 
operations and reap economies of size. In a detailed study of airport dominance, 
Wilson (1993) recommended that regulators should prioritise access to stimulate 
competition. (Wilson 1993: 17. ) Yet, aside from its desire to deflect foreign control, 
for example, by restricting foreign carriers to below 25 per cent of U. S. carrier voting 
stock, regulators have been largely tolerant. As a result, the pattern of competition has 
settled into one of competition between rival hubs but with such high levels of hub 
domination, there is little effective choice for consumers. The level of collusion 
between major carriers is in fact increasing with code share arrangements underway 
between American and US Airways and United and Delta. (Flint 1998: 39. ) 
Mergers have affected labour primarily through the absorption of bankrupt carriers 
and in many cases, the effects have been positive, as merged workforces benefit from 
higher major carrier pay scales. Nevertheless, there have also been negative 
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consequences in the shape of rationalisation of ground and maintenance crews, often 
with considerable levels of redundancy (Sleigh 1995), and loss of seniority for some 
grades, most notably pilots and flight deck staff. Despite the high levels of 
concentration, however, there is a level of competition provided by low-cost carriers, 
who in Penrose's (1959) terminology operate at the "interstices of the market. " As the 
next section explains, the labour market effect of these carriers is considerable. 
8.1.4 Contesting Labour Costs: The Real Impact of Low Cost Carriers 
Whilst there has been little effective competition between the major carriers, the 
existence of low fares in many market segments owes much to the continued impact 
of low cost carriers. Many of the most vaunted new entrants such as People Express, 
New York Air and Air Cal suffered from an Icarits effect as they expanded too early 
and became complacent in the face of major competition. These carriers were then 
digested into the route networks of the major carriers against whom they competed. 
Later low cost entrants, such as Valqjet, Kiwi, Reno Air and Pacific Western, which 
are often invoked to prove the contestability of US airline markets, have in fact also 
succumbed to bankruptcy and merger. In the case of Valujet, the negative publicity 
around the horrific Everglades crash of 1996, forced a name change but the carrier has 
not recovered. In fact the crash almost acted as a negative advertisement for all low 
cost carriers, and probably had an effect on the revenues of others. However whilst 
these later entrants have failed or are failing, a more resilient band of low cost carriers 
continues to operate, driving down fares and provoking the major carriers. 
Possessing network economies such as CRS, FFPs and proprietary hubs is, of course, 
preferable to the undifferentiated approach of the low cost carriers. However, whilst 
the low cost airlines provide ultra low fares, disciplining major operators from 
exploiting their monopoly position, their impact is geographically confined and the 
most successful of them have similar advantages to their major competitors. The 
more resilient low cost carriers, such as Southwest, Continental and America West, 
play a crucial role in the deregulated environment. They offer ultra low fares, 
affording a large measure of public approbation to the process of deregulation. From a 
labour market point of view, these low cost carriers provide convenient 'cost 
comparators' for the major carriers. Their seat mile costs tend to be much lower than 
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the majors and their eschewal of the expensive full fare service options and use Of 
standardised fleets make thein extremely important in competing at the margins. They 
force larue carriers to examine their own cost structures, pailICLII, 11-IN' in WIIIIS Of Cý - 
labour Litillsation. (Wells 1999: 474. ) Southwest, for example, has endured because it 
was Inaugurated as an intrastate can'ier after the CAB relaxed the rules for such 
operators in the early 1970, -,. Its near monopoly of Dallas's second airport allowed it a 
huge advantage in a high growth sector of the US econom . Despite regulatory Z_ I- y 
limitations on its scope to enter new markets, Southwest has challenged the so-called 
inega carriers' with low fares. no frills service. Yet, as figure 8.1 shows, even the Z, 
MOSt Successful low cost carriers account for a small proportion of' the overall sales. 
In fact beCaLISC of their marginalised position many low cost carriers, despite offerino I -- 
low fares and having low operalino costs, have gone bankrupt. Western Pacific, which C- Z- 
ceased trading in 1997, is a case in point. Figure 8.1 below demonstrates the limited 
overall effect ofthe low cost carriers compared to the major operalors. 
Figure 8.1 Market Share Comparison Major and Low Cost Carriers 
Sales US majors and Competitors. Low cost= Valujet (Airtran)and Reno 
Air (1998) Source: Air Transport World 
Lowcost 












The latest new entrants have limited impact and often use older noisier equipment, 
which effectively excludes thein fi-om operations in many of the 11101-C lucrative 
markets where restrictions apply. Valujet, a much trumpeted low cost niche operator 




67 weekly seats offered at its main base, Atlanta, in 1995 . Its share had doubled by 
January of 1996 and another low cost operator, KIWI International, offered 3 per cent 
of seats. However, although Atlanta was one of the most contested markets, the 
combined market share of the two low cost operators is dwarfed by the 75 per cent 
controlled by Delta, which uses Atlanta as a proprietary hub. The latest data for the 
top US airports point to a marginal impact from low cost carriers. The majors, like 
United, American and Delta, have crushing superiority at many of the major hubs. 
Often, however, the impact of low cost carriers, though marginal in terms of overall 
traffic share, dynamises the product market exposing in particular the need for 
management o control labour costs. The low cost threat though marginal in terms of 
overall market share is a very potent one, because hit and run competition from these 
operators drives down yields. There is also an element of management using the threat 
to extract labour concessions. Nevertheless it is the effect of these operators at the 
margins of the product market which is important. 
Essentially the existence of low cost competition encourages carriers like United, 
Continental and Delta to initiate their own low cost niche operations. Virtually every 
ma . or operator has had to respond to the low cost threat either by initiating their own j
low cost operation or by reducing terms and conditions for workers employed on 
commuter and low yield routes. (Jones 1998a: 28. ) Continental Lite, sponsored by 
Continental Airlines to compete within the Eastern United States, and Shuttle by 
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United, aimed at competing with Southwest Airlines, typify these strategies. The 
creation of low cost operations, as in Europe, is usually based on the protection of 
'insider' terms and conditions, with new entrants tending to staff the new lower cost 
operation. In this way airlines can develop low cost counter strategies whilst avoiding 
labour unrest, though not in all cases. 69 
In the US, therefore, the process of deregulation has been accompanied by the failure 
67 The carrier is now known as Airtran in a clear attempt to deflect public attention from its role in the 
Everglades disaster of 1996 (see Chapter 7). 68 Altered lmages: Airline Business February 1995 (the airline subsequently abandoned the strategy 
succumbing to a fare war with United and US Air. 60 9 These option have been somewhat frustrated by the power of the pilots union ALPA and the Allied 
Pilots Association (APA) which represents flight crew at American Airlines. Both, particularly the 
latter, have opposed the introduction of separate pay scales for pilots operating small capacity jet 
aircraft, thus stifling the creation of low cost commuter operations. C, 
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of new entrants and the bankruptcy of established carriers. These market changes 
either had a pronounced effect upon the labour market, as carriers sought to replicate 
the settlements at bankrupt carriers, or were forced to by industry recession. As a 
wave of consolidation took place, regulators stood back and allowed carriers to grow, 
thus allowing them to reap economies of size, particularly of scope, enabling them to 
further reduce costs. This process of market selection was assisted by the permissive 
stance of regulators, who failed to tackle the problem of bankruptcy, thus allowing 
stricken carriers to attack labour costs, whilst other carriers took advantage of the 
general bargaining climate. After the resultant mergers, which resulted in short term 
job loss and wage reduction, regulators tolerated massive concentration and effective 
monopoly of hub airports. When the industry settled down into a pattern of major 
dominance, as Vietor (1990) describes, large firms were able to take advantage of the 
entry of low cost carriers to further rationalise and reduce the cost of their operations. 
In so doing, they particularly focused on labour costs. None of these market effects 
can be seen in isolation, but their combined effect indicates that by allowing a certain 
type of market structure to develop, regulators can influence the nature of labour costs 
within the industry. This aspect of the changing regulatory environment is even more 
apparent in Europe as the next section demonstrates. 
8.2 European Competition Policy: Servicing the Majors? 
8.2.1. From Cosy Cartels to Competitive Consolidation? 
Deregulation within Europe has developed in a series of phased liberalisation 
packages and has been more gradualist than the cathartic deregulation seen in the 
USA. (Button et al 1998. ) In chapters I and 4 we described how the labour market 
effects of European deregulation could be described as a process of controlled 
competitive disengagement. Under these conditions the state's more gradualist policy 
allowed carriers more time for adjustment, but eroded the long-standing pay and 
conditions premia, which had accrued to airline workers. 
To that extent, whilst the implementation of policy was different, the outcomes have 
been broadly similar. A similar pattern of consolidation and monopoly has occurred 
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within Europe. In Europe national regulatory policies have created some scope for a 
downward movement on fares, as has the existence of the low cost charter sector. In a 
sense this is comparable to the US, although the process has been slower. The process 
of consolidation in Europe has not been brought about through bankruptcy, as in the 
USA government support has prevented this, but by the championing policies of 
national governments. British Airways' acquisition of both British Caledonian (1988) 
and Air Europe/Dan Air (1993) can be seen in the light of the UK government's 
desire to see BA as a global carrier, possessed of a wide route structure and able to 
compete with US and Asian carriers. Similarly the Air France take-over of the 
domestic carrier Air Inter and the long distance operator UTA, all were aimed at 
allowing the 'national champion' to attain the size and route network necessary to 
challenge the so called 'mega carriers'. Part of that process of building 'champion 
carriers' has been the establishment of or acquisition of major shareholdings in 
airlines operating within other nations. Thus BA acquired a major stake in TAT in 
order to secure slots at Orly airport. Similarly it acquired Air Liberte, in order to build 
a presence in Southern France, at the same time it created Deutsche BA to challenge 
Lufthansa's dominance in the German market. KLM has been active in acquiring 
stakes in other countries, most notably through its acquisition of Air UK, which now 
operates as KLM UK. British Midland is now in effect a partially owned subsidiary of 
SAS. The nature and extent of the competitive challenge in the more liberalised parts 
of Europe is therefore as sharp as that which occurred in the US market. 
Competition therefore occurred between newly enlarged flag carriers who could offer 
integrated route networks, thus luring passengers into their hub system, and from 
carriers acquired or established within second countries. When competition policy is 
examined, it can be seen that the EU, despite its stated preference for a policy of 
liberalisation and its imposition of conditions on mergers, has consistently taken the 
view that airlines should become 'international champions. ' (Kassim. 1995. ) This 
policy has to be seen in the light of the growth of US carriers on the basis of an 
equally tolerant merger policy. To compete with these mega carriers, Europe wants 
mega carriers of its own. These areas of competition were largely between rival flag 
carriers, but another level of competition also existed. As in the US low cost carriers 
made their mark, and their existence has led to a considerable re-alignment in major 
carrier operations. This is discussed in the next section. 
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8.2.2 European Low Cost Operators: Cheap Fares and Cheap Labour? 
Europe's experience with low cost carriers has been similar to that of the USA. The 
existence of the charter sector and independent operators such as British Midland and 
Air Liberte (now owned by BA) meant there had always been some challenge to the 
cartel pricing which characterised European air transport before deregulation. Periodic 
attempts were made to challenge the transatlantic cartel, with the most celebrated 
example being Laker Airways of the 1970s. However from about the mid 1990s a 
new breed of low cost entrants began to operate in the more liberalised aviation 
environments of the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands. Their avowed intention was to 
'grow the market' for air travel in countries like the UK and Ireland with spare 
terminal capacity, albeit at regional and secondary airports, compete with 'bloated' 
majors, and effect a demographic shift in air travel preferences. The most successful 
such as Ryanair and EasyJet were fashioned on the US low cost operator Southwest 
and like their US counterparts they operated linear, point to point route structures, 
with low initial frequency and ultra low fares, attracting the less time-sensitive leisure 
traveller. Given the low yield, these carriers operated much tighter cabin 
configurations and as in the US dispensed with on board food and otherfrills'. There 
were very few frills in their operating structures, with aircraft and crews being leased, 
cabin crew recruited from non-traditional areas, and functions such as handling and 
maintenance outsourced from the start. (See chapter 7. ) 
There was nothing revolutionary about this operating structure in Europe, as many 
charter operators had long operated in such a way however, the real impact of the low 
cost operators was on the labour cost of the major operators. Whilst carriers like BA 
and the then Air UK dismissed the threat of Ryanair, they restructured operations so 
that regional operations became in effect, lower cost operations. This included a 
restructuring of regional operations within many carriers and signalled the seriousness 
with which the low cost threat was taken. Given the high margin on European 
business class fares, there has also been market entry from premium low cost 
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operators such as Debonair of the UK and Azzura of Italy. 70 The acquisition by 
Richard Branson of the Belgian low cost operator TEA, and its re-branding into 
Virgin Express in 1996, was designed to secure lucrative business traffic from 
Northern Europe, operating under the new European liberalisation 'freedoms'. As a 
result flag carriers in Italy, Spain and Germany have established or are negotiating the 
introduction of internal low cost operations in order to compete with home based and 
'inward' low cost competition. The establishment of these operations has led to 
significant reductions in pay for all grades of staff. (See chapter7. ) 
Yet despite the effect of low cost carriers on the European airline industry, their 
impact is still constrained by infrastructure. Furthermore, it has yet to be tested by a 
lengthy recession, which would probably impact upon the low cost carriers' mainstay, 
the leisure market. For this reason low cost operators are trying to diversify their 
market by attracting price sensitive business travellers as did Southwest in the USA. 
However, the size of the market and the demographic and geographical features of the 
European market, with heavy concentrations of such markets around major cities, 
make this a difficult strategy. In order to reach these markets and a considerable 
segment of the leisure market, these carriers need access to slots at the major business 
hubs such as Heathrow, Frankfurt and Charles de Gaulle. At the moment they have to 
make do with connections between regional airports, which are unattractive to time 
sensitive travellers, and their lower frequencies make delays less acceptable to this 
demanding market. It seems clear that the low cost carriers prefer to avoid the hub 
airports with their high costs and that they prefer not to compete head to head with the 
major carriers. Nevertheless though they do not compete in the same markets, they 
have drained passengers away from the full fare major carriers in every country. 
These carriers find it difficult to compete with the cost structures of low cost carriers. 
Both the effect of low cost carriers and the low cost operations of strong and efficient 
flag carriers has forced European governments to re-evaluate the state aid, which has 
traditionally been used to maintain state carriers. Thus, there has been high level 
institutional support and encouragement to privatisation, both in response to EU 
statutes and aspirations, but also as a method of disciplining and reforming the 
70 Debonair Italian owned and UK based went bankrupt in the Autumn of 1999. The reason offered by 
analysts was its failure to identify a definite market segment. The airline tried to target high yield 
passengers but failed in this strategy (see Pearse (Airline Business) October 1999). 0 
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European airline labour market. The state has used its competition policy in effect to 
sponsor privatisation within the industry. These issues are discussed in the next 
section. 
8.2.3 State Aid Policy: Market Investor Principle or Labour Market Restructuring 
on Principle? 
The EU policy on state aid is specified within the Treaty of Rome within the general 
competition rules. (Articles 92 and 93. ) However, the specific rules on state aid for 
the airline industry are prescribed within the 'second memorandum' of 1978. The 
memorandum policy is in flux, yet a consistent thread runs through it. In essence it 
treats aid on the basis of two distinct guidelines. First, it allows state aid on the basis 
of the market investor principle. This means a government could only provide support 
if an individual or institution, seeking a commercial rate of return, would do the same. 
In such cases, the Commission then retrospectively evaluates the aid measure to 
71 ascertain whether the market investor would have placed equity in this way. If not, 
then, the second criterion comes into play. The Commission can disallow the aid or it 
can permit aid within the specific criteria that the aid is designed to 'facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities'. 
The first criterion is problematic and as such is often strongly contested by member 
states. Firstly, it almost immediately rules out aid to a carrier that does not have an 
extensive route network and global potential attractive to the private sector leading to 
a potential 'catch 22' situation. In essence if the state is prohibited from investing, it 
will be unable to attract private sector investors. Secondly, governments faced with 
the imminent collapse of state airlines have provided aid regardless of the evidence of 
actual investor sentiment on the airline. Alitalia, Iberia, Air France, Olympic and TAP 
have all attempted to secure state aid on that basis. However, from the end of 1993, 
with the exception of the Air France case, the Commission has tended to allow aid 
only on the second criteria: that of facilitating the development of certain economic 
activities. Within these criteria goes the 'one last time'policy of restructuring aid. This 
policy has been endorsed by the most recent enquiry into the European airline 
71 Ibid. 
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industry, the report of the ComW De Sages. (European Union 1994 . )72 The so-called 
'wise men'report stipulates that state aid should be used only for restructuring. 
Restructuring however often implies job loss, wage reductions and the intensification 
of work. Pointing to Europe's low productivity in comparison with the USA, the 
report attributes these differentials to the continuing existence of state aid. 
Nationalised airlines, they argue, are susceptible to overstaffing, bureaucracy and 
inflexibility, echoing the rent sharing, X-inefficiency analysis discussed in chapter 1. 
This gives an indication of the extent to which the perceived need for labour market 
rationalisation informs policy. With this belief, privatisation becomes an irreversible 
trend, given the wage premium in nationalised airlines and their generally lower 
productivity and wider macroeconomic problems of servicing budget deficits. The 
continuation of a large public sector, financed largely by government debt, directly 
threatens the Maastricht criteria. (Button et al 1991. ) Though the state aid criteria are 
nebulous enough for governments to channel finance into failing national carriers, the 
trend is towards privatisation. The central driver towards privatisation in the European 
airline industry is the restructuring of the labour market. Without the state as lender of 
last resort and with the management empowerment which is supposed to result, 
airlines can fundamentally re-order the employment relationship - 
72 Expanding Horizons: Report of The Comite De Sages Into The Future of European Civil Air 0 Transport (Brussels 1994. )
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The following graph (figure 8.2) gives an indication of the staffinc, reductions Zý I- Zý -- Zý 
undertaken by major European airlines in the period 1980-1996, when Inuch 
restructuring took place. 
Figure 8.2 Employment at Major European Airlines 1980-1996 
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It can be seen from the chart that there is a steady trend of employment reduction 
from the crisis point of 1991, when the impact of the Gulf war induced losses 
equivalent to the historical profits ofthe industry. A revival in employment within the 
major airlines is apparent within some rnaýjor carriers by 1995. In the post Gulf war 
period, and subsequent world air transport boom, airlines such as BA, Lufthansa and 
KLM were able to effect nizkjor cost surgery. BA obtained a commitment to close the 
scissors between costs and revenue, securing savings of nearly fl. 5 billion. KLM was 
able to implement a 'Competitive Cost Levels Program' to secure a labour 
productivity increase of 57 per cent, unit cost reductions of 20 per cent and an 
increase in fleet utilisation of II per cent. (Airline Business November 1995. ) Most of 
these savings have been achieved by increasing the intensity of operations. Even with 
the post Gulf war recovery, the industry continues to make cost reductions. Some of 
these cost reduction strategies superficially inflate the overall level of employment. 
For example, in the case of British Airways, the acquisition of Dan Air conceals the 
10 per cent reduction in core BA staffundertaken since the GUlfwar. 
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In the wake of the ComW De Sages report and various other ad hoc enquiries and 
investigations into the competitiveness of the industry, it becomes clear that although 
European carriers have been reducing their workforces and increasing their 
productivity, this process is hampered by perceived rigidities in the input costs which 
they face for certain key services. In a recent interview, the EU transport 
Commissioner, Neil Kinnock argued: 
'Efforts to exert downward pressure on the external costs of airlines must 
continue and particular attention needs to be given to ground handling, 
liberalisation of which is under way, and to airport charges. '(Hill 1998: 52. ) 
Yet this willingness to attack the supply side of service provision to the airlines can be 
contrasted with the glacial progress made on issues of competition and market access. 
The reasons and consequences of this seeming policy paradox are examined below. 
8.2.4 Slot Allocation and Ground Handling Monopolies: Regulatory Schizophrenia in 
Practice 
The current EU policy on Slot Allocation compels the larger carriers to use or lose 
their slots, allocating such under used slots to a pool for distribution to new entrants. 
In effect this amounts to a policy of ad hoc unbundling, with slots used as a 
bargaining chip in negotiations over mergers and alliances. Given the difficulties of 
market entry and access to the most lucrative hubs, this is hardly likely to have a 
significant impact on the structure of competition. 73 The major airlines still enjoy the 
privilege of block exemption in this regard. Arguably, the proliferation of alliances 
and code sharing makes it more difficult for regulators to identify abuses than under 
the previous regime. During the regulated period major flag carriers pooled revenues 
in price cartels, their chosen policy nowadays is to sign route-by-route code shares 
with regulatory approval. (Feldman 1998: 49. ) The fact that these arrangements have 
block exemption status means that regulators have decided to tolerate them in any 
case. 
73 A recent UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) paper entitled Slot Allocation: A Proposalfor 
European Airports (CAA Cheltenham Gloucs. Feb 1995) pointed to a lack of consumer benefits with a 
large proportion of routes being, operated by two carriers who the report alleges were 'more used to co- C, t, 
operating than competing' (Air Competition Warning, Financial Times 11.02.95). C, 
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This permissiveness in the face of industry consolidation can be contrasted with the 
relative zeal with which the European authorities have attacked situations of minor 
importance in the overall competitive picture namely the deregulation of ground 
service monopolies (GSMs). These ground handling monopolies have lost block 
exemption status with the Third Package of deregulation measures implemented in 
1993 (Van Moutte 1993: 283). 
GSMs, which control the provision of airside services, such as baggage handling, 
cleaning and catering, are viewed by many as a supply constraint, locking carriers into 
inflexible contracts, usually with rival national carriers. There is evidence of 
overcharging, but EU regulatory oversight has already been brought to bear. The 
break up of GSMs could lead to a downward bidding of wages and conditions as the 
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) argues. There is already evidence of 
this development within the UK, where ground handling has been substantially 
deregulated. A new wave of deregulation based on lowest cost tender has had major 
effects on airport ground staff. The imposition of two tier wage rates, non-union, low 
cost competition and a large expansion of part time work have all been features of the 
UK experience. (Darlington 1995. ) British Airway's latest attempt to secure so called 
'market rates' for regional ground handling activities, clearly indicates the impact of 
low cost downward directed competition in the UK. Labour costs are hugely 
important within ground handling functions, (see chapter 7). If airlines such as Iberia 
and Air France are forced to surrender their GSM, then the business will be parcelled 
out on the basis of some form of competitive tendering. Given the low capital 
intensity of functions such as check in, information baggage handling and other areas, 
and the imposition of regulatory price caps, airlines will be able to negotiate low 
handling prices only at the expense of wages and conditions for already low paid 
workers. This will only benefit the major dominant carriers, rather than new entrants, 
who tend to use secondary airports where GSMs are less common. (Reed 1998: 55. ) 
The policy paradox between slot allocation and ground handling demonstrates the 
willingness of the European authorities, under intensive lobbying from carrier 
interests, to tackle cost issues on behalf of the airlines whilst ignoring their own 
market dominance. In the European single aviation market, efficient labour utilisation 
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has become the essential com onent of carrier strategy. Any national or regulatory p Cý 
rules, which constrain efficient utilisation, are subject to challenge and lobbying. With 
national regulatory guidelines and trade union agreements, there is a wide disparity 
between nations. Thus, many airlines have argued, somewhat disingenuously, that 
harmonisation is necessary between different jurisdictions in order to conform to EU 
objectives. The apparent willingness of the regulatory authorities to promote 
measures, which facilitate labour market change, is seen in the extension of flight 
crew utilisation proposed by the Commission under the so-called Joint Aviation 
Authority Regulations (JAA). The next section examines how this policy, which is 
actually based on a need for increased utilisation of flight and cabin crew, has been 
promoted as an issue of competition and market convergence. 
8.2.5 Joint Authority Regulation: Extending the Power of the Majors? 
Since most operators are subject to industrial agreements, which determine the level 
of effective utilisation of flight and cabin crews, harmonisation could, in principle, 
mean convergence on the practices of more heavily regulated nations such as France 
and Germany. However, airline operators have made it clear that they wish to see 
convergence on the practices of the more liberal'jurisdictions such as Romania, the 
CIS and Turkey. This policy allows the operators to dilute national regulatory 
safeguards under the veil of 'harmonisation. The policy effectively allows airlines to 
challenge national terms and conditions without confronting their own national 
unions. The regulations designed to allow carriers to benefit from third package 
'freedoms'. have been presented as a harmonisation measure. Yet as the UK airline 
pilots' union, BALPA points out only 12 out of 23 countries party to the JAA 
proposals are EU members. 74 The proposals would allow carriers to roster crews for 
continuous duty on those routes that involved multiple stops. Non-productive periods 
would be subtracted from the total flying hours, allowing a two pilot crew to fly 
London-Glasgow-New York-Boston on a duty time of 12 hours 50 with flying time of 
9 hours 50 minutes. (Ibid . )75 Research by the UK flight deck union BALPA points to 
a large disparity between the JAROPS proposals and the national regulations 
sponsored by the UK regulator the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
74 The Lo- October/November 1995 0 
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The agreement considerably exceeds the limitations imposed within the British 
Airway's Industrial Agreement, which is in turn more restrictive than the CAA's own 
guidelines CAP 371. (Ibid. ) The EU already allows considerable freedom to carriers 
to 'wet lease' aircraft and crews, in effect subcontracting aircraft and crews. These 
crews are often, though qualified, trained under a more lax regulatory regime such as 
that of the CIS or Turkey. An incentive for hiring these crews is their ability to 
disregard the hours limitations of the country concerned. By 'flagging out' in this way, 
some carriers effectively circumvent the more restrictive regulations imposed by the 
national aviation authorities. JAROPS would harmonise the regulations at the level of 
some of the most lax countries. Whilst there has been some backtracking in the face 
of labour campaigning, the prospect of a set of common scheduling and duty time 
limitations is a real threat. 
The more explicit labour market effects of issues such as ground handling 
deregulation and adjustments to flight duty limitations are at least readily identifiable 
as labour issues. This allows a more co-ordinated response from airline labour. 
However, other issues, which carry an implicit threat to labour, are less readily 
identifiable as specific labour issues, yet arguably these have even far more reaching 
implications. Thus the trend towards increasing interfirm, collaboration, ranging from 
joint marketing and shared capacity agreements right through to the creation of global 
alliances, is a major industrial relations issue although its labour market consequences 
are often elusive and difficult to analyse. The next section examines how global 
alliances affect airline labour. 
8.3 Airline Alliances: Towards Global Product Market Convergence? 
Whilst internationalisation and globalisation are often confused in analyses of 
international restructuring (see Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1995), the airline industry is 
clearly undergoing a global transformation. Ourn et al point to the emergence of a 
group of international trading blocs around the Americas, Europe and Asia whose 
airlines will compete globally. (Oum et al 1993: 17. ) From a European point of view, 
75 Ibid. 
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such blocs will be dominated by those airlines enjoying significant global reach, such 
as British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France. These airlines dominate alliances, 
locking smaller national airlines into feeding their proprietary hubs. (Hanlon 1996 
201-202. ) The major airlines in turn will build alliances with US carriers in order to 
secure access to the huge US market and with Pacific Rim carriers to ensure access to 
the expanding Asian market. According to Oum et al, due to national sensitivities 
over ownership and the possibility of anti-trust suits, such alliances will be based on 
joint operations (code sharing) bolstered by significant shareholding. 76 Airlines in a 
junior position will have no choice but to become feeders for those carriers. (lbid. ) 
The issue of alliances is therefore a crucial 'regulating mechanism' within the industry 
and it is increasingly being left to the most dominant firms to oversee this process. 
This has major implications for airline labour, which are explored in the next section. 
According to the German political economist and industrial relations theorist 
Wolfgang Streeck: 
'Globalisation, by increasing the mobility of capital and labour across 
national borders, extricates the labour supply from national control and 
enables the financial sector to refuse doing service as a national utility. 
By internationalising and thereby disorganising capital and labour 
markets, globalisation dissolves whatever negotiated co-ordination 
may have been nationally accomplished between them and replaces it 
with a global hierarchical dominance of the former over the latter. ' 
(Streeck 1997: 49. ) 
Streeck's view is essentially a macro-political one, however, the similarity of the 
environment of globalisation within the airline industry is apparent. Airlines have 
traditionally been national entities supported, subsidised and shepherded by the state 
as instruments of national prestige and policy (see Hanlon 1996 chapter 1). However, 
the pressure of deregulation, competition and economic restructuring are undermining 
this national focus and replacing it with an increasingly global focus. Whilst 
collaboration on routes, fares and services has been a feature of the industry since the 
early years, the industry had little global focus. In the advanced stage of deregulation, 
this multinational focus has been superseded by a drive towards globalisation, as 
major operators seek to expand into markets outside their own domestic and 
76 The authors were mistaken in believing that shareholding would be important. Actual equity stakes 00 
are largely irrelevant, and in fact regulatory tolerance of alliances is based on the understanding that C, 0 
they do not involve significant equity and therefore remain 'virtual'rather than Yeal'mergers. C, 
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transnational sphere. In order to do so, they need to overcome the barriers, which 
remain to acquisition and ownership of state airlines, both from a regulatory and 
political viewpoint. The favoured policy has been that of global alliances. Alliances 
here relate to any form of cross carrier business collaboration, and not just the large- 
scale global alliances which tend to dominate policy consideration. Thus issues such 
as franchising, code sharing, joint ventures in service provision are all considered 
under the term alliances. 
Alliance activity has recently reached a new level of intensity. According to the latest 
annual survey, 204 airlines are involved totalling 501 alliance agreements. Only a 
small proportion (10 per cent), involve equity stakes. (Airline Business Alliance 
Survey June 1999. ) Yet this lack of direct financial involvement conceals a very deep 
level of operational involvement. Most alliances involve highly specified contracts, 
and those with anti-trust approval such as the Star Alliance, have complete revenue 
pooling authority. Even those without regulatory approval, because of their dominant 
position on key routes, such as the BA American 'Oneworld' network, are able to 
collaborate to a high degree. The principal alliances are given below in Table 8.2. It 
can readily be seen that they account for a substantial proportion of world passenger 
traffic, the greater proportion of revenues and over half the directly employed airline 
workforce. When those in service companies are taken into account the proportion is 
around 70 per cent. 
280 
Table 8.2The Major Global Airline Alliances in 1999 
Alliance Star Alliance I Oneworld Nortim, cst/K1, N] I Atlantic 
I BA, AA. Cmiidimi Noriliwest KIAL FxccIIcnce/Quafin)er 
United lmfthansýi, Infl. ("ItImy Aliudi'l. Alrstriý111. swissall. 
Air Camidii, SAS, Pacificý Qarltas' Continental Sýihewi. 
Thai Ind- vzlrig. Fimmir. Iberia, Lan Delta. Air Furope, 
Ansett. Air NZ. Chile AMI. Crossiir. Lauda 
ANA Singapore I TAP. Turkish 
Passenger 540b 467.1 287.0 0 ). 0 
RM (Im) 
NN orld 20.6(/( 17. M'( 1 3.5 
tr affic share 
Passengers 261.0 185.5 1,33 ). 3 47.4 
carried oun) 
ReNenue 5S. 6 36.2 44.0 14.6 
($I)n) 
Emplosees 302.660 31 ý. 198 149.669 114.380 
Sourcc: C omplIcd from Air hiie BLISMess Allimice SUIAey 1999 
8.3.1 Airlme Alliaiice. ý atidAirlitie Employment 
EarlY studies of airline alliances, such as those of BA/US Air. KLM/Northwest and 
United/Luffhansa have emphasised the marketing and sales benefits. Undouhtedly 
these have been considerable. Alliance,, are undoubtedly profitable. KLM/Northwest, 
for example managed to increase their combined market share on Atlantic I-OLItes from 
7.5 per cent to 11.5 per cent. British Airways identified $55 millions in savings fi-oin 
its Lilliniately failed alliance with US Air, which were non-at t Hhu table to re\enue. In 
other words they resulted from operating economics. (Airline Business JLIIIC 1995. ) 
Although there are considerable scope economics in terms of' marketing and 
purchasing, alliances also have a considerable employment dimension. The likely 
employment Implications are outlined in table 8.3 below. 
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Table 8.3 Principal Fornis of' Inter-firm Collaboration in the Clobal Airline 
IncluNtry 
Type ol'Collaborafive Description Likel) outconic 
Venture 
Code Share/blocked space 111%ohe"joint designafion and %%ill imohe long-term rafionalisation 
agreement sometimes operafion ol'ser%ices bý of' major services N60i subsequent 
t%%o r more airlines. The I'light is stat'ling reductions. Emunple: 
a(hertised N60i ajoin( d"i"nation. N\\ /KIAl 
TarilTs are set independentlý. 
Equi(y Alliance I'suall) in (lie form of'cross equit) Tends to result in cost pressin-c Crom 
stakes whereb) airlines agree to the larger to the smaller carrier. 
adol)t cquitý holdings. This ?I 
Examples: S%sissair/Sabena, 
imohes either cross equity BA/TAT' Detit"ClIe/BA 
holdings or a unilateral stake. 
Franchising Based on a subcontracting (ýpe The major procures low cost 
relationship N%hereb) airlines adNantagcs of the 1'ranchisce selected 
Nerticall) integrate I'ccder trallic because of'lower cost base. The 
into their networks. The franchise Nvorkforce of the maJor are then 
carrier ustialh carriers, the lkcrý compared %ýith the franchisee, and 
and branding ol'the ma r. cost reduction negotiated. Examples: 
BA/Mam, possiblý BA/RNanair. 
SOUrcc: Author. 
Within these alliances, cach airline manages its own kIbOLII- fOl-CC bUt Stl'MC-ICýIIIV Cý C, - 
share capacity. In the current phase ol'alliance development, the strategy ofairlines is 
to avoid labour conflict through the allianccs , ivcii flic thrcat of cross alliancc trade 
union co-operation. (See section 8.3.3 heloý\. ) Nonetheless the existence of' a partner 
airline can be used as a bar-ainim-, threat. This has been the case at Northwest, where 
the Use of KLM to operate key European roules has been used to , aln vvork Rile 
changes in Northwests core operations, in addition to the S886 million cost savings I I- 
negotiatccl since 1983. when (lie airline faced bank-ruptcy. (Airline Business, 
November 1995. ) Code sharim, and alliance strategies also reduce the potential 
bargaining powcr of airline labour unless thcrc is co-ordinatcd action berween labour I -- 
groups in both carriers. In the case ol'a strike, its allililiCe partner on duplicated I-OUICS 
Could replace the affectcd Carrier, and the non-striking partner's spare capacity could 
hC Utilised. Alliances pose a greatcr threat to some categories of stal't' than others'. 
Ground cre", and check-in staff ill particular, as the most readik! replaceable of' tile 
labour force with holli iow mohility and low, training le\els are liahle to replacement I 
with partner airline crews. Cabin crew X. 0111st less replaccabic thall (Tround and check-- I- 
in s'laff would he potentially more \ ulnerable in operational strategies such as cre-w 
sharing which WOUld ýIIVC crews, I'Minharity Willi each other", aircraft and 
-)S-) 
routes. Even highly skilled maintenance staff are vulnerable to replacement in a 
dispute situation as there is ample excess Ihird party' capacity and the likelihood of 
duplication across alliances. 
Current thinking on maintenance policy estimates that the minimum efficient scale (to 
justify in-house maintenance) is 50 engine overhauls per engine model per year. 
Pressure exists therefore for the maintenance function, or the most expensive aspects 
of it, to be 'spun ouffrom the core business. Airlines involved in joint ventures can be 
expected to rationalise maintenance work in labour intensive operations such as 
engine overhaul, interiors and external painting where they fail to meet tightly 
specified cost criteria. Such business strategies have a number of implications for 
airline labour. Lucrative, labour intensive work on larger aircraft can be transferred to 
a partner's larger maintenance facilities to reap economies of scale. This is already the 
case with KLM, where older labour-intensive DC10s are being maintained at 
Northwest facilities in Minneapolis. (ATW Oct 1995. ) The scale in this case is 
important as the aircraft types are being phased out. Since Northwest operates a 
greater number of these aircraft, it makes sense to Place maintenance within their 
facilities. The economies of scale are incidental in this case, but are important when it 
comes to the establishment of joint facilities, often in a third low labour cost country. 
The buyer power which combined airlines can command is leading to the export of 
large scale maintenance to overseas facilities such as the Hong Kong Aircraft 
Engineering Company (HAECO) in Guangdong province, China, where wage rates 
are typically a tenth of those payable in the USA. Other operators have built similar 
facilities in Mexico, Brazil and Poland. Again, regulatory approval of measures that 
facilitate cost reduction is evident. 
For these strategies to be possible, the regulatory regime has to play a part. In the case 
of maintenance, the main domestic and international regulators have to permit the 
cross border certification of aircraft maintenance. The US authorities lead the world 
on this because of their size and role in aircraft manufacture, and have undertaken a 
leading role on cross border approval. In 1988, the US Federal Aviation Authority 
(FAA), the industry technical regulator, approved a regulation (FAR Part 145) 
allowing US operators to perform scheduled maintenance work overseas. Previous 
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regulations permitted this only for emergency repairs at foreign locations or where 
there was insufficient maintenance capacity at home, a point made by the major US 
maintenance union. (Peterpaul 1993: 21. ) This regulatory adjustment was made 
despite misgivings about certification and inspection standards within the USA itself, 
anxieties likely to be magnified when countries with less restrictive safety and 
certification rules are involved. The International Association of Machinists (IAM), 
the main aircraft maintenance union in the US, points out that there are 311 FAA 
certified foreign repair stations, with only 16 FAA licensed inspectors to police them. 
(Ibid. ) Once again, the desire of regulators to sponsor the development and growth of 
the industry has conflicted with labour conditions and ultimately safety. Deregulation 
advocates and airline management may well dismiss these concerns as protectionist, 
but given the level of protection being afforded to large scale carriers in terms of 
restrictions on foreign holdings, lax anti-trust laws, tolerance of concentration, it 
seems once again that labour is bearing the cost burden. Regulations seem to be 
considered from the viewpoint of facilitating cost reduction. 
8.3.2 Global Product Market Convergence in the Airline Industry 
These developments point to a discernible process of global product market 
convergence within the airline labour market. This form of convergence is not to be 
confused with the convergence of national employee relations practices based on an 
HRM model as asserted by Warhust (1995: 259-74). Nor does it assume a 
convergence at the institutional level (see Lane 1991: 515-539, and Baldry 1994: 96- 
107, for respectively empirical and theoretical critiques of the convergence issue). As 
Baldry argues, the issue of convergence/divergence, when used within an industrial 
relations context, is a socio-structural concept and its misapplication creates 
theoretical and empirical confusion. The form of convergence, which is taking place 
within the global airline industry, is not a progressive fusion of product and labour 
market; rather it is a convergence on product market constraints. Each carrier faces 
the same parameters of competition and market access, and as a result each is 
constrained in how they operate within that setting. However the strategy which 
carriers pursue in meeting those objectives is mediated by their own industrial 
relations, and national product market context. Therefore convergence within the 
product market limits and constrains the choices and strategies of both management 
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and unions whilst national and industrial relations systems allow them some latitude 
to pursue diverging paths. However this has no overall impact on the outcome of the 
convergence process, which in the airline industry is towards the fragmentation of 
labour markets, the growth of scale within services and support functions, and an 
agglomeration of core airline services within alliance networks. In short the national 
labour market policies pursued are simply different paths on the road to convergence. 
With this trend towards global product market convergence labour conditions come 
under increasing pressure. Changes in the regulatory structure and product market and 
the advent of genuine transnational strategies begin to re-order the labour market. 
This is due to four principal reasons: the salience of labour costs in the deregulated 
environment; the global division of labour within the industry; the asymmetries of 
power between major and minor carriers in terms of their route and operating 
structures; and lastly, the feasibility of interfirm co-ordination on wages and 
conditions. These issues are discussed in turn below. 
Firstly, in the globalised airline environment the relative stability and intractability of 
other costs, such as fuel and equipment, means that labour costs become ever more 
important. This aspect of restructuring relates directly to the second point. 
Secondly, within the spatial dimension of production it is feasible for management to 
develop a globalised division of labour. The international comparison on the 
proportion of labour costs in the structure of overall costs makes this clear. Ubour 
costs range from 20 -25 per cent of overall costs in the Asia-Pacif ic region to around 
30-35 per cent within Europe. (Merz 1995. ) These cost differentials make the 
relocation of labour an attractive proposition, especially in high-cost areas such as 
engineering; they also provide management with an incentive to constantly re-order 
and restructure operations to obtain labour cost advantages. All of these aspects of the 
globally converging product inarket are developing realities within the industry. As 
discussed earlier, joint ventures in maintenance have taken advantage of such low 
labour costs, particularly within China, South America and Eastern Europe. However, 
there is also a re-allocation of employment to low cost areas of Europe, particularly 
the Irish republic and the UK, where wage and non-wage costs are lower. (See Airline 
Business June 1999. ) The growth of the Internet and advanced communications 
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technologies make the relocation of many administrative and technical functions 
relatively simple and cost-effective. The much lower labour costs of skilled technical 
and professional labour make the policy attractive to airline executives. This is 
evident from global outsourcing strategies undertaken by Swissair, British Airways 
and Lufthansa (see chapter 7). A related issue is the rationalisation of service 
provision, notably catering and ground handling as large service providers capture the 
majority of the operations on the basis of superior scale. As airlines outsource the 
catering function, service providers such as LSG Skychefs, (owned by Lufthansa) and 
Gate Gourmet (owned by Swissair), now operate a duopoly within the airline catering 
market. (See chapter 7. ) 
Thirdly, the asymmetric nature of market power, operating and route resources within 
alliances means that large alliance partners could increasingly dominate the smaller 
airlines. Recognising the high relative costs of many subordinate partner airlines, the 
principal players may well develop strategies which curtail the activities and scope of 
these smaller airlines. Thus, a carrier like Iberia could find itself playing the role of 
feeding traffic from Southern Europe into the BA/American Hub at Heathrow and 
would probably maintain some routes where it enjoys a level of cultural as well as 
commercial fit, notably to South America. However, it would almost certainly lose 
routes across the Atlantic and to the Far East, which it operates expensively, and 
without a great deal of hub traffic. The principal hub partners would operate these 
routes, whilst subordinate alliance carriers would operate the low yield routes. This 
process of route rationalisation would also affect the major carriers and their 
employees. British Airways for example might lose Southern European short-haul 
routes, and possibly those to South and Central American gateways. This may lead to 
an overall net reduction in employment. In effect the long haul traffic of junior 
alliance 'partners'is already being fed into the route networks of major players via the 
hub system. A deeper 'division of operations' is a possibility, with the primary 
obstacle a differential in labour costs being eroded by restructuring. 
Lastly, as alliances and interfirm collaboration deepen and extend the possibility of 
common wage structures, bargaining and employment policies become possible and 
even desirable. There is evidence that labour is beginning to organise across carriers. 
The best example so far is the ITF co-ordinated steering groups for the major 
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BA/American alliance 'One World' and the rival United/Lufthansa Star alliance. BA 
and American pilots have concluded a solidarity agreement, which guarantees no 4-P 
cross cover in strikes, joint negotiation on common training initiatives, regular 
meetings and campaigns. (Gill 1998: 46. ) Other workers are set to follow suit, thus 
thwarting some of the potential impact of alliances on industrial action, labour 
organisation, and ultimately jobs and conditions. (Ibid. ) Unions are also looking at the 
possibility of developing cross alliance bargaining and common conditions. This has 
raised the issue of 'global bargaining', although a more likely scenario is global co- 
ordination on wages, conditions and common campaigns. 
Though there would be too many differences in costs and operating structure for 
'system wide' co-ordination, it is possible that there may be 'convergence of the 
fittest'. i. e. the lead alliance operators would have co-ordinated wages and conditions 
with subordinate operators within the hierarchy excluded. The dynamics of alliance 
trade union co-ordination already suggest that trade union co-operation is hierarchical 
and instrumental. (Observations ITF Star alliance forum Dec 1998. )
8.3.3 Delaying the Inevitable? Trade Union Strategies In the Global Airline Industry 
The possibility of global bargaining and the current fact of cross alliance trade union 
co-operation suggest that whilst there are obstacles for trade unions and organised 
labour they are not insurmountable. Despite the emergence of a converging regulatory 
and competitive framework, with pronounced labour market effects, labour has not 
acquiesced. Not only has labour resisted restructuring and employment change within 
a variety of contexts, it has also adapted its response towards the new airline 
environment. In order to gauge the extent to which labour has been able to respond it 
is necessary to finally to examine the nature of labour's response. As we shall see the 
response has been varied and diverse separating along occupational and national lines. 
Though there has been no uniform response, there have been a number of strategies 
ranging from militant opposition to collaborative partnership as befits trade unionism 
within a dynamic and constantly changing environment. 
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In the popular BBC Doctor Who science fiction series, an army of highly efficient 
cold and determinedly heartless robots called the Daleks rolled over any form of 
opposition, emitting their refrain, "Resistance is useless. " International airline 
restructuring on management terms is often presented as inevitable and even 
ineluctable; labour resistance is viewed as pointless, many commentators question the 
value of industrial action when strikes ultimately harm the carrier. Yet, even when 
labour has ultimately had to concede on restructuring, resistance has been fruitful. 
Strike action in the face of autocratic, insensitive and quite often inept management 
has led to the removal of a clutch of airline chairmen. At some airlines, organised 
labour has maintained a great deal of power, even after agreeing to major change. 
Resistance and contestation are still an important part of the industrial relations 
landscape. Increasingly, however, resistance is being redefined. Labour has inanaged 
often, in the face of strident opposition and Dalek - like imperviousness, to establish 
its right to a voice as a major stakeholder within the industry and advance its own 
solutions on restructuring. Increasingly, these solutions require labour groups to 
become involved in restructuring, and the opportunity to influence and shape the 
process of change. Often at its most basic level, trade union action has been about 
curtailing the worst excesses of cost cutting management. This has often involved 
promoting 'high road' strategies of restructuring, whereby a quality/customer service 
focus is advanced and business strategies prioritising high yield routes and services 
favoured. Streeck indicates the extent of such diversified quality production strategies 
within the world car industry, but the concept is equally applicable to airlines. 
(Streeck 1987: 437-62. ) Unions have also become more involved in the political 
arena, lobbying agencies such as the EU and the national governments against 
practices such as wet leasing, and cross border employment, where this is used simply 
to cut labour costs. Other campaigns have been co-ordinated at international level to 
protect airline jobs from the ravages of restructuring. For example, the International 
Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), is pursuing a policy of seeking full licensed 
status for ground handling staff in much the same way as licensing covers engineers, 
pilots and cabin crew. The organisation is using misgivings about safety and security 
to argue that only employees with secure permanent jobs should be employed on 
ground handling functions. (ITF 1997. ) The organisation has also been lobbying the 
international regulator ICAO, to have employee considerations taken into account 
within the policy-making arena and is trying to conduct similar work with the national 
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I-Cý, 'UhtOrS 111d Clllpl()ý'Cr Orgalli sat i ons. Thi's represents a co-ordillated anculpt hý 
lahour groups u) irilluence the emerging regulatory structure, Inleresivingly. it nuinins 
tj', j(IitioMll UlliOll 11-ý-ILIIIICrits ahoUt sjj'CtN' ýJlld joh SCCLII'itý' to the 11CW and 
market frýjjjje"rork. 
Union,,,, are al. so indepcndcntlý' I)Lll'sLlilll-' a IILIII)hC[- 01' diffffent Stl-, I(CýIJCS, I)I-illial'y 
aniong, st these arc co-operation forums across tile various alliances discussed earlier. 
This is clear from the auloCs involvement in a recent research proýject, which looked 
at the is,, Lic,,,, of' ghkalivation and Irade union response ý, vithin the industry. (131\ ton et 
a! 1998bj The proýjec( imolved a survey or 52 airline LlWons on a wkle range of 
labOL11- market and rcgulation issucs. (Blyton ct al 1998h Table 4.2. ) Tahlc 8.4 helow 
pi-mides evidence on union strategies. 
Table 8.4 Union Ranking of Effectiveness of Strategics Cl7c) 
The key fill(fill" IS that IIIdLIStI-II1 ýWtl()n Was Still Viewed aS the 1110st effectiVe 
strategy, with ,. ', ti-on(y SLII)POI*t for education campaigns and trade union co-operation. 
The report discusses tile ISSLIC Of 'assertive C()-()Pcl. lltloll,. vOicreby unions arc ahle to 
co-operate with management in resti-LICRII-ing after having asserted their position 
throuizi-I adversarial industrial action. (Cohn 1993. ) These strategies are il,,.,, o heiffi-I 
supplemented by policies which seek to increase participation. These Include 
providing statutorý worker i-cprescillat loll oil all-1111C boards. it feature of spaill. 11-cland 
and Gcrniany. 
2 89 
Source: Cardiff Business School/ITF Survey 1997 (Blyton et al 1998b) 
Another aspect is the granting, 01' equllý shares to airline employees as 'millessed III 
Italy and France. 
Table 8.5 Trade Union Attitudes Towards Product Market and Regulatory 
Policies In The Labour Market ( (7c )
Support Neither/No Oppose 
-- 
OlAnion 
Uphold L1111011 reCO"IlItIO11 111d COlleCtIVe 98 
bargaining 
Harmonise imminum tcriwý and conditions 94 4 2 
SLIPPOrt 11,11-1110111SC(I 1111t', 011 I'll'-flIt (lLlt\ 90 1 
tinic" 
Enforce existing social protection (e.. g. 88 1 
Social Chapter and 11,0) 
Pro\ ide forstatffl0rý worka i-cpresciitation 07 24 9 
oil boards 
Allow \, vorkcrs and managciiient to 57 -15 is 
negotiate tlicir mýn solutions____ 
Support workers right to obtain a stake in 41 37 31 
their affline 
Source: Cardiff BLISHIeSS choolfffl` Survey 1997 (Bl yton et al 19981)) 
Table 8.5 (abo\e) pi-mides, evidence on the views, 01' ti-ade LIIIiOIIS vvithin the Industry 
tomvards statc and regulatory policies as they affect the labour market. In all of thesc 
cases. trade Unions are assertin- their ridl to he imolved in I-eStRiCtUrim-, and to he a 
key participant on behalf of airline employees in cons iderat i on,, of reoulation, policy I- 
and Ultimately bLl,, ines,, strategy. Unsurpris'ingly, LIIIIOIIS' LII)I)01't the continuation of' 
recognition and the upholdino of collectl\e bargaining. They also favour the 
harnionisation of terms and conditions, although they differ from management in I- 
terms of the directioti of that process. However. OthCI- aSI)CCtS Of IIIC SLIIACV fOLIIId 
that the bargaining level' had in many cases changed, with IIILICII 11101-e L1111011 SLII)I)01*t 
for company lcvcI bargaining 
There Was also Wide SLIPPOI-t fOl' the policy of placing- ýwrkcr I-cpi-c"ClItative's Oil 
airline boards and less SLII)I)01-1 fol- the ESOPs ISSLIe (final (ILIeStI011 'Fable 8.5). 
Althouoh ESOPs are nonunaliv indiVIdLIal relationships. the US experience shows 
that workers can gain power 1111-OL11.111 the 1)001111- OfV0611,11 I)OWel- III union blocs. Thus 
there was higher support for the policy of w, orkCF I-Cl)I-CSCIItat1011.11iVC11 the COlleC(i\'C 
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(WIC11MOOll of' tile trade unions especially general unions, , \ho \icýý [ý, Sol,, s ýýitii 
I, sp '011. (Tahle 8.5. ) Cj'\cii the cITect on orgamsed lahour of chan-es, in tile wider LIS CI I C, 
product market and regulator\ ', Cttill(". tile SLIIA'Cý' I-C\CýIICCI tIMt 1.1111011, s fl\OLll-Cd tile 
preser\ation ofnational ownershipand tile regulation oflow cost carriers, as the most 
important issues. Table 8.6 below 1)1.0\ Ides C\ ldClICC Oil lillion \ lc\ý " of' the product 
market and regulatory situation: 
Table 8.6 Trade Union Attitudes ToNvards Product Market and Regulatory 
Issues (14 
Uphold national sovercignty 
Re, -, ulate low cost carriers to pre\ent cost 
CLIttIll'! 





Promote genume *open skies' policies 
Provide state aWort vdicii requircd 
Accept that state aid is necessary to protect 
-Jobs Government support should only be 
provided to facilitate I-eSti-LICRII-1110 
Allow onlv iiiarkct-ba, ýcd criteria for state 
financial support 
Take action against anti-com etitive P 
practices 
Accept that state aid is uncompetitive and 
should cease 
Accept that state I'mancial support 25 24 
promote incfflclciicý and high fares 
Source: Cardiff Business Scliool/ITF Survey 1997 (Blyton et al 1998h) 





58 28 14 
50 33 17 
49 27 24 
45 33 
36 28 36 
28 35 37 
27 58 15 
25 55 
51 
. Much of the rhetoric around airline restructuring assunics that politicians and airline I 
executives are hufleted by union pressure. (Doganis 1995. ) However, manaoers and 
politicians are not Just WSPOIRIIII(I to union plVSSUI-e, as Do-anis asserts, because C, - 
unions are in control, very often thev are not. but rather because ill-though( and 
pi-ccipitous clianoe prooraninic., have increased tile likelihood of' a militant response I- I- 
from labour. There is arowina evidence, however, that 1,1110111- is becomim, invoked in 
the process of change and that unions are brokering chanoe to then- members. even in 
countries Such as Italy, Germany, Ireland and Spain , vhere there is a nominally higher 
-)() I 
level of labour market regulation. The buzzword of partnership has recently invaded 
the airline management vocabulary and whilst the term is contested, there is one 
common and unifying meaning: it is the notion that labour should be involved in the 
restructuring of the industry. This might mean simply co-opting union leaderships into 
the change programme as occurred within Sabena under its Swiss CEO Paul 
Reuthlinger. As Gallagher demonstrates, the partnership policy is based on little more 
than a requirement for cost reductions: 
The push for partnership has been closely complemented by the pursuit of 
necessary hard cost savings. Major union concessions on job numbers and 
salaries have been made and there is a clear understanding that they must 
continue. Since the agreement with unions in October 1996 the airline has 
seen a2 per cent decrease in payroll costs, and a new pre-downturn plan 
appropriately named 'fit for the cycle'aims at a reduction in unit seat cost of 
15 per cent, by the end of 2000. ' (Gallagher 1998a: 22. ) 
Reutlinger continues to pursue the relocation of short haul Sabena pilots away from 
the higher non-wage costs of Belgium, despite his more emollient stance with the 
unions. This type of 'co-optational partnership' can be contrasted with the more 
corporatist policies at both Aer Lingus and Iberia where the policy is based on 
genuine worker involvement and where unions accept as much as management, the 
need for adaptation to a hostile competitive environment. (See Blyton et al 1999. ) At 
both carriers, management has developed a quality-based partnership (predicated on 
full privatisation), which seeks to retain most services in house against the general 
industry trend. This may seem to contradict the earlier argument about the pattern of 
the globalising industry, however unlike Sabena, neither carrier has been integrated 
into a major alliance. Aer Lingus has yet to join an alliance and Iberia has only 
recently become part of the Oneworld network. The crucial issue is that both carriers 
are, to use Encoua's (1998) terminology, late adapting carriers whose need to 
restructure is encouraged by their need to become integrated into one of the major 
alliances. As the discussion of Iberia above indicates, once integrated, these carriers 
could be forced to play their role within a prescribed alliance hierarchy. In that event, 
national industrial relations polices would be less relevant. 
As we have discussed, a key variable in the development of the global airline 
employment pattern is the influence of national systems of regulation. Clearly 
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countries such as Spain, Ireland, Germany, France, Belgium, the US and Japan vary 
enormously in their forms of labour regulation. These divergent forms of labour 
regulation are important limiting factors in the response to a globalised product 
market and can provide both threats and opportunities for organised labour. For 
example, as Blyton et al (1999) demonstrate, the fact Lufthansa is restrained by the 
German system of industrial relations from pursuing short-term cost reduction, so 
favoured by BA, means that it has been forced to 'adapt' by developing the Star 
alliance and seeking to obtain cost savings globally. However, national industrial 
relations particularities are not impermeable. The restructuring of Alitalia described in 
chapters 4 and 6 was based on an accommodation to the global convergence pressures 
of the airline industry rather than the Italian institutional environment. Similar 
pressures are taking place within both Japan Airlines and Cathay Pacific. 
Unions have, as the evidence on wage premia indicates, managed to retain a great deal 
of control over wages and conditions. However, the diversity within unions needs to 
be understood. Strong labour groups, particularly pilots, benefit from labour market 
characteristics which have allowed them to resist or deflect change and even when 
accepting that change to continue to influence its implementation. These workers have 
also proved adept in influencing the regulatory regime, for example, in the case of the 
JAA proposals and in pursuing their safety and technical agenda. In doing so, these 
workers have been able to influence the new regulatory regime; however, they are 
also building more effective cross border co-operation to preserve global bargaining 
threat. For less skilled workers, there is less opportunity to influence the regulatory 
process or even to negotiate over restructuring. The erosion of wages and conditions 
in ground handling and the removal of favourable work rules for cabin crew, for 
example, has commenced and will deepen, especially as the industry enters a 
downward cycle. These workers have as yet been unable, despite the actions of their 
co-ordinating international union bodies, to influence matters at the regulatory level. 
Their ability to resist rests on a capacity to take strike action, given the costs to 
management of a successful strike, these workers still retain considerable power. 
However, the costs of conflict have been increased as the section on strikes and their 
aftermath in chapter 7 has demonstrated. 
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Conclusion 
The refusal of regulators to address the consolidation of the industry into a tight 
oligopoly has had consequences for the airline labour market. In the USA, Chapter II 
bankruptcy protection pushed the burden of deregulation onto the labour force. 
Permissiveness on the anti-trust front allowed an unprecedented level of hub 
concentration. In both the USA and Europe there has been a reluctance to implement 
measures which increase the scope of competition and which deter consolidation. At 
the same time, measures which improve the supply side of labour have been 
prioritised. 
This is not to argue that greater competition is the Holy Grail for airline labour. On 
the contrary, non-union market entry at depressed wage rates would be disastrous for 
the welfare of airline workers. On a worldwide scale, authorities have been reluctant 
to assess the impact of industry collaboration such as code shares and joint ventures. 
This is particularly the case with vertical integration through the franchising of feeder 
operators. Given the reduced transaction costs associated with such strategies they 
have become the preferred method of expansion for large carriers. It is argued that 
mergers, the traditional concern of regulators, are being superseded by these co- 
operative ventures, whose often-nebulous form makes them difficult to gauge. 
However, this is no accident or oversight. In a globalised and deregulated industry, 
with stable costs for most inputs and finite infrastructure, airlines increasingly rely on 
the control of staff costs as their preferred strategy. Even when airlines increase 
demand by lowering prices, they fall into the trap of falling yields, which renders the 
control of labour costs even more important. Such a background explains the thirst of 
industry analysts for further labour cost reductions. Even those carriers such as British 
Airways and Lufthansa, which have made most progress on costs, are set to secure 
further cost reductions. 77 The onset of alliances is, it is argued, very much about 
procuring these cost reductions on a global scale. 
77 In November 1999 BA was negotiating with pilots to devolve low yield routes from London Gatwick 0 C, 
to the low wage Cityflyer Express, a BA franchise. Negotiations were also taking place with cabin C, 0 
crew. The driver for these renewed attempts at cost reduction was BA's profits slump. (See Airline 
Business November 1999. )
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Within the old regime, the form of regulation favoured all producers and particularly 
labour in a form of producer corporatism. Now the emerging regulatory patchwork 
has shifted the risk towards the airline labour force. This new form of regulation has 
allowed consolidation, merger, vertical integration and the achievement of cost 
economies across a range of functions. Simultaneously, measures which protect 
labour conditions, either directly or indirectly, have been jettisoned or are under 
increasing challenge. These policies range from the abolition of state aid for weaker 
carriers, the deregulation of airport handling, the proposed lifting of constraints on 
working hours and a more liberal' operating environment. This process has 
undermined the power and position of airline workers on a global basis. This process 
of global product inarket convergence will increasingly shape and influence policy 
although it will continue to be mitigated by systems of industrial relations and labour 
market regulation within particular nations. However, as carriers seek to undermine 
labour regulation through supranational channels, these systems will often be 
superseded. 
As described in chapter 5, it is not enough for carriers to pursue their own labour 
strategies within the industry, facing the resistance of organised labour. They 
increasingly seek to escape national constraints, confronting labour at a global level. 
This new era of global product market convergence effectively provides a re- 
regulation of the product market on the basis of the interests of the dominant firms 
whilst deregulating the labour market and allowing these firms to manage and control 
labour costs as never before. Airline workers are experiencing trends evident in other 
deregulated industries as described in chapter 1. Labour, as the final section 
indicated, has resisted and continues to resist. In particular, through industrial action 
where it has asserted its right to be involved in the restructuring process. However, 
labour is employing more long-term strategies. In particular, addressing its concerns 
through international trade union bodies such as the ITF and through international 
trade union co-operation, particularly within alliances. Its success and failure is very 
much dependent upon its strength and resources which vary across occupational 
groups. Though many airline workers have benefited from their own scarcity and 
power, the new environment is much more difficult for labour. As in other industries a 
deepening globalisation presents new threats and challenges for organised workers. 
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Labour's response and adaptation to this emerging regulatory environment will 




In the opening chapter we introduced the issue of deregulation, with the argument that 
whilst the policy is almost always publicly justified on the basis of allocative 
efficiency, the labour market often assumes great importance. Labour market 
deregulation occurs because the state not only withdraws its control over prices and 
market structure, but also because it permits a regulatory framework conducive to 
labour market reform. That is one, which allows the re-regillation of the product 
market whilst affording management the scope to restructure the labour market. This 
is often though indirectly, a consequence of decisions made in the regulatory arena. It 
was demonstrated that in the case of UK bus deregulation, the state fostered a market 
structure which favoured the largest operators and allowed them to acquire their 
competitors. Following the massive wave of consolidation and merger, labour lost out 
in terms of wages, and conditions and witnessed the decline of collective bargaining 
and unionisation. It was demonstrated that the real impact of regulatory reform in the 
bus industry case was to reduce the rents, purported to accrue to labour. Further 
evidence for this was provided by a number of studies including US trucking, and UK 
ports and utilities. With labour weakened and with its bargaining power neutralised, a 
general attack on unionisation and collective bargaining took place. 
Permissiveness and tolerance of concentration, merger and market dominance, have 
effects on the labour market as was argued in the case of price reform within US rail 
freight. Eventually the confluence of deregulation, product market change and 
regulatory intervention/nonintervention, change the labour market and employment 
relationship. In the US it was not just the deregulation of trucking, but state 
permissiveness on mergers and consolidation which broke the power of the 
Teamsters' union by allowing the largest firms to confront organised labour. 
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To truly understand these interconnections required a study of an industry, which has 
been subjected to regulation, and then deregulation in various stages, and to examine 
and explain the developments in regulatory, product and labour market change. Such 
an understanding of regulation had to be comparative across contrasting economic 
and political systems, and it was therefore decided to undertake a study of the airline 
industry in both the US and Europe. This approach provided an emerging comparison 
of the interplay between the forces described. 
It was necessary therefore to develop an understanding of the linkages between 
regulatory, product and labour market change. How did the state enact regulatory 
structures, which offered capital protected markets, free from excessive competition, 
thus protecting prices? How were labour's interests addressed within this framework 
and wider legislation? Thirdly, did labour and capital pursue their interests within 
recognised constraints, delimited by the state's own desire for stability and growth? In 
short we argued that under regulation capital could make profits whilst labour could 
bargain freely for a share of those profits. Thus chapter 2 developed an analysis of 
this regulatory cornpact which had arisen in the US and UK airline industries. The 
chapter demonstrated how the state encouraged the parties at various stages to move 
from positions of contestation, towards one of limited contractual co-operation, 
enforced through collective bargaining and product market regulation. So whilst in the 
US the state strengthened the hand of labour through the legislation of the New Deal 
period and the thorough 'technical' regulations such as Decision 83, curtailing the 
power of employers in the process, this was conditional. It did not hesitate to curb 
labour's bargaining power, by permitting the Mutual Aid Pact of 1957, when it judged 
labour's action detrimental to the future stability of the industry. 
In the UK the state was seen to intervene against the autocratic management of 
Imperial Airways by providing limited bargaining freedoms to labour, whilst 
eventually constraining the most powerful labour groups within the structures of 
bargained corporatism. In the USA firm level bargaining took place, with multiple 
unions and multiple representation for occupational groups. This benefited workers 
with industry specific skills such as pilots and maintenance personnel, with their 
potent and largely un-fragmented craft bargaining power. In Europe, exemplified by 
the UK, state ownership meant national level bargaining, often with a single 
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employer, where labour's disruptive power was counteracted by highly codified 
procedurally-based industrial relations institutions, typiried by the UK's NJC CAT. 
Within that framework pilots as the key occupational group were constrained and 
limited, although the structure of the UK industry meant that when they decided to 
exercise their power the disruption would be much more immediate and widespread 
than in the US. The state's intervention however was not static. The state reserved its 
right to 're-balance' the regulated employment relationship when it saw the need as 
occurred with the Mutual Aid Pact and limited market entry in the early 1970s, and 
the UK government's intervention of the 1970s. 
Having analysed the nature of industrial relations and collective bargaining within the 
regulated era, a more grounded understanding of what transpired in the de-regulated 
era became possible. Having seen in a sense what went before, it became easier to put 
into context what followed. This allows the focus on regulatory change to be located, 
not as a novel and distinct 'event', but as a continuing and evolving process. 
Chaptcr 4 therefore examined how deregulation affected pilots as the strongest and 
most organised occupational group. Evidence from both the US and Europe described 
the experience of pilots as varied and complex. Whilst data on earnings from the US 
show that pilots suffered falls in line with general earnings, this data can be compared 
with other evidence which charts the change between regulated and deregulated 
regimes indicating that pilots lost out significantly in the short-term. 
The earnings and employment picture and thus pilot fortunes on the bargaining front 
were examined. Given their ability to maintain protective rules on scheduling and 
their long run ability to protect wages, pilots made tempting targets in a downturn. 
The state's refusal to implement the protective clauses in the Airline Deregulation Act 
of 1978 meant that it was almost impossible for US airline labour to establish a link 
between deregulation and specific job losses, and avoid these totally as first hoped. 
It is easy to lose sight of the fact that pilots suffered when we look at the longer-term 
aggregated earnings data. But lose ground they did, largely through wage freezes and 
wage cuts, curtailment of pension rights, loss of health benefits and a raft of other 
concessions. But since pilots tended to recoup their losses in periods of expansion, 
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real and pronounced short-term reductions in pilot wages were disguised in pay 
studies such as that by Johnson (1995). Even deep cuts in wages could always be 4-: 1 
recouped. The periodic tightness of the pilot labour market made it difficult for 
carriers to discipline wage expectations with two-tier wages in any case. These gains 
were liable to swing back to labour in better times, and sometimes as in the case of 
Northwest's 1998 contract could be taken back with interest. Perhaps more important 
was the fact that pilots managed to preserve for the most part their restrictive work 
rules on crewing and scheduling. This rendered negotiations an ever-receding horizon 
for airline management, and encouraged a new approach towards restructuring 
characterised by ESOPs. Arguably the quantum shift came with the United Airline's 
deal, whereby labour, particularly pilots, agreed to increased productivity and lower 
earnings in exchange for participation in the management of the carrier. Whilst they 
continued to try and influence regulatory policy it seems that in the US at least pilots 
were seeking to develop their influence within the firm. 
In Europe we noted that regulation and a 'negotiated' deregulatory environment was 
blamed for the fact that pilots delivered lower relative productivity and enjoyed higher 
relative wages than their US counterparts. The productive hours and utilisation of 
European pilots were lower due in part to differences in route structure, and stage 
length. Nevertheless, many ascribed this to the persistence of state ownership and 
attendant rent sharing. In a sense this aspect revisited the discussion initiated in 
chapter 1, where the usual rent seeking explanation that labour profits under 
regulation, and then loses under deregulation, was seen as inadequate. It was stressed 
that we had to look both at countries and sectors, and at differences both between and 
within occupational groups. Thus there was evidence from both the US and Europe of 
pressure on pilot pay and benefits from the entrance of low cost carriers, the creation 
of regional operations and the extension of franchising. 
The pattern was very much set by US experience. Non-union entry provided a cost 
comparison against which management could benchmark costs within the majors. The 
major carriers introduced limited two tier wage levels and modified work rules to 
counteract the low cost threat. By allowing bankrupt carriers only to service their 
debts, and to break their contractual obligations on wages and conditions, the state 
strengthened the hand of employers. 
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By the time the industry settled into a post bankruptcy pattern of consolidation, labour 
recouped losses suffered in the earlier period. However, the state left the machinery of 
the Railway Labour Act intact; its refusal to deal with the consequences of the 
regulatory environment allowing employers the upper hand. In that sense the state 
recognised the need for carriers to restructure their labour costs in the light of 
deregulation and provided a regulatory framework tolerance of bankruptcy and 
permissiveness on concentration, which allowed carriers to focus on labour costs. In 
Europe, whilst deregulation has not been as precipitate as the US, arguably 
management's response has been more pronounced. As carriers respond to 
deregulation and the entry of new carriers they develop cost reduction strategies. Low 
yield services are spun out and expansion in these markets is procured by policies of 
external growth, namely franchising. The effect of such low cost policies was shown 
when UK pilot salaries were related to the salaries of both low cost subsidiaries and 
franchise carriers. As in the USA European pilots, particularly those at the state 
owned carriers, have faced demands for wage cuts, and work rule changes. This is due 
to the withdrawal of state aid and the threat of new entrants especially after the 
liberalisation of intra-European services in 1996. However given the considerable 
bargaining power, which pilots even in weakened state carriers continue to hold, 
many of these strikes have ended in stalemate. Often restructuring occurs with equity 
based concession as witnessed at Air France, Alitalia and a number of other European 
carriers. At the same time pilots in Europe have rather adeptly moved towards 
bargaining with supranational authorities, sensing that it is here and not within 
individual airlines, major decisions affecting their livelihoods are made. Thus the 
lobbying of the European pilot unions over the introduction of more relaxed 
regulatory rules on cockpit hours, a measure which would have cut across national 
jurisdictions, indicates this desire to continue to seek influence where it can best be 
used. Looking at both the USA and Europe therefore the picture is mixed. Pilots 
continue to enjoy the strength of their unique disruptive capability, though are unable 
to resist all of the changes being introduced, but they retain significant bargaining 
power, though the costs of their taking action are higher than under a regulated/state 
controlled environment. We analysed these changes in terms of the competitive 
disengagement nwdel of restructuring. In essence the withdrawal of the state in both 
nations had fairly major consequences for pilots, but long-run sustained demand for 
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pilots and the effectiveness of strike action allowed pilots to resist. Whilst there has 
been some tailing off in wage levels it is not clear that this describes a long-term 
trend. The experience of the US industry suggests that pilots will sustain their 
earnings and protect many of their work rules. The environment in which they are 
attempting to do this is however a more hostile one and concessions have come 
because pilots have been convinced of their necessity in the face of a transformed 
industry environment. 
Pilots, as we have noted, are specialised labour and the analysis of them in both the 
regulated and deregulated periods is intended to indicate what happens to the most 
powerful labour group within the industry. To understand what happened to workers 
generally it is necessary to look at the outcome for less powerful occupational groups. 
Those workers who did not have the skill premium or bargaining power of pilots were 
interesting for a number of reasons. These workers continue to enjoy a significant 
earnings premium above comparable workers in outside industry. Workers develop 
the expectation favoured by long run state involvement and the prestige, which often 
attaches to airline jobs that these premium wages are part of the package of working 
in civil air transport. This perception is heightened when those workers are employed 
within large and profitable airlines. One of the reasons why workers have resisted the 
demands for lower wage levels greater productivity and more flexible working 
practices is that they cling to the employment contract of the regulated period. Thus 
expectations of the labour contract under deregulation are informed by past 
experience, this phenomenon is identified by the author as the regulatory overhang. 
This is especially relevant when the carrier has been state owned, where premium 
terms and conditions apply for all industries. In order to investigate this it was decided 
focus on a case study of a large successful carrier, which had demonstrated long run 
profitability, on the basis of post deregulation expansion, from a history of state 
ownership. British Airways fulfilled that criteria and chapters 5 and 6 formed the 
core of this case study into the concept of the regulatory overhang. This involved a 
large-scale questionnaire survey of general occupations within the industry in order to 
determine the extent of the overhang. 
In chapter 5 the case study was contextualised with a brief description of the post 
privatisation history of British Airways. It was argued that the carrier was privatised 
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into a 'negotiated environment' where its 'global platform' of a comprehensive route 
network and domination of the world's principal international hub allowed expansion. 
Management strategy at that time eniphasised customer service and quality. Within 
such a framework trade unionism and collective bargaining were tolerated, though the 
culture change programme attempted to niarginalise these perceived hangovers of 
national i sat ion. This had no lasting effect on trade union organisation per se as strong 
union representation existed at other levels of the organisation. Wages increased and 
terms and conditions were preserved largely intact. The carrier profited from its 
ability to undertake growth in key expanding markets, and to acquire the routes and 
equipment of UK competitors. In this period product market deregulation was 
confined to mutually negotiated bilateral pacts, and the carrier's major hub was 
protected from further encroachment. Competition consisted mainly of weakened US 
carriers with poor service reputations although all of this changed as chapter 5 
indicated. The replacement of weakened US carriers by vibrant and profitable ones, 
and the presence of Virgin Atlantic, was accompanied by the entry of low cost 
domestic airlines. To adjust to this new product environment the carrier began to re- 
evaluate its operations, involving several pronounced changes in labour conditions. 
Firstly, the understanding on national wages and conditions and the unified firm focus 
was broken by the creation of regional business units and franchising. By about 1994 
competition from a new breed of low cost, non-union carrier, typified by the Luton 
based Easyjet, began to demonstrate the possibility of a lower cost base. The working 
practices of these carriers were characterised by a high incidence of seasonal and 
atypical contracts, short training periods and wages reflecting external 'market rates. ' C) 
Secondly, the presence of low cost carriers forced management to look at the way in 
which labour was utilised within the airline, and to radically re-evaluate the cost base, 
in particular the wage premia accruing to most BA workers. Labour however was still 
wedded to the unified firin focus, full time work, premium earnings and a 
commitment to company wide collective bargaining. What then would be its view of 
such changes? The survey was designed to look at all of these issues and to ascertain 
employee attitudes. Having been conducted amongst unionised workers in thd 
Autumn of 1996 when attitudes on new employment polices and management 
strategies apparent since the early 1990s had had time to permeate, the survey 
provided a timely insight into change within BA. 
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Chapter 6 provided the questionnaire evidence and it was seen that in the majority of 
cases unionised workers in the survey sample opposed BA's policies to procure low 
cost services across regional and European services. The results were similar for 
workers based in the regions and those based at the main bases. Another set of 
questions sought the view of unionised workers on the extension of part-time work. 
BA is seeking temporal flexibility in order to service peaks and troughs in demand 
efficiently. The responses here were equally negative indicating that such workers see 
the extension of such working practices as a threat to the premium terms and 
conditions enjoyed by BA workers, who lead the UK industry in terms of 
remuneration and working conditions. The issue of outsourcing and other contentious 
issues of the period were also addressed in the survey. The issue was viewed in terms 
of how workers would see being separated from the unified firm, as exploratory 
interviews had shown general and predictable hostility to outsourcing. Outsourcing 
often took place during the survey period and since, under the threat of the airline 
withdrawing completely from many activities. The unionised workforce rejected this 
'core/periphery airline' concept. When asked what aspects of working for BA would 
be missed in the event of outsourcing, they provided some interesting responses. 
Most important in terms of worker ranking was the job security of working for a large 
airline, followed by the protection of national terms and conditions and the protection 
of trade union agreements. Interestingly the more unitarist statement 1he common 
purpose of working exclusively for BA' was ranked highest by only half of 
respondents. This indicates that the terms, conditions, and job security, all of which 
can be traced back to the regulated era, are uppermost in workers' minds, providing 
more evidence of the regulatory overhang. 
However the regulatory overhang is not a permanent effect, it can be and is modified 
by the competitive environment. At the time of the survey, BA was adjusting to a new 
globalised environment. Over a third of respondents supported the statement that cost 
reduction should be seen as the overriding priority, and three quarters supported the 
strategy of 'increasing productivity as much as possible. ' High levels of support were 
indicated for ending state aid to BA competitors, taking over and acquiring other 
airlines and building alliances with other carriers. There was little support for the 
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policy of moving functions abroad to lower labour cost countries. When these 
globalisation policies were operationalised into specific statements about 
employment, a different picture emerged. 
A significant proportion believed that globalisation would lead to reduced job 
security, specifically moving jobs to low labour cost nations. These misgivings were 
then translated into direct effects on the jobs of the respondents. Thus the majority felt 
that such polices would lead to reduced wages and benefits. In addition, a lower 
number believed that it would lead to reduced allowances and shift payments. This 
was similar across the two principal trade unions covered: the TGWU and the AEEU. 
Given the importance of collective bargaining and national level negotiation in 
preserving aspects of the regulatory overhang a final set of questions looked at 
employee perceptions of the proposed abolition of national collective bargaining. The 
majority of respondents felt that unions would be marginalised, that workers would be 
under the constant threat of outsourcing and franchising, that management would 
bypass trade unions, and that pay and conditions would be negatively affected. Most 
were sceptical that there would be any positive outcome. The existence of national 
level, or in BA's case company wide, collective bargaining is in a sense the 
institutional lynchpin of the regulated compact, something which BA explicitly 
recognised when they tried to abolish it in 1996. The process of national bargaining 
was seen to guarantee all the benefits that accrued since regulation, and which 
workers wish to retain. Thus, the perceptions of general employees are revealed in the 
survey to be influenced by the past regulatory compact and the bargaining 
environment that accompanied it. 
Having established the regulatory overhang and management attempts to undermine 
it within the British airline industry it then became necessary to investigate trends 
within Europe. Thus, chapter 7 looked at how European airline management has 
responded to the deregulated environment in its own attempts to force change. 
European airline workers had enjoyed wages high above external industry, and 
nationalised and Southern European carriers in particular enjoyed this protection 
above others. The resilience of the Airline Wage Premium (AWP) was indicated in 
the case of the UK where despite ten years of privatisation and deregulation the 
premium for workers in air transport has remained high and stable, outstripping 
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earnings in all other services and in the highly paid manufacturing sector. The 
vulnerability of these premium terms and conditions was demonstrated in our analysis 
of management strategy within Europe. We saw that airlines were seeking wage cuts 
and work rule changes as in the US, but in many cases going much further. A new 
pattern of industry organisation based on the procurement of low cost in service 
provision and competitiveness in core airline services threatened airline labour in 
Europe. Certain occupational groups such as ground and support staff were more 
vulnerable to these strategies than others such as engineers and pilots. In order to 
examine the process of restructuring within Europe we utilised the labour nuirket 
restnictitring model. This indicated that particularly in the case of Southern European 
carriers such as Alitalia and Iberia, restructuring was premised on a need to confront 
the power of organised labour. Detailed case studies of Air France, Alitalia, and 
Lufthansa indicated the product and labour market constraints faced by these carriers, 
and the different approaches towards restructuring. It was argued that quite often the 
tactical deficiencies of senior management exacerbated conflict and provoked an 
inevitable reaction. Nevertheless, European airline workers faced a major challenge as 
the industry began to restructure based on a global product market and regulatory 
regime. The search for market rates as labour cost become central saw a concerted 
attempt to erode the airline premium, as chapter 7 indicated. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated the tortuous nature of deregulation and labour market 
change in Europe, and the difficulties carriers face in confronting organised labour 
within individual nations and airlines. Chapter 8 demonstrates how labour's capacity 
to resist is being undermined by a process of global product market convergence. 
Firstly, the emerging industry pattern of consolidation and merger allows carriers to 
attain economies of scale and scope, allowing ongoing labour cost reduction. 
Secondly, the entry of low cost carriers allowed cost comparisons with unionised and 
state carriers, and thus a downward pressure on labour costs. Thirdly, a process of 
industry restructuring around core strategies of network management and service 
provision has allowed ancillary services to be divorced form core airline operations. 
Fourthly, a related pattern of alliances and collaboration is allowing carriers the scope 
to procure cost options over a wide range of carriers and affords the possibility for 
cost containment on the basis of yield. All of these aspects of global product market 
convergence negatively impact upon the terms and conditions of airline labour. 
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But a further dimension of global product nuirket convergence is the willingness of 
regulators to pursue supply side reforms in the labour market, whilst remaining 
largely tolerant of industry consolidation. The state, with a new goal of fostering 
national and supranational champions, is increasingly supporting carrier pressure for 
labour market reform. The development of alliances presents regulators with the 
conundrum of how to regulate without inhibiting the growth of strong regional 
alliance partners. The aim of most regulators is to nurture their own horne based 
carriers into alliance networks and to aid them in assuming dominance. Increasingly 
domestic competition and market access have come second to the projection of that 
global strength. In Europe the regulatory permissiveness of large scale alliances and 
policies on state aid and restructuring have allowed airline management to restructure 
the labour market. These measures, which allow deep restructuring of costs and large 
improvements in productivity, are designed quite literally to fatten 'moribund' state 
airlines for the alliance market. Once integrated into the alliance networks their role is 
unclear, although their routes and functions are likely to be rationalised. 
Since many of the protections labour enjoys are nested within specific local labour 
market arrangements, and labour tends to be strong and combative, a new approach 
has been adopted towards confronting labour within alliances. Thus the push towards 
harmonisation and a level playing field is designed in effect to level specific national 
labour market conditions, which protect airline labour. The deregulation of ground 
handling arrangements and the creeping harmonisation of flight crew duty hours and 
licensing requirements is fundamentally, and at root, an attempt to circumvent the 
effect of national labour market regulation. This is not to say that labour has been 
quiescent or complacent in that process. 
We noted how labour was able to influence that process through industrial action. 
Despite platitudinous statements that nobody wins in a strike situation, clearly airline 
workers have gained from deploying that tactic. This is the case whether unions 
operate within first mover or late adapting carriers, because the issues under dispute 
though similar are often simply at different stages. It is perhaps surprising, that pilots 
who have the most industry specific skills and the most human capital invested in the 
airline industry have been at the forefront of disputes and threatened disputes, but they 
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have in almost every carrier, in every comer of the globe, a great deal to lose. It is not 
just through strike action. Unions are increasingly taking to the road of cross union 
collaboration, building alliances within and between occupational groups to push 
forward the labour agenda. International federations have long existed but new times 
in the industry have re-vitalised them. Labour is also to a large degree at least 
tactically and strategically co-operating with airline management, as both face a 
hostile environment. Often this works best when it occurs against a background of 
traditional industrial relations, and when some form of participation is involved be it 
employee equity, board representation or forms of ownership and governance. At 
United airlines and a range of other North American operators, ESOPS have been 
used to motivate employees into concessions. Whilst legal, political and institutional 
obstacles prevent widespread ESOP type solutions in Europe, other forms of 
management/employee co-determination exist there. Lufthansa with its supervisory 
board and labour direct strategic and corporate involvement has to an extent managed 
to square the restructuring circle. Aer Lingus, long written off as a 'basket case" 
airline hobbled by excessive labour market regulation and government interference, 
has made a steady if not entirely pain free advance from state controlled chaos to state 
shepherded transformation. Labour has been fully involved and included in that 
profoundly corporatist partnership process. 
At the root of restructuring and transformation within the industry is a simple but key 
issue. Labour needs some say in theTuture shape and structure of the airline industry; 
alliances cannot and should not be made above the heads of workers in the industry. 
Undoubtedly, the persistence of the 'regulatory overhang' in the expectations of airline 
workers means that in most airlines, workers will initially resist restructuring. But the 
evidence indicates that workers accept the need for change, recognising the changed 
environment and the fact that national protections and previous competitive 
advantages cannot be retained. If firms can collaborate and influence regulator 
policy, then workers and their trade unions should be allowed to do the same. Key 
labour groups have demonstrated that they have enormous power to disrupt even 
within the new regulatory framework. As the industry emerges towards a global 
structure of inter-firm collaboration tempting management into rationalisation on the 
basis of labour costs, unions will seek influence. Without a seat at the regulatory 
table, labour is developing its own methods of cross national influence and solidarity. 
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This is the rationale for the cross-national trade union alliances, which are being built 
across the industry (Gill (2) 1998: 16). Only a framework of regulation, which 
involves all parties, can and will avoid this. 
With the vesting of enormous power in the hands of the major airlines, there is need 
for a system of regulation and restructuring, which respects the commercial freedom 
of carriers, but involves labour as a stakeholder. The consequences of labour's 
estrangement are seen in the various strikes and disputes at Air France and British 
Airways. Both episodes show that even where management has the institutional 
freedom to pursue its interests to the end, it is always constrained. BA could use the 
UK's employment laws to dismiss striking cabin crew but did not. The implications 
for morale, commitment and thus service quality were probably the most important 
constraint on this action. In Air France, though the unions have the law on their side 
they have not completely defeated the company's restructuring plan. Partly this is 
because the weakness of Air France's position in the airline market. The unions are 
aware that with the removal of state subsidy and the protection of 'cosy' bilateral 
agreements future job security is under threat. 
In the US which was 'first mover' in the deregulation process the fortunes of labour 
have settled down. Pilots at Northwest, as we discussed, have effectively eliminated 
two tier wage scales and secured a 12 per cent increase over the four-year contract. 
An important aspect of the strike was the internationally co-ordinated support from 
KLM pilots who refused to operate Northwest flights and the support of other pilot 
groups. This is yet another indication that labour deserves and demands to be listened 
to, and increasingly labour is asserting that right in various ways. When pilots at Delta 
vetoed a code share with United Airlines, believing this would lead the carrier into a 
subordinate role, they were expressing their misgivings about a regulatory system, 
which allows carriers great freedom of action, and potentially threatens jobs and 
conditions. (Gill 1998 : 11. ) Labour therefore needs to be involved in the regulatory 
process, not in a partial or technical role, but as a key stakeholder within the industry. 
This approach is a long way off, but not impossible. Without labour's involvement on 
issues such as cabin crew licensing and flight duty limitations only airline employers' 
voices will be heard. The regulatory process has already provided the framework for 
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management to obtain economies of scale and reduce labour costs; some recognition 
of labour right to participate would begin to bring labour into that process also. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
One of the principal findings of the thesis was the persistence of a regulatory 
overhang in terms of the expectations of airline workers. It was clear from the BA 
survey that this would continue to frustrate attempts to restructure the airline industry. 
Future research should try to measure this more definitively and analyse it over time. 
The importance of the case study approach was shown in the analysis of British 
Airways. The author would suggest six principal directions for future research in 
airline employment. Firstly, more case studies and qualitative investigations are 
needed. This will allow the full depth and extent of employment relations to be 
understood, allowing research to get beyond the aggregates and headlines, which tend 
to characterise the field. 78 Secondly, there is a need for data to be collected on the 
goals and aspirations of airline unions. An international survey on restructuring and 
labour issues was conducted for the International Transport Workers' Federation as 
part of the same project. Thirdly, whilst there has been a great deal of concern within 
airline industry circles about the impact of alliances upon competition and market 
structure, it would be timely to conduct a study of the employment impact. The 
incidence of crew sharing and facilities pooling has had limited effect but 
employment impacts can be expected in the future. Fourthly, work needs to be done 
on the micro-level interactions between firms and labour markets in the airline 
industry, particularly in respect of the spread of outsourcing and franchising. What 
sorts of contracting and employment relationships are airlines hoping to develop? 
How sustainable are these from the point of view of employee commitment and 
motivation? Is the 'virtual airline' no more than a concept, a consultant's dream, or 
are management actively seeking to pursue such strategies? Will the policy witnessed 
in both the USA and Europe of 'de-structuring' areas such as cabin crew and ground 
handling by the introduction of temporary contract and tiered wage structures, lead to 
adverse effects on quality? 
78 The author is jointly involved in a four case comparison funded by the Leverhulme Foundation and 
based at Cardiff Business School, to investigate developments in employment and restructuring in four 
major European carriers. 
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In this regard, research needs to be carried out on the low cost sector and the premium 
sector given the latter's tendency to subcontract most functions. How do such carriers 
manage without unions and collective bargaining? To what extent are major airlines 
following suit? In addition there is a need for research on the increasing use of 
financial participation in the global airline industry. Are workers being given shares in 
a depreciating asset, in the hope that they will trade wages and work rules; are 
structures genuinely participatory or merely using labour for concessions? Do such 
policies offer an optimum restructuring strategy in weak state airlines? Finally the 
thesis has shown that the airline industry is developing an increasingly global focus, it 
would therefore be worthwhile for researchers to address the implications of these 
trends for bargaining and industrial relations. Will global collective bargaining 
develop across alliances? Will there be global benchmarking of wages and conditions 
within alliance groups? How and in what ways can labour influence these 
developments? These questions and issues suggest a research and policy agenda for 
airline labour relations, which is distinct from costs and productivity. Though 
neglected in the European literature to date, the airline industry is a complex and 
fascinating sector, two adjectives, which describe why industrial relations scholars 
should be addressing it in greater numbers. The author hopes to have provided some 
encouragement to that endeavour, by developing an analysis of the industrial relations 
and regulatory environment of the industry. 
311 
Bibliography 
Addison, J. T. and Hirsch, B. T. (1997) 'The Economic Effects of Employment 
Regulation: What are the LimitsT In Kaufman (ed. ) Govenitnent Regulation of The 
Eniployinent Relationship IRRA Madison, Wisconsin. 
Addison IT and Siebert W. S. (1979) The Market For Laboun An Analytical 
Treatment Goodyear Press, Santa Maria. 
Alamdari, F. (1997) 'The Move Towards Reducing Labour Costs': Journal of Air 
Transport Management Vol. 2 No. 15 pp. 16-2 1. 
Alamdari, F. and Morell, P. (1997)'Airline Labour Cost Reduction: Post liberalisation 
Experience Journal ofAir Transport Management Vol. 3 No. 2 pp. 53-66. 
Avmark Aviation Economist (1993) Comparison of Labour Cost and Productivity in 
the European Airline Industry 
Avmark Aviation Economist (1994) United ESOP September 
BA News (27/6/97) 'Why We Need to Reduce Costs' 
Baccarach, S. B. and Lawler, E. J. (1981) Bargaining Power. - Tactics and Outcomes 
San Francisco: Jossey Bass. 
Bagwell, P (1988) 'The Transport Revolution 1970 - 1985': Routledge, London 
Bailey, E. and Dong, L. (1995) Airline Consolidation and Consumer Welfare: Eastern 
Economic Journal Vol. 2 1, No. 4, Fall, pp. 463-476. 
Bailey E. E., Graham, D. R. and Kaplan, D. P. (1985) Deregulating the Airlines MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Bailey E. E., Graham, D. R. and Baumol, WT. (1984) 'Deregulation and the Theory 
of Contestable Markets' Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 1111-128 
Baitsell, J. M. (1966) Airline Industrial Relations: Pilots and Flight Engineers. 
Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University. 
Baldry, C (1994) "Convergence in Europe: A Matter of Perspective? " Industrial 
Relations Journal Vol. 25 no 2 
312 
Baltagi, B., Griffin, J. and Rich, D. (1995) 'Airline Deregulation; The Cost Pieces of 
The Puzzle' Intemational Economic Review Vol. 36 Feb, pp. 245-260. 
Banister, D. (1997) 'Bus Deregulation In The UK: The First Decade' In McConville, 
J (ed. ) Transport Regulation Matters Pinter, London. 
Barrett, S. (1997)'The Implications of the UK/Ireland Airline Deregulation for an EU 
Internal Market. 'Journal of Air Transport Management Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 67-73. 
Baurnol, W., Panzar, J. and Willig, J. (1982) Contestable Markets and The Theory of 
Industry Stnicture: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich New York. 
Beatson, A (1995) Libour Market Flexibility: Department of Employment Market 
Research Unit. Research series No 48. 
Beaumont, P. (1986) 'Management Opposition to Union Organisation: Researching 
The Indicators' Employee Relations Vol. 8 (5), pp. 31-38. 
Beaumont, P. (1991) 'Industrial Relations in the 90's' Sage Publications, London 
Belman, D., Belzer, Michael, H. (1997) 'Regulation of Labour Markets: Balancing 
the Benefits and Costs of Competition' In Kaufman (ed. ) Government Regulation of 
The Employment Relationship IRRA Madison Wisconsin. 
Belobaba, PP and Van Acker (1994) 'Airline Market Concentration; An Analysis of 
US Origin and Destination Markets, Journal of Air Transport Management Vol. 1 (1), 
(March) 5-14 
Belzer, M. (1993) Collective Bargaining in the Trucking Industry; the Effects of 
Institutional and Economic Restnicturing. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis Cornell 
University 1993. 
Belzer, M. H. (1994) 'The Motor Carrier Industry: Truckers and Teamsters Under 
Siege' in Voos, P. B. (ed. ) Contemporary Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector 
Industrial Relations Research Association Series, Ithaca. 
Blain, A. N. (1970) Pilots and Management: Industrial Relations in the UK Airlines 
Unpublished Ph. D thesis LSE 1970. 
Blain, A. N. (1971) Pilots and Management: Industrial Relations In the UK Air 
Corporations Unpublished Ph. D. thesis London School of Economics and Political 
Science. 
Blyton, P. and Turnbull, P. (1993) The Dynamics of Employee Relations McMillan 
Basingstoke. 
Blyton, P. and Turnbull, P. (1996) Confusing Convergence: Industrial Relations in the 
European Airline Industry-A Comment on Warhurst Eltropean Journal of Industrial 
Relations Vol. 2 (1) pp. 7-20. 
313 
Blyton, P. and Turnbull, P. (1998) The Dynamics of Employee Relations MacMillan, 
Basingstoke second edition. 
Blyton, P., Martinez-Lucio, M., and McGurk-, J. (1998a) 'Contesting Globalisation: 
Airline Restructuring, Labour Flexibility and Trade Union Strategies', ITF London 
1998a 
Blyton, P., Martinez-Lucio, M., and McGurk-, J. (1998c) 'Strategic Calculation? 
Innovative Cost Reduction and Employment Relations in British Airways', mimeo, 
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University 
Bolger, A. (1997) 'Union Attacks BA For Closure of Union Offices' Financial Times 
May 20 1997. 
Bolton, B. (1994) 'Regulation, Deregulation and Labour: The international 
Telecommunications Industry. ' (Unpublished paper presented to Conference on 
Regulation and Employment Centre For The Study of Regulated Industries) London. 
Bonassies, 0. (1996) 'Ground Handling Liberalisation: Hijacked. ' Annual Aviation 
Economist Vol 13 (6) pp. 2-4 
Booth, A (1994) The Economics of The Trade Union Cambridge University Press 
Borenstein, S. and Rose, N. (1995)'Do Airlines in Chapter 11 Harm Their Rivals? 
Bankruptcy and Pricing Behaviour in US Airline Markets' National Bureall Of 
Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper February. 
Boyne, G. A. 'Competitive Tendering in Local Government: A review of Theory and 
Evidence' PublicAdministration Vol. 76 No4 Winter 1998. 
British Airways Corporation Annual Report and Accounts 1974,1975,1976,1977, 
1978,1979,1980,1981,1982,1983,1984,1985,1986. 
British Airways PLC Annual Report and Accounts 1987,1988,1989,1990,1991, 
1992,1993,1994,1995,1996,1997,1998. 
British Airways (1996) Business Efficiency and Regional Ground Handling (internal 
document, November). 
British European Airways BEA 1945,1946,1947,1948,1949,1950,1951,1952, 
1953,1954,1955,1966,1967,1968,1969,1970,1971. 
British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) Annual Report and Accounts 1945, 
1946,1947,1948,1949,1950,1951,1952,1953,1954,1955,1966,1967,1968, 
1969,1970,1971 
Bryman, A. (1989) Research Methods and Organization Studies, Routledge London 
Business (second edition). 
Button, K., (1988) The Age of Regulatory Refionn: Edward Elgar, Cambridge 
314 
Button, K., Haynes, K., and Stough, R. (1998) Flying Into the Future: Air Transport 
Policy in The European Union Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Button, K. and Weyman-Jones, T. (1992) 'Ownership Structure, Institutional 
organization and Measures of X-Eff iciency' American Economic Review Vol. 82 (2), 
pp. 439-455. 
Cameron, D. (1997) 'People Movers'Airline Business, November pp. 50-52. 
Campell-Smith, D. (1986) The British Ainvays Story The Stniggle For Take-Off. 
Coronet, London. 
Capelli, P. (1985a) 'Competitive Pressures and Labor Relations in the Airlines 
Industry', Industrial Relations, 24(4): 316-38 
Capelli, P. (1987) 'Airlines' in Lipksy, D. B. and Donn, C. (eds. ) Collective 
Bargaining In American Industry Lexington, Mass. 
Capelli, P (ed) (1995) Airline Labor Relations In Global Era: The New Frontier ILR 
Press Ithaca. 
Card, D. (1986) 'The Impact of Deregulation on the Employment and Wages of 
Airline Mechanics. ' Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 39 No. 4, pp. 527- 
538. 
Caves, P. (1962) The Airline Industry and Its Regulators: A Study in The Economics 
of Industry, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 
Chamberlain, N. W. and Kuhn, J. W. (1965) Collective Bargaining (2nd ed) McGraw 
Hill, New York 
Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard 
University Press 1990, Cambridge, Mass. 
Chuter, A 1998) 'Air France Calculates Cost of Pilots Action' Flight Intemational 10 
June 
Civil Aviation Authority (1995) Slot Allocation; A Proposal for European Airports 
CAA Cheltenham Glows, February. 
Cohen, 1. (1990) Political Climate and Two Airline Strikes: Century Air In 1932 and 
Continental Airlines in 1983-85 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43; pp. 308- 
23. 
315 
Collin , T. (1995) 'Experiencing Turbulence: Competition, Strategic Choice and The 9 t) Management of Human Resources In British Airways' Hunian Resource Management 
Journal Vol. 5 No. 5, pp. 18-33. 
Comitd De Sages (1994) Expanding Horizons: Civil Aviation In Europe: All Action 
Programme For The Future Brussels European Commission, January. 
Cordes, J., Goldfarb, R., Johnson, R. (1989) 'Design and Implementation of Job Loss 
Compensation Provisions: Lessons From The Airline Deregulation Experience' 
International Journal of Transport Economics. Vol. 16 No I February. 
Corke, A. (1986) British Airways: The Path To Profitability, Frances Pinter, London. 
Crabbe, T. J. (1992) Multinational Companies In the Cleaning Industry: Local 
Government Privatisation, Trade Union Responses and The European Dimension 
(unpublished Ph. D. thesis University of Glasgow- 43-0627). 
Crerniuex, P. Y. (1992) The Impact of Regulatory Change on Earnings: The Case of 
The US Airline Industry 1959-1990'. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis Berkeley. 
Cremieux, P. Y. (1996) 'The Effect of Deregulation on Employee Earnings: Pilots, 
Flight Attendants and Mechanics 1959-92. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
Vol. 49 No 2 January, pp. 223-242. 
Crouch, C. (1993) Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Clarendon, 
Oxford. 
Darlington, R. (1995) 'Collective Bargaining and The Deregulation of Baggage 
Handling at Manchester Airport. British Journal of In&tstrial relations Vol. 33 
March, pp. 93-115. 
Davidson, P (1995) 'New Man Takes on BA' Interview with Robert Ayling, Chief 
Executive October 1995 
Davies, R. E. G. (1964) A History of The World's Airlines Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
De Vaus, D. (1996) Surveys in Social Research UCL Press London, 4th edition. 
Dempsey, G. A. (1992) Airline Deregulation and Laissez Faire Mythology Quorum 
Books, Westport, Conn. 
Doganis, R. (1991) Flying Off Course: The Economics of International Airlines 
Routledge, London. 
Doganis, R (1994) ' The Impact of Liberalization on European Airline Strategies and 
Operations', Journal ofAir Transport Management, 1 (1): 15-25 
316 
Dooley, F. (1994) 'Mjý Vu For Airline Industrial Relations' Joitmal of Labour 
Research Vol. 15 No. 2 pp... 196-190. 
Dow, G. (1997) 'The New Institutional Economics and Employment Regulation' In 
Kaufman (ed. ) Government Regulation of The Employment Relationship IRRA 
Madison Wisconsin. 
Dubofsky, M (1990) Labour In American History Univeristy of Illinois Press (2 nd 
edition) 
Dunleavy, P. (1986) 'Explaining the Privatisation Boom: Public Choice Versus 
Radical Approaches. ' Public Adininistration, Vol. 64, pp. 13-34. 
Dunlop J. T (1993) Industrial Relations Systems Harvard Business School Press 
Boston 
Dyos, HJ and Aldcroft D. H. British Transport - An Economic Surveyfroln The 
Seventeenth Century to the Twentieth (Leicester: Leicester University Press) , 1969 
Eaton, J (1996) Globalization and Human Resource Management In the Airline 
Industry. Aldershot: Avebury 
Edwards P. K (1986) Conflict At Work: A Materialist Analysis of Workplace Relations 
Oxford, Blackwell 
Edwards, R (1979) Contested Terrain: The Transformation of The British Workplace 
in The Twentieth Century London Heinmann 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. (1979) The Regulatory Process and Labor's Earnings. New 
York Academic Press. 
Fairbrother, P. (1994) Politics and The State as Employer. Maunsell, London. 
Farber, H. S. (1986) 'The Analysis of Union Behaviour' in Ashenfelter, 0. and 
Layard, P. R. G. (eds. ) Handbook of Labor Economics Vol. 2 North Holland. 
Feldman, J. (1997) 'Finding the Centre'Air Transport World May pp. 51-54. 
Ferner, A and Colling, T. (1991) Trivatisation, Regulation and Industrial Relations' 
British Journal of Industrial Relations Vol. 29-(3), pp. pp 391409. 
Ferner, A and Hyman, R, (1992) Industfial Relations in The New Europe (Blackwell) 
2nd edition 
Ferner, A and Colling, T.. (1995)'Privatisation and Marketisation' in Edwards P. (ed. ) 
Industrial Relations Theory and Practice In Britain, Blackwell, Oxon. 
317 
Financial Times "BA Faces Standoff' 3.7.98 
Financial Times (1998) Northwest pilots in Strike Over Contract (7.9.98) 
Forrester, K. (1993) 'Buses' in Pendleton, A. and Winterton J. (eds. ) Public 
Enterprise In Transition: Industrial Relations In State and Privatised Corporations 
Routledge, London. 
Fox, Alan (1974) Beyond Contract: Work power and Trust Relations, Faber, London 
Fox, Alan (1985) History and Heritage Allen and Unwin, London 
Freeman, R., Medoff, J. L. (1984) What Do Unions Do? Basic Books, New York. 
Gall, G. (1996) 'Converging on Conflict? A Further Comment on Warhurst' 
European Joitmal of Industrial Relations Vol. 2 No 2 pp. 255-260. 
Gall, G, Mackay, S (1994) Trade Union Derecognition In Britain 1988-1994 British 
Journal of Industrial Relations (Vol. 32 (3) 433-48 
Gallagher, J. (1996)'Hubs and Partners' Airline Business, January, pp. 51-53. 
Gallagher, J. (1996) Alliance Survey Airline Business June 1996. 
Gallagher, J. (1997) Alliance Survey Airline Business June 1997. 
Gallagher, J. (1998) Alliance Survey Airline Business June 1998. 
Gallagher, J. Odell, M. (1995) 'Moving Targets' Airline Business Efficiency Survey 
November 1995. 
Garahan, P. and Stewart, P. (1992) The Nissan Enigma: Flexiblity and Work In A 
Local Economy, London: Cassell 
Gill, T, (1998) 'World Cup Gets Wrong Sort of Strikers' Airline Business July 
Glaister, S. (1986) 'Deregulation and Its Effect on Bus Size' Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, Vol. 20 (2), pp. 217-44. 
Godard J (1994) 'Beyond Empiricism: Towards a Reconstruction of IR Theory and 
Research' Advances In Industrial and Labour Relations vol. 6. pp 1-35 
Goetzchy, J and Rosenblatt, P (1992): 'France: The Industrial Relations System at a 
Turning Point? 'in Hyman, R and Ferner, A'Industrial Relations in the New Europe' 
Blackwell, Oxford 
Gospel, H and Littler, C, (1983) Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations: An 
Historical and Comparative Study Heinmann, London 
318 
Gospel, H and Palmer, G (1993) British Industrial Relations: Routledge, New York 
Gourvish, T (1991) The Nationalised Industries In Crafts N and Broadberry, S (eds. ) 
British Economic Performance since 1945: Macmillan, London 
Gwilliam, K. (1990) 'The Common Transport Policy' in El Agraa, (ed. ) The 
Economics of the European Community Third edition, St Martins Press, New York. 
Hanlon, P. (1996) Global Airlines: Competition in a Transnational Industry 
Butterworth Heinmann, London. 
Hartley, J., and Barling, J. (1998) 'Employee Attitude Surveys' in Whitfield, K., 
Strauss, G. (eds. ) Researching The World of Work : Strategies and Methods in 
Studying Industrial Relations ILR Press, Ithaca. 
Haskel, J. and Sysmanski, S. (1993) 'Privatisation, Liberalisation, Wages and 
Employment: Theory and Evidence for the UK' Economica 60, pp. 161-82. 
Haskel, J. and Sysmanski, S. (1994) 'Privatisation and The Labour Market: Facts, 
Theory and Evidence. ' in Bishop, M., Kay, J. and Mayor, C. (eds. ) Privatisation and 
Economic Performance, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Haskel, J. and Sanchis, A. (1995) Privatisation and X-Inefficiency: A Bargaining 
Approach' Journal of Industrial Economics Vol. XLI 11, pp. 301-32 1. 
Hayes, K. J and Ross L. B. (1996) 'Measuring Changes in Multiproduct Market States: 
An Application to US Airlines' Review of Industrial Organization Vol. 2 (4) 
Hendricks, W. (1977) 'Regulation and Labor Earnings' Bell Journal of Economics 
Vol. 8 No 2, pp. 483-96. 
Hendricks, W. (1994) 'Deregulation and Labor Earnings'. Journal of Labour 
Research Vol. (15) Summer, pp. 207-234. 
Hendricks, W., Feuille, P. and Scerzen, C. (1980) 'Regulation, Deregulation and 
Collective Bargaining in the Airlines. ' Industrial and Labour Relations Review Vol. 
34, pp. 67-81. 
Heseltine P. M. and Silcock, D. T. (1990) 'The Effects of Bus Deregulation On Costs. '
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, September, pp. 239-254. 
Hewitt, P. (1993) About Time: The Revolution In Work and Family Life. London 
Rivers Orarn, London. 
Hill, Andrew (1995) 'Alitalia Compromise Rejected' Financial Times July 7th 1995. 
Hill, L. (1994)' Labor Pains' Air Transport World February. 
Hill, L (1996) 'Alitalia: Playing a Team Game'Air Transport World September . 
319 
Hill, L. (1997) 'Healthy Appetite'Air Tninsport World November. 
Hirsch, B. and Addison, J. T. (1990) The Economic Analysis of Unions Allen and 
Unwin, London. 
Hirsch, B., MacPherson, D. (1997) 'Earnings and Employment in Trucking: 
Deregulating A Perfectly Competitive Industry' in Peoples, J. (ed. ) Regulatory 
Refonn. and Labour Markets Norwell M. A. Kluwer Academic Publishing. 
Hirschman, Albert 0. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States, Cambridge Mass, Harvard. 
HMSO (1936) Air Navigation Act 1938 (Cmnd. 1032). 
HMSO (1948) Civil Air Transport In Britain 1948 (Cmnd. 6605). 
HMSO (1968) Report of The National Boardfor Prices and Incomes (Cmnd. 355 1). 
HMSO (1968) Report of Dispute Between The British Airline Pilots Association and 
the British Overseas Airline Corporation (Cmnd. 3789). 
HMSO (1969) British Air Transport In the 1970s (Cmnd. 4018). 
HMSO (1969) British Air Transport in the 1970s House of Commons (Cmnd 4018) 
HMSO Report of The National Board For Prices and Incomes 1968. House of 
Commons (Cmnd. 355 1). 
Holobuwicz, P. (1995) Sunny Prospects Airline Business April 1995. 
Hopfl, H. Smith, S. and Spencer, S. (1992) 'Values and Valuations; the Conflict 
Between Culture Change and Job Cuts' Personnel Review Vol. 21 pp. 24-38. 
Hopkins, G. (1992) The Air Line Pilots Association in Leary, (ed. ) Encyclopaedia Of 
US Business Biography: The Airline Industry 1992, Bruccoli Clark Layman Inc. New 
York. 
Hopkins, G. E. (1971) The Airline Pilots: A Study in Elite Unionization Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Hyman, R (1989) the Poitical Economy of Industrial Relations : theory and Pratctice 
in A Cold Climate Macmillan, London 
International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO Fleet and Personnel Statistics series 
1991,1992,1993,1994,1995 and 1996 
320 
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) (1992) The Globalisation of The 
Civil Aviation Industry, and Its Impact on Aviation Workers. London Report prepared 
for ITF Civil Aviation Section Conference London November II- 13. 
Jackson, P. and Price, C. (1994) Privatisation and Regulation: A Review of The Issites 
Longman, London. 
Jennings, M. (1995) 'Altered Images' Airline Business February. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. (1976) 'Theory Of The Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Cý Agency Costs and Ownership Structure' Journal of Financial Econoinics Vol. 3 (4) 
pp. 305-360. 
Johnson, Nancy, B. (1991) 'Airline Workers' Earnings and Union Expenditures 
Under Deregulation' Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 45 October pp. 154- 
65. 
Johnson, Nancy B. (1995) 'Wage Levels Under Deregulation' In Capelli, P. (ed. ) 
Airline Labor Relations In the Global Era: The New Frontier ILR Press, Ithaca. 
Jones, Lois (1996) 'Renaissance or Rigor MortisT Airline Business November 1996. 
Kahn, Alfred, E (1970) The Economics of Regulation : Principles and Institutions (2 
volumes) New York, Wiley 
Kahn, M. L. (1950) Indtistrial Relations In the Airlines: the Interaction of Unions , Management and Subsidized Industry Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation Harvard 
University. 
Kahn, M. L. (1971) Collective Bargaining On the Airline Flight Deck in Levinson, H., 
Rhernus, C. M., Goldberg, J. R., and Kahn, M. L. (eds. ) Collective Bargaining and 
Technological Change in American Transportation The Transportation Center, 
Northwestern University, Evanston IL. pp. 423- 610. 
Kahn, M. L. (1980) 'Airlines' in Somers G. (ed. ) Collective Bargaining: 
Contemporary American Experience Comell, Ithaca pp. 315-372. 
Kassim, H. (1995) 'Air Transport Champions: Still Carrying The Flag? ' in Hayward, 
J. (ed. ) Industrial Enterprises and European Integration: Front National to 
International Champions In Westem Europe. OUP press Oxford. 
Kaufman, B. (ed. ) (1997) Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship 
Industrial Relations Research Association. (IRRA) Madison. 
Kim, S. and Singal, V. (1983) 'Mergers and Market Power: Consolidation In the US 
Airline Industry' American Economic Review Vol. 83 June 1983, pp. 549-569. 
Kitay, J. and Callus, R. (1998) The Role and Challenge of Case Study Design In 
Industrial Relations Research in Whitfield, K. and Strauss, G. (eds. ). Researching The 
321 
World of Work: Strategies and Methods in Studying Industrial Relations ILR Press, 
Ithaca. 
Kochan, T., Katz, H. and McKersie, R. (1986) The Transfonnation of American 
Industfial Relations Basic Books, New York. 
Krolick, S. R. (1966) Economic Status of Skilled Occupations: Railroad Engineers 
and Airline Pilots Unpublished Ph. D. thesis Stanford University pp. 25 1. 
Lane C (1992) 'European Business Systems; Britain and Germany Compared in R 
Whitley (ed) European Business Systems: Firms and Markets in their National 
Context Sage, London cý 
Lane T. (1997) 'Deregulation and Crew Competence in International Shipping' in 
McConville, J. (ed. ) Transport Regulation Matters, Mansell. 
Lawal, H. B. (1980) Tables of Percentage Points for Use with Small Expectations 
Applied Statistics No 29 Vol. 3, pp. 292-298. 
Lehrer, Mark (1995) The Lufthansa Tumaround Insead Unpublished Ph. D paper 
Lehrer, Mark (1997) 'German Industrial Strategy in Turbulence: Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Hierarchies in Lufthansa' Industry and Innovation Vol 4 
(1), June, pp. 115-40. 
Leibenstein, H. (1966) 'Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency' American Economic 
Review Vol. 56 June, pp. 392-415. 
Leveen, S. (1982) Cockpit Automation and The Struggle for Control of The Flight 
Deck Unpublised Ph. D. thesis, Cornell University. 
Levere, J (1996) 'Good Times Back'Airline Business March 1996. 
Levine, M. E. (1965) 'Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and 
national Regulatory Policy' Yale Law Journal Vol. 74 (8) July 
Lloyd, Caroline (1997) 'Decentralization in the NHS: Prospects for Workplace 
Unionism' British Journal of Industrial Relations Vol. 35 (3) September, pp. 427-46. 
Lufthansa Annual Reports 193,1994,1995,1996 1997.1998 
Lundy, 0. and Cowling, A. (1996) Strategic Human Resource Management, 
Routledge, London. 
322 
MacDonald, J. D. and Cavaluzzo, L. C. (1996) 'Railroad Deregulation; Pricing 
Reform, Shipper Response and The Effects on Ubour' Industrial and Libor 
Relations Review Vol. 50 (1) pp. 80-91. 
Marin, P (1998) 'Productivity Differences In the Airline Industry: Partial 
Deregulation Versus Short-Run Protection' Intemational Joitmal of Industrial 
Organiaition Vol 16 (4) pp 395-414 
Martin S. and Parker, D. (1997) The Impact of Privatisation: Ownership and 
Corporate Perfomiance In the UK, Routledge, London. 
Martin, R. (1977) The Sociology of Power Routledge, Kegan and Paul, Oxford. 
McGowan, F. and Seabright, P. (1989) 'Deregulating European Airlines' Econonlic 
Policy, October, pp. 283-344. 
McGurk, J (1998) 'Handling Insecurity; Management Policy and Employment 
Restrcturing at British Airways': Management Research News Vol 21number 2/3 
Mertz, M. (1995) 'Labour Costs Around The World' In Capelli, P. (ed. ) Airline 
Labor Relations In the Global Era: ILR Press Cornell. 
Metcalf, D. (1991) British Unions; Dissolution or Resurgence? Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy Vol. 71 No 1, pp. 18-32. 
Millward, N., Stevens, M., Smart, D. and Hawes, W. R. (1992) Work-place Industrial 
Relations in Transition. The EDIIESRCIPSIIACAS Survey Dartmouth Press Aldershot. 
Milne, S. (1997)The Battle of British Airways' Guardian 14.7.97. 
Mitchell, D. J. (1994) 'A Decade of Concession Bargaining' In Kerr, C., and 
Staudohar, P. (eds. ) Labor Economics and Industrial Relations Markets and 
Institutions Cambridge Harvard University Press. 
Mitchell D. J. (1991) Concession Bargaining: The Evidence Washington D. C. 
Brookings Institution 
Monthly Labor Review Review of Collective Bargaining in 1980,1981,1982,1983, 
1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990,1991,1992,1993,1994,1995,1996. 
Moody, K. (1988) An Injury to All: The Decline of American Trade Unionism Verso 
publications, New York. 
Moore, T. G. (1978) 'The Beneficiaries Of Trucking Regulation' Journal of Law and 
Economics Vol. 21 (2) pp. 327-343. 
Morrison, S. (1989) 'US Domestic Aviation' in Button, K. J. and Swann, D. (eds. ) 
The Age of Regulatory Refionn Clarendon, Oxford. 
323 
Morrison, S., and Winston, S. (1986) Airline Deregulation: The Evidence? Brookings 
Institution Washington. 
Morrison, S and Winston, S (1995) The Evolution of The Airline Industry 
Washington D. C Brookings Institution 0 
Moxon, J (1998) Air France Pilots Use World Cup as Political Football (Flight 
International 03 June 
Nay, L. (1991) Determinants of Concession Bargaining In The Airline Industry' 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 44 No. 2 pp. 307-323. 
Neven, D, Roller, L. H (1996) 'Rent Sharing In The European Airline Industry' 
Ettropean Economic Review (Vol . 40, Apri I 
Northrup, H. (1983) 'The New Employee Relations Climate In the Airlines' 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 36 No. 2 Jan (pp. 167-18 1). 
O'Connell-Davidson, J. (1994) Privatisation Regulation and Employment; The Case 
of The Water Industry Mansell, London. 
Odell, Mark (1997) 'Holding Back The Tide'Airline Business September 
O'Toole, K. (1998) Widening the Franchise Flight Intemational 25-31 March 1998. 
Oppenheim, AN (1992) Questionnaire Design, InteiTiewing and Attitude 
Measurement Pinter, London. 
Ourn Tae Houn, Taylor, Allison J., Zhang, Anming (1993) 'Strategic Airline Policy In 
The Globalizing Airline Networks'. Transportation Journal Vol. 32 (3) pp. 14-30. 
Ourn, Tae Houn, Yu, C (1998) Winning Airlines: Poductivity and Cost 
Competitiveness of The World's MajorAirlines. Boston, Kluwer 
Parry, G (1996) 'European Ground Handling Liberalisation; A (lack of) Progress 
Report' Avmark Aviation Economist Aug/September. 
Pearse J (1999) 'A Lesson in Low Cost'Airline Business 
Pendleton, A. (1993) 'Railways' in Pendleton, A. and Winterton J. (eds. ) Public 
Enterprise In Transition: Industrial Relations In State and Privatised Col7lorations: 
London, Routledge. 
Peoples, James (1990) Regulatory Reform and Labor Markets Kluwer, New York 
Peoples, James (1998) Regulatory Reforin and Labor Markets (2d ed) Kluwer, New 
York 
Peterpaul J. F. (1993) Dissenting Opinion To the Report of The National Commission 
To Ensure A Strong And Competitive Airline Industry August 2. 
324 
Peters, T. and Waterman, P. (1982) In Search of Excellence Harper and Row, New 
York. 
Pfeffer, J. (1998) The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting People First 
Boston Harvard Business School Press. 
Poole, C. P. (1989) US Airline Deregulation: The Lessons for The European 
Community, Government Economic Service Working Paper, No. 109, September. 
Porter, M (1990) The Competitive Advanatge of Nations, New York: Free Press 
Posner, R. (1984) 'Some Economics of Lzbour Law' University of Chicago Liw 
Review Vol. 5 
Price, C. (1994) 'Utility Regulation' In Jackson, P. and Price, C. (eds. ) Privatisation 
and Regulation: A Review of the Issues, Macmillan, London. 
Pustay, M. J. (1989) 'Deregulation in The US Trucking Industry ' in Button, K. J. and 
Swann D. (eds. ) The Age of Regulatory Refibmi, Clarendon, Oxford. 
Rees, R. (1984) Public Enterprise Economics, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
Robinson, P., (1997) Labour Market Studies: The United Kingdont Centre for 
Economic Performance (CEPR), London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Rose, N. L. (1987) 'Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from The Trucking 
Industry' Journal of Political Economy Vol. 95 No. 6, pp. 1146-78. 
Saundry, R and Turnbull, P (1996) 'M81ee on the Mersey: Contracts, Competition 
and Labour relations on the Docks' Industrial Relations Journal, 27 no 4 
Saundry, R and Turnbull, P (1999) 'Contractual (in) Security: Labour Regulation and 
Competitive Performance in the Port Transport Industry: A Contextualised 
Comparison of Britain and Spain British Journal of Industrial Relations 37, no 2 273- 
96 
Savage, 1. (1985) The Deregulation of Bits Services Gower Press, Oxford. 
Sayer, A. (1984) Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, Hutchinson, 
London. 
Skapinker, M. (1996)'BA and Pilots Both Claim Victory In Bitter Dispute' Financial 
Times 13.7.96. 
Skapinker, Michael (1998) 'Weak Rulers Hurt State Airlines' Financial Times 29 
April. 
325 
Sleigh, S. R. (1995) 'Sticking Together in Tough Times' in Capelli, P. (ed. ) Airline 
Labor Relations In Global Era: The New Frontier ILR Press Ithaca 1995Airline 
Business. 
Smith, W (1995) 'Shifting Spanners' Airline Business August 
Somers, G (1980) Collective Bargaining: Contemporary American Experience. 
IRRA Comell (1980) 
Starr, R., and Stinchcombe, M. (1992) 'Efficiency Transportation Routing and 
Natural Monopoly In the Airline Industry: An Economic Analysis of Hub and Spoke 
and Related Systems University of California, San Diego Department of Economics 
Working Paper No. 95 (2). 
Stockman, 1 (1996) 'Ramping Up the Price'Airline Business August 
Storey, J. (1992) Developments in the Management of Hitinan Resources: All 
Analytical Review Blackwell, Oxford. 
Taneja, N. K. (1976) The International Airline Industry, Lexington, Mass. 
Taylor, R. and Skapinker, M. (1996) 'BA Flight Crew Vote To Strike On Pay and 
Pensions' Financial Times 4.7.96. 
Thomas, S., Johnson, N. and Officer, D. (1996) 'Capital Market Responses To 
Airline Wage Negotiations' Journal of Labor Research Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 203-217. 
Thompson E. P (1969) The Making of The English Working Class (Penguin) 
Thomicroft, K. W. (1989) 'Airline Deregulation And The Airline Labor Market' 
Jou mal of Labo r Resea rch Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 163 -18 1. 
Tolley, W. K. (1989) 'Regulatory Reform of the US and UK Inter City Bus Industries' 
in Button, K. J. and Swann, D. (eds. ) The Age of Regulatory Reform Clarendon, 
Oxford. 
Tucker, E. (1996) 'Sabena Chief Poised To Announce Resignation' Financial Times 
27 February 1997. 
Turnbull, P. (1991) 'Labour Market Deregulation and Economic Performance' Work 
Employtnent and Society Spring, pp. 17-35. 
Tumbull, P., Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J. (1992) Dock Strikes: Restnicturing and 
Conflict In the British Ports Avebury, Aldershot. 
Turnbull, P and Wass, V (1996) Stnictural Adjustment and the Labor Market in the 
Global Ports Industry ITF 
Turnbull, P., Saundry, R. (1996) 'Melee On the Mersey: Contracts Competition and 
Labour Relations in the Docks' Industrial Relations Journal Vol. 27 issue No. 4. 
326 
Uittenboggart, P (1997) 'Airline Competition On the Route Between Amsterdam and 
London' Journal ofAir Transport Management Vol 3(4) 
Unterberger, Herbert, Koziara and Edward. (1975) 'Airline Strike Insurance: A Study 
in Escalation' Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 29(l) pp. 26-45. 
Van De Krol, R. (1995) XLM Forced Back' Financial Times June 24 1995. 
Financial TimesJuly 7th 1996. 
Van Moutte, B. (1993) 'Community Competition Policy In The Air Transport 
Sector'Air and Space Law Utrecht Vol. 18 Part 6, pp. 275-87. 
Vass J, (1997) Air Transport: International Comparisons of Labour Productivity; 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research discussion paper no 106 
Ve1janovski, C. (1987) Selling the State: Privatisation In Britain London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson. 
Verchere, 1. (1995) The European Airline Industry: Crisis and Competition 
Economist Intelligence Unit Report. 
Vietor R. H. (1990) 'Contrived Competition; Airline Regulation and Deregulation 
1925-1988' Business History Review Spring, pp. 1-32. 
Walsh, D. (1989) 'Accounting for The Proliferation of Two Tier Wage Settlements In 
the US Airline Industry', Industrial and Labour Relations Review Vol. 42 No. 6 pp. 
50-62. 
Walsh, D. (1994) On Different Planes: An Organizational Analysis of Co-operation 
and Conflict A inong Airline Unions ILR Press, Comell. 
Walsh, J. (1998) Chastened BA Lands Deal With Its Unions People Management 
Vol. 3 No. 19 September 25 pp. 11. 
Walton, R. and McKersie R. (1965) A Behavioural Theory of Labor Negotiations 
McGraw Hill, New York. 
Warhurst, R. (1995) 'Converging On HRMT Change and Continuity In European 
Airlines' Industrial Relations European Journal of Industlial Relations Vol. 1 (2) pp. 
259-274. 
Wass, V. (1994) 'Minimising and Managing Bias In a Mail Survey'in Wass, V. J. and 
Wells, P. E. Principles and Practice In Business and Management Research 
Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot. 
Wever, K. (1989) 'Towards a Structural Account of Union Participation in 
Management: The Case of Western Airlines' Industrial and Labour Relations Review 
Vol. 42 July pp. 600-609. 
Weyman-Jones, T. (1994) 'Deregulation' in Jackson, P. and Price, C. (eds. )
Privatisation and Regulation: A Review of The Issues, MacMillan, London. 
327 
White, P. R. (1995) 'Deregulation of Local Bus Services in Great Britain: An 
Introductory Review' Transport Reviews Vol. 15 (2) pp. 185-209. 
Wichman, A. (1994) 'Occupational Differences in Employee Share Ownership 
Programmes' Human Rekitions Vol. 47 (7) pp. 829-846. 
Willig, R. (1979) 'Mutiproduct Technology and Market Structure' American 
Economic Review, Vol. 69 (2) May, pp. 346-35 1. 
Wilson, G. (1993) Airport Dominance: A Case Study Approach To Competition 
Concentration and Policy. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis University of Illinois 1993. 
Windle, R. J. (1991) 'rhe World's Airlines: A Cost and Productivity Comparison' 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (25) (1) January, pp. 31-49. 
Wolf, S (1995) 'Challenges for labour and Management in the US Airline Industry' in 
Capelli, P (ed) (1995) Airline Labor Relations In Global Era: The New Frontier ILR 
Press Ithaca. 
Wright, M. (1992) 'How Well Does Privatisation Achieve Government Objectives? '
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Vol. 19 No. 3 1992 pp. 259-284. 
Yarrow, G. (1994) Trivatisation, Restructuring, and Regulatory Reform In Electricity 
Supply' in Bishop, M., Kay, J. and Mayer. Privatisation and Economic Per or nce fi ina 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Yin, RX (1994) Case Study Research Design and Methods (2nd edition) Applied 
Social Research Methods, Sage Publications, London. 
Youssef, W. A. H. (1992) Causes and Consequences of International Airline Equity 
Alliances. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis University of California At Berkeley 1992. 
328 
Interviews 





British Airways Management 23.01.1996 
British Airways Management 23.06.1996 
TGVv'U 06.02.1996 
TGWU 18.11.1996 
TGWU 11.09.1998 
TGWU 21.09.1998 
TGWU 08.10.1998 
329 
